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Abstract
For six years since 1984 Israel underwent a unique po litica l 
experience: i t  was ruled by national coalitions supported by more than 
75% of the members of parliament. Larger-than-minimal coalitions have 
always been problematic for traditional coalition theory. The Israeli 
case provides therefore an opportunity to examine the various actors' 
motivations and behaviour, as they re fle c t on coalition theory at 
1arge.
The assumption that actors are driven by "win maximization" is 
central to formal models of coalition theory. This assumption led to 
predictions of winning coalitions which are minimal in size, membership 
or ideological scope. Non-minimal coalitions were regarded as 
suboptimal choices, explainable on an ad hoc basis, e.g. national 
emergency.
A careful examination of Israe l's  "grand coalitions" suggests that 
"not losing" is at least as strong a motivation as "win maximization". 
This notion focuses on what actors stand to lose in case of fa ilu re , 
rather than on what they could win i f  a ll turns out w ell. I t  implies 
that actors would strive to be included in coalition, regardless of its  
size.
Coalition payoffs to be won or lost fa ll  into two categories - 
office payoffs, in terms of power, position, and resources, or 
ideology, in terms of shaping policy according to one's po litica l 
convictions. An important observation which pertains particularly  to 
polarized systems is that the desire to prevent a riva l ideology from 
prevailing forms a major part in actors' "not losing" considerations.
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While coalition po litics  takes place in the interparty arena, 
attention should be drawn to intraparty po litics  as w ell. I t  may happen 
that individual actors stand to lose a great deal by forming a minimal 
winning coalition, which would strengthen the positions of challengers 
for party leadership. In this case they may feel compelled to form 
larger coalitions, in order to reduce payoffs to th e ir in-house riva ls .
In a nutshell, i t  is suggested herein that i f  apparently 
suboptimal, larger-than-minimal coalitions are formed and maintained, 
i t  may be because actors are motivated by "not losing". When risks seem 
too great and uncertainty looms large, as is usually the case, "win 
maximization" cannot provide a satisfactory heuristic tool, unless 
supplemented by "loss minimization".
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Chapter One
Introduction
This dissertation describes the National Unity Governments which were 
formed in Israel following the 1984 and then the 1988 general 
elections, and ruled the country for almost six years. As a case study, 
th is unique experience w ill provide the backdrop for a theoretical 
analysis of coalition formation and maintenance. I t  w ill be shown that 
parties which have to choose between forming a minimal winning 
coalition and an oversized coalition may make the la t te r , suboptimal 
choice, although i t  clearly leads to loss of payoffs to themselves. How 
can we explain such a behaviour?
As a case in point, in 1988 Mr. Yitzhak Shamir, the leader of 
Is rae l's  Likud party, was able to form a narrow-based coalition between 
his party and several small religious and nationalist parties; this  
coalition would have included 65 out of 120 Knesset members, which 
would have met the "minimal winning" crite rion . All the various would- 
be partners have given firm indication of th e ir willingness to jo in in. 
In such a government, the Likud would have held a ll major portfolios. 
Nevertheless, halfway through the negotiations, Mr. Shamir turned to 
his chief riva ls , the Labour party which was the second largest in the 
House (a fte r the Likud), and invited them to jo in  his coalition , which 
eventually included 97 members. This dissertation w ill endeavour to 
provide an answer to a simple question: Why did he do that - and why 
did Labour consent?
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A national coalition, or indeed any larger-than-minimal coalition, 
seems to represent a suboptimal choice in that i t  goes against the 
grain of accepted coalition theory, according to which winning 
coalitions should be minimal (namely exclude numerically unnecessary 
partners). In other words, the existence of non-minimal coalitions 
questions the conventional assumption of coalition theory, which 
maintains that actors strive to form coalitions in order to maximize 
th e ir gains. I f  this is indeed the case, actors who form non-minimal 
coalitions apparently choose against th e ir own interests. However, this 
is only true as long as we assume that actors are solely motivated by 
"win maximization" considerations.
This assumption has dominated the thinking of coalition theorists, 
who were nevertheless faced with a need to explain the frequent 
occurrence, in real l i f e ,  of non-minimal coalitions in parliamentary 
democracies. This they did by devising numerous ad hoc explanations, 
a ll having to do with the specifics of given historical circumstances, 
none claiming general theoretical v a lid ity . Perhaps the most common 
among these extraneous factors relates to a situation of national 
emergency, which places high premium on the "politics of consensus". 
S t i l l ,  the question needs to be asked: can a ll historical cases in
which larger-than-minimal coalitions were formed be explained only on 
such "circumstantial" basis, or can there be another, general way of 
accounting for them on theoretical grounds?
I t  is our contention in this dissertation that coalition-forming 
actors should not be regarded exclusively as "win maximizers". They are 
also "not losers", that is , they tend to adopt defensive, risk-averting  
strategies in which gains may be lower, but they are also more certain. 
Such actors strive to be included in a winning coalition regardless of
-  10 -
the size of the payoffs they could expect to gain. What matters for 
them, f ir s t  and foremost, is to be included in coalition - almost any 
coalition.
Looking at parties as unitary actors, they may therefore form 
larger-than-minimal coalitions because they wish to participate in 
coalition in order not to lose, whenever a minimal coalition seems 
risky to form and maintain. Furthermore, looking at the behaviour of 
party leaders as decision-making individuals, they may form oversized 
coalitions for "not losing" considerations which involve intraparty  
motives. Faced with challenges to th e ir leadership position, they may 
invite  more parties to join in th e ir government, so as to reduce the 
stature of the ir in-party riva ls .
In a nutshell, the argument of this dissertation is that i f  seemingly 
suboptimal coalitions are formed and maintained, i t  may be because the 
actors' motivation is "not losing", rather than s tr ic t ly  "win 
maximization". They make suboptimal choices because they regard the 
optimal choices as too risky.
The Israe li Case
National Unity Governments (NUGs) cannot be regarded as an Israeli 
innovation, completely unprecedented in the annals of p o litica l 
history. Nevertheless, nearly a ll previous examples of such governments 
have had to do with a need for consensus po litics  in the face of dire 
cris is ; even Israel i ts e lf  had one such government, in 1967. What is 
intriguing about Israe l's  latter-day NUGs, however, is that they were
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formed as an answer to a parliamentary deadlock, rather than a national 
c ris is . In other words, i t  is precisely the lack of consensus, the neat 
s p lit  of the electorate between riva l blocs, which made Israe l's  
politic ians prefer the NUG solution to any other option. As such then, 
Is rae l's  national unity governments present a case worthy of study.
Furthermore, both the 1984 and the 1988 MUGs involved innovations 
such as a "no win - no lose" Inner Cabinet, or a Prime M inisterial 
Rotation. Thus, the coalition agreement made the government's modus 
operandi dependent on an ongoing interparty bargaining, contrary to 
conventional im plic it assumptions as though bargaining has to do with 
the formation, rather than maintenance phase, and may subsequently 
arise only in exceptional cris is  situations.
The Israe li po litica l deadlock which brought about both NUGs 
constituted a rare example in re a l- l i fe  for phenomena which can usually 
be studied only in simulations. This deadlock magnified the dilemmas 
faced by party leaders everywhere, except that in more run-of-the-m ill 
situations they are dealt with one at a time, or perhaps do not show up 
at a l l .  As i t  happened, this "house divided against its e lf"  brought out 
a ll the various problems a leader has to contend with - at one and the
same time. This experience therefore encapsulates most of the general
features of leadership behaviour in coalition po litics : dilemmas of 
what ought to be done vs. what re a lis tic a lly  can be done, as well as 
the d iff ic u lt ie s  associated with negotiations with other parties from a 
shaky position within one's own party.
All in a l l ,  then, this particular period in Is rae l's  history
provides po litica l science with an opportunity to look into coalition
processes under conditions of extreme constraints. Usually in science.
- 12 -
tests undertaken under extreme conditions yie ld  significant theoretical 
results. I t  is hoped that our case study w ill also prove useful to 
scholars.
Coalition Politics in Israel
For Israe l, the po litics  of coalition is the essence of the democratic 
system of government. To paraphrase D israe li's  statement, i t  may be 
said that "Israel loves coalitions". This reflects on some profound 
and general truth about the Jewish State. Israel is a p o litica l 
creation: i t  was created, and ever since ruled by p o litica l parties, or 
to be quite specific, by coalitions of p o litic a l parties. The Zionist 
movement, founded in 1897,* created during the f i r s t  half of the 20th 
century a Jewish community in Palestine, which became the state of 
Israel in 1948.** Ever since its  very inception, the Zionist movement's 
organizing principle has been party p o litic s , and never has there been 
a situation in which one party dominated a majority. Coalition po litics  
has been with the Jewish State even before i t  came into being.
Israel is , and has always been, a democracy under pressure. I t  has 
faced d iff ic u lt ie s  resulting from external threats to its  very 
existence, scarcity of resources, mass immigration and a fragmented 
society and po lity . "The more than four decades survival of Israe l's
*  On Zionism as an ideological, social and p o litic a l movement, see 
for instance Halpern, 1961; Laquer, 1972; V ita l, 1975.
* *  Probably the best account of the p o litic a l system of the Jewish 
community in Palestine is Horowitz and Lissak, 1977.
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democratic system of government, under intense external and internal 
pressures, has been fac ilita te d  by an effective regulation of 
unresolved conflicts within society" [Horowitz, 1990, p. 1]. In other 
words, coalition politics has been the adhesive force within the 
regime. I t  was through the employment of modes of conflic t regulation 
such as bargaining, compromise, pragmatism and consociationalism, that 
the Israe li body p o litic  has been able to survive.
The centra lity  of politics in Israel seems to be exceptional among 
democratic nations. The po litica l parties have always been the chief 
actors in social, economic and cultural a c tiv ity , elsewhere undertaken 
by the state or non-political organizations. Is rae l's  democracy is a 
system based on parties more than on formal institu tions. I t  is not 
surprising, then, that Israel was called the "oarteienstaat oar 
excellence": "When comparing the part played by the parties in Israel
with the part played by them in other countries, i t  w ill be found that 
they occupy a place more prominent and exercise an influence more 
pervasive than in any other state, with the sole exception of some one- 
party states" [Akzin, 1955, p. 509].
Not only was Israel always ruled by parties, i t  was ruled by 
coalitions of parties. Twelve general elections (to date) have never 
produced a clear winner in the shape of a single p o litic a l party or 
even an electoral bloc that won a majority of the seats in the Knesset, 
the Israe li legislature. A coalition government, not a one-party 
government, is the Israeli norm. Consequently, coalition po litics  has 
had a strong impact on the s ta b ility  of the p o litica l system. During 
the 1948-1977 period, when the Mapai/Labour party enjoyed po litica l 
dominance and was perceived as the natural party of government, 
coalition po litics of bargaining and negotiation was the major
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"po litica l game". As of the late 1970s, a fte r Israel was le f t  with no 
clearly dominant party, coalition po litics  has loomed even larger.
Interestingly, despite the crucial importance of coalition  
po litics  for the functioning of Is rae l's  p o litic a l system, very few 
studies on the subject have been conducted. Much more attention was 
given to research on individual parties, on electoral behaviour and on 
the characteristics of the party system as a whole. Perhaps one reason 
for this omission is the feeling that the Is rae li case is too unique 
for an adequate handling by any coalition model. De Swaan, for one, 
found Israel "a d if f ic u lt  country for the theories" [1973, p. 237], 
while Laver and Schofield claimed that "the Israe li party system is 
enough to bring tears to the eyes of the most stalwart coalition  
analyst" [1990, p. 230]. But perhaps, with a modification of coalition  
theory as suggested above, the case may become somewhat clearer.
Outline
The dissertation begins (Chapters Two and Three) with a review of 
coalition po litics  in Israel until 1984, in order to set subsequent 
developments in th e ir context, the better to understand the formation 
and existence of the national coalitions of the 1984-90 period. In 
analysing the changing patterns of coalition po litics  in Israe l, two 
d ifferen t periods can be identified - the year 1977 marking the 
watershed. Chapter Two deals with coalition po litics  in a period when 
Is rae l's  was a dominant party system, characterized by re la tive ly  
stable coalition governments. For 29 years, from 1948 to 1977,
Mapai/Labour controlled the business of government. During eight
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general elections, the electorate changed in size and composition and 
so did voting patterns and party structures, but p o litic a l power eroded 
only very gradually. Mapai/Labour endeavoured to reinforce its  
dominance by forming surplus coalitions and by employing modes of 
conflic t regulations, which had a moderating effect on competitiveness 
and polarization within the p o litica l system. F inally , however, its  
hegemony faded away.
Chapter Three describes coalition po litics  during the transition  
from a "unipolar system" to a "bipolar system". During the 1977-1984 
period, the party system saw the crysta llization  of two opposing party 
blocs - the right-of-centre Likud/Religious bloc and the le ft-o f-cen tre  
Labour bloc. Supported by small centre parties, the Likud formed a
number of re la tive ly  unstable narrow based governments. The weakness 
and division of the po litica l centre, coupled with major conflicts
between the Likud and Labour over fundamental issues, were gradually 
creating a pattern of bipolar coalition po litics  which was essentially  
an interparty competition over control of the system's frag ile  "pivotal 
position". Since the party system became disjointed right through the 
middle, there followed a period of destabilization which was a prelude 
to the formation of the national coalitions since 1984.
Having la id  part of the foundation, so to speak, we turn in 
Chapter Four to complement i t  by theory. There we relates the notion of
"not losing" to coalition models. A survey of the major coalition
theories shows that they a ll predict the formation of minimal winning 
coalitions - presumably because they a ll base on the premise that 
actors are solely motivated by "win maximization" considerations. The 
re la tive ly  poor predictive powers of these theories, as well as the 
frequent r e a l- l i fe  occurrence of non-minimal coalitions, seem to
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ju s tify  looking for additional heuristic tools. In this vein i t  is 
suggested to make use of the notion of "not losing", as explained 
above. A model based on the Israe li case of the 1984 and 1988 national 
coalitions is subsequently used to illu s tra te  the logic and importance 
of the po litics  of "not losing" in coalition behaviour.
Chapter Five returns us to re a lity  by focusing on the coalition  
bargaining which took place following the 1984 elections, producing a 
Labour-Likud p o litic a l deadlock. The strategies of the various actors 
involved are analysed, showing how, given the p o litic a l t ie ,  the 
opposing large parties as well as the smaller parties f i r s t  turned 
th e ir attention to setting up "blocking coalitions", and only 
subsequently came to the conclusion that they would rather share power 
in government than compete in repeat elections. Furthermore, Labour and 
the Likud opted for a multipary coalition instead of a two-party 
national executive. This chapter describes in detail the coalition  
agreement, uniquely based on prime m inisterial rotation and mutual veto 
arrangements, which put a stranglehold on the national unity 
government's modus operandi.
The following two chapters deal with the maintenance of the 1984 
NUG. This involved mainly efforts by Labour to swing the pivotal 
parties to its  side on fundamental issues (peace and te r r ito r ie s ) , as 
against the Likud's po litics  of status q u o . At the end of the day, 
despite a few Labour successes, status q uo won.
Chapter Six deals with the 1984-86 period, under the prime 
ministership of Labour's Mr. Shimon Peres. Despite the institu tional 
constraints on executive mechanisms, a high level of interparty  
bargaining, focusing on the tantalising prospect of rotation, enabled 
an effective decision-making on a number of issues. The Likud's Mr.
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Shamir, notwithstanding strong intraparty opposition to the NUG formula 
and its  policies, has had to calculate each step with a view to 
rotation.
Chapter Seven examines the 1986-88 period under the prime 
ministership of Mr. Shamir. I t  was characterized by a low level of 
interparty bargaining, so that the Likud's po litics  of status q u o  
prevailed. Labour's Mr. Peres attempted in vain to change the status 
QUO by pursuing the po litics  of early elections. Nevertheless, he 
stayed in the NUG, since the alternative could have been his party's 
relegation to opposition. Using the mechanism of the deadlocked Inner 
Cabinet, also prescribed in the coalition agreement, Mr. Shamir has 
been able to maintain his government on an even keel.
Chapter Eight deals with the formation and maintenance of the 
national coalition following the 1988 elections which resulted in a 
narrow victory for the Likud/Religious block over the Labour bloc. Mr. 
Shamir formed a non-rotational NUG in order not to be dependent both on 
extreme religious and nationalist parties and on his riva ls  within the 
Likud. However, his alliance with Labour's Mr. Yitzhak Rabin could not 
sustain the government formula for too long because Labour's Mr. Peres 
and Mr. Shamir's rivals within the Likud were determined to destroy 
this government. Eventually, Mr. Peres succeeded to bring down the 
government by t i l t in g  the balance of the coalition; however, he 
subsequently fa iled  to form a Labour government. In this way, the 
downfall of the national coalition led to the formation of a narrow- 
based Likud government.
Chapter Nine concludes the dissertation. Its  major findings are 
put together to show that the theoretical notion of "not losing" can be 
used as a tool to give a structure to the discussion of re a l- l i fe
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coalition po litics  in Israel. In trying to explain the empirical 
phenomenon of larger-than-minimal coalitions, the notion of "not 
losing" seems rather effective in its  a b ility  to explain the re a litie s  
of the Israe li national coalitions - not only the behaviour of parties 
and factions within them, but also that of individual party leaders. I t  
turns out that while "win maximization" may well re late to hopes and 
expectations, "not losing" can explain the compromises made in real- 
l i f e  situations. Therefore, this principle seems capable of making a 
meaningful contribution to coalition studies in general.
Sources
The source material used in this dissertation can be divided into three 
categories:
General studies on coalition theory. Much use was made here of the 
work done by Riker, Gamson, Leiserson, De Swaan, Dodd, Axelrod, Laver, 
Brams, Schofield, Shepsle, and others. Their books, artic les  and papers 
are included in the Bibliography. In October 1990, a conference on 
coalition theory was held at Rochester University to honour Riker's 
seventieth anniversary. There I had the opportunity of meeting some of 
these scholars and hearing th e ir views.
Case studies on d ifferen t individual countries. Here I related 
mainly to Austria, one of the few western democracies ruled by a "grand 
coalition" for any length of time, as well as other European countries. 
These works too are lis ted in the Bibliography. Also, I have had an 
opportunity to discuss Austrian po litics  at length with Prof. W. 
Mueller, when he visited Nuffield College in Oxford in 1990.
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Material relating to Is rae l. This, in turn may again be divided 
into two subcategories:
General. The number of studies published on Israe li p o litic s , both 
in English and Hebrew, is fa ir ly  large, although, as mentioned above, 
not much of i t  relates d irectly  to coalition p o litic s . Nevertheless, I 
have relied a great deal on the works of the la te  Prof. D. Horowitz, a 
distinguished scholar and a good friend, with whom I have had many 
enlightening conversations. Also helpful were the works of Arian, 
Diskin, Doron and others. These too are included in the Bibliography.
As for material relating specifically to the case-study period, 
the major source was the daily and weekly press, complemented by 
personal interviews with most of the individual actors involved. In 
Is rae l, as in most democracies, nothing stays hidden for long from the 
press. Hence, i t  should not come as a surprise that discussions herein 
of apparently secret meetings, deals and so on, appear without a source 
reference, to indicate that i t  has soon become common knowledge, to be 
found in the newspapers of the time. I t  may be stated quite defin ite ly  
that most goings-on are public domain, and have been so since they have 
taken place.
However, in order to gain insight into motivations, intentions and 
prospects, I have talked to many individuals who took an active part in 
Is rae li po litics  during the case study period, as well as some keen 
observers. Data obtained in such interviews are marked as such in the 
body of the text. In the Likud, I have talked to Ministers Sharon, 
Moda'i and Nissim (who was chief negotiator on behalf of Mr. Shamir 
during most of this period), as well as many others. I have also 
communicated with the late Mr. Begin, in w riting, and with Mr. Shamir 
through his personal aide, Mr. Achimeir.
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As for Labour, I have interviewed former President Navon, 
Ministers Peres, Rabin, and Shachal (chief negotiator for Mr. Peres), 
Speaker Mr. H il le l ,  Secretary-General of the Histadrut Mr. Kessar and 
others. Mr. Ya'acobi allowed me to read his p o litic a l diary. I was also 
given access to the Labour Party archives. The l is t  of interviewees 
also includes leaders of smaller parties, such as Mr. Weizmann, Prof. 
Rubinstein, Mr. Hurwitz and others.
Several p o litica l commentators have shared with me th e ir  views and 
insights, such as Mr. Crystal of Hadashot and Israel Radio and Mr. 
Shchori of Haaretz. I was also given access to the archives of Israel 
Radio. A fu ll l is t  of a ll interviewees and correspondents appears in 
Appendix D. I would like  to express here my gratitude to them a l l .
My superviser. Prof. Gordon Smith of LSE, has been patient, 
encouraging and enormously helpful. My gratitude to him is boundless.
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Chapter Two:
A Workers Party's Paradise 
Labour Party Dominance, 1948-1977
Minority or Majority?
P olitica l scientists' views concerning p o litic a l dominance in 
democratic regimes d iffe r  dram atically.* They seem however to agree 
that Israel has been for several decades a classic example of a 
dominant-party system, with one party, Mapai (subsequently Labour), 
ever acting as the central p i l la r  of the p o litica l regime. Deeply 
involved in the interaction between socioeconomic groups, elections and 
state power, this party won electoral p lu ra litie s  in one election after  
another for almost half a century, between 1930** and 1977. This 
predominance gave Mapai/Labour a sense of moral superiority, which was 
reflected by its  opponents' attitudes of almost preordained
*  E.g. Arian & Barnes: " It  is our contention that the dominant party 
system is sui generis" [Arian & Barnes, 1974, p. 592]; Compare 
Sartori, "the notion of dominant party establishes neither a class 
nor a type of party system" [S artori, 1976, p. 195].
* *  As noted in the Introduction, Is rae l's  p o litica l system actually 
antedates the State its e lf .
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in fe r io r ity . The "other” parties were ineffective, "reduced to the role 
of carping and sniping rather than that of developing immediate 
alternatives" [Arian & Barnes, 1974, p. 599].
Mapai/Labour's charismatic leadership, which in pre-independence 
times implemented an agenda of rapid development of the Jewish 
community in Palestine, was publicly identified  with the realization of 
the independent State of Israel. The party played the p o litic a l game 
quite s k il lfu lly , both to keep i ts e lf  in government and to expand its  
power base. Thus began a "virtuous circle" [Pemple, 1990, p. 16], which 
made i t  possible for Mapai/Labour to control government, even though i t  
always remained a minority party. The longevity and enduring s ta b ility  
of Mapai/Labour's dominance were, to a large extent, the outcome of 
successful strategies, alliances and coalition po litics : despite a ll
appearances to the contrary, i t  was not an historical in e v ita b ility .*
Israe l's  Party Svstem. 1948-1977
Israel elects its  single-chamber, 120-member parliament, the Knesset, 
on the basis of one of the most extreme version of the proportional- 
representation (P.R.) l is t  system, where the entire country is deemed 
as a single constituency. Inherited from pre-independence times (when 
individuals and groups participated in po litics  on a voluntary basis).
On the po litica l dominance of Mapai/Labour until 1977, see 
Etzioni, 1959, pp. 196-214; Medding, 1972; Arian, 1972, pp. 187- 
201; Aronoff, 1979, pp. 115-132; Shalev, 1990, pp. 83-127.
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this system assures almost any p o litica l group of representation in the 
Knesset.*
I t  should come as no surprise, therefore, that Is rae l's  electoral 
system has resulted in an inordinate number of parties (usually called 
"lis ts" in this context) joining election campaigns, with better-than- 
even chances of success. Even though party mergers and sp lits  have 
frequently occurred across the p o litica l spectrum, the overall level of 
fragmentation has remained rather stable. The electoral system 
accounted not only for repeated attempts by new lis ts  to capture seats 
in the leg islature, but also for a large variance in party s izes .**
The P.R. electoral system in Israel has created a situation  
characterized by a single dominant party facing a host of much smaller 
parties, in a system that displayed a high degree of ideological 
fragmentation, with a bilateral opposition. The fragmentation of the 
Is rae li party system during Mapai/Labour's era is described in Table 
2.1 on the next page.
Three characteristics of the party system in the 1948-1977 period 
emerge from this table: the numerical balance between the d ifferent
groupings has remained basically stable; electoral v o la t i l i ty  and party 
mergers and sp lits have chiefly occurred within, not across, 
p o litica l blocs; and the median position of the system has stayed 
within the le ft-o f-cen tre  Labour bloc.
*  For a discussion of the electoral system see Diskin, 1988, pp. 46- 
64. For its  historical origins, see Horowitz & Lissak, 1977, pp. 
52-54.
* *  For a fu ll account of the various parties represented in the 
Knesset, 1948-1990, see Appendix A.
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Table 2.1 Election Results: P o litica l Parties
(by a f f il ia t io n )
Parliamentary seats
Party/Year 1949 I95I 1955 1959 I96I 1965 1969 1973
Left-of-centre
Communist 4 5 6 3 5 4 4 5
Mapam 19 15 9 9 9 8
A. Ha'avoda 10 7 8
Mapai 46 45 40 47 42 45 56 51
Rafi 10
CRM 3
State List 4
Riaht-of-centre
Free centre 2
Herut 14 8 15 17 17 26 26 39
Gen. Zion. 7 20 13 8 17
Progress. 5 4 5 6 5 4 4
Reliaious
NRP 16 10 I I 12 12 I I 12 10
Aguda 5 6 6 6 6 6 5
Other 9 8 5 5 4 5 6 3
Source: Israel Government Yearbooks for the resoective vears.
Mapai/Labour has exploited this fragmented, fractionalized and 
polarized party system in a most effective way, as far as coalition  
po litics  was concerned. I t  has la id  out the rules of the coalition game 
and defined the bargaining structure. Quite simply, the dominant party 
determined who may join in the game and who is to be le f t  out. This 
kind of power is usually associated with parties which enjoy an 
electoral, or at least a parliamentary majority. Yet in Israe l, one 
minority party seemed to enjoy majority status; Mapai/Labour's 
p o litica l strength has resembled the power of a governing party in a 
two-party system, rather than a p lu ra lity  party in a multiparty system.
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The Numbers Game: The Onlv Game in Town
Several factors account for Mapai/Labour's p o litic a l dominance, two of 
which prove central to coalition p o litics : size and ideological
cen tra lity , which together determine a party's pivotal position in the 
system.*
Naturally, a dominant party must demonstrate real strength at the 
grassroot level, , must prove an a b ility  to mobilize again and 
again a significant number of socioeconomic groups. Despite great 
social, economic, demographic and cultural changes which took place 
during the 1948-1977 period, vastly affecting the electorate, 
Mapai/Labour has enjoyed large and re la tive ly  steady support from 
various sectors of the public. At the grassroot leve l, the strength of 
Mapai/Labour was manifest by its  a b ility  to secure one-third or more of 
the popular vote in a ll the eight general elections between 1949 and 
1973, ranging from 32.2 percent (in 1955) to 46.2 percent (in 1969).
The very size of Mapai/Labour's share of the vote has guaranteed 
its  control over sizeable public resources, which were then distributed  
according to a "party key" method [Galnoor, 1985, pp. 173-6]. This 
method bases the distribution of resources upon the existing power
Strong leadership was certainly an important factor in Mapai's 
dominance. In fact, Mr. David Ben-Gurion's charismatic personality 
overshadowed the leaders of a ll other parties (Mr. Menachem Begin, 
the leader of Herut who became Prime Minister in 1977, proved an 
effective and charismatic figure only a fter Mr. Ben-Gurion had 
le f t  the scene). Yet another contributing factor was Mapai's 
control of important po litica l subsystems: the powerful trade
union movement, the Jewish Agency and many local authorities.
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relations, which process in turn affects future power relations. In
addition to making this kind of use of public resources, the party also 
developed an elaborated patronage system, thus making its e lf ,  for many 
social and cultural groups, "their own" party [Shapiro, 1980, pp. 28- 
31]. Integrative in nature, Mapai/Labour has maintained its  ongoing 
a c tiv ity  on a high level which has enabled i t  to mobilize large cadres
for the real test - election time.
In parliament, a dominant party has to win the largest number of 
seats; i t  should become the "number one" party, while its  main rivals  
should qualify merely as "also rans". Mapai/Labour's dominance in
parliament has always been clear-cut. Not only was the party the
largest Knesset's group: i t  has always been bigger than a combination
of any other two parties. Mapai/Labour's vast margin of p lu ra lity  is
clearly indicated in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2 Maoai/Labour vs. the second largest l i s t .  1949 - 1973
Seats in the Knesset
Party/Year 1949 1951 1955 1959 1961 1965 1969 1973
Mapai 46 45 40 47 42 45 56 51
Mapam 19
Gen.Zionist 20
Herut 15 17 17 26 26 39
Note: In 1965, Mapai and Achdut Ha'avoda formed the Labour Alignment; 
in 1969 and 1973, the Israel Labour party (Mapai, Achdut Ha'avoda and 
Rafi) was a llied  with Mapam. Herut and Liberals joined in the Gahal 
bloc in 1965 and 1969; in 1973 they created (with several smaller 
groups) the Likud bloc.
Source: Israel Government Yearbooks for the respective years
- 27 -
The vast gap between the dominant and the second largest party has 
had strong impact on coalition p o litics . Essentially, the po litica l 
bargaining structure in Israel has been defined by a single pole - the 
dominant party. In Ita ly , for example, the dominant Christian
Democratic party has had to take into account in its  coalition po litics
the existence of another pole - the powerful Ita lia n  Communist party. 
Thus, while both Israel and Ita ly  have had dominant party systems, in 
terms of coalition p o litics , Israel (during the period discussed in 
this chapter) may be called a "unipolar system", whereas Ita ly  was (and 
s t i l l  is) a "multipolar system" [Laver & Scofield, 1990, pp. 114-6]. In 
th is context, i t  is interesting to note that the "soft" hegemonial 
system in Ita ly  has proven more enduring than the "strong" Israe li 
dominated system [Tarrow, 1990, pp. 306-332].
Mapai/Labour being by far the largest parliamentary party, its  
leader has always become the "formateur", the person appointed by the
President to form the next government: the party has thus been the
"core" to any executive coalition, dominating the bargaining 
structure.* In a ll its  coalitions, i t  has had a majority in both 
cabinet portfolios and parliamentary support. Being in fact a minority 
party yet enjoying a "majority within the majority" situation, 
Mapai/Labour achieved "dictatoria l" powers within the p o litica l system 
as a whole [Herman & Pope, 1973, p. 192].
In this way came into being a concentric decision-making process: 
decisions were f ir s t  made by the top leadership of the dominant party.
*  On the bargaining advantages of being a coalition leader, see 
Austin-Smith & Banks, 1988, pp. 405-422.
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thus becoming o ffic ia l party policies. These moved on to the executive 
coalition in which the dominant party had a majority, and fin a lly  were 
adopted by the Knesset, where the coalition had a majority. This 
decision making system is outlined in chart 2.1.
Chart 2.1 Concentric Circles
I M a p a l\vv
Labour
Coalition
Knesset
Source: Gutmann, 1961, p. 18.
Political dominance, of course, is not just a matter of numbers as 
such, but also a matter of political perceptions. "A dominated system 
is one in which party leaders assume that no majority government is 
possible in the foreseeable future that excludes a particular party" 
[Luebbert, 1986, p. 72]. Mapai/Labour has been taken for granted as the
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natural leading party by most actors in the p o litic a l arena. 
"Consequently, other parties as well accommodated themselves to this  
state of a ffa irs , aiming to become junior partners in government or, as 
the leader of one such party once put i t ,  to be a 'corrective ' rather 
than an 'a lte rn a tive '"  [Horowitz, 1977, p. 4 ]. In other words, Mapai's 
"core" position has had considerable impact on the p o litic a l behaviour 
of other parties. The recognition of the in feas ib lity  of ousting Mapai 
from government in the foreseeable future has set centripetal forces in 
operation throughout the party system. The creation of alliances and 
mergers between parties was, among other things, aimed at nearing the 
"core" c irc le .
In the le ft-o f-cen tre  bloc, the centripetal processes started in 
the 1960's, following the retirement of Mapai's leader Mr. Ben-Gurion 
and the struggle over his p o litica l heritage. In 1965 Mapai created an 
Alignment with Achdut Ha'avoda, and in 1968 Mapai, Achdut Ha'avoda and 
Rafi formed the Labour party. In 1969 the Labour party set up an 
Alignment with Mapam. At the same time, centripetal moves began within 
the religious bloc, where most constituent parties were nearing the 
inner c irc le  through participation in coalition governments. Even the 
right-wing Herut party was constrained to cooperate to some extent with 
Mapai - f i r s t  in the World Zionist Organization, subsequently in the 
trade union movement, the Histadrut, and f in a lly  in the 1967 national 
coalition.
At the same time, centrifugal forces were also in operation within 
the party system during Mapai/Labour's dominant era. The rationale  
behind such moves was to capture bargaining positions in preparation 
for possible coalition alternatives which had not previously existed. 
For example, the defection of Rafi (a right-wing faction within Mapai)
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from the party in 1965 was a move out of the inner c irc le , aimed at 
creating new coalition p o ss ib ilit ie s .*  The ultra-orthodox parties also 
withdrew from coalition participation and waited for new opportunities. 
The centrifugal moves intensified with the creation of the Likud in 
1973, in which elements previously belonging to the le ft-o f-c en tre  bloc 
were included.
In the 1973 elections, for the f i r s t  time in decades, the 
dominance of Mapai/Labour showed signs of weakness. The number of votes 
gained by Labour in 1973, 621,183, was only one-third higher than the 
Likud's vote - 473,309. Moreover, the number of votes attracted by the 
two largest parties has risen, again for the f i r s t  time, to about 70 
percent. These developments were indicative of future changes in the 
party system that were to occur in 1977 [Arian, 1975, pp. 287-304].
Where the Action Is
Unless a party controls a majority in parliament, its  size does not 
necessarily determine p o litica l dominance in and of i ts e lf .  " I f  we 
ignore policy motivations en tire ly , then even a party with 49 per cent 
of the seats is not dominant i f  i t  faces several other parties which
Rafi's schism actually s p lit the "nucleus" of the dominant party 
system - Mapai's top leadership - and caused an irreparable 
damage. All the attempts to restore a new "core" within the 
framework of the Labour party were only p a rt ia lly  successful. 
Since Rafi's breakaway, things have never been the same [Johnston, 
1967, pp. 288-307; Yanai, 1969].
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hold 51 per cent of the seats between them. There is nothing to prevent 
the other parties from ganging up and keeping the dominant party out of 
office on a more or less permanent basis. Once we take policy into
consideration, however... certain parties at the 'centre' of the policy 
system can prove very d if f ic u lt  indeed to keep out of office" [Laver & 
Schofield, 1990, p. 86].
Indeed, i t  seems that a dominant party does not necessarily enjoy 
a favourable bargaining position in parliament. Its  location on the 
parliamentary map must be central enough for i t  successfully to
negotiate with other parties in the process of coalition forming. The
"core" position of the party, in addition to its  size, quite excludes
the possib ility  of forming a government without i t .  "There is an
important distinction to be made... between systems in which the
dominant party is located at the median position and those in which i t  
is in an off-centre position, away from the median" [Laver & Schofield,
1990, p. 114]. The median is a good position to be in for coalition
partic ipation .*
Theoretically, a potentially dominant party may or may not be 
located in the po litica l centre. I f  placed in an off-centre position, 
however, i t  certainly has a strong motivation to move towards the 
centre. The logic of the development of p o litic a l dominance suggests 
that in the long run, any dominant party is eminently pragmatic, i f  not
There are some exceptions to this rule, e.g. the Fianna Gail party 
in Ireland: Despite being a dominant party in the median position, 
i t  was not included in a number of coalitions. The Independent 
party in Iceland is an off-centre dominant party that took part in 
most coalitions. Such situations usually develop when other issues 
overshadow the le f t  vs. right dichotomy [Budge & Keman, 1990, pp. 
192-3].
- 32 -
opportunistic, its  main goal being to remain "near the centre where the 
action is ."  This is because "its  orientation towards power encourages 
i t  to move with long term shifts in public opinion regardless of its  
ideology... Any dominant party is , or w ill become, a centre party"
[Arian & Barnes, 1974, 595-9]. In other words, dominant parties
inevitably maintain flex ib le  centrist governing formulae, les t they 
lose th e ir dominance sooner or la te r . I t  is not easy to determine, 
however, whether the dominant party simply moves to the p o litica l 
centre, or perhaps i t  defines and shapes the p o litica l centre through 
its  dominance. Probably both are true.
I t  seems, therefore, that any dominant party has strong incentives
to move away from an ideologically cohesive but narrowly based set of
policies or grassroot support in order to become a "catchall party" 
[Kirchheimer, 1966]. Consequently, i f  exclusivity may be important in 
the early stages of dominance, inclusiv ity  tends to become the 
watchword for the successful dominant party further on. This rationale  
has guided Mapai/Labour throughout the development of its  p o litica l 
dominance [Shapiro, 1976]. The party started out in pre-independence 
times as the major force of the Jewish le f t ,  being tru ly  a non-marxist, 
socialist party, adhering to a combined Socialist-Z ionist programme. 
Since independence in 1948, the party has proven more fle x ib le , 
becoming a social-democratic party and enjoying good relationships with 
bourgeois parties and the private sector. F inally , while nominally a 
social-democratic party, Mapai/Labour has developed a substantial 
interclass social base and behaved as a typical centre party in order 
to maintain its  p o litica l dominance. "Mapai's success was due not only 
to its  dominant position in Israe li cabinets, but also to its  gradual 
sh ift to the centre. As a result. Labour's issue preferences often
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represented the ideological centre of the various coalitions" 
[S e lik ta r, 1982, p. 309].
Mapai/Labour has been a centre party in the sense of representing 
the widest possible consensus. I t  has been the party of consensus 
simply because of its  being the biggest and most heterogeneous party in 
Is rae l, drawing support from nearly a ll segments of society. This 
heterogeneity seems to suggest a degree of overlapping between its  
ideological positions and those of other parties, which has fa c ilita te d  
the mergers that formed the Labour party and the Alignment between 
Labour and Mapam. Indeed, there has been a wide gap between the 
positions of the "hawkish" Rafi and Achdut Ha'avoda and the "dovish" 
Mapam on foreign and defense issues - but each had partners within the 
ranks of Mapai its e lf  [B eilin , 1985].
Mapai/Labour's positions vis-a-vis the three major ideological and 
social cleavages in Israe li society have indeed reflected its  "middle- 
of-the-road" attitude: the Arab-Israeli co n flic t, involving mainly
"dovish" and "hawkish" views about the future of the te rrito rie s  
occupied since 1967; the religious issues, relating to the position of 
Halacha (Divine Law) in a secular Jewish State; and the le ft-r ig h t  
division regarding desired society and economy goals [Etzioni-Halevy & 
Shapiro, 1977].
Placed at the centre of these cleavages and thus tending to 
emphasize the pragmatical, rather than the fundamental aspects of 
policy issues, Mapai/Labour has found i t  not too d if f ic u lt  to cooperate 
with various parties. In particular, the selection of potential 
coalition partners has had to do with the existence of cross-cutting 
ideological axes, i .e . ,  the possib ility  of d iffe ren t parties finding 
themselves in sim ilar positions on certain issues while at odds on
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other issues. This feature of the Is rae li party system accounts for a 
considerable degree of po litica l moderation. The level of controversy 
on each issue notwithstanding, no extreme polarization has developed as 
yet in Israel to any alarming extent.
Trad itionally, Mapai/Labour has been a moderate party, capable of 
accomodating a variety of views. Being the most p lu ra lis tic  of a ll 
Is rae li parties has been a great help on the interparty leve l, without 
damaging i t  in ternally . Normally, ties  with many diverse groups and 
interests tend to create factionalism and make i t  d if f ic u lt  to maintain 
party cohesion. However, this situation is tolerable because b ilatera l 
opposition, within the context of a P.R. system and multipartism, 
allows divisions within the dominant party to be papered over at 
election time, preventing zero-sum factional fights . The electoral 
system, of course, frees the party from the need to garner 50 percent 
plus one vote in order to govern.
In this respect, Mapai/Labour was less compelled to d ilu te  its  own 
programme, to alienate its  core of support, or to choose among its  
competing tendencies. At the same time, however, the overlapping 
between Mapai/Labour's policies and the ideological positions of 
parties in each of the three p o litica l blocs - le f t ,  centre-right and 
religious - fa c ilita te d  interparty cooperation. Actually, the party has 
actively been involved in a partial incorporation of policies and 
interests that were trad itio n a lly  represented by its  b ila tera l 
opposition. This has stressed the party's image of cen tra lity , 
fa c ilita te d  its  role as a regulator of p o litica l conflicts and, of 
course, reinforced its  po litica l dominance.
In order to assess the fu ll impact of Mapai/Labour's cen tra lity , 
one ought to examine more closely the Is rae li p o litica l party map. In
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general, a "party map" relates to the way p o litic a l parties are 
organized along a continuum or in space, according to th e ir ideological 
dispositions, reflected as distances from an arbitrary p o litica l 
"core". The combination of each party's distance from other parties, 
including the po litica l "core", and its  re la tive  power, creates a 
linkage between the "party map" and the composition of government.
As noted above, Israe li parties are involved in three major 
ideological confrontations; socioeconomic ( le ft - r ig h t)  issues, foreign 
and defense policy issues and religious issues. The f i r s t  two 
categories happen to overlap, and could be accommodated on the le f t - to -  
right scale. However, the weakness of a unidimensional ideological 
continuum, in the Israeli context, is that i t  can hardly accommodate 
religious issues. In other words, not a ll parties can properly be 
located on the le ft-to -r ig h t scale, particu larly  the religious parties, 
which in most ways are typical centre parties, with fle x ib le  policy 
positions on many issues. When i t  comes to religious issues, however, 
they should be placed at the extreme end of the ideological scale. 
Consequently, a second policy dimension must be introduced in order to 
provide for a more meaningful party map.*
The following charts represent the policy positions of Israeli 
parties on uni- and bi-dimensional scales.
The "objective" problem of placing the religious parties on the 
le ft - to -r ig h t continuum has occasionally resulted in their  
omission from discussion and presentation. On problems concerning 
the Israe li le f t-r ig h t scaling see Diskin, 1976, 1980 and 1988;
Shamir, 1986, pp. 267-296.
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Chart 2.2 Parties along the Left-to Right Ideological Continuum
(1949-1977)
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Source: Lissak & Horowitz, 1979, p. 310.
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Both charts suggest that the closer the location of a certain 
party to the po litica l "core”, the higher its  likelihood of 
participating in government. The bi-dimensional party map cannot te ll  
which dimension is more relevant at any given time during coalition  
formation. I t  does show, however, that Mapai/Labour has had to go quite 
a long way towards a compromise with the religious parties, in order to 
win th e ir cooperation at the executive leve l.
Weight and Counter-Weights
An election campaign in a multiparty system is , among other things, a 
p o litic a l struggle for a pivotal position in the subsequent formation 
of the next government. The a b ility  to capture such a position is 
rarely contingent upon the sentiments of the majority of the 
electorate; far more often, i t  is at least p a rtia lly  a product of the 
rules of the electoral game [Remy, 1975, pp. 293-301]. A specific party 
may find i ts e lf  in a pivotal position, on the le f t -r ig h t  scale, i f  the 
parties to its  right and the parties to its  le f t  do not possess a 
parliamentary majority or i f  (which is more usual) th e ir combined 
majority does not have the makings of a coalition government. The
a b ility  to "pivot" with less than an outright majority of the seats in
parliament is quite essential in situations of ideological po larity . 
"The only way [a pivotal party] could be beaten by a vote on an issue 
located on the le ft-r ig h t dimension would be as a result of an unholy 
alliance of right and le f t .  Furthermore, even i f  th is had happened, i t
is very lik e ly  that this alliance would have been forced to agree upon
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a policy position very close to that of the [pivotal party]" [Laver & 
Schofield, 1990, p. 112].
In the Is rae li dominated system, the operational distinction  
between " le ft"  and "right" was the impossibility of forming any 
coalition between parties to the le f t  of Mapai/Labour and to its  right, 
for ideological reasons, even though they have had a parliamentary 
majority between them. Mapai/Labour's pivotal position has been based, 
then, not only on its  size but also on its  location at the centre of 
the ideological spectrum. The bloc of parties to the right of 
Mapai/Labour was the larger, but even so had l i t t l e  chance of forming a 
coalition, since even with the support of the religious parties, i t  did 
not have a majority in the Knesset. Mapai/Labour was "a uniquely 
essential proto-coalition", precisely because i t  was impossible to form 
a coalition without i t  [Riker, 1962, p. 130].
The party has retained its  pivotal position in each of the eight 
general election in the 1949-1973 period. In 1961, its  p o litica l 
dominance was tested for the f i r s t  time. Deeply divided from within and 
b itte r ly  attacked from without because of the "Lavon A ffa ir" [Yanai, 
1981, 43-44 et passim.1. Mapai had to cope with a merger between the 
General Zionist and the Progressive parties which formed the Liberal 
party, a real centre-right challenge to its  hegemony. As i t  happened, 
Mapai lost five seats in the Knesset, the Liberal party gained three, 
but the overall picture has not changed dramatically. Although 
weakened, Mapai s t i l l  held the pivotal position. Following the 
elections, the Liberal party led the "Club of Four" (which included 
parties from both right and le f t ) ,  which tried  to face Mapai en bloc in 
the coalition negotiations [Diskin, 1988, p. 31]. Mr. Levi Eshkol, 
Mapai's second-in-command, took charge of the negotiations and
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eventually succeeded in dismantling th is unholy alliance and formed a 
le ft-o f-cen tre  coalition government. The fa ilu re  of the "Club of Four" 
proved that a coalition of le f t  and right parties without Mapai was not 
a p o lit ic a lly  viable alternative.
In the 1965 election, the prospects of changing the pivotal party 
looked more promising, and the composition of the next coalition  
appeared to be in doubt. Thus, i t  was the f i r s t  "c ritica l election" in 
Israel [Key, 1955, p. 4 ]. For the f i r s t  time a strong right-wing 
p o litic a l bloc, Gahal (composed of the General Zionist and Herut 
parties), was formed to fight Mapai head-on. No less significant was 
the attempt by the secessionist Rafi l is t  (previously a right-wing 
faction of Mapai, led by Messrs. Ben-Gurion, Moshe Dayan and Shimon 
Peres) to capture the pivotal position for i ts e lf .  However, election 
results showed once again that the parties to the right of Mapai, 
including Gahal, Rafi, and the religious parties, could not achieve a 
parliamentary majority. Rafi learned the lesson and re-merged with 
Mapai to form the Labour party following the Six Day War.
The 1969 election was not b itte r ly  contested, due to the existence
of a national coalition since 1967. However, a very serious challenge 
to dislodge the Labour party from its  pivotal position was made in the 
1973 election. The traumatic events of the Yom Kippur War provided the 
background for the electoral fight between Labour and its  riva l from 
the righ t, the Likud, resulting in the right-of-centre bloc gaining 
strength vis-a-vis the le ft-o f-cen tre  bloc. The move to the right was 
not lim ited to the electorate. In 1973, the State List (which
originated in the Labour party) joined the Likud. These significant
developments were not, as yet, strong enough to topple Labour from its  
dominant status, shaky as i t  may have become. S t i l l ,  i t  was clear that
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the party's p o litica l dominance was nearing its  end [Galnoor, 1980, pp. 
119-148].
In the 1977 election. Labour lost both its  status as the largest 
party and its  position as the pivotal party. Prior to the election, i t  
was believed that the Democratic Movement for Change (DMC), a new 
centre party, might capture the median position in the system. As i t  
happened, the sh ift to the right was so strong that a coalition of the 
right-wing and the religious parties, without the centrist DMC, was 
possible. In the past, centre parties (such as the Liberal party in 
1961 or Rafi in 1965) fa iled  to "pivot" because, between them and the 
right-wing and religious parties, they did not have a parliamentary 
majority. In 1977, the right-wing and religious parties simply were not 
dependent any more on the centre to form a government. The DMC was 
cordially offered (and grudgingly accepted) an invitation to jo in  the 
right-of-centre coalition, but i t  had no real bargaining power. In a 
matter of a few years, the DMC has v ir tu a lly  vanished from the 
p o litic a l scene [Rubinstein, 1982].
In conclusion, Mapai/Labour's p o litica l dominance from 1948 to 
1977 was not an accident or a matter of a few sporadic successes on 
election day. The party has been the strong pivotal actor in the 
p o litica l system, due to its  numerical strength and moderate 
ideological posture. Mapai/Labour, an electoral and parliamentary 
minority, has achieved a majority status at the governmental level and 
behaved as a fu lly  established majority party. In the Is rae li dominated 
system, coalition po litics did not determine who w ill govern the 
country, but rather who w ill be the junior partners of the dominant 
Mapai/Labour party.
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Surplus Coalitions
The Coalition Actors
At any given time, i t  is not very easy to determine the unit of 
analysis used to define coalition actors [Budge & Keman, 1990, pp. 39- 
43]. The conventional assumption that only p o litic a l parties play the 
coalition game seems too sim plistic, since quite often these do not 
behave as unitary actors. Actually, a single coalition situation tends 
simultaneously to involve d ifferen t types of nonpartisan actors as 
well: factions, p o litica l blocs and individual members of parliament - 
a ll of whom try  to influence the formation and the maintenance of the 
national executive.
This has certainly been the case in the Is rae li dominated system. 
Participating in the coalition game were self-serving party leaders, 
factions and breakaway parties, well-established parties, p o litica l 
blocs (proto-coalitions) and various extra-parliamentary p o litica l 
bodies: the powerful trade union movement, other pressure groups, the 
media and other actors. Even i f  lim ited exclusively to p o litic a l groups 
within parliament, the nature of Israe li coalition actors does not 
become much clearer, changing as i t  did over time and overshadowed by 
the presence of a dominant party within the framework of an extreme 
version of the P.R. system. As already noted, the existence of a single 
pole, the central p lu ra lity  party, has tended to in it ia te  centripetal 
and centrifugal moves, usually associated with party alliances, 
mergers, and sp lits , by "other" parties trying to influence or else
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replace the party at the p o litica l "core". Not one Is rae li party has 
been le f t  unmarked by this kind of experience, which accounts for the 
extremely large number of participants in the coalition game.
Nevertheless, two major types of coalition actors can be 
identified  in the dominated system: from 1948 to the mid-1960's,
individual parties were the chief players in the coalition game, 
whereas from the mid-1960's on, blocs of parties organized along 
ideological lines dominated the scene. In each bloc, however, there has 
been a leading party which has dominated coalition strategies: Mapai 
was the leading party in the Labour bloc, while Herut dominated the 
Likud bloc. The leaders of these parties were simultaneously the heads 
of the proto coalitions.
The actors in the coalition games leading to the governments 
formed by Mapai/Labour fa ll  into three categories: F irs t, "pariah" 
parties, excluded a priori from participation in government. This has 
been the case of the Israe li Communist party, regarded (not only by 
Mapai/Labour but also by a ll other Israe li parties) as lying outside 
the "Zionist consensus". The Communists never participated in any 
executive coalition, not even in national coalition of 1967. Another 
"excluded" party, at least until the Six Day War, was the right-wing 
Herut, the mainstay of opposition. Mapai and Herut shared traditional 
h o s tility  since pre-independence times, and have not had much in 
common, policy-wise, afterwards. Viewing Herut as its  most dangerous 
r iv a l, Mapai has gone to a lo t of trouble in order to ascertain that no 
p o litic a l power come its  way [Levite & Tarrow, 1983, pp. 301-3].
The exclusion of the extreme parties from potential participation  
in government has been, of course, a smart coalition strategy which 
served to increase Mapai/Labour's po litica l dominance well above
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whatever was warranted by its  electoral and parliamentary achievements. 
In very much the same way, the Christian Democratic party in Ita ly  
excluded the Communist party from office on ideological grounds, which 
policy also happened to improve its  pivotal position in a ll the post­
war coalitions. "Centre parties, often in a pivotal position in the 
coalition system, like  to portray th e ir p o litica l r iva ls  as members of 
some lunatic fringe, typ ica lly  alleging an obsession with extreme 
policies and thereby attempting to marginalize them from the p o litica l 
process" [Laver & Schofield, 1990, p. 47].
The second category of actors has included "occasional partners": 
parties that have had coalition potential, yet participated in 
government mainly when the needs of the dominant party required i t .  The 
ultra-orthodox Adugat Israe l, which cooperated with Mapai for only 
three years in almost three decades, is a case in point. An ongoing 
partnership between the two parties was quite d i f f ic u lt ,  due to the 
vast gap separating them on the religious-secular scale. Also the 
Liberals (formerly the General Zionist party), Poalei Adugat Israel and 
Mapam, each belonging to a d ifferen t p o litica l bloc, have alternated 
between government and opposition. In general, whenever these parties 
gained in electoral support, and more so when th e ir policy positions 
became popular, Mapai/Labour tended to include them in the coalition. 
To this extent, the public was allowed a modest influence over the 
p o litica l agenda of a government, the "core" of which has remained 
constant.
The th ird category of actors were the parties which constituted 
the "regulars" of the coalition governments in the 1948-1977 period. 
First and foremost among them was Achdut Ha'avoda, which has joined 
with Mapai in coalition for twenty two years, until the two parties
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formalized th e ir alliance and fin a lly  merged. In addition, two smaller 
parties, each belonging to a d ifferen t p o litic a l bloc, were included in 
this category: the National Religious Party (NRP) and the Independent
Liberal Party ( IIP , formerly the Progressive party). Both the NRP and 
the ILP have joined in coalition with Mapai/Labour for over twenty 
years.
In this "core" group, the ILP was the junior partner which
probably preferred participation in government - for v is ib i l i ty ,  some
jobs for party activ is ts , an opportunity to influence legislation and 
fear of electoral extinction. Mapai/Labour's interest to include this  
small centre party in coalition was to offset the influence of the 
le f t is t  Mapam and Achdut Ha'avoda. Most important for the dominant 
party, however, was to cooperate with the ILP, an "unnecessary" actor 
(save the 1974 coalition ), for preventing the crysta llization  of a 
riva l centre which, bringing together religious and right-wing parties,
might challenge its  pivotal position, i f  not oust i t  from power
altogether [Mahler & T r illin g , 1975, p. 216].
A po litica l onslaught from the right has always been Mapai's 
nightmare. In retrospect, i t  is tempting to speculate on the possible 
outcome of a move by Mapai, in the early 1960's, to cooperate with both 
constituents of the Liberal party, the Progressives and the General 
Zionists, rather than with the le f t is t  parties. This might have put the 
entire party system on a d ifferen t course, quite the better one for 
Mapai. As i t  happened, having been le f t  out of the 1961 coalition  
government, the General Zionists looked for a p o litic a l alternative and 
found i t  in Herut. Thus were formed Gahal in 1965 and the Likud in 
1973, and the stage was set for the termination of Mapai/Labour's 
p o litic a l dominance in 1977.
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Be this as i t  may, the real inner "core" of coalition po litics  in 
the dominant party system was the "historic alliance" between Mapai and 
the NRP. For size and policy considerations, Mapai needed at least one 
medium-size coalition partner, a permanent and stable one near the 
p o litic a l centre. Up to 1967, the NRP was an ideal coalition partner 
since its  policies were sim ilar to those of Mapai's, save on religious  
issues. Finding a common ground and maintaining a status q u o  on 
religious matters in the framework of a coalition seemed best for both 
parties. For Mapai/Labour, minor concessions on religious issues were 
exchanged for support on other major policies. As for the NRP, i t  could 
always argue that whatever concessions attained would not have been 
possible at a l l ,  had i t  stayed out of coalition altogether.
The sh ift of the NRP from centre to right on national issues, 
following the 1967 war, brought uneasiness to its  relationship with 
Mapai/Labour. S t i l l ,  both parties avoided confrontation by formulating 
increasingly vague programmes on foreign and defense policy. This 
helped maintain an overall coalition framework, but could not prevent 
repeated cabinet crises and breakdowns. All in a l l ,  " [th is ] marriage is 
one of convenience, not one based on harmony" [Don-Yehiya, 1975, p. 
258].
Coalition Membership
Mapai/Labour has formed an uninterrupted series of seventeen coalition  
governments during the tenure of eight parliaments. As required by law, 
those governments were each presented to the Knesset, won a vote of 
confidence and assumed o ffice . There have been many changes in the
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party composition of these coalitions, however, with quite a few 
parties and individual Members of Knesset (MKs) going in and out during 
each government's term of office (the picture in its  entirety is 
presented in Table 2.3 on the next page). Thus, the 8th coalition saw 
the National Religious Party quit over the "Who is a Jew?" issue* in 
1958, but this withdrawal did not force the downfall of the government, 
which carried on until the elections to the 4th parliament. The 13th 
coalition became a national unity government on the eve of the Six Day 
war in June 1967, when joined by Rafi and Gahal. During the 15th
coalition, Gahal le f t  in August 1970, when the government decided to
accept an American peace in it ia t iv e , the Rogers Plan. The 17th 
coalition was formed without the NRP, which joined in la te r only to 
withdraw again, in December 1976, from the last of Mapai/Labour's 
governments.
Coalition membership seems to have had l i t t l e  to do with 
ideological a ff in ity . Never was there a coalition based on any one bloc
of parties, and most coalitions actually included parties from each of
the three main p o litica l blocs. Curiously, already in the f i r s t  Knesset 
Mapai and Mapam, both of the left-w ing bloc, had had an outright 
majority, but Mapai's leader, Mr. Ben-Gurion, did not even include
Since Israe l's  Law of Return grants a more or less automatic 
citizenship to any Jew asking for i t ,  while leaving the question 
of e l ig ib i l i ty  open to interpretation, this problem's significance 
is not exclusively theological, not quite. Rather, i t  has been 
plaguing Israe l's  p o litica l system ever since the State was 
created.
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Table 2.3 Coalitions Formed bv Maoai/Labour. 1949-1974
Cabinet Partners 120 Knesset
1) 3/1949 Mapai*+Religious Bloc+Progressive+Sephardim 
(48) (16) (5) (4) 73
1
2) 11/1950 Mapai+Religious Bloc+Progressive+Sephardim 
(48) (16) (5) (4) 73
1
3) 10/1951 Mapai+Hap.Mi zrach i +Mi zrachi+Aguda+Poa.Aguda 
(50) (8) (2) (5) 65
2
4) 12/1952 Mapai +NRP+General Zioni sts+Progressive 
(50) (10) (23) (4) 87
2
5) 1/1954 Mapai +NRP+General Zi oni sts+Progressi ve 
(50) (10) (23) (4) 87
2
6) 6/1955 Mapai+NRP+Progressive 
(52) (10) (4) 66
2
7) 8/1955 Mapai +NRP+Achdut Ha' avoda+Mapam+Progressive 
(45) (11) (10) (9) (5) 80
3
8) 1/1958 Mapai +NRP+Achdut Ha' avoda+Mapam+Progressi ve 
(45) (11) (10) (9) (5) 80
3
9) 12/1959 Mapai +NRP+Achdut Ha' avoda+Mapam+Progressi ve 
(52) (12) (7) (9) (6) 86
4
10) 11/1961 Mapai+NRP+Achdut Ha'avoda+Poalei Aguda 
(46) (12) (8) (2) 68
5
11) 6/1963 Mapai+NRP+Achdut Ha'avoda+Poalei Aguda 
(46) (12) (8) (2) 68
5
12) 12/1964 Mapai+NRP+Achdut Ha'avoda+Poalei Aguda 
(45) (12) (8) (2) 67
5
13) 1/1966 Alignment+NRP+Mapam+lnd. Liberals 
(49) (11) (8) (5) 73
6
14) 3/1969 Al i gnment+NRP+Mapam+1n.Lib.+Rafi +Gahal 
(49) (11) (8) (5) (9) (22) 104
6
15) 12/1969 Ali gnment+NRP+lnd. Liberals+Gahal 
(60) (12) (4) (26) 102
7
16) 3/1974 Alignment+NRP+lnd.Liberals 
(54) (10) (4) 68
8
17) 6/1974 Alignment+CRM+lnd. Liberals 
(54) (3) (4) 61
8
Including the M apai-affiliated Arab lis ts .
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Mapam in the coalitions of the early 1950's. The conflic t between Mapai 
and Mapam on foreign policy orientations at the time has barred Mapam's 
participation, a ll the more so because Mr. Ben-Gurion never wanted an 
en tire ly  left-w ing government in the f i r s t  place.
Moderate and "Closed” Coalitions
Mapai/Labour formed coalitions that were "closed" and ideologically 
moderate. A "closed" executive coalition implies the inclusion of a ll 
parliamentary parties within a given ideological sphere. An "open" 
coalition "skips" over one or more such parties. Usually, coalitions in 
parliamentary democracies tend to be "closed". I f  some are found to be 
"open", i t  is probably due to problems in defining and measuring 
ideological distances in one dimension or more [c f. Taylor, 1972].
Mapai/Labour has always preferred moderate parties to extreme ones 
within the various p o litica l blocs; whenever a more extreme party 
participated in any of its  coalitions, a ll the moderate parties in the 
same bloc also participated. In Axelrod's terms [1970], a ll its  
seventeen coalitions were "closed" and "winning". The only exceptions 
to this rule were Rafi and the C ivil Rights Movement (CRM), Mapai's two 
breakaway parties, which were blackballed by the dominant party 
[Diskin, 1988].*
Unlike Rafi's s p lit , the CRM's secession was not p o lit ic a lly  
dangerous, since i t  has remained within the le ft-o f-cen tre  camp. 
S t i l l ,  the challenge to the veteran leadership (Mrs. Golda Meir 
was then party leader) was unforgivable.
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The dominant party tried  to create balanced as well as moderate 
situations. " I f  the dominant party has partners on opposite sides of i t  
on the same [policy] dimensions... then these flank parties tend to 
balance each other out, as neither can get what i t  wants without the 
dominant party's support" [Luebbert, 1986, p. 80]. Thus, for instance, 
the NRP with its  "hawkish" policies on foreign and defense issues 
(a fte r the Six Day War) counterbalanced the "dovish" influence of the 
ILP, Mapam, and moderate factions within Mapai i ts e lf .  Certainly, the 
dominant party has never sought a balance across the entire ideological 
spectrum. I t  preferred not only a balance, but an ideological proximity 
as well among its  coalition partners. Consequently, in building 
coalition governments, Mapai/Labour has started out from the "core" and 
proceeded in both directions to bring in moderate rather than extreme 
parties.
Bargaining for a Limited Partnership
Throughout its  rule, Mapai/Labour has been torn between the need to 
form coalitions, because of its  minority status, and the not unnatural 
desire to rule the country a ll by i ts e lf .  The solution has been to 
trea t the various coalitions as lim ited partnerships: in the context of 
the dominated system, the most important principle - i f  not the only 
principle - in the process of coalition negotiation was that 
Mapai/Labour should maintain an absolute majority in government. That 
is to say, i t  should have more votes in the executive than a ll its  
coalition partners combined. This principle was never negotiable, and
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has had a strong impact on the entire bargaining structure both for the 
formation and the maintenance of executive coalitions.
Mapai/Labour's "d ictatoria l" position in government was not always 
readily accepted by its  partners. The f i r s t  challenge, by the "Club of 
Four", as noted above, fa iled  miserably. When two opposition parties, 
Gahal and Rafi, joined in the national unity government on the eve of
the Six Day War, this principle was put to yet another te s t. While
there was an apparent cause to redistribute m inisterial portfo lios, so 
as to re flec t the re la tive  parliamentary power of the various coalition  
partners, old and new, this was not done, the reason given being that 
Gahal and Rafi joined government "just" because of a national
emergency. After the 1969 elections, when the formula of a national
unity government continued, a change in power relations within 
government indeed took place, yet the absolute majority of the Labour 
Alignment, consisting now of the Labour party (formerly Mapai, Achdut 
Ha'Avoda and Rafi) and Mapam, was maintained.
Having a clear majority in government has made the dominant party 
rather w illing  to compromise and make promises; these mattered, but not 
too much. After a l l ,  i t  was up to Mapai/Labour to decide, during the 
life tim e of the coalition, whether or not i t  was going to liv e  up to 
its  promises. Consequently, bargaining was not lim ited to the formation 
process, but rather was an ongoing endavour throughout the tenure of 
each government. Needless to say, i t  was usually at the formation of a 
new coalition that a great many previously ignored promises have had to 
be dealt with.
Coalition bargaining to form the government has usually proven to 
be a rather lengthy, excruciating process. Most negotiations took up 
the entire period allowed by law; typ ica lly , the would-be coalition
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partners have had to be seen to drive a hard bargain. In fac t, even 
when portfo lio  distribution and policy issues could be readily settled, 
bargaining has had to appear as a prolonged (and by implication, tough) 
encounter, for reasons of po litica l legitimacy. "What makes the ta lk  so 
long, d if f ic u lt  and complex is generally not the lack of goodwill among 
the e lite s , but the fact that negotiations must appear the way they do 
in order to satisfy the members whose orientations are s t i l l  largely 
attuned to the vocal, symbolic, and ideological aspects characteristic  
of each respective p o litica l culture. I t  is wrong to assume that, 
because interparty negotiations take a long time, much is being 
negotiated among the parties. Most negotiation in cases of protracted 
government formation takes place between leaders and th e ir followers 
and among rival factions within parties" [Luebbert, 1986, p. 52].
The never-ending bargaining process was, among other things, an 
excellent device to avoid controversial issues. As i t  happened, parties 
which had long participated in interparty negotiations came to prefer 
the postponement of fundamental decisions, placing a greater emphasis 
on operative goals, over which i t  was easier to compromise. This 
tendency accounts, among other things, for the fact that no 
constitution was ever drawn in Israel (the religious parties strongly 
object to th a t), or that no decision was taken on the issue of the 
occupied te rr ito rie s  during the period between the Six Day War in 1967 
and the Yom Kippur War in 1973, or actually ever since. In fact, the 
practice of making compromises and the proc liv ity  for short-term 
solutions, in order to accommodate coalition parties, has created a 
tendency in Israe li p o litics , whereby neither government nor the 
Knesset has been able to implement comprehensive, long-term programmes 
even on less controversial issues such as economic policy.
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Finally , there is no doubt that intraparty po litics  have an impact 
on the coalition bargaining process. Factionalism and threats of party 
s p lits , particularly  in the context of the P.R. system, may constrain 
decisions making in coalition negotiations. Intraparty tensions may 
make i t  d if f ic u lt  for parties to participate in coalitions. In the 
Is rae li case, for example, "The NRP's reason for not joining the Rabin 
coalition was a desire for party unity. S im ilarly, Labour's decision 
not to yie ld  on 'Who's a Jew?' and a national coalition cabinet was, to 
a large extent, influenced by its  desire to maintain the party and its  
electoral coalition with Mapam" [Don-Yehiya, 1975, p. 273]. Thus, even 
the bargaining position of the dominant party was strongly affected by 
intraparty p o litics . Moreover, i t  had carefully to distribute its  
m inisterial portfolios among its  various factions, lest the delicate 
intraparty balance be tipped and bring about a s p lit .
Coalition Pavoffs and Tradeoffs
In fina l analysis, payoff distribution is the name of the game for the 
participants in coalition p o litics . Unless one expects to be paid, one 
does not play the game in the f i r s t  place. As for the stakes in the 
coalition game, there seem to be "two major motivations for playing: 
the desire to gain office and the desire to influence p o lic y ... Office 
may be pursued instrumentally in order to enhance control over policy, 
and conversely that policy may be pursued instrumentally in order to 
improve the chance of getting into office" [Laver & Scofield, 1990, p. 
164].
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Office Pavoffs
M inisterial portfolios are certainly the major payoffs distributed  
among coalition partners. Basically, the number of portfolios allocated 
to parties may either conform to a norm of proportionality, whereby 
each party w ill be represented in government in accordance with its  
parliamentary strength; or else the distribution of portfolios may 
re fle c t the individual bargaining power of each coalition partner. The 
proportional basis seems to provide for a sense of fairness and thus
may contribute to s ta b ility , whereas the use of bargaining power
appears to be associated with p o litic a l "blackmail" and may introduce 
destabilization into to the coalition game. Most coalition studies have 
found that "the number of ministries received by partners in a 
governing coalition is indeed explained, almost on a one to one basis, 
by th e ir contribution of seats to that coalition" [Browne & Franklin, 
1973, p. 458].
Indeed, in the Israe li context, i t  was argued that "the ra tio  of 
m inisterial payoffs obtained by each party support, by and large, the 
proportionality proposition. The size of the deviations in most cases 
is not s ignificantly large. However, in some instances, such as in the 
I964-I969 period, Mapai managed to obtain a disproportionally large 
share of payoffs as opposed to the 1974 government, when i t  was
underpaid. The NRP's payoff is less variable, but at least on two 
occasions (I95 I and 1952) i t  obtained a larger than proportional
payoff. On the other hand, the smaller parties lik e  the ILP, Mapam, and 
Achdut Ha'avoda conform to the proportionality rule" [S e lik ta r, 1982, 
p. 306].
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Actually, Mapai/Labour has managed, for most of the time, to 
secure a disproportionally large share of the payoffs, compared to its  
coalition partners - mainly, of course, because i t  was the dominant 
party, not easily blackmailed by other parties. True, in the f i r s t  two 
coalitions, during the early 1950's, the dominant party had paid a high 
price for the cooperation of its  partners, mainly the NRP. However, i t  
soon learned that a lower price would be su ffic ien t to get the same 
amount of cooperation. Since then, the dominant party has increased its  
own payoffs disproportionally to its  electoral strength, at the same
time reducing its  partners' share. In the mid-1970's, Mapai/Labour's 
declining p o litica l dominance again forced i t  to o ffer a high reward 
for participation. The loyal ILP provided an extreme example when its  
four-member parliamentary group was offered two seats in the 1974
government [Nachmias, 1973, pp. 301-5].
I t  is popularly believed that smaller parties tend to "blackmail" 
the larger parties. In Israe l, the small coalition partners, at least 
until 1977, although needed for the coalition to be a winning one, did 
not even receive th e ir fa ir  share in the allocation of governmental 
payoffs. Actually, the total rewards received by the smaller parties - 
portfo lios, government appointments, financial support, and so on -
seem to indicate a defin ite  discrimination against them, compared with 
Mapai/Labour's share [Diskin, 1988, p. 162]. The Is rae li experience can 
explain why "bargaining power" is not always relevant. The one-party 
dominance has been strong enough to make sure that no other party can 
exercise much leverage against i t .  The smaller parties have been happy 
"not to lose" and get whatever they were given.
The distribution of portfolios has both quantitative and 
qualitative dimensions. Bargaining over who gets which portfo lio  does
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seem in practice to be an important component of coalition  
negotiations. Although the assessment of quality is not always easy to 
make, not least because d ifferent parties may take a d ifferen t view of 
the same portfo lio , there seems to be a consensus in a given system on 
the pecking order of portfolios. In the Israe li dominated system, 
Mapai/Labour's control has been qualitative as well as quantitative; 
the Prime Ministership, Defence, Foreign A ffa irs , Finance and 
Education. The ministries distributed to coalition partners have not 
been, by and large, major or significant in any hierarchical sense.*
Mapai/Labour's long-time a lly , the NRP, trad itio n a lly  received the 
Ministries of Religious A ffa irs , Social A ffa irs and for a while the 
Ministry of the In terio r. The NRP valued these offices both for the 
patronage possib ilities  inherent in them and th e ir instrumentality for 
controlling policy in certain areas important to the party. Smaller and 
v irtu a lly  "unnecessary" coalition partners, such as the ILP, Mapam and 
Achdut Ha'avoda, scarcely received any re la tive ly  important portfo lio .
While in o ffice , a ll parties tried  to ladle out patronage and 
influence policies to th e ir own advantage. O ff ic ia lly , positions in the 
Is rae li c iv il service could not be part of coalition, or any other kind 
of bargaining. Most coalition agreements e x p lic itly  stated that the 
public service should be depoliticised. In re a lity , however, 
Mapai/Labour placed its  own loyal personnel in top bureaucratic 
positions, thus reinforcing its  p o litic a l dominance. Moreover,
One major exception, quite easy to explain under the circumstances 
prevailing then, was the appointment of R afi's  Mr. Dayan as 
Defence Minister on the eve of the Six Day War in 1967.
- 56 -
Mapai/Labour's patronage was not lim ited to government agencies. The 
party also exercised control over patronage payoffs in various public 
institu tions, and most importantly over the trade union movement.
Within the state bureaucracy, a clear manifestation of 
Mapai/Labour's dominance was its  d irect control over 75 to 90 percent 
of the government budget through its  m inisterial portfo lios. The party 
tended to hold on to "big spending" m inistries, while controlling the 
rest through th e ir budgets, which could only be spent with the approval 
of the Finance Ministry. Sometimes, in order to se ttle  conflicting  
claims, Mapai/Labour saw f i t  to transfer departments from one ministry 
to another, without losing much control in the process. In 1952, for 
instance, the General Zionist party was given the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry, but without some departments (and th e ir  budgets) which 
Mapai moved over to the Treasury. In I9 6 I, Mapai handed the Ministry of 
Labour to Achdut Ha'avoda a fte r removing from i t  the Housing 
Department, which eventually became a Mapai ministry [S e lik ta r, 1975, 
p. 15].
The fact that in Israel there is no legal lim ita tion  on the number 
of ministries and ministers has had an important impact on coalition  
p o litic s . Coalition partners have tended to prolong bargaining, hoping 
to gain more seats at the government table. In final analysis, the size 
of government depended on the a b ility  of Mapai/Labour's negotiators 
successfully to conclude the coalition formation process without giving 
up too many portfolios. Generally, the number of ministers has 
continuously been on the increase, regardless of the parliamentary base 
of the executive. I f  in 1949 there were 12 government positions in a 
coalition based on 73 members of parliament, in 1974 a coalition of 68 
MKs formed a 20 member government. The executive/legislature ra tio  has
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increased from a 1:6 level to more than 1:4. The number of 
Mapai/Labour's ministers has always been on the rise , the party's 
parliamentary strength, the total number of ministers or the number of 
ministries notwithstanding. The change in figures certain ly represents 
a change in p o litica l culture.
I f  the table in the government meeting room seemed to have been 
made out of rubber rather than wood, i t  suggests that coalition  
po litics  in Israel is a "nonzero-sum game" rather than a "zero-sum 
game". This partly explains why most Mapai/Labour governments have 
been surplus coalitions.
Policv Pavoffs
As noted above, a party can influence government policy by having
control over a particular ministry. Ministries in it ia te  leg islation and 
introduce measures to advance certain policies; they can also spend 
th e ir budgets on specific programmes which involve policy payoffs. In 
addition, a coalition partner may simply enjoy policy payoffs resulting 
from the overall coalition policy package. In this context, a party's 
policy payoff is inversely related to the distance between its  "ideal" 
policy line and the policy of the government as a whole. The wider the 
gap, the lower the policy payoff, and vice versa [Laver & Schofield, 
1990, p. 193-4].
In a dominated system, the policy positions of the coalition tend 
to correspond to the positions of the dominant party. After a l l ,  the 
dominant party formed the coalition in the f i r s t  place and most
probably is located at the p o litica l "core". Certainly in Israe l,
Mapai/Labour's policy positions have represented, to a large extent,
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the ideological centre of the various coalitions i t  formed. Whereas the 
central dominant party has received maximum policy payoffs, a ll other 
coalition partners received much less. The religious goals championed 
by the NRP, for instance, have been able to obtain re la tive ly  low-value 
payoffs, since such positions sharply deviated from the policies of a 
government controlled by secular parties. There is a sense, however, in 
which the "religious payoffs" could be regarded as not too low: simply, 
in any other circumstances the religious payoffs would have been even 
lower.
As for non-religious issues, the NRP, located as i t  was near the 
"core", could and did enjoy high policy payoffs. After the 1967 war, 
however, the NRP moved to the right on defense and foreign policy 
issues; consequently, i t  received fewer policy payoffs in a 
Mapai/Labour coalition which was based on the centrist formula of 
status QUO on those issues. The "dovish" socia list Mapam party, on the 
other hand, received low policy payoffs across the board - in economic, 
religious and nationalistic terms. The overall coalition policy 
favoured a mixed economy rather than socia list planning. Mapam was also 
quite displeased with the government's policy package on religious 
issues. Moreover, i t  was dissatisfied with the coalition 's  foreign and 
defense policy, and actually suspended its  membership in the national 
coalition of 1969 because of the participation of the right-wing Gahal.
The smaller ILP held positions sim ilar to Mapam's on religious 
issues, but on economic issues i t  was to the right of both Mapam and 
Mapai, advocating a basically free market economy. Achdut Ha'avoda, 
which started out from positions sim ilar to Mapam's, eventually drifted  
towards the "core" and merged with Mapai. Theoretically at least, this
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move represented an increase in its  policy payoffs [S e lik ta r, 1982, p. 
309].
A Party which is mainly concerned with policy payoffs might jo in
the coalition but forgo the right to m inisterial seats. Sometimes its
representatives may jo in government, but as ministers without 
portfo lios. Usually, these arrangements indicate the party's interest 
in the coalition policy package rather than its  o ffice  patronage. The
Civil Rights Movement joined the 1974 Rabin government but did not
assume m inisterial positions, claiming interest only in government 
policy. The ultra-orthodox Agudat Israel exerted coalition patronage 
which was instrumental to the advancement of its  religious policies. I t  
was not interested, however, in assuming government positions in a 
secular Zionist government.
To conclude, Mapai/Labour as the central party has provided the 
core for the po litica l system and as such controlled the distribution  
of payoffs. I t  secured the cooperation of other parties by le ttin g  
them, in a selective fashion, enjoy the payoffs that were controlled by 
the p o litica l centre. Mapai/Labour exchanged with its  coalition  
partners access to economic, po litica l and ideological payoffs in 
return for p o litica l support. In this way, the payoffs system 
contributed significantly to the s ta b ility  of coalition governments.
Continuitv and Change
During the 1949-1977 period, Israel was governed by seventeen 
coalitions, each with an average life -tim e  of twenty months. These 
re la tive ly  short-lived governments meant that coalition negotiation
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have become a regular feature of po litics  not only a fte r elections, but 
also in between. Dissension within the coalition was the chief cause of 
government dissolution. S t i l l ,  the short duration of the various 
governments was not a reflection of p o litica l in s ta b ility , since the 
dominant party has always remained in control. Opposition parties have 
never been successful in the ir attempts to bring down the government in 
no-confidence votes in parliament.
Short-lived governments came and went, but the rule of a single 
party was never interrupted. I t  was an impressive display of government 
continuity in a period of intensive change. The essence of s ta b ility  
has had to do with the dominant party's coalition p o litic s . I t  employed 
successful modes of conflict resolution which could deal with social 
and economic change and cope with deep and widespread p o litica l and
ideological controversies. The regime attributes in Israel certainly  
pointed to a p o litica l system with alarming disintegrative features. 
The party system was fragmented, fractionalised and polarized. I t  went 
through frequent changes in the wake of mergers and s p lits . Also, there 
were many changes in the composition of the coalition governments due 
to uneasy alliances between parties that did not always adhere to the 
same set of po litica l rules [Horowitz, 1990, pp. 1-10].
The centra lity  of a dominant party was, however, a cohesive force 
which counterbalanced the centrifugal tendencies of the po litica l
system. In fact, the deficiencies of the p o litic a l system did more to 
strengthen the dominance of Mapai/Labour than to undermine the system's 
s ta b ility . As we have seen, there have been changes of coalition
partners, but there was not a change of government. This situation
provided continuity and s ta b ility  at the interparty leve l. The parties 
served as agents to distribute resources and as mediators between the
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public and the government. The patterns of response by the parties and 
government to demands of various p o litica l groups also contributed to 
s ta b ility , but at the expense of p o litic a l effectiveness.
Labour's "Not Losing” Governments
In pre-statehood times, coalition "governments" were particularly  
large-based, in order to achieve the widest possible consensus among 
p o litic a l parties and groups, due to the essentially voluntary nature 
of the p o litica l organization in the obvious absence of the enforcing 
powers of a sovereign state (some po litica l groups actually rejected 
the legitimacy of the Jewish central authority) [Horowitz & Lissak, 
1979, pp. 13-5]. In those large coalitions Mapai, already the leading 
p o litic a l force but unable to acquire a clear hegemony because i t  did 
not possess an outright majority, had to share power with other 
p o litic a l groups (save in the Histadrut, where i t  had exercised fu ll 
control). Mapai remained in minority in the interim coalition  
government that was set up immediately a fte r independence in 1948, 
since i t  was based on the previous formula (Table 2 .5 ).
Table 2.4 The Interim Coalition Government bv Parties - 1948
Mapai 4
Mapam 2
General Zionists 2
Religious group 2
Orthodox group 1
Sephardic group 1
Progressive party 1
Total 13
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The major p o litica l change of 1948, from community to statehood, 
was not followed by a substantial change in the electoral and 
parliamentary strength of Mapai. Although Mapai and its  leaders were 
identified  with the establishment of the new state, the party never 
became a majority party [P a lt ie l, 1975, pp. 397-414]. However, the 
party could use its  strength to bring to an end the trad ition  of 
consensus and achieve for i ts e lf  a majority status at the government 
leve l, following the elections to the f i r s t  Knesset. Certainly, in 
sovereign Israel there was no more relying on voluntary obedience, so 
Mapai, as the p lu ra lity  party, could form coalitions in the manner 
described above. In terms of coalition theory, Mapai acted according to 
the logic of Riker's "size principle" [Riker, 1962]. By reducing the 
size of the "grand coalitions" which had existed before, i t  was able to 
increase the payoffs granted to the fewer coalition partners - and 
mainly to i ts e lf ,  as the coalition leader. Those smaller coalitions 
s t i l l  remained rather large, but not too large as to deny Mapai its  
outright majority within the respective governments, as indicated in 
Table 2.6 [Nachmias, 1975, pp. 241-254].
Table 2.5 Maoai/Labour's strength in the Coalition Governments
1949 - 1973
Year: 1949 1951 1955 1959 1961 1965 1969 1973
No. of
Members 
Of which
12 13 16 16 16 21 24 20
Maoai: 7 9 9 9 11 12 14 16
Source: Israel Government Yearbooks.
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Generally, the size of Israe l's  coalition governments has been 
determined by "normal" p o litica l situations, not by external threats to 
the democratic system. Only once was the size of coalition d irectly  
influenced by an external threat - on the eve of the Six Day War in 
1967, when a national unity government was formed to deal with a 
perceived threat to Israe l's  very existence. Iron ica lly , this national 
coalition came to an end in 1970 as a result of yet another external 
"threat" - an American peace in it ia t iv e  which the right-wing Gahal 
rejected, withdrawing from the coalition when the government decided to 
go along with i t .  I t  seems that some external pressures tend to unite a 
nation, and some work to divide i t .
Is rae l's  survival needs in face of external threats to its  
security seem to have created a popular attitude towards the po litica l 
parties, whereby they were expected to strive for consensus and 
accommodation, or at least appear to be doing so. After a l l ,  larger 
coalitions tend to have more legitimacy and authority than smaller 
ones, particu larly  in dealing with serious crises. In this context, 
coalition po litics  is viewed as a "nonzero-sum" game because p o litica l 
parties cooperate as well as compete among themselves. "The p o litica l 
culture in which coalition formation and coalition management takes 
place attaches a high value to consensus: payoff maximization occurs in 
terms of 'concord'" [De Swaan, 1973, p. 81].
The impact of the prolonged conflic t with neighboring countries on 
the behaviour of po litica l parties in Israel notwithstanding, i t  seems 
that the composition of governments, and thus th e ir size, have in final 
analysis emerged from "normal" interactions among the actors in the 
coalition game. In determining the size of the coalition, Mapai/Labour 
has opted, as a matter of principle, to secure for its  governments an
- 64 -
outright parliamentary majority. In fac t, a ll seventeen coalitions 
formed by Mapai/Labour were supported by a majority of the members of 
the Knesset. The size of these coalitions has varied: from a national 
unity government, a "grand coalition" of 104 seats, through many 
"surplus coalitions", to a "minimal winning coalition" of 61 seats in 
the 120-seat Knesset.
The formation of a minority government, while theoretically  a 
viable possib ility , has never been seriously considered. Of course, 
some coalitions formed by Mapai/Labour lost parliamentary support and 
became, through the resignation of the Prime Minister - never by losing 
in a no confidence vote in parliament - "caretaker" governments for 
re la tive ly  long periods. S t i l l ,  when the next executive coalition was 
formed, i t  was based on the support of a majority in parliament, 
usually an "oversized" one.
One way to explain surplus coalitions is by recalling Riker's 
"information effect": imperfect information, at the bargaining and 
formation stage, may increase the size of the winning coalition [Riker, 
1962, pp. 87-9]. For instance, in a highly fragmented multiparty 
system, a surplus coalition may eventually be formed because no 
participant has suffic ient information to calculate in advance how many 
parties would be needed for the coalition to be a winning one, or what 
conditions w ill ensure the participation of one party or the other.
Riker's "information effect" has to do with the stage of coalition  
bargaining and formation, and as such, can indeed explain surplus 
coalitions in "regular" multiparty systems. In dominant party systems, 
however, the logic of the "information effect" is not as relevant, 
since the dominant party controls the bargaining and formation process 
and thus seems to have adequate information. What a dominant party
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cannot know for certain, is the way its  coalition partners are going to 
behave once government has been set up. " I f  a dominant party deals 
simultaneously with a cluster of less powerful 'o ther' parties, 
offering each of them a place at the government table, then none is 
able to twist the dominant party's arm in the negotiations that precede 
government form ation... Dumping an awkward passenger by the side of the 
track in the run-up to the investiture debate presumably has few 
costs ... Dumping the same passenger a fte r the government has formally 
taken office is another matter altogether and may impose fa r higher 
costs on the dominant party" [Laver & Schofield, 1990, p. 86].
That is to say, considerations concerning the maintenance and 
s ta b ility  of the coalition, rather than its  formation, may explain the 
existence of "larger-than-minimal " coalitions in dominant party 
systems. "Some actors may defect the coalition at crucial moments and 
therefore i t  may be necessary to form a 'reserve' in terms of weight, 
i .e .  votes" [De Swaan, 1973, p. 84]. Luebbert, in dealing with 
dominated systems, suggests that the dominant party has an incentive to 
add "unnecessary" coalition partners in order to avoid war of nerves 
with smaller parties. "A minimum-winning government would contain no 
excess parties, and the withdrawal of one party would bring down the 
government. This situation permits a kind of blackmail of the dominant 
p a rty ... for a party can threaten to leave the government at w il l ,  and 
thus compel the dominant party to choose between making concessions or 
renegotiating the entire government agreement. The leaders of the 
dominant party can avoid this dilemma i f  they can form a government 
that includes one or more unnecessary parties, none of which can bring 
down the government by its e lf"  [Luebbert, 1986, p. 79].
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In Israe l, this proved to be the case in 1955, when the General 
Zionist party le f t  the coalition government without taking with i t  the 
parliamentary majority of the Mapai-led coalition . In 1958 the National 
Religious Party withdrew its  support of the government over the "Who is 
a Jew?" dispute, but coalition s t i l l  enjoyed a parliamentary majority. 
So i t  was not until the 1974 Labour government, headed by Mr. Yitzhak 
Rabin, that the dominant party came to realize the high costs imposed 
on a minimal winning coalition. Formed in the aftermath of the 
traumatic 1973 war, i t  was an uneasy coalition to begin with. In 1976, 
a minor incident developed into a major r i f t  between Labour and the
NRP. Once the coalition agreement was shattered, the weakened dominant
party was unable to negotiate a new one. In fact, this coalition turned 
out to be the last Mapai/Labour dominated government.
The notion that "larger-than-minimal" coalitions are more stable 
than "minimal winning" coalitions in dominated systems seems to have an 
important theoretical implication. Most coalition theories assume that 
surplus coalitions are re la tive ly  unstable precisely because of the 
inclusion of actors who are "unnecessary" for the coalition to be 
winning. In the same way i t  is argued that "minimal winning" coalitions  
are stable because there are no "free passengers" on board. In other 
words, in the context of "minimal winning" coalitions, the various 
actors have maximized th e ir gains so they have no motivation to change 
the composition of the coalition, whereas in surplus coalitions there 
is s t i l l  room to increase "winnings" by ejecting "unnecessary" actors. 
Consequently, "minimal winning" coalitions should almost by defin ition  
be more stable than coalitions of any other size [Dodd, 1976, passim].
I t  seems, however, that i t  is basically a question of semantics.
I f  we regard any change whatever in the party composition of the
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coalition as indicative of lack of s ta b ility , i t  may be reasonable to 
suppose that "minimal winning" coalitions are the most stable ones. I f  
however lack of s ta b ility  refers to the actual downfall of the 
government, or to a substantial change in its  p o litica l formula, there 
is no reason to suppose that "larger-than-minimal" coalitions are 
re la tive ly  unstable. The Israe li experience during the period under 
discussion here has shown that surplus coalitions can be rather stable 
precisely because a number of "unnecessary" actors are included: the
dominant party can maintain the basic coalition formula, in spite of a 
p o litica l cris is  with a junior partner who may or may not stay on 
in the coalition.
Surplus coalitions in Israel result in part from internal 
pressures within society at large. "The cleavage structure in Israel 
which is based on ideological, relig ious, and ethnic factors makes i t  
necessary for the coalition leader to absorb the resulting pressures in 
the coalition structure" [S eliktar, 1975, p. 5]. This can explain why 
Mapai saw f i t  to include in the f i r s t  two coalitions the Sephardic 
party - an "unnecessary" partner, but one which was useful in dealing 
with ethnic pressures. Sim ilarly, the "open invitation" to the NRP to 
jo in coalition governments, even when i t  was not arithm etically  
necessary, served among other things to diffuse the explosive secular- 
religious situation.
Enjoying a high degree of consensus, surplus coalitions have a 
moderating effect on cleavages. Moreover, th e ir  a b ility  to push through 
parliament legislation on controversial issues is unmatched by smaller 
coalitions. On specific policy issues, the consent of "interested" 
parties is indeed crucial. For instance, on religious issues the 
participation of religious parties is important, while on labour
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relations the cooperation of the left-w ing parties is v ita l.  These 
instances could help explain surplus coalitions as well: "Political 
requirements a lte r the defin ition of a 'winning coalition ' because 
decisions adopted by a simple majority or without the concurrence of 
certain groups or individuals in the voting body w ill remain 
ineffective" [De Swaan, 1973, p. 81].
Surplus coalitions were also created through the in it ia t iv e  of the 
"other" parties, to which the dominant party favourably responded. The 
usual case was for centre and religious parties to express interest in 
expanding coalition scope by coopting parties ideologically adjacent to 
themselves. In 1952, the Progressive party made joining the coalition  
conditional on the inclusion of the General Zionist party. Sim ilarly, 
in 1974 the ILP pushed for the inclusion of the CRM in the coalition. 
Interm ittent attempts by the NRP to bring the Likud into government 
were however rejected by Mapai/Labour, for obvious reasons.
The partners on the le f t ,  Mapam and Achdut Ha'avoda, usually 
pressed for a "minimal winning coalition" exclusively composed by the 
left-w ing bloc. The dominant party refused to accede because i t  has 
been its  overall coalition strategy to a lly  with the centre and 
religious parties. Actually, in most coalitions, the le ft-o f-cen tre  
parties have become "unnecessary" actors. However, Mapai/Labour tended 
to included them in government, not least because of th e ir much 
stronger position in the powerful Histadrut. In this sense, the 
Histadrut has been an extra-parliamentary actor who, in aroundabout 
way, added "unnecessary" weight to the coalition government. Commenting 
on "larger-than-minimal" coalitions. De Swaan argues that "political 
requirements a lte r the defin ition of a 'winning coalition ' because 
decisions adopted by a simple majority or without the concurrence of
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certain groups or individuals not represented in the voting body w ill 
remain ineffective" [De Swaan, 1973, p. 81].
I t  has been noted already that Mapai/Labour attempted to control 
coalition po litics  by counterbalancing ideologically divergent partners 
in government. This was most evident in the juxtaposition of the NRP 
and the ILP on religious issues, or the offsetting of Mapam by the ILP 
in economic policy. This strategy, in the exigencies of a m ulti­
dimensional policy space, has brought about coalitions that tended to 
be oversized and of an extended policy range. In this way the 
government resembled "a supercoalition from which ad hoc coalitions for 
each b i l l  or each category of issues are formed" [De Swaan, 1973, p. 
81].
In the context of coalition formation, the re la tive  importance of 
policy and size seem to display inverse proportionality. When 
coalitions are formed to achieve particular policy goals, i t  is the 
implementation of the coalition agreement that is important, not 
coalition 's  re lative  size. Minority, minimum-winning and surplus 
coalitions, a ll may be acceptable to members (and even to nonmembers) 
i f  salient policy goals can be attained. The possession of a "minimal 
winning" coalition is all-important onlv in a world with no policy 
goals whatsoever. For self-serving office-seekers, the only thing that 
matters about a coalition is that its  size should be minimal, because 
in such a coalition participants can maximize th e ir winning in terms of 
office payoffs. Surplus or minority coalitions make sense only when 
policy payoffs are involved as well [Budge & Keman, 1990, p. 18].
In Israe li coalition p o litics , the pursuit of ideological goals 
has been important, alongside with the unavoidable office-seeking. 
Consequently, from the theoretical point of view, both surplus
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coalitions and minority governments should have formed - at least on 
occasion. The coalitions formed by Mapai/Labour were mostly "larger- 
than-minimal", however, never minority governments, which begs a 
question. We do know that dominated systems do not always have majority 
governments. In typical dominated systems such as Ita ly  and Sweden, for 
instance, minority governments are rather common. Why not in Israel?
Luebbert argues that "the f i r s t  and essential point to appreciate 
is that in a dominated system the only opportunity a party has for 
influencing public policy is by participation in a coalition" 
[Luebbert, 1986, p. 73]. This may explain the behaviour of the "other" 
parties which may seek coalition participation, realizing they have no 
opportunity to influence government policy from opposition benches. Yet 
why would the dominant party, which controls the bargaining process, 
find i t  important to include the "other" parties in its  coalitions, i f  
i t  does not have to?
I t  seems that Mapai/Labour has included some "other" parties in 
its  coalitions because they were weak and could not have much impact on 
government policy. The cost of th e ir inclusion was rather low, so i t  
was better to have them in coalition than outside. As mentioned above, 
Mapai/Labour has been careful to maintain an absolute majority in the 
executive coalition, and the presence of some "other" parties could not 
make much of a difference. A minority government, however, i f  formed, 
might have been blocked, at least occasionally, by the opposition - 
regardless of its  policies. In the Is rae li p o litic a l culture, a 
trad ition  of supporting the government from the outside has never 
developed. I f  you are not in, you are out. I f  you are out, you tend to 
oppose. Certainly, policy positions are important to Is rae li parties, 
but when in opposition they tend to ignore policy considerations and
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oppose government for opposition's sake (the rule being "you stand were 
you s it" ) .
I t  seems that in the 1950's and 1960's, when the po litica l 
dominance of Mapai/Labour was at its  highest and the system was not 
extremely polarized, the "other" parties were moving towards the 
centre, clamouring to be included in Mapai/Labour's governments in 
order "not to lose". For most parties, there were no strong ideological 
barriers to coalition participation; the anti-establishment parties 
have not been rea lly  powerful. The outcome was majority coalitions  
which, based on Mapai/Labour strategy, turned out to be surplus 
coalitions.
In the 1970's, however, the p o litica l consequences of the Six Day 
War made the party system more competitive and polarized, in particular 
over the number one issue on the p o litic a l agenda: the future of the 
te rr ito rie s  occupied in the 1967 war. This development forced parties 
to take sides, to become either po litica l "hawks" or "doves". Achdut 
Ha'avoda, for example, which merged with the ruling Mapai party, 
abandoned its  previous "hawkish" positions and became a more moderate 
faction within Labour. In a sim ilar way, the General Zionist party, 
orig ina lly  rather moderate, became more "hawkish" in the framework of 
the opposition Likud. Yet nowhere was this change more marked than in 
the National Religious Party: trad itio n a lly  moderate on defense issues, 
i t  gradually became more and more na tionalis tic , undertook to champion 
the cause of settlement, and its  "historic alliance" with Mapai/Labour 
seemed more and more anachronistic.
This redefinition of ideological positions involved making choices 
about government participation. Under the changing circumstances, i t  
was Mapai/Labour which looked for the inclusion of some "other" parties
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in its  coalitions in order "not to lose" its  p o litica l dominance. Since 
the base of potential coalition partners was narrowing, Mapai/Labour 
found i ts e lf  in trouble. The hesitancy of the NRP on whether or not to 
jo in  the 1974 coalition was an indication of the weakness of the ruling 
party. Eventually, Mapai/Labour was unable even "not to lose", and its  
half a century of p o litica l dominance came to an inglorious end in 
feeble attempts to run a narrow, minimum-size government.
To conclude, in the dominated system, changes in electoral
po litics  did not generate changes in the po litics  of forming a
government. There was but one fixed bargaining structure, and i t  was 
controlled by Mapai/Labour. The increasing importance of foreign and 
defense policies after 1967, however, in itia te d  a slow change in the 
structure of the bargaining game, as Mapai/Labour was losing p o litica l 
ground. The public support for a more right-wing national policy was 
reflected in a qualitative change in the bargaining environment. In 
1977, the voters decided to strip  Mapai/Labour o ff both its  large size 
and pivotal position. A new bargaining structure was in the making, as
we shall see in the next chapter.
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Chapter Three
Control from the Sidelines:
The Likud's Narrow-Based Governments, 1977-1984
From Dominance to Competition
Dimensions of Change
Most observers of Israe li po litics  identify two periods in the 
evolution of the party system: one-party dominance and consensus
p o litic s , from 1948 until 1977, and party competitive system and 
adversarial p o litics , since 1977 [See, for instance, Horowitz, 1977; 
Aronoff, 1988; Arian, 1977]. The "realigning electoral era", or the 
"defreezing" of the party system structure in Israel began somewhere in 
the mid-1960's. Yet the year 1977 stands out as the watershed between 
old and new p o litics , because in that year, for the f i r s t  time - 
through a "c ritica l election" - changes took place in electoral 
po litics  which revolutionized the pattern of coalition po litics  in 
Is ra e l.
How much change would ju s tify  the use of the word "realignment"? 
V.O. Key, for one, suggests that a true realignment of a party system 
involves "more or less profound readjustments... in the relations of
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power within the community, and in . . .  new and durable election 
groupings" [Key, 1955, p. 4 ]. In other words, a significant party 
system realignment must manifest i ts e lf  through changes both in the 
po litics  of elections and in the po litics  of coalition. I t  seems that a 
genuine realignment is not only an electoral change that persists, but 
a change that has an impact on power re la tion , the way parties interact 
to form a government. Thus, a gradual change in the makeup of the 
electorate may "suddenly" change the composition of government; an 
"electoral flux" which may not have meant much for a long time can, at 
one particular juncture, dramatically change the structure of coalition  
bargaining [Mair, 1990, p. 216; Smith & Mair, 1989, pp. 1-2].
The combined impact of changes in election and coalition po litics  
on the Israe li party system has been such that i t  seems to require a 
new classification altogether. Realignment in Israel actually suggests 
a party system change from the category of dominant party systems to a 
new category of bipartisan (bloc) dominant, or bipolar systems. 
Specifically , this realignment was characterized by the erosion of 
Mapai/Labour's po litica l dominance and the rise to power of Herut/Likud 
- two d istinct yet related processes.
In assessing possible changes in a dominant party system, Duverger 
notes that "domination takes the zest from l i f e . . .  The dominant party 
wears i ts e lf  out in o ffice , i t  loses its  vigour, its  arteries harden... 
every domination bears within its e lf  the seeds of its  own destruction" 
[Duverger, 1963, p. 312]. He seems to refer to the classic dilemma 
facing a dominant party: how to retain the trad itional core support and 
at the same time attract new and significant p o litica l support. In 
other words, a dominant party has to find the right balance between 
r ig id ity  and f le x ib i l i ty ,  i f  i t  is to maintain a long-term p o litica l
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hegemony. I f  the dominant party shows signs of immobility and 
stagnation, i t  may turn the "virtuous cycle" of dominance into a 
"vicious cycle" of p o litic a l collapse [Pempel, 1990, p. 16]. 
Furthermore, "a fa ilu re  of the dominant party is a major cris is  for the 
entire system" [Merkl, 1988, p. 574].
The realignment of the party system can be explained as a change 
in the p o litica l e lite  to which the voters respond, or as an e lite 's  
response to social and electoral pressures. Sartori suggests that 
p o litica l rather than social forces are decisive in party system change 
[S artori, 1969, p. 90]. Duverger maintains that once the dominant party 
loses its  sp iritual dominance the voters w ill sooner or la te r bring 
about its  collapse [Duverger, 1963, pp. 308-312]. This is exactly what 
happened to Mapai/Labour in its  last decade in power. The party lost 
its  ideological and leadership supremacy and ran into p o litic a l and 
organizational crises. "One factor in the fa l l  of the dominant party is 
the inner structure of the party. Within a p lu ra lis tic  party in power 
over a long period of time, undermined relations within the party, 
disagreements, disintegration and erosion encouraged the party's decay" 
[Shamir, 1986, p. 269].
The stagnation of the dominant party has opened up previously non­
existing opportunities to alternative party e lite s . In 1977, Israelis  
were offered, for the f i r s t  time, more than one real candidate for the 
prime ministership, an alternative to Mapai/Labour's ru le. The voters 
had the last word - and they chose Herut/Likud. However, but for the 
alternatives created by party e lite s , there would have been no real 
possib ility  for those voters to desert Mapai/Labour on such a scale. 
Needless to say, social trends favouring Herut/Likud have existed long 
before 1977, but before a real counter-elite was formed, Herut/Likud
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could not win. An alternative ruling group had had to crysta llize  
before electoral changes could manifest themselves in oarliametarv-cum- 
coalition p o litic s . According to this view, the electorate does not 
create new parties and counter-elites; i t  merely realigns its  support 
and loyalties to the shaping po litica l alternatives [Shapiro, 1980, pp. 
23-38].
Some scholars assume that the change in the Is rae li party system 
has originated in the social, rather than p o litica l system. "The Labour 
party lost power primarily because i t ,  and its  leadership, had lost 
legitimacy by becoming increasingly unresponsive to the demands created 
by a dynamically changing society" [Aronoff, 1979, p. 115]. 
Furthermore, "empirical analyses... seem to suggest that the electoral 
changes witnessed in the Israe li party system... stem from the 
electorate more than from the e lite . The public appears to lead the 
realignment... the public has preceded its  leadership" [Shamir, 1986, 
p. 293]. In other words, the party structure changed as a response to, 
or more precisely as an attempt to take advantage of massive changes in 
the attitude of the voters.
The roots of the party system change notwithstanding, i t  is clear 
that Mapai/Labour, as a dominant party, had fa iled  to provide 
acceptable forms of "linkage" between citizens and state. A wide gap 
has opened up between the party and the public, but "the party 
machinery tried  to conduct party l i f e  as i f  nothing had changed... 
Their power game became a private one. Labour... showed... a growing 
gap between the party machinery and the electorate" [Azmon, 1981, p. 
433]. Certain of its  continued rule under a ll circumstances, 
Mapai/Labour has grown even more insensitive to public demands, which 
attitude only helped the party in its  headlong rush downhill.
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When support for a dominant party is on the decline, the situation  
becomes rather complicated. Obviously, a dominant party which has never 
had seriously to compete with other parties finds i t  d if f ic u lt  to 
change its  style or its  methods, or even display the ideological 
f le x ib i l i ty  required for a real electoral struggle - just when i t  is 
needed most. In Israe l, the dominant Mapai/Labour party has gradually 
gone into a state of stagnation and immobility which proved detrimental 
to its  electoral chances. "Because the distinction between party and 
state is blurred in a dominant party system, the dominant party, while 
being credited for any progress and achievement, is also blamed for a ll 
problems and failures" [Shamir, 1986, p. 269]. The more disabled 
Mapai/Labour became, the more its  nonaccomplishments tended to loom 
large in the eyes of the people.
A complex combination of factors contributed to the decline of 
Mapai/Labour and the rise of Herut/Likud, a phenomenon that changed the 
very nature, and with i t  the classification  of the Is rae li party 
system.
Labour's Leadership Crisis
A powerful and cohesive leadership has been a key factor in maintaining 
Mapai's p o litica l dominance. In particu lar, the cultivation of the 
charismatic image of its  leader Mr. Ben-Gurion as the "Founder of the 
State" helped make Mapai the natural ruling party. In the early 1960's, 
however, an internecine struggle for leadership developed between Mr. 
Ben-Gurion and his old comrades-in-arms, Mr. Eshkol and Mrs. Golda 
Meir; as might have been expected, the more b itte r  i t  became, the more
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costly i t  turned out to be. On the face of i t ,  the struggle focused on 
the so-called "Lavon A ffa ir" [on the whole a f fa ir , see Yanai, 1981]. 
Whatever its  real causes, however, its  long-term consequences for the 
dominant party were nothing short of devastating. The conflict
destroyed the effective and indispensable partisan leadership of Mr. 
Ben-Gurion; i t  badly damaged the ideological, indeed the moral 
superiority of the Labour Movement; and i t  eventually resulted in an 
acrimonious s p lit in 1965, when Mr. Ben-Gurion, Mr. Moshe Dayan and Mr. 
Shimon Peres, among others, were forced out of Mapai's ranks; they then 
went on to establish a new party, Rafi.
The intraparty victory of the Eshkol-Meir faction was, i f
anything, short-lived. Although the compromising style of Prime
Minister Levi Eshkol has had some advantages in dealing with
controversial issues, the public at large had no confidence in his 
a b ility  to handle foreign and particu larly  defense a ffa irs . Prior to 
the Six Day War in 1967, under massive public pressure, Mr. Eshkol had 
to relinquish the Defence portfo lio  to Mr. Dayan, a sworn enemy of the 
vetern leadership. Rafi then rejoined Labour, and from 1967 to 1973,
younger leaders (such as Mr. Dayan, Mr. Peres, Mr. Abba Eban, and Mr.
Yigal Allon) became more in fluentia l within the party, yet they were 
unable to assume fu ll command because of factional r iv a lrie s  among 
themselves. Mrs. Meir, who succeeded Mr. Eshkol as prime minister, 
s t i l l  maintained a strong leadership position, not least because she 
headed the powerful party machinery. The old Labour leadership has 
become very well entrenched in its  party positions, from which i t  was 
able to manipulate the composition of party organs and control their  
agenda. Also, the oligarchical leadership used to recruit activists in 
the patron-client style, bringing in mediocre people to positions
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requiring more qualities than loyalty to superiors. They never allowed 
the development of an open pattern of upward mobility for new and 
capable young men and women; independent and creative young leaders
were an anathema to the old guard of the party.
The repeated succession crises brought about by this narrow-minded 
leadership style did much damage to Labour's power and public image. In
the aftermath of the 1973 war, there took place "a p o litica l
earthquake", with Mr. Rabin, Mr. Peres and Mr. Allon replacing Mrs. 
Meir, Mr. Dayan and Mr. Eban as Prime Minister, Defence Minister and 
Foreign Minister, respectively. S t i l l ,  the new leadership was plagued 
with the same b itte r  factionalism, which caused further damage to the 
public image of Labour. As a matter of fact, the Rabin-Peres king-of- 
the-castle running battle , which f i r s t  began in 1974, s t i l l  tops the
party agenda at the time of w riting.
The emergence of the Democratic Movement for Change (DMC) as an 
independent party in 1977 was widely perceived as an adequate answer to 
this deepening leadership c ris is . The DMC provided an alternative  
channel of upward mobility for m ilita ry , economic and academic leaders 
who were not given a fa ir  chance of competing for positions within 
Labour's ranks. Thus, the DMC played a major role in the downfall of 
Labour in the 1977 election, since a majority of both its  leaders and 
voters had previously been identified with Labour.
The Legitimation of the Opposition
P o litica l dominance involves, among other things, the delegitimation 
the opposition, in order to deny i t  any c re d ib ility  as a real
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alternative . A strong dominant party has the power to define the 
boundaries of legitim ation, and this is exactly what Mapai/Labour has 
done throughout its  long period of ru le. I t  has engaged in a systematic 
campaign aimed at delegitimazing and isolating the Herut party and 
other right-wing p o litica l forces. During the pre-independence era, Mr. 
Ben-Gurion, Mapai's unchallenged leader, consciously orchestrated the 
efforts  to stigmatize Herut and the entire right wing. The Irgun Zva'i 
Leumi, the pre-state m ilit ia  headed by Mr. Begin, which la te r  formed 
the core of the Herut party, was portrayed as being a te rro ris t 
organization whose actions against the British authorities actually 
undermined the Jewish struggle for independence. Needless to say, its  
p o litic a l organs were excluded from participation in the "national" 
pre-state institutions headed by Mapai.
Following independence in 1948, Mr. Ben-Gurion blatantly accused 
Herut of being an antidemocratic, repressive fascist type of movement, 
posing a grave threat to the core values of the Jewish people and the 
Is rae li state. He e x p lic itly  expressed doubts about Herut's commitment 
to the precepts of parliamentary democracy and used to warn that i f  Mr. 
Begin should come to power, Israel would turn into a dictatorship. More 
than once, Mr. Ben-Gurion declared ( i t  has actually become one of his 
bywords) that a ll parties are e lig ib le  to participate in his 
coalitions, "except Herut and the Communists". This was a clever b it of 
ostracization, which turned Herut into a pariah party. Indeed, Herut 
has been excluded from coalition participation from 1948 until 1967, at 
which time of emergency i t  was invited to jo in  in as a junior partner 
in the national unity government headed by Mr. Levi Eshkol. Mr. Ben- 
Gurion's departure from active po litics , with his partisan style of 
leadership and b itte r  enmity towards Herut, thus signified the end of
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this party's "illegitim acy". His successor, Mr. Eshkol, dealt with 
Herut in a more conciliatory style, which helped reduce its  po litica l 
iso lation.
Meanwhile, a fter a long period on the farther shores of the 
p o litic a l map, Herut has been consciously making moves of its  own 
towards p o litica l legitimacy. Two such moves took place in 1965: Herut 
participated for the f i r s t  time in the election to the Histadrut, the 
trade union movement controlled by Mapai; and more importantly, 
together with the Liberal party, Herut set up a new p o litic a l bloc 
named Gahal. Despite its  own declining power, the Liberal party seemed 
to be a natural a lly , both because i t  did have p o litic a l legitimacy and 
because of its  traditional h o s tility  towards the Labour Movement. In 
forming Gahal, Herut was w illing  to forego immediate p o litic a l payoffs 
in anticipation of greater dividends in the future. Allowing the 
declining Liberals to ride on the ta ilcoat of its  own growing popular 
support (the jo in t party l is t  was made up on a f i f t y - f i f t y  basis), 
Herut has won its  oh-so-coveted legitimacy, not to mention the Liberal 
party's considerable material assets.
Thus, the crysta llization  of the new p o litic a l bloc in 1965 was 
for Herut a f i r s t  c r it ic a l step along the path of legitim ation. 
Participation in the national unity government since 1967 made the 
process irreversib le. Mapai/Labour's continued attempts to warn the 
public against the dire consequences of Herut's rise to power were now 
fu t i le .  "In the final analysis, i t  would seem that a dominant party 
seeking to re institu te  a policy of excluding and delegitimizing a 
p o litic a l opponent who has acquired a legitimacy status faces a much 
more d if f ic u lt  task than was the case before that opponent gained 
legitimacy" [Levite & Tarrow, 1983, p. 309].
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For the Liberal party, the establishment of a p o litica l bloc with 
Herut was yet another attempt to find its  proper place in the party 
system. In spite of an impressive record in the history of the Zionist 
movement, the party (formerly the General Zionists) has regularly  
suffered major p o litica l setbacks since the state of Israel was 
established. I t  has been unable to produce any charismatic leader of 
national stature; its  historic constituency was s p lit between moderate 
and extreme tendencies, between centre and right-wing; furthermore, the 
party lacked clear parliamentary orientation, undecided as to whether 
i t  should be in coalition with or in opposition to Labour. All this 
came down to a decline in electoral support which in turn encouraged a 
search for interparty agreements. When the merger with the Progressive 
party in 1961 fa iled  to create a strong p o litic a l centre, the Liberals 
resolved to a lly  with Herut even at the cost of a s p lit  with the 
Progressives. Gahal gave the Liberals a more secure electoral basis, 
guaranteeing th e ir continued parliamentary representation, and of 
course gave hope of a real alternative to Labour's rule.
The formation of Gahal in 1965, which was expanded in 1973 and 
renamed Likud, turned isolation and stagnation into p o litic a l success. 
In 1977, Herut and the Liberals found themselves running the legitimate 
government of Israel.
Enter the Likud
The Likud's major component was the Herut party. Descended from both 
the revisionist faction in the Zionist movement and the Irgun Zva'i 
Leumi of pre-independence period, th is p o litic a l party has for long
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stagnated in the backwater of Israe li p o litic s . Its  membership was 
based on middle-class Ashkenazi, mainly urban and usually an ti- 
socia list groups. In time, this core attracted several other, mostly 
discontent groups. Among them, Sephardim have been playing an 
increasingly important ro le. I t  was, however, only the force of Mr. 
Begin's personality that has kept them together throughout this long 
period.
The Liberal party on the other hand has represented a be tter-o ff 
segment of the population, mainly upper-middle class urban and rural 
groups. I t  was perhaps the most d is tin c tly  Ashkenazi party in the 
Is rae li system. As noted e a rlie r , possibly its  most severe problem has 
been in the sphere of leadership.
Yet another component, which joined the Herut-Liberal alliance  
(Gahal) in 1973 to form the Likud, called i ts e lf  La'am. I t  was a hodge­
podge of Herut politic ians who had previously been forced out of the 
party for challenging Mr. Begin's leadership, and la te r  joined forces 
with persons who had le f t  Mapai/Labour - most of them supporters of the 
"Greater Israel" idea.
The catalyst who played a major role in turning th is rather 
unlikely alliance into a party, in 1973, was ex-General Ariel Sharon. 
Although without any power base of his own at the time, he was an 
immensely popular war hero, who could influence i f  not manipulate 
veteran party workhorses - particu larly Mr. Begin, who simply adored 
generals.
Unlike Mapai/Labour's leadership, which had lost a ll dynamism and 
became quite immobile, Herut/Likud's leadership moved in the opposite 
direction, from stagnation to openness and m obility. A fter years of 
heading the oligarchical leadership of the natural party of opposition,
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Mr. Begin realized that only through genuine recruitment of new leaders 
carr the in ferio r position of his party be changed. While protecting his 
own top position, Mr. Begin was determined to set up a counter-elite  
which would be able successfully to challenge the ruling party. When 
Herut was s t i l l  part of the national unity government, in 1969, Mr. 
Begin invited Air Force General Ezer Weizmann to become a cabinet 
minister. This was a major turning point in the pattern of national 
leadership recruitment. Labour's monopoly in selecting persons of 
proven record in other domains, mainly defense, for top p o litica l 
positions, was now broken as Herut became a new channel to the power 
e li te .
The formation of the Likud in 1973 represented a giant step 
forward in the buildup of a powerful and attractive leadership 
structure. To begin with, Mr. Begin agreed to make peace with former 
party riva ls  and challengers such as Mr. Shmuel Tamir or members of 
Lehi ("the Stern Gang"), who had been b itte r  riva ls  in pre-independence 
times. Secondly, Mr. Begin was w illing  to put up with the po litica l 
maneuovers of Mr. Ariel Sharon, because of the la t te r 's  major role in 
bringing together the various factions to be included in the Likud. 
Also, Mr. Begin brought in new p o litic a l groups under the Likud 
umbrella, even though i t  narrowed the representation of his own Herut 
party within the new p o litica l bloc.
All these steps were taken in order to present to the public a 
respectable and legitimate ruling alternative. I t  was believed that 
only a wide spectrum of leaders (including former Ben-Gurion and Labour 
supporters) could substantially enhance the winning prospects of the 
Likud bloc. The Movement for a Greater Is rae l, for instance, added much
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respectability to the Likud, since i t  included some prestigious 
personalities previously associated with the Labour establishment.
The leadership stature of Mr. Begin himself was growing with the 
passage of time; his personality became an important factor in the 
Likud's rise to power. Long obscured by Mr. Ben-Gurion, as of the 
1970's Mr. Begin's charisma turned out to be an invaluable p o litica l 
asset for the right-wing bloc. His d irect, populistic style, using 
nationalis tic  overtones and reflecting sensitiv ity  to Jewish symbols 
(which Labour lacked, by and large) proved appealing to the proverbial 
"man-in-the-street” - particu larly  to Sephardic Jews, a growing 
component in the electorate. He was quite articu late  in his forceful 
defin ition  of the goals of the Jewish State and thus was able to 
establish himself as a statesman with an international reputation as 
well as "a proud Jew”. Labour leaders were no match to Mr. Begin when 
i t  came down to electoral p o litics . And i t  was thus that in 1977, after 
long years in p o litica l wilderness, Mr. Menachem Begin was called by 
the President to form the government.
The Ideological Shift to the Right
In the pre-independence era, socialist and social-democratic symbols 
shaped the ideology of the Labour Movement; quite a significant part of 
the small Jewish community in the then Palestine upheld egalitarian  
principles. Later on, socialist ideology began to pale - not an unknown 
phenomenon in most social democracies in the Western world, to say 
nothing of the Eastern. The net result was a sh ift of the Israeli 
electorate away from the le f t .  One dimension of this ideological
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decline was an apparent d iff ic u lty  experienced by Mapai/Labour in 
mobilizing the Sephardic mass immigration of the 1950's through 
p o litic a l education in social-democratic ideas. Realising that the new 
immigrants were unlikely to back social democracy, Mapai did not even 
try  to use its  power bases - the Kibbutzim, or the Histadrut with its  
indispensable health services, labour exchanges and regional trade 
unions - to reinforce its  image as a workers' party. Instead, i t  
exploited these p o litica l organs to develop economic dependency among 
Sephardic Jews.
As far as the Sephardic segment was concerned, this dependency was 
associated with a growing feeling of economic inequality and ethnic 
in fe r io r ity . The social and economic gap made i t  easy for Sephardic 
groups to blame Labour for its  duplic ity . Looking for an alternative, 
many Sephardim made a bee-line to the riva l p o litica l camp. The Likud, 
focusing on national and religious symbols and addressing i ts e lf  to 
problems of social and economic in justice, has had fa r greater appeal 
to low-status groups than Labour.
The p o litic a l sh ift to the right was reflected not only in the 
socioeconomic domain but also in foreign and defense issues. The Six 
Day War, which brought under Israe l's  control the te rr ito rie s  of its  
Biblical heartland, has given much boost to ideological fundamentalism. 
This took the form of strong national and religious sentiments which 
have had an impact on Sephardic groups as w ell. I t  was the root cause 
for a continuing d r if t  to the right in Israe li public opinion, which 
naturally strengthened the Likud.
The Labour party, by contrast, found its e lf  completely vexed in 
the aftermath of the 1967 war, in this particular respect. The party 
has been uniquely unable to formulate any clear-cut position on the
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future of the occupied te rr ito rie s , torn apart by dovish and hawkish 
tendencies as i t  was. As a matter of fact, Labour has tried  to 
consolidate a consensus around a status q u o  notion of "no withdrawal, 
no annexation", which was correctly interpreted by a ll and sundry as a 
non-starter, making the switch-over to the Likud that much easier. I t  
is important to note in this context that as fa r as the controversy 
over the future of the te rr ito rie s  is concerned, Herut/Likud has never 
been alone on its  side of the issue. Not only most religious groups, 
but significant elements in the Labour movement as well tended to 
support the Likud's basic positions.
Labour Means Old. Likud Means Young
Labour's major achievements, which accounted for most of its  success 
and p o litica l power, took place mainly in the 1940's and 1950's. 
Naturally, these were losing much of th e ir impact with the passage of 
time. The Labour party appeared less attractive to younger voters, for 
whom old symbols meant l i t t l e ,  past achievements were taken for 
granted, and present injustices were a ll that rea lly  mattered. Thus, 
Labour was increasingly perceived as a senior c itizens' party, whereas 
the alternative, the Likud, was for the younger generation.
As of the mid-1960's, polls were reflecting this trend, also in 
terms of positions on issues, not only with respect to partisan 
support. These tendencies in the positions of the general public were 
also displayed by e lite  groups. For instance, opinion polls showed that 
university professors leaned to the le f t ,  while th e ir students were 
more supportive of the right wing [Peres & Shemer, 1984, pp. 89-110].
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Published surveys and opinion polls create p o litica l images which 
tend to be translated into p o litica l re a lity , as shown in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 Likud and Labour Gains in A Variety of Aoe Groups
(percentage)
Likud Labour
Aoe Grouo 1969 1973 1977 1969 1973 197]
Under 24 36 44 51 40 39 20
25-39 30 44 34 54 37 25
40-49 25 35 29 61 48 38
Over 50 21 23 23 62 54 53
Based on Arian, 1985.
The most striking feature here is the data for 1977, when 51 
percent of the 18-24 age group supported the Likud, as against a low 20 
percent support for Labour. And indeed, in that year the Likud came to 
power and Labour was badly defeated. Demographically speaking, the 
groups registering greatest support for the Likud were steadily 
increasing in size, while age groups supportive of Labour were 
naturally shrinking. When ethnicity is thrown in, this tendency becomes 
a snowball.
Ashkenazi versus Seohardi
The chief ethnic cleavage among the Jews in Israel is between the 
Ashkenazim (immigrants of European origin and th e ir descendants) and 
the Sephardim (of Asian or African orig in, mostly from Arab countries).
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The Ashkenazim constituted an overwhelming majority of Israe l's  
population at the time of independence in 1948. In the 1950's, however, 
massive immigration waves of Sephardic Jews came to Is rae l, bringing 
with them significant demographic changes in the composition of the 
electorate. In the course of time, the share of Sephardic Jews, with 
th e ir higher birth rate, have increased in the voting population as 
against a steady decline in the share of the Ashkenazi group. All this  
has had considerable impact on voting patterns.
The main beneficiary of the demographic changes has been the 
Likud. I t  was estimated that "the long-term influence of changes in the 
demographic-ethnic makeup of the population upon the balance of 
parliamentary power... would increase the gap between the two major 
parties (in the Likud's favor) at a rate of some 2% in each election 
campaign" [Peres & Shemer, 1984, p. 106].
The following Table sums up the situation.
Table 3.2 Labour and Likud Vote bv Ethnic Origin. 1969. 1973. 1977
(percentage)
Labour Likud
1969 1973 1977 1969 1973 1977
Sephardim 51 39 32 32 43 46
Sephardic origin 49 40 23 37 47 65
Ashkenazim 61 53 48 20 26 19
Ashkenazi origin 
Based on Arian, 1985
48 38 23 26 39 23
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I t  is quite apparent from the above Table that the increase in the 
share of Sephardic Jews in the electorate, a well as the change in 
th e ir voting patterns (particu larly  among the second generation of the 
1950's immigrants) has significantly strengthened the Likud. In the 
face of this trend, i t  becomes quite clear that any efforts  made by 
Labour to prolong the Likud's p o litica l isolation were doomed to 
fa ilu re .
Economically, the Ashkenazi group generally enjoys a higher 
standard of liv ing than the Sephardim. Over time, there has been no 
sign of narrowing the gap. The persistent overlapping between ethnic 
a ff i l ia t io n  and socioeconomic status was one more factor which worked 
for the Likud. Promising economic reforms and improvements, i t  appealed 
d irec tly  to the poorer section of the voters, who happened to be mostly 
Sephardic. The Ashkenazi Labour establishment was blamed for th e ir  
economic problems, so that voting for the Likud was also an act of 
social protest.*
For Labour, the changing demographic makeup of the voting 
population has created insurmountable p o litica l problems. The moderate 
but steady decline in the re la tive  size of the Ashkenazi group, its  
main voting reservoir, hurt Labour. The tendency to identify  Labour 
with the Ashkenazi group earned the party an anti-Sephardic image, 
portraying i t  as largely responsible for the ethnic gap in the f ir s t
*  I t  is interesting to note that the Likud was regarded by many as 
an anti-establishment party long a fter i t  had come to power. Thus, 
in 1981, for instance - a fter four years in power - the Likud 
s t i l l  commanded the ethnic vote, gaining about 70% of the general 
Sephardic vote and close to 90% of the underprivileged Morrocan 
Jews [Diskin, 1984, pp. 44-56].
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place. At the same time, the Likud was portrayed as promoting the 
advancement of the Sephardic group. However weakly founded in re a lity , 
these images (which s t i l l  persist) have nevertheless counted in 
determining electoral choices. Labour's attempts to deal with the 
"Sephardic problem" have fa iled  to distinguish between patronage 
po litics  (being responsive to Sephardic demands) and participation  
p o litics  (keeping open channels for authentic representation of 
Sephardic Jews within its  ranks). This fa ilu re  to comprehend the 
fundamental difference between patronage and participation can explain 
- perhaps better than any other factor - Labour's weak position among 
Sephardic Jews.
"The coming to power of the Likud has opened the way for Oriental 
[Sephardic] Jews to redefine th e ir collective status in Israe li 
society" [Lewis, 1984, p. 34]. For the Sephardic group, the Likud was 
perceived as some kind of shelter from the e l i t is t ,  arrogant and 
secular Labour party and the condescending, paternalistic Ashkenazi 
establishment. They were anti-Labour, i f  nothing else.
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Competition and P o la r iz a tio n . 1977-1984
The Changing Power Relations
The fa ll  of Labour and the rise of the Likud can best be traced by 
th e ir  changing fortunes at the electoral leve l. The vote for Labour 
came down from 51.2% in 1965, through 46.2% in 1969 and 39.6% in 1973, 
to a low of 24.6% in 1977, at which point its  p o litic a l dominance came 
to an end. Conversely, the Likud's vote had moved up from 25% in 1965, 
through 29.2% in 1969 and 33.8% in 1973, to a victorious 35.3% in 
1977.*
In parliament, the losses of Labour and the gains of the Likud 
appear in Chart 3.1 on the next page.
I t  can readily be seen that voters in large numbers le f t  the ir
previous p o litic a l homes and formed new attachments during the period 
under discussion. In 1977, the pattern of Labour's dominance was broken 
and the Likud won the largest number of Knesset seats. Many believed, 
however, that the election results were but a temporary setback, an
accident. I t  was thought that when the emotional force of those
realigning issues was spent, aberrant voters would come back to the
In 1981 Labour gained 36.6% of the vote by recovering most of its  
1977 losses to the DMC, but the Likud remained number one by 
gaining 37.1% of the to ta l. Labour seemed to have exhausted its  
vote potential in the 1981 elections, whereas the Likud's vote 
continued to grow, carving into the 12 to 15 percent level of the 
religious vote. As of 1973 the combined Likud-religious vote was 
higher by 5% to 10% than the vote for Labour and its  a f f i l ia te s .
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fold. Thus, the 1981 election was equally c r it ic a l, in that i t  proved 
that the changes of 1977 were of a lasting nature and the old pattern 
of Israeli politics was unmistakably and to ta lly  broken. The results of 
the 1977 and 1981 elections appear in Table 3.3 on the next page.
Chart 3.1 Labour and Likud Knesset Seats. 1965-1984
Knesset Seats
La boa
*
Likud
Year 1965 1969 1973 1977 1981 1984
Source: Arian, 1985, p. 141.
Fragmentation
The level of fragmentation in the party system reflected a change from 
a consensus model to an adversarial or majoritarian model [Lijphart, 
1989, pp. 141-4]. In 1977, the number of party lis ts  participating in 
the elections was 22, out of which 13 acquired parliamentary
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Table 3.3 Results of the 1977 and 1981 Knesset Elections
1977 1981
Left-of-Centre
Communist (Rakah) 5 4
Shell 2 -
CRM 1 1
Arab (Labour) 1 -
Labour 32 47
Shinui - 2
Centre
Ind. Liberals 1 -
DMC 15 -
Telem - 2
Reliaious
Poalei Agudat Israel 1 -
Agudat Israel 4 4
NRP 12 6
Tami - 3
Riaht-of-Centre
Likud 43 48
Shlomzion 2 -
Techiya - 3
Flatto-Sharon 1 -
Source: Israel Government Yearbooks.
- 95 -
representation.* In 1981, the number dropped to an a ll-tim e low of 10 
out of 31 lis ts  that ran for election. Moreover, the Progressive party, 
Poalei Agudat Israel and the Arab lis ts  disappeared from the scene for 
the f i r s t  time since 1949. As for parties' size, i f  in 1977 the two 
major parties won 75 seats out of a total of 120 between them, in 1981 
they won 95 seats. The leading religious party, NRP, was cut in half 
between 1977 and 1981, from 12 to 6 Knesset members. In fac t, a ll the 
smaller parties, le f t ,  right or relig ious, lost power in 1981.
This indicates an overall reduction in the levels of fragmentation 
and fractionalization . The actual number of parties may not have 
changed dramatically, but looked at from the point of view of 
parliamentary proto-coalitions, or the effective number of parties with 
coalition potential, the number has gone as fa r down as may be expected 
within the framework of an extreme P.R. system [Laakso & Taagepera, 
1979, pp. 3-27]. The figures seem to represent a strong potential for 
s t i f f  competition and a high level of polarization between the two 
largest parties.
By Israe li law, a " lis t"  had to obtain at least one per cent of 
the total e lig ib le  vote in order to be able to claim a seat in the 
Knesset. Periodic attempts to change the law in order to increase 
th is "blocking percentage", thereby reducing the number of parties 
in the Knesset, have a ll fa iled  until recently, for obvious 
coalitionary reasons. In early 1992, the "representation 
threshold" was raised to 1.5%.
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P o la riza tio n
In the 1977 election the DMC , a centrist party, gained an impressive 
number of parliamentary seats, 15, and became the th ird largest party 
afte r the Likud and Labour. Some analysts have viewed the rise of the 
DMC as signifying a major structural change, from a dominant party 
system to a basically tr ip a r t ite  system - le f t ,  right and centre. By 
1981 i t  became clear, however, that the sh ift was instead towards a 
b ip artite  system. There is no doubt that the DMC brought down Labour in 
1977, but i t  is equally true that its  flash-in-the-pan was a negative 
vote against the ruling party, not a positive vote to the notion of a 
th ird  major party. Come 1981, there was no p o litica l centre, no middle 
ground, no DMC. In the absence of a p o litica l centre, two opposing 
p o litic a l blocs, the Likud and Labour, were fighting each other head-on 
- a clear sign of increasing polarization [Pollock, 1982, pp. 28-52].
Two major factors contributed to polarization - the debate on the 
future of the te rr ito rie s  occupied since 1967, and ethnicity . In 1981, 
a ll the lis ts  represented in the Knesset, save one, had declared th e ir  
allegiance with either large p o litic a l party even prior to the 
elections. This choice was related to policy positions on the 
te r r ito r ia l issue. The hawkish, right-wing Likud camp included the NRP 
and Agudat Israel (both religious) as well as Tami, a party which 
attempted to outflank the Likud on the ethnic issue, and also Techiya, 
which endavoured to do the same on the te rr ito r ia l issue. The dovish, 
left-w ing Labour camp included the CRM, Shinui (a leftover from the 
heyday of the DMC) and Hadash, the "new" communist party, reflecting  
mainly Arab national sentiments. Telem, led by Mr. Dayan, was the only 
l is t  to withhold its  post-election intentions. This clear pattern of
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two proto-coalitions has reflected deep polarization on a key 
ideological issue.
Thus crystallized a party system consisting essentially of two 
large parties, each drawing its  support from d ifferen t class and ethnic 
elements in the population. The voting pattern in the 1981 election was 
blatantly ethnic, the Likud gaining most of the Sephardic vote and 
Labour supported by the majority of the Ashkenazi group. Labour never 
realized the depths of ethnic animosity and was not prepared for an 
Ashkenazi-Sephardic showdown.
V o la tility
The party system's transformation has been accompanied by fluctuations 
in the level of electoral v o la t i l i ty , as shown in the following Table, 
which gives the estimated percentage of voters who changed th e ir vote 
from one general election to the next:
Table 3.4 Electoral V o la tility
Years Electoral V o la tility
1965-1969 25%
1969-1973 32%
1973-1977 50%
1977-1981 40%
1981-1984 25%
Source: Arian, 1985.
- 98 -
During the 1965-1977 period, the level of electoral v o la t i l ity  
doubled, from 25 to 50 percent. The weakening of party identification  
in itia ted  a move of many voters across party and even bloc lines - a 
sure sign that the dominant party system was coming to an end. After 
1977, however, electoral v o la t i l ity  has not taken the form of switch 
across party blocs but rather represented a reshuffle of parties' 
strength within each bloc. In 1981, nearly a ll the 1977 Likud voters 
returned to support th e ir party, and helped i t  secure its  second 
electoral victory. Labour's gaining back most of the vote i t  had lost 
to the DMC in 1977 helps explain the high level of v o la t i l i ty  in 1981 - 
40 percent. Towards 1984, voting patterns seem to have settled, 
returning to pre transformation levels.
The formation of two competitive blocs of parties along both 
politica l-ideo log ical and social-ethnic lines has created class 
po litics  in Israel that did not exist in the past, when the dominant 
Labour party obtained a p lu ra lity  of the vote within a ll categories of 
the electorate. Theoretically, there seems to be an apparent 
contradiction between deep polarization and high levels of electoral 
v o la t i l i ty . This however can be explained, at least in part, i f  
v o la t i l i ty  occurs within, not across, party blocs.
Socio-Political Cleavages
Lijphart suggests that whereas the consensual model is associated with 
a multi-cleavage situation, the adversarial model is characterized by 
the existence of a major dividing issue [L ijphart, 1989, p. 147]. In 
Is rae l, the number of controversial issues has not been reduced when 
the party system was transformed, yet one single issue dominated the
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entire p o litic a l scene - the future of the occupied te rr ito r ie s . All 
other cleavages coincided with this question, including the ever- 
problematic religious issues. Even parties formed with a sole intention 
to address specific issues (such as Tami) were firm ly based on one side
or the other of the chief p o litica l issue that rea lly  mattered.
The existence of such a salient issue is the key to understanding 
the Is rae li party system. The division into three p o litic a l blocs - 
Labour, right-wing and religious - which had played such an important
role in the dominant party system, lost its  significance with the
emergence of the national issue. While the p o litic a l and organizational 
structures of the old party system were preserved, ideology placed them 
now in only two polarized party blocs: the right-w ing/religious bloc 
and the left-w ing bloc.
Competitiveness
A change from a consensual to an adversarial model is associated with 
minimal rather than oversized coalitions [L ijphart, 1989, p. 148]. Also 
in the adversarial model, the power of the opposition (which is usually 
not of a b ila tera l nature) tends to increase. This proved to be the 
case in Israel as well. The emergence of two opposing party blocs, the
Likud's and Labour's, capable of contesting for the control of
government, has contributed to a high level of competitiveness. 
Certainly the very formation of party blocs was prompted by a strong 
desire to attain  and retain power.
The increasing competitiveness between opposing parties may 
actually lend more importance to the distinction between " le ft"  and
"right" than is warranted by the ideological differences between them
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[Arian & Shamir, 1983, p. 277]. This was the case in the 1981 election 
campaign - the longest and most b itte r ly  fought in Is rae l's  young 
democracy. The results show that the consolidation of power in the two 
major blocs was the strongest (95 out of 120). This very high level of 
competition was the outcome of the voters' preference for a clear-cut 
choice between the only two parties capable of making a coalition  
[Azmon, 1981, p. 434].
The Three-Ringed Circus
Significant party competition in Israel takes place in three different 
arenas: elections for parliament, elections for control of the
Histadrut, and municipal elections. In the past, the dominant 
Mapai/Labour had the elections to the Histadrut, where i t  enjoyed an 
overwhelming majority, take place prior to the date on which both 
parliamentary and municipal elections were held. In the former arena, 
elections could serve Mapai/Labour as a re la tive ly  harmless lightning- 
rod for whatever protest vote there was, as well as a useful indicator 
for te l l ta le  shifts in public attitudes, the better to prepare its e lf  
for national and local elections. In 1977, for the f i r s t  time, 
parliamentary elections were held prior to the Histadrut elections, and 
local elections took place even la te r . This departure from tradition  
cost the party dearly at the polls. The parliamentary election h it 
Labour hard, with no "early warning" of the massive protest vote that 
had emerged.
Labour's humiliating Knesset defeat was a p o litic a l shock which 
created a sense of loss and despair among many, including most of the 
e lite  groups in society. When Labour won the Histadrut elections a few
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months la te r , however, i t  created a feeling that the loss of 
parliamentary power was just an aberration, which feeling served to 
cushion the transition to a competitive two-bloc party system. I t  
appeared to make sense for each of the large parties to control a 
differen t p o litic a l arena, and even the division seemed right: the 
Likud would control national issues in parliament and Labour would have 
a strong influence on socioeconomic issues by controlling the 
Histadrut.
The following Table shows the Likud-Labour power relations in both 
the Knesset and the Histadrut, which contributed to the competitive 
dimension of the p o litica l system.
Table 3.5 Electoral Gains in the Knesset and the Histadrut
Year Knesset 120-seats Histadrut (oercentl
Likud Labour Likud Labour
1973 39 51 22.7 58.3
1977 43 32 28.8 55.3
1981 48 47 26.8 63.1
Source: Israel Government Yearbooks. Histadrut Yearbooks.
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The growing level of competitiveness discerned in the varying 
results of Knesset and Histadrut elections was also manifest in the 
municipal arena. The Israe li voter has emerged, on the whole, as a 
rather sophisticated p o litic a l animal: he has proven his a b ility  to 
distinguish between the three arenas and generally cast his vote in 
each according to independent evaluations of the parties competing in 
each case - even though they were the same parties a ll along.
Much Change. L it t le  S tab ilitv
The 1977 elections were as dramatic as can be. One day in May, "the 
patronage, prestige and power which Labour leaders had been accustomed 
to were suddenly removed from th e ir grasp" [Arian, 1977, p. 20]. The 
end of half-a-century of p o litica l dominance was characterized as "more 
than a change in government" [Horowitz, 1977, p. 3 ]. No "revolution" 
took place, however, because major factors relating to p o litica l 
culture in the environment of the party system have been preserved. 
Loyalty to the Jewish state, adherence to democratic values, acceptance 
of p o litic a l legitimacy, playing by the rules of the game, adoption of 
patterns of bargaining and compromise and so on - these elements were 
strong enough to allow a party system change and a change of government 
without a change in the nature of the regime.
As of May 1977, the Herut party has controlled the power centre of 
the p o litic a l system. Herut, in a way reminiscent of the early-days 
Mapai, maintained a majority in Gahal, Gahal dominated the Likud, the 
Likud had a majority in the coalition and the coalition controlled 
parliament. Labour, for the f i r s t  time, was not the core of government 
- i t  was not even in  government.
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The Herut party controlled the power centre but was not In  the 
power centre; this is more than a semantic d istinction . A system 
controlled from an off-centre position tends to experience acute 
problems of p o litica l s ta b ility . In this sense, the 1977 election
brought about only "half a revolution" - a new party at the head of the 
government, but not a new p o litic a l hegemony. Unlike Mapai/Labour in 
the past, the Likud has not become the pivotal party in the centre of 
the p o litica l map. In general, i t  has been argued that a P.R. system 
and coalition government undermine democracy by taking the choice of 
government from the people and giving i t  to a few politic ians who wheel 
and deal for coalitions that do not re flec t the "w ill of the people". 
Much more so when an o ff centre party controls the executive coalition, 
a condition which may lead to "government without consensus". This was 
certainly the case with the Likud, particu larly  in the early years of 
its  p o litic a l rule.
The development of p o litica l b ipo larity , with two more or less
equal party blocs, strengthened the bargaining power of m inorities,
thus contributing to further in s ta b ility . There was no centre party to
lend s ta b ility  to the p o litica l system. The attempts by the DMC in 1977 
and Telem in 1981 to adopt a neutral centrist position between the two 
blocs fa iled  miserably. As i t  happened, the pivotal position was 
occupied by the religious Agudat Israel in 1977 and the ethnic Tami in 
1981, but they were in no position to consolidate a genuine p o litica l 
centre around them. I t  seems that only a party of medium or big size 
could rea lly  act as a pivot, and no such party has existed in Israel 
since 1977. In this respect, the party system has changed from a 
"working multiparty system" to a "non-working multiparty system".
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In conclusion, the "partial revolution" of 1977 robbed the party 
system of a sizable pivotal party. The p o litic a l centre became weak and 
divided. The linkage between size and cen tra lity  was broken and, 
consequently, the pivotal position became shaky and unstable. The 
disjointed party system was hurt right where i t  lived , in the middle. 
One consequence of this situation has been a succession of unstable 
governments. The formation of the f i r s t  bipolar, national coalition in 
1984 actually represented a successful e ffo rt to strengthen the pivotal 
position and secure government s ta b ility . Until 1984, the Likud 
maintained its  p o litica l rule by coalition politicking that was 
successful mainly in keeping Labour in opposition, as w ill be explained 
in the next section.
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The Likud's "Not Losing* Coalitions
Realignments in party systems tend to be accompanied by changes in 
patterns of coalition p o litics , a ll the more so when a dominant party 
system turns into a competitive one. After a l l ,  "dominance" mainly 
suggests controlling coalition p o litic s , whereas "competitiveness" 
necessarily implies a p o litic a l struggle over the composition of 
government. Being an off-centre dominant party, the Likud developed 
rather interesting mechanisms to control coalition po litics  in the 
1977-84 period.
Off-Centre Control of Coalition Politics
The very existence of a coalition-forming party which is located at an 
off-centre position, or indeed nearer the end of the classic le ft-r ig h t  
continuum, has a strong impact on the formation and maintenance of the 
executive coalition. Chart 3.2 is a hypothetical illu s tra tio n  of the 
modus ooerandi of an o ff centre coalition leader.
50
Left _____________________ .___________________.__ Right
Party A B C  D E  F G
15 25 6 5 6 8 35
Chart 3.2 An Off-centre Coalition Leader
(in a hypothetical 100 member parliament)
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Party G, being by far the largest parliamentary party, is lik e ly  
to become the coalition "formateur". The location of Party G, near the 
end of the po litica l spectrum, indicates that i t  attaches importance to 
policy considerations, otherwise i t  would probably not have been 
positioned there in the f i r s t  place. A major concern of Party G in 
forming the government is thus to ensure that the coalition 's  "policy 
package" w ill be as close as possible to its  own policy position. 
Accordingly, Party G w ill endeavour to form a minimal ideological range 
coalition DEFG (54 seats) which provides i t  with the best possible 
policy payoffs. Coalition DEFG happens to be of a minimal size in terms 
of membership, and as such i t  supposedly maximizes o ffice  payoffs to 
its  members. I t  seems therefore that Party G should be content with 
this coalition, which maximizes both its  policy and o ffice  payoffs. 
Moreover, in view of coalition theory's assertion that a minimal 
winning coalition is the most stable one. Party G apparently enjoys an 
"ideal" situation: I t  maximizes payoffs in a coalition which maintains 
a long-term s ta b ility . This situation seems too good to be true.
Actually, the s ta b ility  of coalition DEFG is rather precariously 
balanced. To begin with, the pivotal Party D may jo in  an alternative  
coalition ABCD, possibly enjoying even better payoffs compared to 
coalition DEFG. Also, Party G i ts e lf ,  which formed coalition DEFG, may 
not be content with the overall payoffs arrangements. Its  office  
payoffs, 35/54, seem reasonable enough. Its  policy payoffs, however, 
are disappointing because the policy position of coalition DEFG is a 
good way to the le f t  of Party's G ideal policy position. Being the 
coalition leader. Party G may in it ia te  a right-wing sh ift of the 
coalition 's  policy position. Such an attempt may resu lt, however, in
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the defection of centre Party D. Should we conclude that coalition DEFG 
is inherently unstable? not necessarily.
I t  is possible to s tab ilize  coalition DEFG, to some extent, by a 
tradeoff between policy payoffs and office  payoffs among its  members. 
For example. Party G, the coalition organizer, can o ffer Party D some 
of its  many office payoffs in exchange for policy payoffs. Party D may 
well accept the o ffe r, i f  i t  is less concerned with policy payoffs 
compared to Party G. In any event. Party D w ill certain ly expect to get 
significant office payoffs for its  policy concessions. After a l l ,  as a 
centre party i t  has to "justify" its  membership in a coalition that 
pursues a rather extreme right-wing policy. This is the essence of the 
deal between the dominant (off-centre) Party G and the pivotal Party D. 
This p o litic a l exchange supposedly contributes to the s ta b ility  of 
coalition DEFG, in that Party G enjoys higher policy payoffs and Party 
D gets more office payoffs.
I t  is important to note that a dominant off-centre party cannot 
maximize both policy and office payoffs. Also, i t  is very unlikely that 
this party w ill choose to maximize o ffice payoffs at the expense of the 
policy positions that had brought i t  po litica l success. What is lik e ly , 
however, is that in time, the dominant party w ill move to the p o litica l 
centre and then try  to maximize both policy and o ffice  payoffs. In the 
short run, however, the off-centre dominant party w ill probably choose 
to maximize policy payoffs in exchange for a goodly share of office  
payoffs to its  coalition partners.
In this example, i t  may be the case that Party G w ill d istribute  
important cabinet posts to Parties D, E and F in order to make them 
pursue its  desired policy, not theirs. I t  is up to the larger party to 
strike the right balance between policy and office tradeoffs within the
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coalition framework. Such arrangements may be somewhat complicated, but 
the principle of payoffs exchange seems valid and operative. Since the 
leading party controls bargaining, its  overall position is safe enough 
to in it ia te  cabinet reshuffles whenever needed. Moreover, a certain 
degree of in s ta b ility  is tolerable in situations where the leading 
opposition party (in this case Party B) cannot put together a winning 
coalition . I f ,  indeed, the other side cannot win, you cannot lose even 
i f  your coalition becomes less stable due to an increasing imbalance in 
the distribution of policy and office payoffs among partners.*
The Likud, headed by Mr. Begin, was an off-centre dominant party 
that controlled coalition po litics  in a way sim ilar to Party G in this 
hypothetical example. As the coalition organizer, the Likud was 
interested in policy as an end onto i ts e lf  and used office as a means 
to influence policy. Prime Minister Begin did not mind giving important 
cabinet positions to non-Herut members, as long as they supported Herut 
policies. Thus, Mr. Yadin, the leader of the DMC, served as a Deputy 
Prime Minister, while two former Labour leaders, Mr. Dayan and Mr. 
Hurwitz, were given the weighty Foreign A ffairs and Finance portfolios, 
respectively.
Actually, giving non-Herut members high cabinet positions was the 
most effective way to ensure that Herut's off-centre positions would 
become government policy, which was what rea lly  mattered to Mr. Begin. 
Leaders of other factions and parties were offered glamorous and 
powerful offices in which to implement Mr. Begin's policies - not
On portfolios as a currency whereby parties may be compensated for 
loss of policy payoffs, see Austin-Smith & Banks, 1988, pp. 405- 
422. For an opposite view see Laver & Shepsle, 1990(A), p. 890.
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theirs . For the policy-motivated Mr. Begin, office assumed secondary 
importance. Needless to say, only a leader who enjoys complete 
domination over his own party, as Mr. Begin did, could have 
contemplated such tradeoffs at the expense of his loyal lieutenants.
Offering senior positions to non-Herut leaders was apparently a 
suboptimal choice. But since these persons played an "office" game to 
Mr. Begin's "ideology" game, a tradeoff was the logical way to go. The 
coalition was able to secure a majority and Mr. Begin's policy 
predominated. Obviously, i t  is often quite d if f ic u lt  to ascertain the 
precise motives of players and to te l l  who plays which game, or whether 
they play only one game at a time. In this particular case, however, 
there were clearly two divergent motives leading to the development of 
two d ifferen t games, which made tradeoff possible: o ffice  payoffs in
exchange for policy payoffs in a framework of a viable coalition  
[Schlesinger, 1976, pp. 840-9].
That this was indeed the case is te s tif ie d  to by the fact that 
when the top non-Likud ministers mentioned above, namely Mr. Yadin, Mr. 
Dayan and Mr. Hurwitz, attempted to pursue "independent" policies that 
were unacceptable to Mr. Begin, they were ejected from government one 
by one. Even a Herut leader. Defence Minister Ezer Weizmann, was forced 
to resign his office as a result of policy conflicts with the Prime 
Minister. I t  was de fin ite ly  Mr. Begin's government, and he got rid  of 
those who did not see i t  this way. He could afford to do so, because 
there was no real alternative either to his leadership or to his 
government. The resigning ministers could and did vote against his 
weakened coalition, but i t  did not matter. This was partly  why Mr. 
Begin was confident of his a b ility  to d ictate policy and control 
coalition po litics  from an off-centre position.
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The complexity of off-centre control of coalition p o litics , 
involving as i t  does the employment of d ifferen t mechanisms of 
decision-making in the implementation of policy positions, is best 
illu s tra ted  by two major decisions, one on peace and one on war, made 
by the Likud's government, using completely d ifferen t decision-making 
mechanisms in each case.
The Peace Accord
The major decision on the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty in 1979 offers  
an opportunity to study how a party which controls the executive 
coalition , but not the pivotal position in the leg is la ture , operates. 
Under the circumstances, the Likud leadership could not have used the 
"concentric circles" mechanism, simply because i t  would not have 
worked. I t  was impossible to go through the motions, because there were 
major disagreements within the ruling party. The strongest anti-peace 
group opposing Prime Minister Begin was in Herut i ts e lf .  Any attempt to 
enforce the principles of party discipline and government collective  
responsibility might have torn party and government apart. Realizing 
that the pro-peace forces, including most of the Labour opposition, had 
a sure leg is la tive  majority, Mr. Begin decided to resolve the issue 
neither in his party nor in government, but in parliament.* So this
Mr. Begin says that he brought the issue d irec tly  to parliament's 
approval only because he had promised to do i t  and for no other 
reason [personal communication, 19.8.91]. I f  no intraparty 
po litics  was involved, however, there was no reason for him to 
threaten with resignation, as he did before the vote was taken.
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example illu s tra tes  a way in which intragovernment decision-making can 
be affected by the balance of power in the leg islature.
The more general point relates to decisions made by the government 
as a whole, or in itia ted  by coalition partners. I t  is not necessary for 
the executive coalition to be supported by the same leg is la tive  parties 
on each single vote. I t  is possible for a decision to be supported by 
parties or individual members who are not usually supportive of the 
executive coalition. When both coalitions, executive and leg is la tive , 
are involved in decision-making, i t  is the verdict of the leg is la tive  
coalition that counts most.
Choosing the main location of conflic t resolution tends to 
influence the outcome, and is therefore usually manipulated by 
p o litic a l leaders. The Israe li debate on peace with Egypt in 1979 
brings to mind the dispute about B rita in 's  entry into the European 
Community in 1975. The then British Prime Minister Harold Wilson put 
the issue to a referendum at the electoral level. The o ffic ia l 
explanation was that the decision was of such import that i t  could not 
have been taken without "the whole-hearted consent of the British  
people". In re a lity , this decision was merely intended to preserve the 
unity of Mr. Wilson's Labour party, which was severely divided between 
pro- and anti-European sentiments. I t  was the minority Labour's pro- 
European group that pushed to resolve the issue outside the party 
ranks. The anti-European forces had a majority in the Labour party but 
were heavily outnumbered in parliament and in the electorate, due to 
the overwhelming pro-European attitude of the Conservative party. Both 
cases, then, illu s tra te  Archimedes's leverage principle: the force 
applied to the lever sometimes counts less than the fulcrum you chose.
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The War in Lebanon
The Is rae li debate about the war in Lebanon in 1982 shows the above 
principle in work a ll over again. The decision in point was the 
in it ia tio n  of a war against the PLO which had created in Lebanon "a 
state within a state". The issue was highly controversial and the Likud 
leadership was faced with much opposition within the party, as well as 
in the executive coalition and in parliament, by opponents of a large- 
scale m ilita ry  operation.
To implement its  policy, the Likud this time did use the 
"concentric circles" model. Its  leaders, mainly Mr. Begin and Defence 
Minister Ariel Sharon, f ir s t  pushed a vote in party caucus, in order to 
silence factional c r it ic s . Then they secured government approval 
against the opposition of two coalition partners, the NRP and Tami; 
f in a lly , using the instruments of "party discipline" and "government 
collective responsibility", they were able to withstand a series of no- 
confidence motions in parliament. Had a free vote been taken in the 
leg islature, there is an undeniable possib ility  that a majority of the 
members would have rejected the Likud's position. The war in Lebanon 
was an example of a major issue in which the position of a minority (or 
actually a bare majority within a minority government, since at the 
time, the coalition had 59 members out of 120 Knesset members) becomes 
an o ff ic ia l policy, due to the astute choice of a particular decision­
making mechanism which involves specific locations of conflict 
resolution.
The above cases show how a non-pi votai party has a capacity for 
effective decision-making, through cleverly-used p o litic a l mechanisms 
for problem resolution. S t i l l ,  an off-centre control of coalition
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po litics  involves many d iff ic u lt ie s  and complications. One way to 
reduce the tensions involved in such an imbalanced situation is to 
widen the gap between ideological declarations and p o litic a l action. 
This was what Mr. Begin did by making peace. While giving up huge 
te rr ito rie s  (the whole of the Sinai Peninsula), he nevertheless 
intensified his hawkish policy declarations. However, the safer way to 
deal with the in s ta b ility  inherented in off-centre control of coalition  
po litics  is to find strong and long-term p o litica l a ll ie s .
Coalition Membership - Home in on the Range
As related in the previous chapter, until 1977 coalition governments 
usually consisted of parties from each of the three traditional 
p o litica l camps - le f t ,  religious and centre-right. The major share of 
the coalition membership was drawn from the left-w ing and religious 
camps, basing on Mapai's "historic alliance" with the NRP. Located as 
i t  was in the centre of the party map, Mapai however usually managed, 
as coalition leader, to recruit parties from the centre-right camp as 
w ell. Contrariwise, the coalitions formed by Herut a fter 1977 mostly 
consisted of parties from only two p o litic a l camps - the right-wing and 
the religious bloc; centre elements became negligible and the left-wing  
camp was le f t  out altogether. The narrowing basis for coalition  
formation was the outcome of two related factors: the increasing 
importance of ideology in the party system and the strategy of the o ff-  
centre Herut to minimize the ideological range of the coalition.
Table 3.6 describes the size and ideological range of the three 
coalition governments formed by the Likud during the 1977-1984 period.
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Table 3.6 Coalitions Formed bv the Likud
1977-1984
No.*  Date Coalitions Partners 120 Knesset
18) 6/77 Likud + NRP + Aguda + Dayan
(45) (12) (4) (1)
19) 8/81 Likud + NRP + Aguda + Tami
(48) (6) (4) (3)
20) 10/83 Likud + NRP + Aguda + Tami + Techiya + Telem
(46) (6) (4) (3) (3) (2)
*  Number of coalition government since 1949.
Source: Israel Government Yearbooks.
62 9
61 10
64 10
The 18th coalition reached a size of 77 Knesset members in October 
1977, when the DMC joined in with its  15 members. However, this very 
coalition became a minority government in October 1980, following the 
defection of a few Likud members and the effective dissolution of the 
DMC. The 19th coalition, formed a fter the 1981 elections, became a 
minority government in the f i r s t  half of 1982, when an NRP member le f t  
the coalition and two Likud members crossed the floor to Labour. I t  was 
with a minority coalition that the government in itia te d  the Lebanon War 
in June 1982. In the second half of 1982, the government regained a 
majority status when Techiya and Telem joined the coalition framework. 
The 20th coalition was formed by Mr. Yitzhak Shamir a fte r Mr. Begin's 
resignation; its  majority status deteriorated within months until 
f in a lly , in March 1984, Tami - a coalition partner - joined the 
opposition in an unprecedented move to force early elections.
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In order to understand how the governments were formed and why 
th e ir  membership changed so e rra tic a lly , we ought to analyse the 
Likud's basic modus ooerandi - off-centre control of coalition  
p o litic s .
Coalition Bargaining
In the past, the dominant Mapai/Labour used to see coalition government 
as a matter of Hobson's choice. Being a minority party, i t  had to form 
coalitions but always regarded them as a lim ited partnership. I t  could 
afford to do so because i t  enjoyed a dominance in the centre of the 
party system. The Likud, by contrast, realizing the risks involved in
maintaining power in a competitive party system, viewed alliances and
coalitions as the vehicle of choice towards dominance. Unlike 
Mapai/Labour, the Likud sought cooperation with other parties on the 
basis of an unlimited coalition partnership. An effective way to create 
such a partnership is the formation of p o litic a l alliances (proto­
coalitions) before elections, rather than afterwards. In this way, a 
pre-election a lly  may be in a more powerful position in the post­
election bargaining process to form a government.
Electoral coalitions seem to be more relevant in competitive 
rather than in dominant-party systems. In a dominated system, electoral 
po litics  is not translated into coalition po litics  - at least not as 
fa r as the coalition leader, the dominant party is concerned. This is 
not the case in a competitive party system, where the composition of 
government hinges on post-election negotiations. Here, electoral 
cooperation rather than competition may increase the chances of the
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parties involved eventually to form the executive coalition. In this 
situation, a fight at the electoral level between possible future 
a llie s  may prove too costly .*
Actually, the very formation of electoral proto-coalitions is an 
indication that the party system is nearing a more competitive posture. 
In such a system, electoral po litics  and coalition po litics  are closely 
related. One problem involved in the formation of pre-election 
alliances is the difference in size between the parties. The smaller
party may have to be careful lest i t  lose its  own identity  - and with
i t  a goodly number of votes - to its  senior a lly . This problem may
become very much a re a lity  in the context of a two proto-coalition race
in a competitive party system, as the Israe li example illu s tra te s .
In 1981, the Likud and the NRP created an electoral proto­
coalition by appealing to the voters to return the 1977-1981
government. In fact i t  was Tami, an NRP's Sephardic sp linter group, who 
f i r s t  committed i ts e lf  to a Likud government, in order to draw
electoral support from among Mr. Begin's supporters. Tami thus forced 
the NRP's hand, lest vts voters think i t  might contemplate cooperation 
with Labour. While the Likud's parliamentary representation went up 
from 45 in 1977 to 48 in 1981 and Tami gained 3 seats, the NRP lost
half of its  seats, previously 12 and now only 6.
Of course, electoral coalitions do not necessarily depend on 
ideological proximity; sometimes i t  is a question of survival. The 
FDP in (formerly West) Germany, for example, does not regard its  
libera l ideology as a version of either Social-Democracy or 
Christian-Democracy. Apparently, i t  wishes to have a progressive, 
libera l society in Germany. S t i l l ,  in order to pass the 5 per cent 
threshold, i t  has had to a lly  with either major party already at 
the electoral level, so as to be able to cross th is particular 
p o litic a l barrier.
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The NRP suffered, among other things, from an "identity  c ris is" . 
The party was one of two religious groups in the 1977-1981 Likud 
coalition (the other one was the ultra-orthodox Agudat Is ra e l), so i t  
could not claim exclusive credit for "religious" concessions by the 
government; and, of course, i t  found i t  d if f ic u lt  to compete with the 
Likud on nationalistic  issues. The NRP's slogan in the 1981 elections 
was "A vote for us is a vote for the Likud". Many of its  potential 
supporters seem to have preferred direct voting to voting by proxy...
After 1981, the NRP sought to maintain its  unique identity by 
calling over and over again for a national unity government, namely a 
coalition which would include the Labour party. This appeal represented 
the NRP's best strategy for maintaining a unique centrist role while 
qualifying its  support for the Likud. Actually, i t  was only back then, 
in the days of Labour's rule, that the NRP had enjoyed a salient 
p o litic a l status and was electorally  secure by virtue of its  unique 
identity .
The d ifferen t p o litica l strategies employed by the NRP under 
Labour and Likud governments can illu s tra te  the crucial difference 
between "not losing" and "win maximizing" strateg ies.* Under Labour, 
the NRP developed a strategy of how "not to lose". Its  main concern was 
to protect its  members and th e ir particular interests from the 
arbitrariness of a secular government. The "historic alliance" between 
Mapai and the NRP was actually meant to guarantee, through a lim ited
Being central to our thesis, the difference between these two 
alternative strategies w ill be elaborated upon in the next 
chapter.
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p o litic a l partnership, the basic needs and rights of religious groups. 
The NRP participated in Labour's coalitions because i t  was the only 
game in town. I t  was not an ideological alliance; cooperation and 
participation simply meant protection.
When the Likud came to power, however, the NRP saw its  chance to 
play to "win", not just "not to lose". The NRP was not concerned any 
more solely with the protection of its  trad itional constituency; taking 
up the settlement banner, i t  now tried  to reach out to other, non­
religious groups, as long as they had positive attitudes towards Jewish
culture and symbols. The NRP wanted to become a sizable centrist party, 
a kind of Jewish "Christian-Democratic" party, as i t  were. As i t  turned 
out, the NRP fa iled  in the attempt to "play in the major league", as
the Americans say, namely to try  and win non-religious as well as
religious votes in an open party competition. Having set its  aims too 
high, the NRP stumbled over its  own electoral success in 1977. 
Apparently, the party was better o ff playing "not to lose" under 
Labour. Actually, as long as Labour was believed to be the coalition-
forming party (including the 1977 election, when nobody expected a
Likud v ic tory), the NRP had received potential Likud votes. The NRP 
appeared then to be the only force which could stop Labour from
relinquishing te rr ito ry  and pursuing a dovish policy. After 1977,
however, i t  was the Likud, not the NRP, who was regarded as the major 
force fighting i t  out against Labour's policy, so the Likud gained 
votes at the expense of the NRP [Friedman, 1984, pp. 141-165].
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The Minor League
I t  was the fierce p o litica l fight between the Likud and Labour that 
shaped the basic structure of the bargaining process. The Likud was in 
power, Labour was a strong opposition. No such opposition existed when 
Labour dominated the party system; at that time, opposition was 
divided, b ila te ra l, incapable of presenting alternative policies and 
leadership to the ruling party. When Labour went into opposition, 
however, i t  was a "dominant opposition party", i . e . ,  an opposition 
party that could provide a clear alternative to the ruling party. 
Labour possessed over a two-thirds of the parliamentary seats obtained 
by a ll opposition parties, so there was no b ila te ra l opposition to 
speak of. Needless to say, the existence of "a dominant party in 
opposition" is what makes a party system competitive in the f i r s t  place 
[Punnett, 1975, p. 437].
Due to the competitive nature of the party system, the small 
parties became indispensable to the bargaining process. In this 
context, three categories of small parties could be identified  in the 
1977-1984 period. F irs t, the s a te llite  parties which clearly swore 
future allegiance to a specific government, e .g ., the CRM and Shinui 
(ex-DMC) to a Labour government, or Tami and the NRP to a Likud 
government. By declaring th e ir intentions, these parties have actually 
undertaken pre-election informal commitments to form what were in fact 
electoral proto-coalitions. The s a te llite  parties claimed to pursue the 
"correct" policy of the coalition they intended to support.
The second type included balance-tipping parties, such as the DMC 
in 1977 or Telem and Agudat Israel in 1981. W illing to cooperate with 
either large party (th e ir major objective being to capture the pivotal
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position in the party system), these parties refrained from making any 
pre-election commitments. The th ird type of small parties included 
"pariah" parties such as extreme le f t  groups, or Mr. Flatto-Sharon,* 
who professed to support the right wing. Certainly, a ll three types of 
small parties maintained coalition "relevancy", even though not a ll of 
them were potential candidates for participation in a given executive 
coalition - because a ll of them (including the "pariahs") counted in 
defining the balance of power in the leg is la ture , which is rea lly  the 
crucial factor in an extremely competitive party system.
Institu tional Constraints
The competitive nature of the system created situations in which even 
institu tional constraints were "exploited" to determine the outcome of 
coalition bargaining. Such was the case with the formation of the 20th 
coalition . After months of rumours to the effect that he has not been 
functioning properly as Prime Minister, Mr. Menachem Begin announced 
his retirement on August 28, 1983. He re tired , however, without
formally submitting his resignation to the President of the State, as 
required by law. On September 1, Foreign Minister Mr. Yitzhak Shamir 
was elected by the Herut/Likud party organs as Mr. Begin's successor, 
having b e a te r. David Levy, the Housing Minister, by a 60 to 40 margin.
Shmuel Flatto-Sharon, a m illionaire of shady background, found 
refuge in Israel in 1976 from heavy suspicions of fraud and 
embezzlement in France. When the French asked for extradition, Mr. 
Flatto-Sharon sought refuge again, finding i t  th is time in 
parliamentary immunity - an outstanding testimony to the merits of 
the P.R. system.
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Meanwhile, Mr. Shimon Peres, Labour's leader, claimed that he 
should be invited by the President to form a new government, being the 
head of the largest party (at the time Labour had 50 Knesset members, 
against Likud's 46). The President was bound by law to do nothing, 
however, since legally  Mr. Begin was s t i l l  Prime M inister. By the time 
Mr. Begin's le t te r  of resignation was submitted to the President, Mr. 
Shamir had managed to put together a winning coalition of 64 Knesset 
members. The calculated delay in submitting Mr. Begin's le t te r  of 
resignation was a tactical move designed to anticipate the theoretical 
possib ility  of a Labour government being formed, and i t  also served to 
avert pressures within the Likud (mainly by Liberal members) and the 
NRP to form a national coalition.
Coalition Pavoffs: Office vs. Policv
Naturally, in a competitive system the coalition-forming party tends to 
be rather generous in ladling out payoffs to its  coalition partners in 
order to maintain th e ir loyalty . The small parties, for th e ir  part, try  
to exert strong bargaining pressure by playing one large party against 
the other. Furthermore, during the 1977-1984 period, th is bargaining 
process was characterized by some cooperation among the smaller 
parties. The NRP, Agudat Israel and Tami, which tended to support the 
Likud, nevertheless negotiated simultaneously with Labour. As a result 
they received, in a Likud coalition of course, payoffs according to 
th e ir bargaining power rather than the norm of proportionality. 
Quantitative and qualitative o ffice  payoffs were the clearest 
indication of the strength of the minor coalition partners.
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O ffic e  Pavoffs
With the formation of the f i r s t  Likud government in June 1977, Herut 
offered factions within the Likud and parties in the coalition  
government positions which Mapai, the former ruling party, had never 
relinquished. Herut held on to only two important portfo lios, the Prime 
Ministership and Defence. The Foreign A ffa ir  ministry was offered to 
Mr. Dayan ,an "outsider", the Finance ministry was given to the Liberal 
faction in the Likud and Commerce and Industry to the La'am faction. 
Two other significant portfolios. Education and In te rio r, were offered 
to the NRP, the main coalition partner. When the DMC joined the 
coalition in October 1977, Prime Minister Begin offered i t  four seats 
around the government table and made its  leader, Mr. Yigael Yadin, his 
deputy.
The NRP benefitted most from its  alliance with the Likud. Winning 
the Ministry of Education was indeed a great coup for NRP. This 
portfo lio , as befits its  "important" status, was regarded in the past 
as one of the dominant party's "protected domains". Moreover, le ttin g  a 
religious party control the Education portfo lio  in a basically secular 
state had a more profound significance than a mere distribution of 
payoffs to a coalition partner. The NRP was also given its  traditional 
domains. Ministry of Religious A ffairs and the In terio r Ministry (which 
included then the Police Department). Even when the NRP lost ha lf of 
its  parliamentary representation, in the I98I election, i t  was able to 
retain the positions i t  had gained in 1977, due to the near-tie  between 
the Likud and Labour.
The Likud was rather generous with the DMC, in terms of office  
payoffs: i t  even kept vacant portfolios waiting for this party's
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delayed decision to jo in the coalition. Its  leader, Mr. Yadin, was made 
"arch-minister", charged with coordinating the a c tiv itie s  of the 
various ministries dealing with social a ffa irs  and given control of 
th e ir budgetary allocations. This in addition to his duties as Deputy 
Prime Minister, in which position he proved to be a major asset to Mr. 
Begin, by chairing government meetings in his absence (fo r almost a 
fu ll year) and by defending his policies. Three other DMC leaders were 
given portfolios, including the highly respected Justice M inistry. Even 
while the DMC was fa llin g  to pieces, i t  set a record of government 
payoff disproportionality: the original ra tio  of 4 government seats for 
15 DMC Knesset Members went up to 3 for 7, then 3 for 6, until f in a lly  
2 government members represented 3 Knesset members.
Unlike the NRP and the DMC, the ultra-orthodox Agudat Israel was 
not interested in taking up seats around the government table, an 
important coalition partner though i t  was. Apart from its  objection to 
sharing fu ll responsibility in a secular Zionist government, Agudat 
Is rae l, a small but highly fractious party, was unable to share among 
its  leaders one or even two potential portfo lios. In terms of office  
payoffs i t  preferred the chairmanship of parliamentary committees and 
control over governmental agencies and departments which deal with 
socioeconomic and educational matters that d irec tly  affected the 
party's constituents. I t  also acquired the chairmanship of the 
Coalition Caucus, a prominent position previously reserved to the 
dominant party. Agudat Israe l's  main office payoff, however, was a 
coalition agreement fu ll of promises, including massive state funding 
for its  social and educational institutions.
Tami was a coalition partner interested in both material benefits 
and government status. This ethnic party was led by a previous NRP
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government minister, Mr. Aaron Abu-Hazeira, and a former Labour 
government minister, Mr. Aaron Uzan. These two well-established public 
figures managed to gain 3 Knesset seats in the 1981 election, basing on 
the vote of Sephardic and trad itional Jews.* The price for its  
participation in the coalition was s tr ic tly  jobs and funds with which 
to support and reward its  members. The 3 Knesset members of Tami were 
a ll made front benchers in the coalition government ( ! )  - one
government minister and two deputy ministers who controlled between 
them a triple-decker ministry - Labour, Social A ffa irs  and Immigrant 
Absorption (at the same time, the Likud had only 13 government 
ministries le f t  for its  48 Knesset members). Tami enjoyed a strong 
bargaining power because its  3 seats helped Mr. Begin form a 61 
coalition in 1981.
The Likud i ts e lf  became more concerned with o ffice  payoffs as i t  
adjusted to its  dominant p o litica l ro le. In 1977, Herut settled for two 
out of the four top positions; a fter the 1981 election, Herut doubled 
the number of its  ministers and ministries to include also the Foreign 
A ffa irs and Finance portfolios, which had been orig ina lly  assigned to 
the Liberal faction. The strengthening of Herut was, in fac t, at the
There are several "degrees" of religious adherence in Is rae li 
Judaism: Ultra-Orthodoxy, which includes most Hassidic
congregations, is uncompromising in its  observation of the 
Halacha, the body of religious law; Orthodox Jews observe the 
Halacha, but in a more relaxed fashion; other Jews regard 
themselves as "trad itional", namely, they respect the Halacha but 
observe i t  only partly. Reform and Conservative Judaism, while 
prominent in the diaspora, are practically  non-existent in Israe l. 
In term of p o litics , the ultra-orthodox w ill always vote for th e ir  
own parties; an orthodox w ill tend to vote for a religious party; 
a "trad itio na lis t"  may vote for any party, but would presumably 
prefer one that is not blatantly a n ti-c le r ic a l.
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expense of the Liberal group which declined in influence and status due 
to resignations, internal s tr ife , and poor m inisterial performance. 
From being an equal partner with Herut in Gahal and the Likud, the 
Liberals were relegated, especially a fter the 1981 election, to a 
secondary role in the Likud and in government.
Actually, the Liberal leader, Mr. Shimcha Ehrlich, was a loyal 
friend of Begin's and trusted him more than his own fellow Liberals, 
when i t  came to making decisions about the makeup of the parliamentary 
l is t  and the allocations of government positions for the Liberal 
faction. Mr. Begin stuck by the time-honoured factional formula for 
dividing up the spoils and gave the Liberals th e ir  fa ir  share of 
portfolios - a ll of them of secondary importance, however. Mr. Ehrlich 
himself, once the Finance Minister, was "kicked upstairs" to become a 
harmless Deputy Prime Minister. Mr. Ehrlich's major concern was to 
ensure that his Liberal riva l Mr. Yitzhak Moda'i would not get any 
important position. Yet another faction in the Likud , La'am, was also 
weakened by defections when some of its  Knesset Members joined Herut or 
crossed the floor to Labour. Also its  leader, Mr. Yigal Hurwitz, could 
not find a proper place around the government table, resigning twice 
over policy disagreements with Herut's leadership.
In time, o ffice payoffs began to play an increasing role in the 
maintenance of the Likud's coalitions. These payoffs seemed to be 
effective in buying the support of coalition partners and in solving 
the Likud's factional problems. In 1977, a 13-member government 
represented a coalition of 62 Knesset Members. In 1981, a government of 
18 ministers plus 10 deputy ministers was needed in order to put 
together a coalition of 61 Knesset members!
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Policy Payoffs
I t  was argued that "Unlike Mapai, the Likud was coopérâtiye and 
forthcoming in accommodating the needs of coalitionary parties. Mapai 
stroye to allocate what may be termed p articu la ris tic  rewards, while 
the Likud was prepared to allocate uniyersalistic ones as well" 
[Aronson and Yanai, 1984, p. 16]. The idea was to allow partners 
influence oyer policy in th e ir particular areas of in terest. The 
formation of the f i r s t  Likud-led coalition in 1977 was based on having 
Herut control defence and foreign a ffa irs , the Liberals controlled the 
economy, while the religious parties had control over areas with 
special concern to them. Reasonable as the original plan may have been, 
i t  fa iled  the test of time, since none of these groups was happy with 
the payoffs granted to the others.
Religious Payoffs, compared with the past, were increased quite 
substantially. Labour had basically maintained a status q u o  in its  
relations with the religious parties, whereas the Likud was w illing  to 
change the status q u o  in favour of the religious sector. Put 
d iffe re n tly . Labour had made certain concessions to the religious 
parties but had taken special care to protect the interests of the 
secular sector; the Likud lent a hand to religious leg islation which 
effec tive ly  changed the status quo, although i t  did not go a ll the way. 
The religious parties fa iled , for instance, in th e ir ongoing efforts to 
change the Law of Return over the "Who is a Jew" question. Such a 
change would have antagonized not only the secular sector in Israel 
proper, but also most of the diaspora Jewery, which may have been the 
crucial point. All in a l l ,  however, the Likud was quite w illing  to
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increase policy payoffs to the religious sector, hoping to consolidate 
a national-religious po litica l bloc.
In terms of socioeconomic oavoffs. the Likud tr ie d  in a haphazard 
way to be a ll things to a ll people at once - both factions within its  
ranks and a ll the coalition partners. The government never had a 
coherent economic policy, coming up every few months with newfangled 
"package deals" to prevent economic deterioration. Four Finance 
Ministers, with four d ifferent economic philosophies, served in the 
Likud governments from 1977 to 1984. The f i r s t  minister was a ll for 
"market economy" and laissez fa ire : the next favoured a "balanced
budget" economy; his successor was simply for a "correct economy"; and 
he was followed by a minister who wanted a "mixed economy". In re a lity , 
the Likud conducted seven years of "electioneering economy" - as Mr. 
Begin himself used to say, "we wanted to do good by the people".
Lavishly spending, heavily borrowing from abroad, printing money, 
incurring huge budget d e fic its , sapping out foreign currency reserves, 
increasing imports, the government was able, in the short run, to 
create a sense of prosperity. Herut, the NRP, Agudat Israel and 
especially Tami (which claimed to represent the underprivileged) thus 
received "socioeconomic" payoffs galore. Even the Liberals were happy, 
since the middle class - and certain ly the rich - got richer. There was 
only one f ly  in the ointment, which did not seem to cause much 
distress for a while: the country became poorer, its  future became
mortgaged. The inevitable cris is  was dealt with in 1985, when the Likud 
was no longer the sole ruling party.
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As for policy payoffs in terms of national issues, these were not 
granted to coalition partners, or indeed to factions within the Likud, 
unless Herut - in effect its  leader, Mr. Begin - so wished. The 
parties, factions and leaders whose policy positions were located to 
the le f t  of Mr. Begin's own have achieved practica lly  nothing, in 
ideological terms. The moderate DMC was in a particu larly  awkward 
situation, because "Begin concluded that the coalition negotiations 
with the DMC would have to avoid substantive ideologies and policies, 
and focus on m inisterial payoffs" [Torgovnik, 1980, p. 91]. Indeed, 
this was exactly what Mr. Begin did, said the DMC leader, Mr. Yadin: 
"We were told categorically that i f  we wanted to insert a clause into 
the coalition agreement to the effect that this government, in order to 
bring about peace ta lks, is w illing  to make a te r r ito r ia l compromise on 
the West Bank, then there was nothing to ta lk  about" [Haaretz, 
17.6.1977].
Aware of Mr. Begin's uncompromising stance on national issues, the 
DMC was faced with a dilemma: to be an opposition to the government or 
to jo in  the coalition and "fight for changes from within". After seven 
months of negotiations, the DMC chose to jo in the Likud's coalition, 
which had a majority with or without i t ,  believing i t  could moderate 
Herut's policy. The DMC's rationalization was of the classical variety: 
I f  we were out of office things would have been much worse, namely, the 
right-wing fringe would have carried on with th e ir policy of more 
Jewish settlements in Arab populated areas, expropriation of lands, and 
so on. In fact, what "moderating" influence the DMC may have been able 
to exert was rapidly diminished, along with its  parliamentary strength. 
The DMC did manage occasionally to delay the implementation of Herut's
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policy, but never to change i t .  Indeed, these low policy payoffs seem 
to have been a major factor in the party's downfall.
Even Foreign Minister Mr. Moshe Dayan and Defence Minister Mr. 
Ezer Weizmann did not have much influence, in th e ir  efforts to push 
forward a moderate foreign and defence policy which was unacceptable to 
Mr. Begin. They both found themselves in a position sim ilar to the 
DMC's. Having played a crucial role in the Camp David peace talks with 
Egypt, th e ir influence on national policy gradually dwindled t i l l  
eventually they both lost a ll real power and resigned - Mr. Dayan in 
October 1979 and Mr. Weizmann in May 1980.
Mr. Dayan's p o litica l emasculation seems to have followed a rather
typical pattern. When Mr. Begin considered that his once indispensable
Foreign Minister was expendable a fter a l l ,  he made the NRP's In terio r  
Minister Mr. Burg chief negotiator in the short-lived talks on 
Palestinian autonomy in 1979. At the same time, Mr. Weizmann, s t i l l  in 
government, was in charge of policy in the te rr ito rie s ; yet Mr. Begin 
backed Agriculture Minister Mr. Ariel Sharon's hawkish policy on 
settlements. Thus, Mr. Dayan found himself ch iefly involved in the one 
aspect of his portfo lio  he hated most and was least suited to -
attending cocktail parties and the lik e , while Mr. Weizmann was unable 
to do anything in the most crucial aspect of his own portfo lio ,
settlements. They both quit government pretty soon. With the departure 
of these two charismatic leaders, Mr. Begin was in a better position to 
pursue his ideology; in other words, he increased, i f  not maximized, 
his own policy payoffs.
Mr. Dayan, Mr. Weizmann and some DMC ministers le f t  Mr. Begin's 
coalition because of the slow pace of the peace process, whereas the 
right-wing Techiya party opposed Mr. Begin because he signed the peace
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treaty in the f i r s t  place. I f  those moderate leaders were in opposition 
to Mr. Begin on the le f t ,  Techiya was a strong opposition on the righ t. 
When policy payoffs to the moderate groups went up, the payoffs to 
Techiya came down, and vice versa. Techiya has been a true-blue 
ideological party, concerned with policy payoffs f i r s t  and foremost. In 
1980 i t  was paid a bonus, when parliament passed a declarative law 
affirming that the reunited Jerusalem is Is rae l's  eternal capita l. 
After the 1981 elections the coalition had a one-vote m ajority, which 
meant that Mr. Begin could least afford to antagonize Techiya's three 
Knesset Members with too strong a show of "moderation". Actually, the 
Techiya party joined the coalition only a fter the Lebanon war began in 
1982, when the Prime Minister promised i t  a firm stance on national 
issues.
All in a l l ,  most coalition parties and factions have had 
misgivings about the way Herut's leadership distributed policy payoffs. 
The Liberal faction thought the religious payoffs too high; Tami and 
some groups within Herut thought that socioeconomic payoffs were not 
high enough; a few moderate Likud MKs wanted a change in "national" 
payoffs, and so on. I t  was rather d if f ic u lt  to keep a ll of them happy 
a ll the time. However, there was one payoff which a ll partners were 
happy to share - "anti-Labour" policy. In fact, th is attitude was the 
cement holding the coalition together, the main asset of the Likud's 
coalitions.
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Not Losing or Winning bv Default?
During the 1977-1984 period, anti-Labour forces maintained a majority 
in parliament. This, rather than the positions of individual parties, 
was where the cleavage between the two p o litic a l blocs, the Likud and 
Labour, cut through. I t  was this fact that pointed to the supremacy of 
the Likud and accounted for the po litica l durab ility  of its  governments 
[Warwick, 1979, pp. 465-98]. In fact, as soon as the 1977 and 1981 
election results were in, i t  became clear that the Likud, rather than 
Labour, w ill form the next government. Essentially ,the postelection 
coalition bargaining determined p o litica l payoffs, not p o litica l 
control. A Likud coalition seemed to be a sure thing, as was a Labour 
opposition; a ll the rest were details - important, but s t i l l  deta ils . 
The investiture vote of the Likud's coalitions provided a picture of 
how the major cleavage line divided the leg islature.
The performance of the Likud's governments was frankly poor from 
day one, and analysts soon began predicting that i t  would quickly come 
apart. Instead, i t  held on for fu ll seven years, surviving many a major 
c ris is . The Likud's governments survived the resignation of its  leading 
ministers; parliament was asked by the attorney general to remove the 
immunities of several members, a ll of them associated with the ruling  
coalition , in order for them to stand t r ia l ;  the state of the economy 
reached p it bottom when Israel surpassed Argentina to lead the world in 
rates of in fla tio n . To put i t  m ildly, the Likud's government was not an 
outstanding po litica l success. But none of this rea lly  mattered. Since 
an alternative Labour coalition was unacceptable to a majority in 
parliament, the crippled Likud coalitions carried on. Simply put, the 
Likud could not lose because Labour could not win.
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I t  is not only that the Likud governments did not have to be 
successful in order to maintain p o litic a l v ia b ility ; they actually did 
not even have to have a parliamentary majority. The governments' 
position was secure because the opposition could not put together any 
kind of majority to replace i t  at the helm. Usually, i t  is the le f t -  
right balance in parliament that determines which coalition  w ill be 
viable. I f  the right wing is dominant in parliament, there w ill be a 
right-of-centre executive coalition. Its  size may be important, but 
not crucial. A surplus coalition, a minimal winning coalition or even a 
minority government - any w ill do. A right-of-centre executive 
coalition cannot lose, because right-wing parties w ill certain ly block 
the formation of a le ft-o f-cen tre  executive coalition . Certainly, not 
a ll right-wing parties w ill actively support or participate in a righ t- 
of-centre executive coalition; some may even oppose i t ,  but knowing the 
consequences, they w ill be careful not to help the opposing bloc.
In defining government v ia b ility , what re a lly  counts is the 
majority of the leg is la tive  coalition, not the size of the executive 
coalition. "A proto coalition V w ill form a government i f  there is no 
alternative coalition A which is supported by parties controlling more 
leg is la tive  votes than those supporting V and which a ll supporters of A 
prefer to form rather than V" [Budge & Laver, 1985, p. 488]. In terms 
of v ia b ility , whatever the size of the Likud's executive coalitions, 
they did not face opposition from a majority in leg islature, due to 
ideological considerations and anti-Labour feelings. Even when the 
Likud led a minority government, i t  was s t i l l  a viable coalition vis-a- 
vis the opposition. The opposition could win a few votes in parliament 
or at best force early elections, but i t  could not form its  own 
executive coalition. Thus, for example, when Tami, a coalition partner,
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wanted in 1984 to get back at the Likud government, i t  voted for early  
elections - not for a Labour government. And even for this the party 
was severely punished by voters who suspected that i t  had wanted to 
help bring Labour back to power. Anti-Labour passion was, and s t i l l  is , 
a potent p o litic a l power.
I t  seems that when ideological polarization tends to create a 
p o litic a l gap within the party system, the executive coalition which is 
currently in power enjoys stronger p o litica l v ia b ility . In this sense, 
the more polarized a system is , the greater the p o litic a l s ta b ility  of 
the executive coalition. Also, in a disjointed party system, the larger 
the difference in size between the two p o litic a l blocs, the more stable 
the government. The existence of ideological polarization and the way 
i t  sp lits  the party system are two related factors which together 
determine coalition s ta b ility . When the two poles of the disjointed  
party system are more or less equal, and when the coalition is 
controlled from an off-centre position, the s ta b ility  of the government 
cannot last for long. This is what happened to the Likud's governments.
As we saw, the Likud bloc never won a landslide victory against 
Labour. I t  had a slight advantage, just enough to keep i t  in power. In
fact, the Likud's rule depended on a coalition of disparate, ultim ately
incompatible interests, which could only stay in power by default, that 
is , i t  could not lose to Labour. Labour found i t  d if f ic u lt  to regain 
power because i t  faced both opposition to its  policy positions and 
resentment by extensive segments of the public. Seven years of poor 
Likud performance in government, from 1977 to 1984, hardly changed the 
verdict of the electorate. In 1984, Labour barely managed to achieve a
p o litic a l t ie  with the Likud, and the only way out was to form a
national coalition.
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Chapter Four 
The Politics of "Not Losing"
The 1984 election results have brought about an unprecedented change to 
Is rae li coalition po litics ; a ll bets were now o ff. Before proceeding to 
analyse the characteristics of the new system and its  modus ooerandi. 
which is in effect the main subject of this dissertation, we must take 
a close look at the theory of coalition po litics  as i t  stands today, in 
order to see how i t  may help us understand the changed rules of the 
Is rae li situation. In the final analysis the same question w ill be 
asked in reverse - whether the Israe li experience, unique as i t  was, 
may contribute something to coalition theory.
Minimal Coalitions
Essentially, two d ifferent types of theories have been used to explain 
and predict the formation of coalition governments in parliamentary 
democracies. The f i r s t  type, "office-seeking" theories, deals with 
coalition formation only on the basis of the numerical strength of the 
parties in parliament. Policy considerations do not enter the 
discussion. The second type, "policy-based" theories, assumes that 
coalition governments are also the outcome of policy considerations and 
thus predict th e ir formation on the basis of both the power relations 
and the policy positions of the parties. The three most fam iliar
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"office-seeking" or "policy-blind" theories are: "size principle"
[Riker, 1962]; "minimum-size coalition" [Gamson, 1961]; and "bargaining 
proposition" [Leiserson, 1968]. The better-known "policy-based" 
theories are: "policy distance" [De Swaan, 1973]; and "closed minimal
range" [Axelrod, 1970].
The one feature common to a ll these theories is th e ir overall 
purpose - to predict which coalitions w ill form out of a given 
distribution of parties in parliament. Each in its  own way deals with 
the essence of a democratic regime: translating the "will of the
people" into governmental power.
By and large, these d ifferen t coalition theories are based on 
d ifferen t definitions and make divergent assumptions. Nevertheless, 
they a ll seem to share a single fundamental premise: maximizing office  
and/or policy payoffs is the major motivation for the actors who 
bargain over coalition formation. I f  this is indeed the basic 
motivation, i t  necessarily follows that the various actors strive to 
form a winning coalition that is minimal in some sense, because i t  is 
such a coalition that would secure maximal office and/or policy payoffs 
for its  participants (a "winning coalition" is a group of parties in 
the legislature which combine to sustain a government). In order to 
c la r ify  the differences, as well as s im ila rities , among the various 
theories proposed, le t  us use an imaginary example of election results 
and see which coalition(s) w ill be predicted by each.
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Table 4.1 Winning Coalitions Predicted by Five Coalition Theories 
For a Hypothetical Distribution of Parliamentary Seats.*
LEFT......................................................................................................................RIGHT
Parties: A B C D E
Seats: 6 41 6 43 4
Total seats 100, minimum required 51.
Theories:
Minimal winning coalition ABC (53) ABE (51) ACD (55) ADE (53)
BCE (51) BD (84) COE (53)
Minimum size ABE (51) BCE (51)
Bargaining proposition BD (84)
Minimal range ABC (53) BD (84) CDE (53)
Closed Minimal Range ABC (53) BCD (90) CDE (53)
Based on Lijphart, 1984, 48.
E arlier coalition theories were "policy blind", under the
influence of the work done by von Neuman and Morgenstern in th e ir  
Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour [1953]. They are:
Minimal winning theory. Riker's famous "size principle" assumes 
that the bargaining undertaken to form a winning coalition is a zero-
sum game, that is , the total value of the prizes a coalition can offer
is fixed. Since the value of the prizes cannot increase with the
The use of the le f t-r ig h t unidementional policy scale seems to 
capture the essential aspects of coalition formation: "Generally,
one dimensional and multidimensional form ulations... yie ld  rather 
sim ilar results" [Taylor and Laver, 1973, p. 228].
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addition of a new member, actors w ill strive to form winning coalitions 
that do not contain more actors than those absolutely necessary to win. 
In other words, the "size principle" predicts only minimal winning 
coalitions, without any "dummy" or "surplus" parties which are not
necessary to satisfy the minimal majority requirement in parliament. In 
the above example, however, no less than seven d ifferen t minimal 
winning coalitions are predicted. This rather poor predictive a b ility  
is precisely the problem with the size principle: in any given
situation in a multiparty system (three parties or more), i t  never 
makes a single specific prediction about the winning coalition. The
larger the number of parties, the more minimal winning coalitions are
predicted.
Minimum size theory. The coalitions predicted by the size 
principle alone may vary considerably in size, that is , the number of 
seats they represent. As a necessary refinement, therefore, the mininum 
size theory predicts that among a ll the possible minimal winning 
coalitions, the one most lik e ly  to form is the one with the least 
surplus weight (in  terms of seats) above the absolute minimum needed to 
satisfy a majority crite rion . The logic is quite simple - in this  
situation, each party w ill prefer to secure for i ts e lf  the largest 
possible payoff, assuming a direct relationship between a party's size 
and its  re la tive  share in these payoffs. In our example, the seven 
minimal winning coalitions predicted range in size from coalition CDE 
with 51 seats to coalition BD with 84 seats. The minimum size theory 
narrows i t  down to two possible coalitions - ABE and BCE, each with 51 
seats. However, this theory cannot predict which specific coalition, 
between the two possible ones, w ill in effect be formed.
Bargaining proposition. Michael Leiserson suggested a d ifferent
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criterion  to reduce the number of predicted minimal winning coalitions: 
"The proposition regarding bargaining is that as the number of actors 
increases there is a tendency for each actor to prefer to form a 
minimal winning coalition with as few members as possible" [Leiserson, 
1968, p. 775]. He assumed that from among the possible minimal winning 
coalitions, those with the least number of parties are lik e ly  to form 
because the bargaining process is less complicated and thus easier to 
complete; also, he expected such a coalition, once formed, to remain 
more stable than most alternatives. Other things being equal, a two-- 
party coalition is preferable to a three party coalition , and so on. In 
our example, the bargaining proposition theory predicts that from among 
the possible minimal winning coalition, BD w ill form because i t  
involves only two parties, whereas a ll the others involve three.
I t  is worth noting that there is a 33 seat difference between the 
84-member coalition BD predicted by the bargaining proposition and the 
51-member coalitions predicted by the minimum size theory. This wide 
gap in numbers is indicative of the to ta lly  d ifferen t approach to the 
considerations guiding party negotiators in th e ir efforts  to set up a 
winning coalition: payoff distribution on the one hand, smoothness of 
bargaining and s ta b ility  on the other hand.
Among these three "policy blind" theories, the "minimal winning 
coalition" predicted seven coalitions, the "minimum size coalition" 
defined two, whereas the "bargaining proposition" theory made a unique 
prediction, although one to ta lly  d ifferen t from either coalitions 
predicted by its  r iv a l. Therefore, while the f i r s t  theory proves 
unsatisfactory in terms of predictive powers, the la t te r  two may be 
regarded as refinements, narrowing down the range of p o ss ib ilities , but 
they do i t  in radically d ifferen t ways. Is there a way further to
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refine our tools, so as to arrive at more conclusive predictions?
I t  does make sense to take into account not only the various 
parties' sheer size, in terms of parliamentary seats, but also what 
they stand fo r. After a l l ,  despite sometime appearances, a party is not 
just (al least, not always!) a bunch of people out to grab power and 
office payoffs, regardless of policy and ideology considerations. I t  
makes sense, therefore, to look into this area as w ell. "Just as i t  was 
assumed to be easier to forge a coalition agreement between fewer 
rather than more parties, so i t  was assumed to be easier to do so 
between parties closer to each other, rather than farther apart, in 
terms of policy" [Laver and Schofield, 1990, p. 97]. The following 
theories do precisely that.
Minimal range theory. I t  is plausible to suggest that ideological 
compactness may encourage parties to bargain and form coalitions which 
would not suffer from too many conflicts among prospective partners. 
The more heterogeneous a coalition is , the higher the cost, in terms of 
its  maintenance, of goal c la rific a tio n . Actors w ill therefore endavour 
to form coalitions with a minimal range, i .e .  least ideological 
diversity . Specifically , the distances between the parties on the le f t -  
-to -r ig h t scale can be measured in ideological "spaces". The total 
number of spaces between the extreme left-w ing Party A and the extreme 
right-wing Party E in our example is four. The seven minimal winning 
coalitions have ranges of two or three "spaces"; no possible coalition  
has a single "space", which would have been the best possible situation  
in terms of this particular theory. The minimal range theory, 
predicting as i t  does the formation of coalitions with the least number 
of "spaces", w ill therefore point out coalitions ABC, BD and CDE. Yet 
i t  offers no means of selecting among them.
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Closed Minimal Range. A closely related approach, proposed by 
Axelrod In his Conflict of Interest [1970], predicts a "minimal 
connected winning coalition". Connected here means that coalitions tend 
to consist of actors who are contiguous on the policy scale. Such 
coalitions must be both connected and "minimal" - they should contain 
no more members than is necessary for a coalition to win, but these 
members should represent a "straight flush" in the deck. Thus, there 
may be superfluous actors, in terms of coalition size, since without 
whom the coalition w ill fa il  the connectivity te s t .*  Coming back to our 
specific example, this theory makes three d ifferen t predictions - ABC, 
BCD and CDE, a ll minimal connected coalitions. Note that coalition BCD 
appears here for the f i r s t  time: none of the previous theories
predicted i t  because i t  is not "minimal", since Party C is not needed 
for this coalition to meet the size requirement. I t  is needed, however, 
to ensure connectivity. S t i l l ,  in predicting three d ifferent 
p o ssib ilities , without offering a way to select one of them as the 
lik e ly  outcome, this theory too leaves something to be desired.**
I t  seems then that "minimal winning" theories have largely been 
proven to possess poor predictive a b ilit ie s , because "they yie ld  many
* The findings of several studies, which tested the app licab ility  of 
policy-blind and policy-based coalition theories to the re a lity  of 
European parliamentary democracies, suggest that Axelrod's 
approach has been the most fru it fu l one among those tested. See 
for instance Taylor and Laver, 1973, pp. 222-27, and De Swaan, 
1973, pp. 147-58.
* *  The above discussion was based on: L ijphart, 1984, pp. 46-66; 
DeSwaan, 1973, pp. 47-79; Laver and Schofield, 1990, pp. 89-143; 
Budge & Keman, 1990, pp. 10-19; Browne, 1973.
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predictions for any one given parliamentary situation" [L ijphart, 1984, 
p. 51]. Furthermore, they obviously cannot explain why non-minimal 
winning coalitions do occur very often in real-world coalition  
p o litic s , which phenomenon is quite widespread: "When we look at actual 
governments, only 34 per cent of coalitions in twelve West European 
countries between 1945 and 1971 can be described as 'minimal winning'" 
[Budge & Keman, 1990, p. 14]. This lack of correspondence between 
theory and re a lity  has opened the way for a ll kinds of arguments which 
may account for circumstances that could "justify" the occurrence of 
larger-than-minimal winning coalitions.*
One of the better-known explanations of th is kind is Riker's
famous "information effect: " I f  coalition-makers do not know how much 
weight a specific uncommitted participant adds, then they may be 
expected to aim at more than a minimum winning coalition" [Riker, 1962, 
p. 88]. Lijphart explains its  significance thus: "In the negotiations 
about the formation of a cabinet, there may be considerable uncertainty
about how loyal one or more of the prospective coalition parties, or
individual legislators belonging to these parties, w ill be to the 
proposed cabinet. Therefore, additional parties may be brought into the 
coalition as insurance against defections and as guarantee for the
cabinet's winning status" [L ijphart, 1984, p. 54].
For the sake of brevity, we shall discuss here only surplus 
majority coalitions, not minority governments. The la t te r  are also 
non-minimal winning coalitions, even though the 50 per cent + 1 
criterion  is not satisfied by them . However, they pertain to 
circumstances way outside the subject of this dissertation, and 
w ill not be considered here.
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A sim ilar approach was taken by Laver and Schofield, who referred 
to in tra - rather than interparty uncertainty, a situation in which 
"party discipline is low, so that party leaders cannot be certain, for 
key votes, that they w ill be able to deliver the fu ll seat to ta l won by 
the party at the preceding elections. In this case, surplus majorities 
represent 'insurance' against unauthorized defections by factions of 
undisciplined parties. We can think of what happens in this case as 
party strategies unoffic ia lly  moving the winning post a b it further 
down the road, so as to include a few extra seats for insurance 
purposes" [Laver & Schofield, 1990, p. 82]. In other words, sometimes 
the minimum size requirement may re late  not to a "simple" majority but 
rather to a "working majority".
Another situation in which there is need for a larger-than-minimal 
winning coalition arises when constitutional and p o litic a l requirements 
"a lter the defin ition of a 'winning coalition ' by prescribing qualified  
m ajorities or by bestowing veto power on at least one actor in the 
voting body that must be included in any c o a lit io n ... because decisions 
adopted by a simple majority or without the concurrence of certain 
groups or individuals in the voting body w ill remain ineffective" [De 
Swaan, 1973, p. 81].
S t i l l  another case for a larger-than-minimal coalition is when 
high value is attached to consensus p o litics : "When consensus...
becomes an independent source of motivation, the actors strive to take 
the objectives of a l l ,  or almost a l l ,  actors into considerations when 
the composition and policy of the winning coalition is determined" [De 
Swaan, 1973, p. 83]. Arend Lijphart, for one, observes that "oversized 
cabinets are more typical of the consensus model, and they are
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particu larly  suitable for governing plural societies" [L ijphart, 1984, 
p. 62]. In fact, coalition po litics  based on consensus appears to be a 
typical response to pressures originating in the environment, e.g. 
external war or a major economic c r is is .*
The above explanations, and others of th e ir i lk ,  are problematic 
in two respects at least. F irs t, they certainly do not cover a ll the 
divergent real-world instances of larger-than-minimal coalitions - many 
cases remain apparently unexplained [Laver & Schofield, 1990, p. 83]. 
Second, and more important, they essentially use ad hoc c r ite r ia  to 
account for surplus coalitions. To sum up our discussion so fa r, the 
dominant orthodoxy of Coalition Theory suggests that coalitions w ill 
tend to be minimal with respect to size alone, or a blend of size and 
policy. However, i t  has to resort to ad hoc explanations whenever the 
number of possible coalitions emerging from theoretical considerations 
is larger than one, and far more importantly, whenever re a l- l i fe  
coalitions prove to be larger-than-minimal. Can there be another set of 
theoretical considerations which w ill improve predictability?
In fact. De Swaan goes further to suggest a whole l is t  of unique 
circumstances with which he tries  to explain the existence of non- 
minimal coalitions [De Swaan, 1973, pp. 81-87].
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The Politics of "Not Losing"
Given the aforementioned problems, one should look for more basic 
reasons that could explain why oversized governments are so prevalent 
in the actual po litics  of coalition formation. One possible avenue to 
explore is the va lid ity  of the assumption whereby actors are motivated 
above a ll by a desire to maximize coalition payoffs - a pattern of 
behaviour which logically  should lead to the formation of minimal 
winning coalitions.
I t  is not unreasonable to suppose that actors who bargain to form 
coalitions may be motivated by what could be termed a "not losing" 
behaviour: loss avoidance being regarded as more important than win 
maximization. Since typ ica lly , the main coalition actors are party 
leaders, th e ir major concern with "not losing" can be understood in two 
important ways at least. F irs t, they do not want to lose in the 
interparty game, that is to say, they do not want to be excluded from a 
winning coalition, which is the only way to secure payoffs - policywise 
or otherwise. Second, they do not want to lose in the intraparty game. 
Here, the basic assumption is that a leader's position within his or 
her party becomes more vulnerable i f  the party is relegated to 
opposition, more easily défendable i f  the party is a member of the 
ruling coalition. Consequently, interparty as well as intraparty  
considerations which involve elements of risk  and uncertainty may 
account for a conservative, defensive behaviour - a "not losing" 
attitude - on the part of individual as well as partisan coalition  
actors.
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The important point here is that in view of a "not losing" 
approach towards the po litics  of coalition formation, actors w ill be 
mainly concerned with being included in, rather than excluded from, a 
winning coalition. I f  participation in coalition is considered v ita l,  
actors cannot be said to be motivated exclusively by a desire to 
maximize th e ir payoffs through forming minimal winning coalitions. In 
fac t, they may want to be included in almost any winning coalition - be 
i t  minimal or not. I f  almost a ll the actors in a given situation want 
to become members of a winning coalition regardless of size 
considerations, there is a high probability that the eventual coalition  
w ill be wide-based. One may expect therefore an intense, confusing and 
sometimes underhanded bargaining process, the end result of which may 
well be a larger-than-minimal coalition whose members have traded o ff 
larger but less certain payoffs for smaller but safer ones.
Oversized coalitions can be explained as a result of the "not 
losing" approach also in a d ifferen t way. The alternative approach 
turns our attention from the coalition-making process to the coalition- 
fo ilin g  process, in which actors attempt to block the formation of 
coalitions from which they may be excluded. These actors become 
involved in the creation of "blocking coalitions" - protocoalitions 
based on interparty agreements which exclusively aim to prevent other 
parties from forming a coalition. I f  a deadlock has been reached in 
this way, actors can now concentrate th e ir efforts on undermining each 
other's protocoalition or, fa ilin g  that, unite competing 
protocoalitions together, as the only way to form any coalition, which 
w ill then be well oversized, of course.
Such behaviour cannot be explained by the "win maximization" 
motivational assumption. In re a lity , since i t  is rather d if f ic u lt  to
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dismantle interparty agreements ("proto-coalitions, once formed, remain 
non-dissolvable" [Grofman, 1982, p. 86 ]), the phenomenon of wide-based 
coalitions could more easily be explained by the logic of "not losing".
The "not losing" approach emphasizes the presence of risk  in the 
process of forming a coalition. This risk may make actors more 
sensitive to losses involved in being excluded from a winning coalition  
than to the amount of payoffs receiveable through being included.* 
Actors may adopt a "low risk , low expectations" attitude and choose to 
sacrifice possible high payoffs for the greater probability of 
acquiring some payoffs. Put d iffe ren tly , by reducing th e ir  expectations 
they make th e ir realisation more probable. They may be w illing  to give 
a premium to certainty over uncertainty. For them, "not losing" may 
simply be a matter of being included in a winning coalition , almost any 
winning coalition; of participating in the only p o litic a l game that 
distributes payoffs and secures th e ir leadership positions. The idea of 
"not losing" gives a new sense to an old saying: they know i t 's  
crooked, but i t 's  the only game in town.
The logic of "not losing" is contested by those who assume that 
rational coalition behaviour should aim exclusively at maximizing 
payoffs: "Some participants w ill choose the alternative leading to the 
larger payoffs. Such choice is rational behaviour and i t  w ill be 
accepted as defin ite  while the behaviour of participants who do not so 
choose w ill not necessarily be so accepted" [Riker, 1962, p. 23]. 
Riker's assertion notwithstanding, i t  may be less reasonable for an
On the idea that "losses loom larger than gains" under conditions 
of uncertainty, see for instance Quattrone & Tversky, 1988, pp. 
717-736.
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actor to aim at a minimal winning coalition, since the advantage i t  
offers over an oversized coalition may be offset by the risk  of losing 
a l l ,  in the actor's subjective reckoning. This reasoning does not 
attempt to question the rationale involved in the desire to maximize 
payoffs - i t  comes to complement i t .  I t  is certa in ly rational for 
actors to strive to maximize payoffs; i t  is equally ra tio na l, however, 
for actors to strive not to lose. Thus, i t  is possible to think of
Riker's "win maximization" approach as part of the rational theory of
choice, and of the "not losing" approach as part of the descriptive 
theory of choice.*
Indeed, given coalition formation re a lit ie s , i t  seems reasonable 
enough to assume that actors would rather be in a "not losing" 
situation than in a "win or lose" situation. In a sense, not winning, 
winning a l i t t l e ,  winning a lo t or winning the maximum, are a ll but
special cases of the general notion of "not losing". To suggest that
actors strive exclusively to maximize payoffs is hardly more 
significant than to say that they would rather have more money than 
less. Maximization of payoffs is more of a desire than a strategy, 
involving a hypothetical option that may or may not come true. In any 
immediate and practical sense, actors are involved in attempts to avoid 
losing. The logic of "not losing" thus implies surv ivab ility  - which is 
what po litics  is a ll about.
Essentially, the rational theory of choice deals with the choice 
between alternatives as a ra tionally  guided process governed by 
abstract considerations; the descriptive theory of choice is more 
empirical, using re a l- l i fe  situations for the development of 
c r ite r ia . On the differences between these two theories of choice 
see for instance Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, 1982; Dawes, 1988.
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Certainly, not to a ll types of p o litic a l games can the "not 
losing" approach be applied effec tive ly . For example, i t  is hard to 
imagine a "not losing" approach in presidential p o litic s . In such an 
instance, a rather clear win-or-lose situation is certain to develop. 
However, parliamentary po litics  is a to ta lly  d ifferen t proposition, 
which provides room for considerations of "not losing" in forming 
coalition governments. Here, there are many actors who "play i t  safe" 
since they do not want to lose and be "out of i t " .  They are not 
gamblers but rather risk averting creatures who would be happy not to 
lose, happier to win something and happiest i f  they were to h it the 
p o litic a l jackpot. In short, when the benefits are of an "either-or" 
nature, there is no room for a "not losing" approach; but in the more 
common case of graded benefits, there is very l i t t l e  room for anything 
else.
"Not losing" represents a conservative minimax approach in the 
formation phase of coalition p o litics , when i t  may safely be assumed 
that actors strive above a ll to be included in a winning coalition - a 
government - in order to avoid the risks of opposition. This implies a 
certain level of interparty cooperation: riva ls  may become a llie s  in 
the process of coalition formation, namely the transition from the 
parliamentary level to the governmental leve l. This raises a key 
question: does a strong interparty competition take place at a ll in 
coalition p o litics , and i f  so, where? According to the "not losing" 
approach, the more lik e ly  place for effective interparty bargaining 
could be found at the coalition maintenance phase, that is , within the 
framework of an already established winning coalition . The "not losing"
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actor Is lik e ly  to reason out that his bargaining position would be 
much stronger once he has been included in the winning co a litio n .*
Indeed, i t  is quite possible that a fter the formation of the 
government, an actor may try  to renegotiate the coalition agreement and 
extract more advantages at the expense of other partners. I f  his 
demands are refused he may even threaten to leave the coalition  
altogether.** In other words, coalition strategies could possibly 
revert from "not losing" to "winning" a fter the transition from the 
formation to the maintenance stage had been completed. However, such a 
change of strategies may be risky because i t  entails coalition  
in s ta b ility  and possible demise. Given these considerations, i t  is not 
unreasonable to assume that the "not losing" approach may continue to 
dominate even the coalition maintenance stage. Much as the various 
actors may desire to get more payoffs, they nevertheless have to make 
sure that conflicts amongst themselves not become exacerbated to the 
point where dissolution of the winning coalition becomes inevitable.
"Not losing" actors appreciate that coalitions are also ruling  
governments, and that coalition po litics  is basically about acquiring 
governmental payoffs. Under conditions of uncertainty, these payoffs 
are the best "insurance" actors may have for p o litic a l survival.
*  D ix it & Nalebuff [1991, pp. 25-27] te l l  an amusing story about
bargaining with a taxicab driver, the long and the short of i t  
being th is: get in f i r s t ,  then te ll  the driver your destination.
I f  you'd te l l  him before you got in, you may never get in at a l l .  
Its  particular relevance to our case in point is also due to the 
fact that the horrid experience they re late  took place in 
Jerusalem...
* *  In is not uncommon for actors to reopen the interparty agreement
or break agreed-upon rules, as witness the fact that in the real 
world, coalitions do dissolve.
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A Working Model for "Not Losing”
In order to examine the "not losing" approach in action, le t  us 
re ite ra te  our previous numerical example and see how i t  works now.
Table 4.2 A Hypothetical Distribution of Parliamentary
Seats Among Five Parties
LEFT......................................................................................................................RIGHT
Parties: A B C 0 E
Seats: 6 41 6 43 4
Total seats 100, minimum required 51.
Given the distribution of parliamentary seats among these parties, 
the question is which winning coalition is most lik e ly  to form? The 
various coalition theories discussed e a rlie r suggested several 
divergent po ss ib ilities , and i t  seems that the most elaborate among 
them, in terms of taking the most factors into account, seems to be the 
"closed minimal range" winning coalition developed by Robert Axelrod. 
As noted e a rlie r , i t  predicts that coalitions w ill tend to form when 
they are both "connected", that is , composed of parties adjacent on the 
policy scale, and "minimal", that is , devoid of unnecessary members 
[Axelrod, 1970, pp. 165-87]. In our case, three such possible 
coalitions were predicted: coalitions ABC and ODE with 53 seats each, 
and coalition BCD with 90 seats. Which one w ill eventually emerge as 
the winning coalition? Axelrod offers no help here, so le t  us try  to 
answer this question by examining the bargaining logic of the various
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parties involved, noting that no coalition is possible at a l l ,  
according to this theory, without Party C.
The Large Parties
The le ft-o f-c en tre  large Party B, for instance, could develop two 
d ifferen t bargaining strategies: (1) to try  and form coalition ABC; or 
(2) to participate in coalition BCD. I f  Party B was to form coalition  
ABC, its  expected share of the payoffs w ill be 41/53, whereas i f  i t  
joined coalition BCD its  payoffs w ill be 41/90. Win maximization 
suggests that "any participant w ill expect others to demand from a 
coalition a share of the payoff proportional to the amount of resources 
which they contribute to a coalition. When a player must choose among 
alternative coalition strategies where the total payoff to a winning 
coalition is constant, he w ill maximize his payoff by maximizing his 
share... Since his resources w ill be the same regardless of which 
coalition he jo ins, the lower the total resources, the greater w ill be 
his share. Thus, where the total payoff is held constant, he w ill favor 
the 'cheapest winning coalition '" [Gamson, 1961, p. 376].
In other words, i f  Party B's driving motivation is to maximize its  
payoffs, i t  should have no hesitation in preferring coalition ABC to 
BCD, since this is the "cheapest winning coalition" (41/53 > 41/90). 
For the very same reason. Party D would prefer coalition CDE to 
coalition BCD. Could we conclude, then, that from the predicted set of 
three "connected" coalitions, either ABC or CDE w ill form but probably 
not BCD? The "win maximizers" have no hesitation: " I f  there are two
almost winning proto coalitions and several quite small ones, the size 
principle suggests that the two large ones [B and D in our case] do not
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combine, for the resulting coalition would be so large as to be nearly 
worthless" [Riker, 1962, p. 126]. A closer analysis of the outlooks of 
Parties B and D, however, w ill show that they may adopt a "not losing" 
approach and resolve to form coalition BCD rather than ABC or CDE.
I f  Party B bargains to form coalition ABC, i t  runs the risk  that 
coalition CDE w ill be formed - depending which way Party C decides to 
jump. By the same token, i f  Party D bargains to form coalition CDE i t  
runs the risk that coalition ABC w ill be formed. Generally, then, the 
bargaining to form coalition ABC or CDE involves the risk that at the 
end of the day either Party B or Party D w ill be le f t  in opposition. I f
coalition ABC is formed. Party B w ill get 41/53 payoffs and Party D
w ill get 0 payoffs. Conversely, i f  coalition CDE w ill form Party D w ill
get 43/53 payoffs and Party B w ill get 0 payoffs. Thus, a "win
maximization" coalition strategy runs the risk of losing a l l .
The mutual fear of Parties B and D to be le f t  out of coalition
altogether may trigger a change in th e ir respective bargaining
strategies. In other words, the commonality of interests to avoid 
losing may provide a compelling raison d 'etre for a B-D interparty
cooperation the outcome of which may produce coalition BCD. Indeed, i f  
the bargaining logic of Parties B and D is to avoid losing, i .e .
maximize the probability of winning anything at a l l ,  they w ill
cooperate to form coalition BCD, or even BD, both of which are certain  
winners for them. The formation of coalition BCD would suggest that 
Parties B and D have adopted a "not losing" approach rather than a "win 
maximization" approach. They have probably resolved that th e ir
aspiration level w ill be satisfied by virtue of th e ir being included in 
a winning coalition. Coalition BCD may not be the "best" winning
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coalition they could have formed (41/90 < 41/53, and 43/90 < 43/53),
but i t  is de fin ite ly  a winning coalition - and they are d e fin ite ly
included in i t .
I f  we turn our attention from office  payoffs to possible policy 
payoffs in the would-be winning coalition. Parties B and D w ill have 
even a stronger reason to prefer the wide-based coalition BCD to the 
narrow-based coalitions ABC or CDE. Ideologically, Party B would tend 
to prefer coalition ABC, where i t  could more easily advance left-w ing  
policies, while Party D should prefer coalition CDE in order to push 
forward right-wing policies. However, as already noted, a bargaining 
aimed to form the narrow-based coalitions ABC or CDE involves the risk  
of being defeated by the opponent, which entails painful costs in terms 
of policy payoffs. Thus, in order to avoid the risk of an ideological 
defeat which may be not only regrettable but also irreversib le . Parties
B and D would prefer to form coalition BCD.
True, in terms of policy payoffs, coalition BCD is worth very 
l i t t l e  to Parties B and D, because its  formation represents, i f  
anything, a le f t -r ig h t ideological "freeze" (provided Party C is 
neutral in this respect). However, an ideological stalemate may be 
better than an ideological disaster. And i f  Parties B and D are two 
poles apart and deeply divided on fundamental issues, the risk of 
opposition may indeed be regarded a disaster. Theoretically, a strong 
ideological clash between the two leading parties should lower the 
chances of coalition BCD to form. However, i t  is precisely because of 
the great ideological distance between them that a high value is 
attached to "not losing" in terms of policy payoffs.
I t  appears, then, that the desire to reduce uncertainty about 
participation in a winning coalition, based on considerations of both
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office and policy payoffs, accounts for a high probability that Parties 
B and D w ill form the non-minimal coalition BCD.
The Extreme Parties
The bargaining logic which requires the leading Parties B and D to form 
a wide-based winning coalition may make even more sense i f  Parties A 
and E in figure 4.2 are not "merely" located on both ends of the local 
policy spectrum, but are rea lly  extremist, "irresponsible" parties. Let 
us suppose, for example, that Party A is Marxist and Party E is 
Fascist. These w ill be then essentially "anti-system" parties, equipped 
with well-developed non-democratic ideologies, representing alienation 
and distrust towards the parliamentary system. Such extreme parties may 
or may not be active in the bargaining process.* Sometimes they seek 
active participation in order to diminish th e ir p o litic a l isolation, 
establish th e ir legitimacy and expand th e ir p o litica l power. Sometimes 
they do not play any active role and wait to see i f  the emerging 
winning coalition would be on th e ir "side" of the party system or not. 
They may even want the other side to win, believing that "things have 
to get worse before they could get any better".
We assumed that a "not losing" attitude entails coalition  
membership. However, remaining fa ith fu l to a certain ideology and 
adopting a non-parti c ipatory strategy may be an effective "not 
losing" strategy for extreme parties, as when a Communist party 
refuses to "manage the cris is  of capitalism". Such parties may win 
votes away from th e ir adjacent parties who joined the winning 
coalition and became "de-ideologized". See for instance Sartori, 
1976, p. 327; D ittrich , 1985, p. 266.
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Be this as i t  may, the extreme parties are necessarily part of the 
coalition bargaining process simply because they are there 
represented in parliament and thus having an impact on the calculations 
of the possible coalition "formateurs", the large parties. Usually, 
extreme parties passively contribute to the crysta lliza tion  of 
leg is la tive  "blocking coalitions", organized by opposing larger parties 
with the intention of preventing each other from forming a winning 
coalition . However, these large parties w ill probably refuse to rely  on 
extreme "pariah" parties to form th e ir own winning coalitions. Winning 
coalitions based on the support of irresponsible extremist parties lack 
both p o litica l legitimacy and s ta b ility , that is , they are risky to 
form. I f  these constraints apply to our example, then Party B w ill not 
form coalition ABC and Party D w ill stay away from coalition CDE. These 
coalitions are theoretically feasible but p o lit ic a lly  impossible. 
Consequently, there is no much bargaining to be conducted, and BCD 
becomes a "given" coalition.
The Centre Party
The centre Party C in figure 4.2 occupies the pivotal position and can 
possibly dictate the coalition solution from among the three possible 
coalition options: ABC, BCD and CDE. Apparently, Party C should bargain 
to form either coalition ABC or CDE but not coalition BCD, because its  
proportional share in coalitions ABC or CDE is 6/53 while in coalition  
BCD i t  is only 6/90. Moreover, as the pivotal party i t  may use its  
bargaining power to get more than its  " fa ir  share" of the payoffs in 
the smaller coalitions - perhaps even the top position.
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However, Party C ' s  choice of ABC or CDE may be somewhat 
problematic since i t  may soon be identified  as either a left-w ing or a 
right-wing party. This may weaken its  pivotal power and incur a future 
electoral price. Such a costly and possibly irreversib le damage would 
not occur i f  Party C chose to participate in coalition BCD. In th is  
wide-based coalition, Party C does not lose its  pivotal role and may 
subsequently (in the "maintenance phase") a lly , at its  w il l ,  e ither 
with Party B or with Party D. Thus, by employing a strategy which makes 
i t  jo in  coalition BCD, Party C could possibly extract high office  
payoffs (assuming that, in its  "neutral" central position, i t  has few 
policy payoffs to demand - the balance between Parties B and D w ill 
take care of th a t). This may occur not necessarily at the coalition  
bargaining table, but probably a fter the formation of the winning 
coalition . This bargaining logic represents a "not losing" approach at 
the formation stage, and possibly a "win maximization" approach at the 
maintenance stage.
However, even though coalition BCD could be a ttractive to Party C, 
this party cannot dictate its  formation. The formation of a wide-based 
coalition depends on Parties B and D, which would probably prefer 
coalition BD (though i t  is not "connected") to BCD. For Parties B and 
D, coalition BCD does not make sense: its  policy position is identical 
to BD and Party C may be expected to demand high o ffice payoffs, even 
i f  i t  remains neutral on policy matters. I f  Parties B and D adopt a 
"not losing" attitude, however, i t  is possible that they w ill form 
coalition BCD anyway, foregoing the option of BD. They may not need 
Party C in order to strengthen the winning coalition against its  
opponents, but each of them - separately and at cross-purposes! - may
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need i t  badly for a narrow-based coalition, i f  and when i t  becomes 
desirable.
I f  Party C fears being outmaneouvered by the formation of 
coalition BD, i t  may resort to its  original bargaining strategy and try  
to form either coalition ABC or CDE. However, its  a b ility  to play an
effective pivotal role depends on its  strength as well as on its
central position. I f  Party C is weak (as in our example, 6/100), i t  is 
quite possible that neither Party B nor Party D w ill be much interested 
in forming a narrow-based coalition (even i f  Parties A and E are not
regarded as "pariahs"), since such a coalition is lik e ly  to be highly
unstable (53/100). Moreover, i f  Party C is in ternally  divided i t  may
find i t  v ir tu a lly  impossible to use its  potential power to "jump on the
bandwagon" and bargain to form coalitions ABC or CDE. A feeble and 
fragmented centre is not capable of playing an effective  role in 
forming a le ft-o f-cen tre  or a right-of-centre coalition . Given these 
considerations, the probable coalition solution would be either BD or 
BCD.
Whichever winning coalition fin a lly  emerges, i t  w ill be dominated 
by the large parties, and even i f  Party C is included i t  would be 
effec tive ly  blocked from playing a pivotal power - unless either large 
party allows th is . The large Parties B and D mean to form a "not 
losing" coalition and they would not le t Party C to make them lose. All 
this may change, however, i f  either large party decides i t  stands to
lose nothing by forming a narrow-based coalition, in which case Party C
w ill become essential. Since such an eventuality can never be ruled 
out, i t  is most reasonable for both Parties B and D to court Party C on 
an ongoing basis, for which reason the end result of the present 
discussion is that "not losing" predicts coalition BCD.
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Intraoartv Politics
What emerges from the above discussion is that the large Parties B and 
D would tend to form coalition BCD, placing BD as a second-best. The 
preference for a wide-based coalition involves a preference to win less 
with certainty over the option of winning more with a degree of 
uncertainty. This choice was based on the assumption that Parties B and 
D are unitary actors in pursuing th e ir  bargaining strategy. Will the ir  
choice of a winning coalition be d ifferen t i f  they were in ternally  
composed of strong factions which press for independent bargaining 
strategies?
Let us suppose, for example, that the le ft-o f-c en tre  party B with 
its  41 parliamentary seats consists of two major factions: a dominant 
left-w ing faction B1 with 25 seats and a more right-wing faction B2 
with 16 seats. Will the dominant left-w ing faction B1 pursue a strategy 
aiming to form the le ft-o f-cen tre  coalition ABC, instead of the middle- 
of-the-road coalition BCD? Possibly, because for faction Bl, more than 
for faction B2, the former coalition is de fin ite ly  more attractive  in 
terms of policy payoffs than the la t te r . Moreover, faction Bl may fear 
that in coalition BCD the minority faction B2 may be strengthened at 
its  expense, through cooperation with Parties C and D.
I f  the above considerations convince faction Bl to bargain for the 
formation of coalition ABC, i t  runs of course the risk  of the party as 
a whole being le f t  in opposition, i f  eventually coalition CDE w ill be 
formed. In opposition faction Bl may also face trouble from faction B2. 
The fa ilu re  of party B to be part of a winning coalition may be 
exploited by faction B2 to stage an intraparty coup. Failing that,
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faction B2 may s p lit away and try  to jo in  the winning coalition CDE. 
Indeed, i t  seems that Faction 61 in formulating a coalition bargaining 
strategy finds i ts e lf  between the devil and the deep blue sea. In the 
fin a l analysis, however, the dominant faction Bl may possibly resolve 
to form coalition BCD and not coalition ABC. F irs t, i t  is easier to 
face intraparty opponents in a winning coalition than in opposition. 
Second, faction Bl can exploit the formation process of coalition BCD 
to "punish" faction B2 by reducing its  expected payoffs and thus 
hurting its  pivotal power (such an intraparty maneouvre is hardly
possible in the narrow-based coalition ABC). Faction Bl's intraparty  
move would probably be "justified" by the need to preserve the 
distinctiveness of party B in the le f t-r ig h t coalition BCD.
Let us turn to the right-of-centre party D with its  43 seats and 
also assume that i t  consists of two factions: a dominant re la tive ly  
left-w ing faction Dl, with 26 seats, and a right-wing faction D2 with
17 seats. Here, the minority right-wing faction D2 w ill certainly
prefer coalition CDE to coalition BCD because for i t ,  more than for 
faction Dl, such a choice involves both higher office and policy
payoffs. Moreover, faction D2 is not rea lly  worried: i f  the bargaining 
to form coalition CDE brings about the relegation of Party D to 
opposition, because ABC eventually formed, this w ill provide D2 with an 
opportunity to stage a successful intraparty coup. By contrast, the 
dominant faction Dl w ill most probably choose a strategy aiming to form 
coalition BCD. I f  need be, i t  w ill bargain mainly with faction B2 (and 
not Bl) which favours the same coalition solution. Moreover, in the 
bargaining process to form coalition BCD i t  w ill use its  intraparty  
dominance to reduce payoffs to faction D2.
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Luebbert noted that "in parties in which factional competition is 
intense, government formation provides an often ideal opportunity for 
one faction to seek to sabotage another" [Luebbert, 1986, p. 52]. 
Furthermore, i t  is worth noting that intraparty p o litics  may be carried 
over into the coalition maintenance stage and possibly determine the 
government's modus ooerandi. Dominant factions may create formal or 
informal structures from which th e ir intraparty riva ls  are excluded 
("kitchen cabinets"). In fact, the "real" winning coalition may consist 
of factions whose combined po litica l power represents but a minority in 
parliament, i f  not in the government i ts e lf .  This "core" may 
nevertheless be stable and viable, since no other alternative "core" 
has the p o litic a l power to replace i t .
In our example, the "core" and thus the whole coalition is not 
rea lly  stable. In the le ft-o f-cen tre  party B the dominant faction is a 
left-w ing faction. Also, the minority right-of-centre faction 02 in the 
right-wing Party D is strong, and has a clear interest to bring down 
coalition BCD. For its  survival, this coalition w ill largely depend on 
cooperation between a majority faction in one party (D l) and a minority 
faction in another (B2). This is an obviously unstable situation.
The main conclusion from the above discussion is that wide-based 
coalitions could be the outcome of intraparty p o litic s , where dominant 
factions use the bargaining process to thwart th e ir intraparty riva ls . 
Larger-than-minimal coalitions "can o ffer attractions for party leaders 
motivated above a ll by the desire to remain party leaders" [Laver and 
Schofield, 1990, p. 30]. Fighting intraparty riva ls  through cooperation 
in a winning coalition with other, "unnecessary" parties, indeed seems 
to be an effective way to secure p o litica l survival for factions and 
individuals, even though i t  may weaken the party as a whole. When a
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dominant faction invites additional parties to jo in  the winning 
coalition , there are bound to be fewer payoffs for the party as a 
whole. But then, of course, in intraparty terms what counts most is the 
payoff to the individual factions, not to the party as a whole. The 
dominant faction would see to i t  that its  intraparty r iv a ls , rather 
than i ts e lf ,  would suffer from the reduced payoffs to the party. After 
a l l ,  the very reason to bring in more parties to the winning coalition  
was to hurt them.
Such intraparty considerations which could bring about a surplus 
coalition are based on the "not losing" approach and seem further to 
undermine the va lid ity  of the "win maximization" approach. Each party 
as a whole certainly does not maximize its  winnings in the wide-based 
coalition , and the intraparty factions just "maximize" th e ir  efforts  
not to lose. Thus, the reasons why actors behave in a "not losing" 
fashion are to be found within the parties as well as in the interparty  
arena.
In conclusion, what emerges from the discussion of the "not losing" 
approach is that when the coalition process in its  en tire ty  is viewed 
as a game played in stages, and in d ifferen t arenas, the "win 
maximization" assumption - on which the formal coalition theory is 
predicated - seems only p a rtia lly  adequate. When Riker formulated the 
famous size principle in his Theorv of P o litica l Coalitions, he pointed 
out a contradiction between his theory and another famous theory 
suggested by Downs in his Economic Theorv of Democracv [1957]: "Downs
assumed that p o litica l parties (a kind of coalition) seek to maximize 
votes (membership). As against th is , I shall attempt to show that they 
seek to maximize only up to the point of subjective certainty of
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winning. After that point they seek to minimize, that is , to maintain 
themselves at the size (as subjectively estimated) of a minimum winning 
coalition" [Riker, 1962, p. 33].
As the following discussion of the Is rae li experience during the 
period 1984-1990 w ill show, "not losing" proves to be a more powerful 
analytical tool than "win maximization". In other words, while neither 
Riker's nor Downs's approach w ill do in i ts e lf  to explain what had 
actually taken place, an amalgamation of both w ill enable us to 
understand the rather unique exercises, maneouvres, machinations and 
plots which characterised the Is rae li coalition scene during that 
period, and most particu larly  the bizarre, rather than simply strange 
bed-fellowship witnessed then. The system's behaviour w ill be related  
in great d e ta il, at the conclusion of which i t  w ill be analysed to see 
just how far the "not losing" notion can contribute to a better 
understanding of coalition p o litics .
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Chapter Five 
Forming a National Unity Government, 1984
Strategy and Tactics
About a year a fter the June 1981 general elections, which had produced 
a narrow-based Likud government, the opposition Labour party took a 
commanding and stable lead in public opinion polls [Diskin, 1988, pp. 
135-150] This was mainly due to the poor performance of the Likud 
government (such as the protracted Lebanon War and tr ip le -d ig it  
in fla tio n ), leading most po litica l observers to conclude that Labour 
was going easily to win the coming general elections and form the next 
government. They proved to have been very wrong. The Likud, but more so 
Labour, were both the losers in the 1984 elections, and instead of the 
expected Labour government, the two major parties were forced into a 
national unity government (henceforth NUG).
Two p o litic a l in itia tiv e s  taken separately by Labour and the Likud 
could partly explain the surprising election results. Labour's 
in it ia t iv e  to force premature elections turned out to be a po litica l 
error, while the Likud's idea to make the formation of an NUG after the 
election the centrepiece of its  election campaign turned out to be a 
smart p o litic a l move. Contrary to the pre-election projections. Labour 
lost some power, the Likud gained some power, and the overall result
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was a p o litica l t ie  between the two major p o litic a l blocs, which was 
going to las t for years.
Should Opposition Rush to Assume Power?
The July 1984 elections were held almost a fu ll year before the end of 
the regular four-year parliamentary term. The decision was taken in 
March 1984, through the in it ia t iv e  of the opposition Labour party, when 
the Knesset resolved to dissolve i ts e lf  and set a date for new 
elections.* For an opposition party to force a government into 
premature elections was an unprecedented event in Israe l's  
parliamentary h is to ry .** Generally speaking, there is nothing unusual 
about an opposition party trying to topple the government, given the 
opportunity. I t  certainly looks bad i f  a major opposition party does 
not do its  best to get to power as soon as possible. Under those 
specific circumstances, however. Labour seems to have made an error of 
judgement by forcing early elections. S pecifically , Labour could 
probably look forward to better results, had the elections taken place
*  Is rae li law requires a majority of the Knesset to decide on
premature elections. Until then, such an in it ia t iv e  has only been 
taken by the coalition. In B rita in , for example, early elections 
can happen on the Prime Minister's whim, usually with an intention 
to catch the opposition unprepared. In Is rae l, the opposition 
cannot rea lly  be surprised, not least because quite a few months 
pass between the dissolution of the Knesset and election date.
* *  The Likud government tried  to have the vote taken in a secret
ballot rather than show of hands, expecting many opposition 
members to vote against party line for obvious, self-serving  
reasons. The Speaker, Mr. Menachem Savidor (a Likud member) ruled 
against i t ,  which ruling cost him his p o litica l career.
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at the due date, mid-1985, since Mr. Yitzhak Shamir's Likud government 
of 1983-84 was in complete, hopeless shambles.
Mr. Shamir's government did not seem able to resolve the burning 
issues on the national agenda on its  own. The Is rae li army was deeply 
stuck in the Lebanese quagmire, in a protracted conflic t that was 
already two years old. The Likud, which had decided on the Lebanese 
"war by choice" in June 1982, had no idea when or how to withdraw the 
army and put an end to the m ilita ry  operations.* Moreover, Israe li 
economy was in total disarray, following the collapse of the so-called 
"correct economy", a once effective Likud slogan. Spiraling in fla tion  
required urgent measures to manage the c ris is , but no recovery plans 
seemed to be in sight.
Actually, the Likud government did not seem capable of formulating 
and implementing coherent policies in any major area. Also, the Likud 
party i ts e lf  suffered from b itte r  factionalism due to leadership 
succession fights , following Mr. Begin's resignation as Prime Minister. 
Furthermore, Mr. Begin, having resigned, then steadfastly refused to 
intervene in this struggle, even though i t  might have made a 
significant contribution to s ta b ility  within the p arty .** In less than
* On the Lebanon war see for instance Schiff and Y a 'a ri, 1984. I t
was the f i r s t  war in Is rae l's  history about which there was no 
nation-wide consensus.
* *  "I have never intervened in this kind of things" [personal
communication, 19.8.91]. The motives for Mr. Begin's resignation 
have never been made public, other than the usual "personal 
reasons" excuse. However, Labour fa iled  to make any use of this  
potentially damaging (for the Likud) fact in the campaign. I t  
seems that Mr. Begin's prestige has remained so high that any 
reference to his resignation would have backfired - at least, that 
i t  how Labour's strategists saw i t .
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a year, Mr. Shamir was twice challenged as party leader - in September 
1983 by Mr. David Levy and in April 1984 by Mr. Ariel Sharon. Under 
such circumstances, the question faced by Labour was: Why not wait for 
the scheduled general elections in 1985 and le t  the Likud get into more 
trouble meanwhile?
There was apparently one problem, however, with th is kind of logic 
- i t  did not f i t  well into the p o litic a l schedule of Labour's leader 
Mr. Peres, who wanted early elections as soon as possible. For Mr. 
Peres, waiting for 1985 was a risk , since by then he might have faced a 
leadership challenge himself. Mr. Peres had already made an arrangement 
with his party riva l Mr. Rabin, whereby the la tte r  would become Defence 
Minister in a future Labour government. However, he feared yet another 
potential challenger, Mr. Yitzhak Navon.* As a former President of the 
State of Israel and a popular Sephardic leader, Mr. Navon seemed an 
excellent candidate to lead Labour against the Likud, capable of 
drawing away some of the crucial Sephardic voters. When Mr. Navon ended 
his term as President, in May 1983, he said he would observe a 
"cooling-off period" of one year before returning to active po litics . 
Mr. Peres therefore had to move fast in order to avert this challenge 
to his party leadership. He promised Mr. Navon the Foreign A ffairs  
Ministry in a would-be Labour government, and at the same time, in 
order to secure his top position, pushed for early elections.
Once Mr. Peres secured early elections through an agreement with a 
coalition partner, the Tami party, he suggested a May or June 1984 
date. Labour's preference for the earliest possible date (in Israe li
*  Yitzhak Rabin and Yitzhak Navon, interviews.
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terms, that is) was based on its  lead in the opinion polls, and was 
aimed at preventing the Likud from introducing "election-economic" 
measures. Labour remembered well the prolonged 1981 campaign, when the 
Likud government was effective ly  buying o ff the public vote, which 
policy had paid o ff handsomely in opinion polls as well as on election  
day [Ben-Hanan and Temkin, 1986, pp. 15-35].
The Likud, for its  part, wanted to buy time and proposed a 
November election date, presumably on the assumption that things were 
so bad now that six months henceforth they could only get better. 
Eventually the two parties met halfway, and the date was fixed for July 
23, 1984 - at the height of the vacation season, which seems to have
been disadvantageous to Labour.* Nevertheless, "Peres decided to accept 
a July compromise, calculating that the personal and party risks of a 
November election were greater than the potential loss of travelling  
Alignment [Labour] supporters" [Arian, 1986, p. 5].
I t  is not unreasonable to assume that a p o litic a l leader finds i t  
d if f ic u lt  to make a distinction between his own personal interests and 
those of his party. Moreover, when the good of the party and the good 
of the leader are not one and the same, leaders almost invariably tend 
to rationalize this fact away. Mr. Peres was no d iffe ren t. Yet some of 
his colleagues re flect b itte r ly  on his decision. According to them, had 
the elections taken place in November 1984, or sometime in 1985, Labour
At the time, the number of Israe lis  spending some time abroad 
during the summer was greater than half a m illion , while total 
population was about 4 m illion . Presumably, Labour's w e ll-o ff  
voters took to vacationing overseas more than the Likud's poorer 
constituency. Haaretz (30.7.84) reported that in a straw polling 
station outside "Mark & Spencer" on Oxford Street, London, Labour 
enjoyed a big lead over Likud among v is itin g  Is ra e lis . . .
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would have picked up a few more parliamentary seats - which was a ll 
that was needed for Labour to form its  own government, rather than 
share power with the Likud in the framework of an NUG [interviews Mr. 
Ya'acobi, Mr. Gur and others].
Because Labour forced early elections, the Likud apparently did
not pay the fu ll electoral price for its  poor performance in
government. Mr. Peres had been anxious to get to power as soon as 
possible, but in the end he was not given the p o litic a l power needed to 
assume fu ll charge of the government for a fu ll parliamentary term. But 
then, of course, he was s t i l l  the leader of the Labour party. Mr. Peres 
did not win the 1984 general elections, but in the intraparty arena he 
did not lose. For him, as for a ll po litic ians, the intraparty arena 
counted for most. Thus, i t  seems that personal "not losing" 
considerations could partly explain both the date and, thus, the
results of the 1984 elections.*
Consensus Is Competition
During the 1984 election campaign, in a nationally televised p o litica l 
debate between the leaders of Likud and Labour, Prime Minister Shamir 
unexpectedly proposed the establishment of a unity government following
Mr. Peres said that the need "to save the nation" from the Likud, 
rather than intraparty considerations, made him decide to push for 
early elections. Other Labour leaders (such as Mr. Rabin, Mr. 
Moshe Shachal, Mr. Mordechi Gur and Mr. Gad Ya'acobi), however, 
cited intraparty politicking as having played a role in the 
decision on early elections [personal interviews].
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the elections, to include both the Likud and Labour. A rather surprised 
Mr. Peres declined to take up the challenge. This incident, a fortnight 
before election day (10.7.84), apparently had an impact on the course 
of the campaign and thus on election results. I t  appeared to have 
helped the Likud, which was well behind in opinion polls, and possibly 
hurt Labour which was then regarded as a sure winner.
The Prime M inister's call for an NUG was a smart p o litica l move on 
the part of the beleaguered Likud. To begin with, Mr. Shamir was 
portrayed as a national statesman who puts the country ahead of his 
party. Naturally, the public prefers to see nonpartisan attitudes 
displayed by its  p o litica l leaders, especially in times of national 
crises and distress. More importantly, the call for national unity 
served to pacify traditional Likud supporters who were disappointed 
with the poor performance of the government and were hesitant about 
voting for i t .  However, i f  the Likud promised cooperation with Labour, 
these people could square the c irc le  and vote yet again for the Likud, 
as required by sentiment but t i l l  then vetoed by reason. Also, Labour's 
disregard for the Prime Minister's unity gesture reaffirmed its  
sectarian image as a party which puts p a rticu la ris tic  interests ahead 
of the national in terest. This had a particu larly  strong impact on the 
behaviour of the Sephardic voters, who disliked Labour for precisely 
th is reason.*
The Labour party rejected the call for a national unity 
government, explaining that i t  would bring about stagnation, not
The impact seems to have been significant since by 1984, voters of 
Sephardic origin have become a majority within the electorate 
[Arian, 1986, p. 8]
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progress. What the nation needed was not an unwieldy national coalition  
but rather an effective government which could make crisp, clear 
decisions on major issues. In re a lity , of course, the main reason for 
rejecting the call for a national coalition was that Labour maintained 
a big lead in the public opinion polls and was sure of easily winning 
the elections.
I t  is worth noting that the wide publicity given to opinion polls 
that indicated a big Labour lead, about 10 seats over the Likud, seems 
to have influenced the very results they were supposed to forecast, 
because the information tended to change voting behaviour in both the 
Likud and Labour camps. I t  made i t  easier for disaffected Likud 
supporters to follow their hearts anyway, feeling that th e ir  votes
would not affect the preordained results, especially in view of the 
Likud's call for national unity. In the Labour camp, voters who
hesitated whether to vote for Labour or its  s a te llite  parties, voted 
for the la t te r , assuming that Labour would win anyhow. These two 
parallel developments contributed to a more or less equal s p lit  of the 
vote between the two big parties and th e ir blocs, which brought about 
an NUG. [Diskin, 1988, p. 142]
With the benefit of hindsight, i t  seems that Labour's refusal to 
accept the Likud's suggestion of an NUG was a p o litic a l error. Even i f
Labour had good reasons to reject the idea (such as fear of stronger
opposition from the left-wing Mapam) - i t  would have done better
publicly to announce, at least for campaign purposes, that i t  may be 
favourably inclined to national unity "under certain conditions". To
ignore or indeed disapprove of the idea altogether was a tactical
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mistake which reinvested Labour with the arrogant image i t  had 
desperately tried  to shake o ff. The Labour party should have learnt the 
lessons of the 1981 elections, when i t  paid dearly for its  partisan 
p o litics  and image - always a sure weapon in the hands of its  p o litica l 
r iv a ls . Already in the 1960's, Herut and Rafi attacked Mapai as a se lf- 
serving party and charged i t  with ignoring the national in terest. This 
old p o litic a l weapon seemed effective also in 1984.*
Generally speaking, advancing a conciliatory strategy in elections 
campaigns seems to possess electoral power, since i t  tends to a ttract a 
good number of voters who prefer consensus and view partisan attitudes 
with distaste. This is particu larly  true when a governing party shows a
willingness to cooperate with the opposition. Such a move may be
interpreted by voters as a magnanimous gesture, thus increasing the 
chances for reelection. S t i l l ,  consensus po litics  in elections does not 
mean coordination or cooperation with p o litica l opponents. Rather, i t  
implies a well devised and s k illfu l form of competition. In the Israe li
context, the Likud's conciliatory attitude was proven to be an
effective campaign strategy in a fierce competition with a po litica l 
"enemy".
Mr. Peres admits now that he was genuinely surprised by Mr. 
Shamir's NUG o ffer, and that his response was not adequate 
[in terv iew ].
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The Losers - Likud and More So Labour
The Likud and Labour parties were both the losers in the 1984 election. 
There was, however, a difference in perspective, in that the Likud's 
loss was less than expected whereas Labour was the sure winner who 
never won. The timing of the elections and the one smart campaign move 
by the Likud could account in part for these unexpected results. There 
were, however, other factors involved.
The poor record of the Likud government was probably the main 
reason why this party could not avoid the voters' punishment (any
e ffo rt to escape i t  through the use of electioneering economics was 
ruled out - not for lack of desire to do so, but for lack of means). 
Moreover, in 1984, the charismatic Mr. Begin, who had almost 
singlehandedly won for the Likud the 1981 elections, was not around 
anymore. Another charismatic leader, Mr. Sharon, was not rea lly
involved in the campaign, due to his authorship of the fiasco in 
Lebanon.* Apart from that one b r il l ia n t  move, inviting Labour to a 
national unity government, the Likud ran a bad campaign which le f t  most 
of the in it ia t iv e  in Labour's hands [Torgovnik, 1986].
The Likud's numerous problems notwithstanding, there were two
factors that worked in its  favour. F irs t, the policy positions of the
party on foreign and defence issues were rather popular with the
Mr. Ariel Sharon says that apart from the Lebanon issue, the 
Likud's campaign managers did not want his participation because 
of his impressive showing in the leadership contest against Mr. 
Shamir [interview].
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electorate. Second, i t  could s t i l l  rely on the loyalty of a majority of 
the Sephardic community. Thanks to these factors, the Likud, already 
written o ff in opinion polls, was able to escape an electoral disaster. 
Not unscathed - the Likud lost in 1984 seven seats, so that its  
parliamentary strength was reduced from 48 to 41 seats - the biggest 
defeat of a ruling party in Is rae l's  history, save Labour's collapse in 
the 1977 elections. However, paraphrasing Mark Twain, the ea rlie r  
reports of the Likud's death were greatly exaggerated.
I f  observers were surprised, to some extent, by the re la tive ly  
small loss of the Likud, they must have been shocked by the fact that 
Labour lost too. Throughout the campaign, almost a ll opinion polls 
forecast a clear Labour win, with the party gaining over 50
parliamentary seats. The real figure turned out to be very d ifferen t - 
its  parliamentary representation came down from 47 to 44 seats. 
Granted, early elections (especially in summer) and the party's
reaction to Likud's NUG proposal were damaging - but these factors 
cannot en tire ly  explain Labour's fa ilu re . There were deeper reasons 
involved.
Actually, Labour's election campaign was rather e ffective , and the 
party held the p o litic a l in it ia t iv e  a ll along. Its  leadership appeared 
united and forcefu lly dealt with the campaign issues, successfully 
exposing the weaknesses of the Likud government. This was done in a 
low-key fashion, however, in order not to ir r i ta te  and antagonize the 
Sephardic voters who trad itio n a lly  leaned towards the Likud. This
strategy seemed reasonable enough at the time, but in final analysis
proved ineffective. I t  fa iled  to make any significant inroads into the
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Sephardic vote, which probably goes to show that Labour's defeat was 
not so much related to campaign strategies, but rather to the simple 
fact that its  policy positions, especially its  stance on foreign and 
defence issues, were rejected by the majority of the electorate. 
Leadership was seemingly another problem Labour suffered from, at least 
as fa r as the popularity of Mr. Peres was concerned.* Be i t  as i t  may, 
under almost "ideal" conditions. Labour was badly beaten in the 
elections.
Mr. Peres has been regarded by some people as an Is rae li Richard 
Nixon. His "lack of c red ib ility" was partly due to b itte r  
accusations made by Mr. Rabin, under whom he served in government 
in 1974-77 (one label stuck on him by Mr. Rabin w ill probably 
follow Mr. Peres for the rest of his p o litica l l i f e  - 
"indefatiguably seditious"). Also, some have never forgiven him 
his b itte r  conflicts with the Likud's idol Mr. Menachem Begin.
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The Coalition Bargaining Process
Election Aftermath
General elections, especially in multiparty systems, do not choose 
governments at a l l ,  they just define the power relations between 
parties in parliament. These relations, however, tend to provide some 
indication as to the composition of the new government. This was not 
the case, however, a fter the 1984 elections. For the f i r s t  time since 
1949, the results gave no indication about the final outcome of the 
post-election interparty bargaining. Indeed, the results were puzzling 
to such an extent that seasoned observers, as well as the leading 
actors, could not predict whether i t  w ill be possible to set up a new 
government, le t  alone how.
Following the announcement of the final results, i t  transpired 
that in addition to Labour and the Likud, a record of no less than 
thirteen small parties gained parliamentary representation. Moreover, 
the newly elected Knesset was apparently deadlocked. Eight parties 
(consisting of sixty Knesset Members) seemed to oppose Labour as the 
potential coalition leader, while seven parties (also comprised of 
sixty members, of course) appeared to be against Likud as the leading 
party in a future government. The 60:60 parliamentary impasse, 
consisting of two "blocking coalitions", is presented in the following 
table:
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Table 5.1 The 1984 le g is la t iv e  blocking c o a litio n s
Against the Likud Against Labour
Labour 44 Likud 41
Shinui 3 Techiya 5
CRM 3 NRP 4
Yachad 3 Shas 4
Ometz 1 Agudat Israel 2
Rakach 4 Morasha 2
PLP 2 Tami 1
Kach 1
60 60
Of course, the neat picture presented here was hardly apparent 
when the election results were f i r s t  in. I t  gradually emerged out of 
post-election maneouvering, where each of the two large parties f ir s t  
tried  to get together several small parties in order to block its  
opponent from forming a government and only then, i f  possible, form its  
own narrow-based government. Essentially, the interparty bargaining was 
conducted simultaneously between each of the large parties and the 
various smaller parties, and between the large parties themselves. The 
bargaining had its  own dynamics, since i t  was assumed that a few small 
parties might jump either way.
Theoretically, six d ifferen t p o litica l options seemed to be 
possible in the aftermath of the 1984 elections: (1) a narrow-based
Labour government; (2) a narrow-based Likud government; (3) a 
bipartisan Labour-Likud government; (4) a multiparty national 
coalition; (5) repeat general elections; and (6) a prolonged period of 
a caretaker government - headed by the Likud - which might presumably 
survive until the next scheduled elections, in 1988. Let us examine
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each option in turn in order to see, by way of elim ination, why a 
multiparty national coalition emerged as the most preferred option.
Bargaining Strategies
Labour's Strategy
Since Labour was given f i r s t  opportunity to form a new government, its  
behaviour seems a useful perspective from which to s tart analysing the 
bargaining process. On August 5, 1984, following consultations with a ll 
the parties in the Knesset (as required by law ),* the President of 
Is rae l, Mr. Chaim Herzog, granted Mr. Peres, the leader of the largest 
party in parliament, a mandate to try  and form a new government. Mr. 
Herzog added a "presidential advice", suggesting that Mr. Peres should 
form a national unity government. The Labour leader perfunctorily  
promised to form a "wide coalition", and immediately invited a ll 
parties, including the Likud, to participate in the bargaining process.
While exploring the wide-based coalition p o ss ib ility , Mr. Peres 
f i r s t  attempted to form a narrow-based Labour government. In fact, Mr. 
Peres and Mr. Sharon (on behalf of Mr. Shamir) met secretly a few days 
after the elections to discuss a Labour-Likud government based on 
parity , quite sim ilar to the national coalition that was eventually
The Kach l is t  held views so distasteful to the general public that 
its  leader and single representative in the Knesset, Rabbi Meir 
Kahana, was not consulted by the President, against a ll precedent.
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formed. Both parties continued, however, in th e ir efforts to form a 
narrow based government [Mr. Sharon, interview; see also Kotler, 
1988(A), pp. 164-5].
In parliament. Labour could rely on the immediate support of 56
members: 44 Labour, 3 CRM, 3 Shinui, 4 Rakach, 2 PLP. In other words,
i t  was 5 members short of a leg is la tive  majority coalition of 61. 
Additional support could come from small central and religious parties. 
Following long negotiations. Labour signed on 22.8.84 a "memorandum of 
understanding" with two centre parties - the 3 members of Yachad and
the single member of Ometz. By securing the support of 4 additional
members of Knesset, Labour achieved a major objective: a 60-member
"blocking coalition" which made i t  impossible for the Likud to form a 
government. Now, from an apparently strong position. Labour was looking 
to break the 60-member barrier by trying to court some of the religious  
parties. For this purpose Labour was w illing  to pay those parties 
substantial religious and financial payoffs.
In talks with the ultra-orthodox parties, Agudat Israel and Shas, 
Mr. Peres realized that both were squarely placed in the Likud camp. 
The same applied to the right-wing Morasha. The NRP, on the other hand, 
took a somewhat moderate stand. O ff ic ia lly , i t  did not exclude the 
possib ility  of Labour heading a government, although i t  demanded that 
i t  be a national co a litio n .* Practically , then. Labour fa iled  to gain 
the support of 4 out of 5 religious parties for a narrow-based
This public attitude of the NRP was aimed mainly at maintaining 
its  own identity vis-a-vis  the Likud bloc, and should not be 
deemed a true expression of support for a Labour government.
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government, and the tiny Tami party apparently remained Mr. Peres's
las t hope. Tami was badly beaten in the 1984 elections and was le f t  
with a single member in the Knesset, Mr. Abu-Hazeira.* In the post­
election maneouvering he loosely coordinated his bargaining strategy 
with Yachad and Ometz, which was why Labour regarded him as a potential 
a lly . However, Mr. Abu-Hazeira, as a leader of a patently Sephardic 
l i s t ,  could not bring himself to support a Labour government and 
eventually sided with the Likud bloc, to create the 60:60 p o litica l 
t ie . * *
I t  should be pointed out that even i f  Abu-Hazeira was to side with 
Labour, i t  would create a 61-member leg is la tive  coalition , but only a 
55-member executive coalition ( i .e .  government), because 6 out of the 
61 were members of the two left-w ing parties, PLP and Rakach. These 
parties were - and are - widely regarded as representing the Arab 
sector. A government depending on these parties was a b itte r  p i l l  to 
swallow; a government in which they actually held portfolios was
to ta lly  out of the question: i f  nothing else, i t  would have cost Labour 
dearly in the next elections. In other words, a narrow-based Labour 
government would have been necessarily a minority government. A 
minority Labour government was unacceptable to the Yachad and Ometz
parties, who joined Labour in its  60-member "blocking coalition", so
* *
One of the major reasons for Tami's fa ilu re  was the fact that i t  
had helped Labour in bringing about early elections.
Mr. Abu-Hazeira: "I coordinated my steps with Weizmann of Yachad; 
I was abroad when he signed with Labour. He called me and wanted 
me to jo in  him. I refused, although as the 6 Is t member I could get 
almost anything from Labour. I wanted a national unity government, 
so in a situation of 60:59 in favour of Labour I gave my support 
to the Likud bloc in order to create a 60:60 tie "  [Abu-Hazeira, 
in terview ].
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basically this alternative was non-existent. Mr. Peres was, of course, 
aware of these complications, but he believed that with the addition of 
the 61st member, some more religious parties would jo in  in, fearing to 
be le f t  high and dry. In re a lity , however, this scenario did not even 
begin to unfold, and Labour was le f t  with the support of no more than 
60 members of Knesset.
Labour's fa ilu re  to acquire the support of even one religious  
party carried a clear p o litic a l massage: The religious parties would 
not take part in bringing Labour into power, although they might 
support and cooperate with an already existing Labour government. In 
fac t, as of 1977, this attitude by the religious parties has become a 
major premise of coalition po litics  in Israe l. In practical terms, i t  
has made the formation of a Labour government an almost impossible 
undertaking. On the other hand, the attitude of the religious parties 
towards the Likud has been far more benign.
Most Labour leaders were aware of the problems th e ir party have 
had with the religious parties. Mr. Rabin, for instance, said: "In many 
talks I have had with the religious parties, I realized that they would 
never give power to Labour at the expense of the Likud, they w ill only 
come to us when we are in power."* The party leader Mr. Peres, however, 
has never resigned to the idea that the religious parties have 
basically become an integral part of the Likud bloc. Being aware of 
Labour's declining strength within the electorate, he has continuously 
tr ied  to find for Labour a llie s  in the religious camp. In the 1984
*  Mr. Yitzhak Rabin, interview. This view is shared by most Labour 
ministers and MKs interviewed.
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post-election period, however, there was not much he could do about 
wooing religious support for a Labour government: a11 the 5 religious  
parties f la t ly  rejected a narrow-based Labour government, regardless of 
possible heavy payoffs.
Labour's in a b ility  to form its  own government created a precedent 
in Is rae l's  parliamentary history. I t  was the f i r s t  time that the 
largest parliamentary party could not form a coalition government at 
a l l .  That the party which came out f i r s t  in the elections is not 
necessarily the leader in coalition formation is a fact of l i f e  in many 
a democracy;* but for Israel i t  was a shocking f i r s t .
The Likud's Strateov
While Labour's Mr. Peres was o ff ic ia lly  trying to put together a 
government, the Likud was doing very much the same, but u n o ffic ia lly .**  
Actually, both Labour and the Likud fielded negotiating teams to 
bargain with the smaller parties. This was probably a classic case of 
two opposing proto-coalitions being set up simultaneously [see Riker, 
1962, pp. 167-8]. The o ffic ia l "formateur", Mr. Peres, was given 42 
days at the most ( in it ia l  21 days and possibly a 21 days extension) to 
complete his task, and the Likud's strategy during this period
*  In 1977, for instance, the Dutch Labour party, PvdA, gained an
impressive parliamentary p lu ra lity , but was nevertheless removed 
from office by many smaller parties [Vis, 1983, pp. 153-167].
* *  The Likud's Deputy Prime Minister Mr. Levy explained the strategy
on Israe li Radio (8 .8 .84): "The fact that the President asked
Peres to form a government does not necessarily mean that he would
head i t " .  For an insider's account of the bargaining process, see
Moda'i, 1988, pp. 95-106.
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essentially aimed at making him waste his valuable time. The Likud's 
"blocking" strategy concentrated mainly on consolidating its  ties  with 
the religious parties. The Likud's leader Mr. Yitzhak Shamir put i t  
quite clearly: "The Likud w ill remain loyal to its  coalition
partners ... mainly to the religious p a rtie s ... [there is a] sp ec ia l... 
sp iritua l a f f in ity  between the world-view of the Likud and that of the 
religious parties. I t  is not just a matter of coalitionary expediency" 
[interview in M a'ariv. 10.8.84].
Needless to say, the Likud was not just trying to block Labour's 
bargaining moves, but actually endavoured to form its  own narrow-based 
government. All in a l l ,  its  in it ia l  support base appeared more solid 
than Labour's. In the new parliament, the Likud could apparently rely  
on the support of 60 members of the right-wing and religious parties. 
The right-wing parties accounted for 47 members (Likud 41, Techiya 5, 
and Kach 1), while the religious parties had 13 members (NRP 4, Shas 4, 
Aguda 2, Morasha 2, and Tami 1). On paper at least, i t  appeared that 
the right-wing and religious parties had a 60-member "blocking 
coalition", enough to obstruct the formation of a Labour government. 
This situation also encouraged the Likud to look for additional support 
in order to form its  own government.
The problem with some parties in the religious bloc was that they 
were not in favour of a Likud, or in fact any kind of narrow-based 
government. But assuming that when push comes to shove, the right-wing 
and religious blocs would stick together, the Likud was only one member 
short of securing a parliamentary majority of 61. The two small centre 
parties, Yachad and Ometz, appeared to be the only possible candidates 
to jo in  the right-wing/religious alliance. The irony of the situation  
was that the leaders of those two parties, Mr. Weizmann of Yachad and
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Mr. Hurwitz of Ometz, had s p lit away from the Likud only a few years 
before, and now i t  was up to them to allow the Likud to be the sole 
governing party.
The Likud's leadership targeted Mr. Weizmann and made him "an 
offer he could not refuse". He was to become the Deputy Prime Minister 
and the number two leader in the Likud party (second only to Prime 
Minister Shamir) - a position he had already held under Mr. Begin. 
Additionally, Mr. Weizmann could choose either the Defence or the 
Foreign A ffairs portfo lio  in a Likud government. Moreover, the Yachad 
party would get two seats at the government table, and another 
p o rtfo lio .*  This was probably the most generous p o litic a l o ffer that 
could have been made to a 3-member pivotal party. While the MK number 
two on the Yachad l is t ,  Mr. Benjamin Ben-Eliezer, seemed to be tempted 
by the Likud o ffer, Mr. Weizmann himself was against any deal with the 
Likud. In crucial talks with Deputy Prime Minister Levy, the Likud's 
"king maker", he made i t  clear that he had le f t  the party mainly for 
ideological reasons and had no intentions to resume his p o litica l 
career in the Likud.**
Having fa iled  to create a partnership with Yachad, the Likud next 
tr ied  to woo Mr. Hurwitz of Ometz. A p o litica l hawk who had been one of
*  Mr. Ben-Eliezer, interview.
* *  When Mr. Weizmann signed his agreement with Labour, he said on 
Is rae li Radio (22.8.84): "The Likud kicked me out, I owe them 
nothing". Apparently Labour somehow fe lt  i t  owed Mr. Weizmann 
nothing as well; he was never rewarded properly for making i t  
possible for Labour to set up its  all-im portant "blocking 
coalition". Labour even refused to allocate Yachad and Ometz a few 
spots on its  l is t  for the trade union elections in 1985. At the 
time this dissertation was nearing its  completion, Mr. Weizmann 
announced his final retirement from active p o litic s .
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the founders of the Likud in 1973,* he was promised in 1984, being in a 
pivotal parliamentary position, no less than the Finance Ministry in 
exchange for his support. For a ll his hardline stance on foreign and 
defence policy, Mr. Hurwitz's main electoral asset was his no-nonsense 
approach to economic issues, which was worlds apart from the Likud's. 
Mr. Hurwitz did not want to risk  his public image, so he too turned 
down the Likud's o ffe r .* *  This practica lly  closed the door on the 
option of a narrow-based Likud government.
These efforts notwithstanding, the prospect of a narrow-based 
Likud government was problematic even with the support of Yachad and 
Ometz. Very much lik e  the situation on the Labour side, a 60-member 
leg is la tive  "blocking coalition" on the Likud's side did not mean that 
the party was one member short of an executive coalition . To begin 
with, two of the religious parties, NRP and Tami, were opposed to the 
very idea of a narrow-based government, even though they sided with the 
Likud. Also, the Likud found i t  morally uncomfortable to rely on the 
support of the pariah, u ltra -nationalis t Kach l is t  in forming a 
government. For an executive coalition, then, the Likud enjoyed the 
support of only 55 members of parliament. Only a change in the 
positions of the NRP, Yachad and Ometz would have given the Likud a
* In the late 1970's, when s t i l l  a member of the Likud, Mr. Hurwitz
resigned from government on two separate occasions, following 
policy disputes with the Likud's leadership. F irst he had quit his 
Commerce and Industry portfo lio  in opposition to the Camp David 
agreements, la te r he le f t  the position of Finance Minister as a
protest against the Likud's in flationary economic policy.
* *  Unlike the case of Mr. Weizmann, the Likud might have secured the
support of Mr. Hurwitz i f  i t  had tried  hard enough ( i t  did get his
support in 1986). However, i t  was not worth the e ffo r t , since his 
single vote was not enough for a stable narrow-based government.
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fighting chance to form a majority government. This was not to be, and 
the Likud was le f t  with only a 60-member "blocking coalition" in the 
leg islature.
To sum up, a stable narrow-based government was not rea lly  a 
viable option under the conditions which prevailed in the aftermath of 
the 1984 elections. The efforts of both Labour and the Likud to form 
th e ir governments resulted in a 60:60 p o litica l stalemate. This 
deadlock, of course, was not only the result of "pure" bargaining. 
Ideological constraints also prevented the formation of a narrow-based 
government by either party. Specifically , reliance on Arab/Communist 
support by Labour or on fascist support (the Kach movement) by the 
Likud was ideologically unacceptable. Thus, both arithmetics and 
ideology ruled out the option of a narrow-based government and forced 
the main actors to look for alternatives.
The Small Parties' Strateov
In a multiparty parliament with two opposing large minority parties, 
each of them requiring the support of smaller parties in order to form 
a majority (or at least to block the opponent from doing so), i t  is not 
unreasonable to assume that the stronger the competition between the 
two larger parties, the more dependent they become on the support of 
the smaller parties. The tight competition in the Is rae li Knesset 
following the 1984 elections appeared to re fle c t an extremely 
interdependent relationships between large and small parties.
In the emerging 60:60 po litica l t ie ,  the small parties could play 
two d ifferen t yet related roles. F irs t, they were potential "pivotal
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players”, being capable of creating a majority in parliament, namely 
making a government possible. Second, they could serve as "blocking 
players", s ignificantly  contributing to the creation of parliamentary 
"blocking coalitions". I t  is seldom, however, that a parliamentary 
power structure lends i ts e lf  to a c r it ic a l ac tiv ity  by so many small 
parties in "pivotal" and/or "blocking" roles. The more-or-less balanced 
power relations between the two leading parties apparently heralded a 
f ie ld  day for the smaller parties. How did the small parties take an 
advantage of the extremely competitive situation? Did they make the 
most out of it?  During the 1984 coalition bargaining process, i t  was 
widely assumed that the small parties - especially those in the 
p o litica l centre - would do very well for themselves. At the end of the 
day, however, there was a widespread agreement that the small parties 
could have done much better.
The number of the small parties in the Knesset increased from 8 in 
1981 to 13 in 1984. Based on manifest preferences and past record, 8 
out of these 13 parties seemed clearly to belong to either po litica l 
bloc. Four parties were le ft-o f-cen tre ; the CRM, Shinui, the PLP, and 
Rakach; four were right-of-centre: Agudat Israe l, Morasha, Techiya, and 
Kach. Naturally, each was opposed to a government led by the p o litica l 
opponent, and supportive of a narrow-based government led by the larger 
party in th e ir p o litica l bloc. Actually, these parties provided the 
solid base for the formation of the two leg is la tive  "blocking 
coalitions". The remaining five small parties - Shas, the NRP, Tami, 
Ometz, and Yachad - occupied, theoretically at least, a real "pivotal" 
position and were thus expected to try  and use i t  e ffec tive ly .
In re a lity , however, things turned out d iffe re n tly . Shas, an 
ultra-orthodox Sephardic party, did not even try  to play "pivot".
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Following its  surprising electoral success, having come out of nowhere 
to gain four parliamentary seats, Shas immediately declared i ts e lf  on 
the Likud's side. In a sense, i t  was only natural for Shas, a party 
whose voters were trad itio n a lly  pro-Likud, to become part of the righ t- 
of-centre bloc. Shas's electoral appeal in the Likud's traditional
strongholds, however, was precisely the reason why i t  could have 
advanced a "pivoting" strategy - keeping a distance from the Likud and 
contemplating cooperation with Labour. I f  "pivoting" was a high
p rio rity , the Shas leadership should not have given its  voters the
impression that the Likud and Shas were basically one and the same.
However, having learned the lesson of Tami, which paid dearly for
abandoning its  alliance with the Likud, Shas quickly joined the right- 
of-centre bloc. I t  probably did i t  too soon for its  own good.
Certainly, Shas demanded and received the In te rio r M inistry, allocated
to the Likud in the subsequent unity government - a high payoff by
anybody's standards; but then i t  lost something no less valuable - its  
potential "pivoting" power [Herzog, 1986, p. 114].*
Unlike Shas, the NRP did not jo in  the Likud bloc unconditionally. 
Actually, this party expressed its  opposition to any narrow-based 
government. Instead i t  proposed the formation of an NUG. The party even
Since its  inception prior to the 1984 elections, Shas was 
completely under the sway of its  nationalis tic  leader, Mr. 
Yitzhak Peretz, who was forcefu lly  in favour of supporting the 
Likud. For that reason, l i t t l e  thought was given at the time to 
other options. Later on, when Mr. Peretz was replaced by the more 
middle-of-the-road Mr. Der'i and Shas did try  to steer a middle 
course between the Likud and Labour, i t  had quite a few 
d iff ic u lt ie s  with its  voters. Had Shas spent more time in 1984 
figuring out its  options for the future, i t  would have been in a 
better position in the late  1980's [D ix it and Nalebuff, 1991, p. 
232].
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suggested that, under certain circumstances, i t  would be w illing  to 
participate in a wide-based coalition headed by Labour. The NRP's 
theoretical "pivoting" strategy was essentially a matter of survival. 
Close cooperation in the past with the larger Likud cost the NRP two- 
thirds of its  parliamentary representation between 1977 and 1984, eight 
seats altogether. Now the NRP wanted to keep its  options open as long 
as possible.* This strategy turned out to be successful, and in the 
subsequent NUG, the NRP was the only party not counted in either 
p o litic a l b loc.** However, in the actual allocation of portfolios the 
NRP was not so successful, since i t  had to share payoffs with Shas, 
Agudat Israel and Morasha, a ll of which were taken care of by the 
Likud.***
As i t  turned out, Shas and the NRP, and other religious parties 
for that matter, managed to maintain a re la tiv e ly  strong position in 
the NUG eventually set up by Labour and the Likud - even stronger than 
the one they had when a llied  with only one major party. The reason was 
that both leading parties had a clear interest to maintain good working 
relations with the smaller ones, in anticipation for future p o litica l
*  On the complicated way payoffs were allocated when the NUG was
eventually formed, see below.
* *  The NRP did gain some strength by adopting an apparent "pivoting"
role - i t  increased its  representation to 5 seats in the 1988
elections. However, i t  was no longer the largest party in the 
religious sector of the electorate.
* * * Mr. Sharon, who was in charge of contacts with the religious  
parties on behalf of the Likud, had a particular motivation "to 
teach the NRP a lesson" for opposing his policies during the 
Lebanon war.
- 189 -
cooperation.* As for the "one-person" parties of c lie n te lis tic  nature, 
namely Ometz, Tami, and Yachad, they were not successful in the
coalition bargaining process. Mr. Abu-Hazeira of Tami, even i f  he could 
not but side with the Likud, as he claimed, should have at least been
given a seat in government; however, he was le f t  altogether outside the
c o a lit io n .**  Mr. Hurwitz of Ometz was allowed by Labour to become a 
Minister without Portfolio and without influence in the NUG.
Even the most important small party in the p o litica l centre, 
Yachad, did not take advantage of its  seemingly strong pivotal 
position. Even i f  its  leader Mr. Weizmann wanted to side with Labour 
for ideological reasons, he was s t i l l  in position to demand - and
receive - more than what he actually got: a membership in the Inner 
Cabinet, with no portfo lio  and no powerful basis for operation.*** 
A fter a l l ,  his contribution to the consolidation of the "blocking 
coalition" on Labour's side - a crucial step towards the eventual unity 
government - was more significant than anybody el se 's.
The existence of too many small parties; the formation of a wide- 
rather than narrow-based government; and mistakes in the implementation
*  This partly explains why the large parties did not leg is la te  an 
electoral reform during the life tim e of both NUGs, even though i t  
was in th e ir own interest to shake free of th e ir dependence on 
small parties.
* *  Tami was promised a "safe" place on Likud's l is t  for the next 
elections and some financial payoffs. [Abu-Hazeira, interview].
* * *  Both Mr. Weizmann and Mr. Ben-Eliezer of Yachad admit that 
mistakes were made during the bargaining process. (On possible 
errors by rational players, see Riker and Ordeshook, 1973, pp. ST­
AS.) Mr. Weizmann was promised (and believed) that he would handle 
Labour's foreign policy within the NUG - but things did not work 
out that way. [Interviews.]
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of bargaining strategies - a ll these provide explanations as to why the 
small centre parties did not do as well as expected. In terms of 
coalition strategies, i t  was Yachad, more than any other small centre 
parties, that fa iled  most notably to realize its  strong potential to 
dictate terms and conditions [Doron, 1988, p. 84], I f  in past 
governments the large parties fe l t  "exploited" by the small parties, in 
the 1984 coalition bargaining process i t  seems that the large parties 
"exploited" the small parties. The central minor actors, having staked 
th e ir claim by "blocking" a narrow-based government by either Labour or 
the Likud, practically  gave up, or else could not perform, the ir  
parliamentary "pivoting" role. This pattern of behaviour tended to add 
to the ongoing p o litica l standoff between the two opposing p o litica l 
blocks.
Any Which Wav But Lose
From the above discussion emerges the following picture: in an evenly 
divided 15-party Knesset, the possib ility  of a narrow-based Labour or 
Likud government, supported by the three extreme le f t -  or right-wing 
parties, respectively, but opposed by four centre and religious  
parties, was practically non-existent. Of course, both leading parties 
realized that a narrow-based government involved high costs, and 
nevertheless its  chances of success were very slim. However, they each 
pursued the option of a narrow based government - ch iefly  in order to 
prevent the opponent from creating one. Given this situation, where was 
the escape route out of the 60:60 p o litica l impasse?
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s tr ic t ly  speaking, there was no constitutional obligation forcing 
anyone to deal with the p o litic a l stalemate. In Is rae l, as long as a 
new government is not confirmed by a vote of confidence in parliament, 
the old government is legally  en titled  to carry on with its  duties. 
Thus, i f  the 1984 po litica l impasse was to persist, i t  would mean that 
the caretaker government (headed by the Likud) stays on in power for 
the duration - theoretically , even until the next scheduled elections 
in 1988. This option, however, was not considered seriously even by the 
governing Likud party, because i t  might have led to an unstable 
"Weimar” s ituation .* "The Likud chose not to attempt to capita lize on 
its  temporary incumbency enforced by law without the legitimate 
authority of a majority government and without the cooperation of the 
largest faction in the Knesset [the Labour Alignment]" [Yanai, 1990, p. 
183].
An apparently plausible course out of the p o litic a l impasse was to 
hold another round of elections. Any competition that ends in a draw 
might produce a winner i f  repeated, so a p o litic a l t ie  could be broken 
by a "po litica l playoff". This seemingly reasonable solution, however, 
did not appeal to the various party leaders, for several reasons.
To begin with, following many months of electioneering and 
bargaining, starting yet another campaign seemed a very tiresome and 
expensive undertaking. The business of elections in Israel takes 
months, not weeks, and quite a few burning issues, which should have 
been dealt with most urgently, would have had to wait until a fter the
Many concerned commentators drew comparisons between Israe l's  
situation in 1984 and the Weimar Republic, c iting  the election of 
the fascist Kach party as the most worrying common aspect.
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next round of elections. Prime Minister Shamir, for one, said: "I hope 
i t  won't happen. I t  would be very hard for the country to endure 
another election campaign" FMa'ariv. 10.8.84]. Besides, i t  was assumed 
that repeat elections would not produce a clear winner, but essentially  
result in yet another stalemate. I t  was widely accepted that the 
p o litica l impasse appeared to represent a genuinely divided society. 
Mr. Rabin, for instance, said that "we fe l t  that the p o litica l t ie  
reflected the opinions of the public" [interview ].
In this situation, there was no reason to pursue repeat elections. 
"In a two-faction co nflic t, the more equal that balance, the more 
lik e ly  a cooperative outcome is . With equal power, neither faction can 
win large gains in a p o litic a l struggle - which most lik e ly  w ill end in 
stalemate. The expected payoffs for conflict w ill be low" [Quirk, 1989, 
p. 914]. In other words, the essential equality between the Labour and 
Likud blocs made i t  logical to adopt a cooperative rather than 
conflictual strategy. In practical terms i t  meant to try  and set up a 
jo in t government, instead of conducting yet another electoral 
competition.
Consequently, this was the preferred choice for both the Likud and 
Labour. I f  the only possible government was a national coalition, which 
entails power-sharing between po litica l opponents, so be i t . *  Such a 
bargaining strategy actually meant that the two leading parties 
preferred the certainty of governmental power-sharing over the
Both Labour's Mr. Moshe Shachal and Likud's Mr. Moshe Nissim said 
that at no point during the complicated bargaining process was the 
option of repeat elections seriously considered, even though i t  
was clear that the only way out was a Likud-Labour government 
[interview s].
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uncertainty of winning a new round of elections. In other words, each 
of the large parties preferred lesser but guaranteed payoffs to greater 
payoffs that could only be reaped by the winner of the repeat 
elections, the loser losing a l l .  As everyone knows, love and po litics  
make strange bedfellows; for reasons of p o litic a l expediency, then, i t  
was more convenient for Labour and the Likud to acknowledge this fact, 
rather than risk another cliche, "win or bust".
The Importance of Intraoartv Politics
All other considerations notwithstanding, the decision of both Labour 
and the Likud to prefer the formation of a jo in t government over repeat 
elections was mainly influenced by intraparty p o litic s . Specifically , 
the personal interests of both party leaders, Mr. Peres and Mr. Shamir, 
probably played the most important role in the decision to form a jo in t  
government, instead of a new election. The reason was that prior to 
repeat elections, both were bound to face intraparty challenges which 
might result in a loss of th e ir top party positions. Becoming
bedfellows appeared to be safer for both leaders, in terms of 
maintaining th e ir own leadership position. This personal risk , more 
than the uncertainty of th e ir party's success in repeat elections, 
dominated th e ir separate but identical decisions.
In other words, for the two losers of the 1984 elections, Mr.
Shamir and Mr. Peres, the expected u t i l i t y  of a compromise leading to
the formation of a national coalition was higher than that of new
elections preceded by an intraparty challenge. The challengers would 
probably have made a great deal of th e ir respective fa ilures in not
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winning the elections. The Likud under Mr. Shamir lost 15% of its  
voting strength in the 1984 elections, and Mr. Peres lost for Labour 
three consecutive elections, in 1977, 1981, and 1984.* Turkeys do not 
look forward to Christmas, and losers do not look forward to intraparty 
challenges.
Intraparty considerations gave preference not only to government 
formation over repeat elections, but also to a national coalition over 
a minimal winning coalition. This was particu larly  true as fa r as the 
Likud was concerned. By Mr. Shamir's reckoning, in a narrow-based Likud 
government (minimal winning coalition) his intraparty riva ls , Mr. Levy 
and Mr. Sharon, were bound to receive high payoffs such as the Defence 
and Foreign A ffairs portfolios for themselves, numerous key 
appointments for th e ir supporters, and so on. In a national coalition  
with the Labour party, however, he would be able to see to i t  that they 
get lower payoffs. This, of course, was a good enough reason for him to 
prefer a wide-based government (namely a national c o a lit io n ).**
Indeed, considerations of portfo lio  allocations were closely
*  Despite repeated electoral losses, i t  was no mean task to 
challenge Mr. Peres within Labour. He was s t i l l  the established 
leader of the party and his riva ls , Mr. Rabin and Mr. Navon, were 
not rea lly  versed in intraparty p o litic s . The Likud's Mr. Shamir 
seemed to be in more trouble. In April 1984 he hardly survived a 
challenge from Mr. Sharon, even though the entire top leadership 
of his party supported him.
* *  I t  is of interest to note that in 1984 Mr. Sharon, Mr. Shamir's 
r iv a l, also supported a national coalition: following the Sabra 
and Shatila massacre of September 1982, a Judicial Commission of 
Inquiry found him unsuitable to the position of Minister of 
Defence, a ruling which badly handicapped his po litica l 
aspirations. Now, s ittin g  around the government table with Labour 
leaders meant for him a po litica l rehab ilita tion . In 1988 he did 
not need p o litica l legitimacy anymore, so he opposed an NUG.
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related to the choice of a national coalition option, and when the 
government was formed portfolio distribution was based on intraparty 
p o litic s . In the Likud, for example, a young Sephardic leader, Mr. 
Moshe Katzav, was given a government position by Mr. Shamir in order to 
counterbalance the influence of another Sephardi, Mr. Levy, among the 
Likud's many voters in this sector. Also, Mr. Moshe Arens, the former 
Defence Minister who became a close a lly  of Mr. Shamir's, was made his 
heir apparent in a move against the Sharon faction. Other loyal 
supporters of Mr. Shamir were also given governmental posts.* In 
Labour, by the same token, seven ministers were Peres supporters, and 
only two looked up to Mr. Rabin. Mr. Peres also strengthened the 
government position of his loyal supporters such as Mr. Shachal. Even 
Mr. Peres's insistence, during negotiations with the Likud, that Mr. 
Rabin be given the Defence portfo lio  for the entire four year period, 
was not as strangely a ltru is tic  as i t  may appear: he preferred his 
riva l from within busy with the heavy burden of Is rae l's  security, 
rather than in party po litics  [interviews, Mr. Shachal, Mr. Ya'acobi, 
Mr. Baram and others].
I t  seems then that Mr. Peres and Mr. Shamir, both in a weak 
intraparty position in the aftermath of the 1984 elections, had a 
mutual interest to coordinate th e ir policies. Their preferences were 
identical: a jo in t coalition rather than repeat elections, a wide- 
rather than narrow-based coalition: "The two leaders, Shamir and Peres,
Mr. Shamir's rivals accused him of playing factional po litics  
instead of acting as the leader of the entire party, unlike Mr. 
Begin [Mr. Aridor, a former Finance Minister, in a Herut meeting, 
16.9.84].
- 196
also made good use of each other to thwart opposition to th e ir  
leadership within th e ir own parties. The two leaders were enmeshed in a 
bear-hug which propped up both of them and prevented challengers from 
th e ir own parties from bringing down th e ir man lest the other - 
opposing - leader be le f t  standing alone in the ring" [Arian, 1988, p. 
19 ].*
I t  is not untypical of po litic ians to settle  rather than fig h t. 
This is one difference between po litic ians and th e ir voters. The voters 
may have preferred another round of elections in a 60:60 p o litica l t ie ,  
but the politic ians tried  to find a compromise. Politicians fear 
p o litic a l deadlocks and attempt to reduce tensions and s tr ife , which at 
least some voters enjoy. This is probably why electoral po litics  is 
basically polarized, while parliamentary and coalition po litics  tend to 
have more accommodative dimensions.
I t  seems that personalities have also had a lo t to do with the 
formation of a national coalition. Unlike the charismatic, and 
unchallengeable leaders of past years, such as Mr. Ben-Gurion of 
Mapai or Mr. Begin of Herut, who were made of the stern s tu ff 
required to run a narrow-based government, and in any event were 
unlikely to share power with th e ir trad itional opponents, the 
current lacklustre leaders, Mr. Peres and Mr. Shamir, were capable 
and w illin g , by default, to cooperate in the framework of a 
national unity government.
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Why So Many Partners?
A Labour-Likud cooperation in a national coalition indeed seemed 
ju s tif ie d  under the circumstances; a narrow-based government was 
impossible, repeat elections unacceptable and a caretaker government 
in tolerable. Besides, in a fragmented Knesset with a record 15 parties
i t  made more sense to form a national coalition between the two leading
parties than go into a "partial" coalition based on one big party and a 
large number of smaller ones.
Apart from the arithmetics of interparty and intraparty po litics , 
there were many more reasons that made a jo in t coalition the best 
choice. To begin with, the country was s t i l l  facing economic bankruptcy 
and the army was s t i l l  in Lebanon - two major crises that threatened 
the yery fabric of society. So graye was the situation that a narrow- 
based government, even i f  a feasible a lternatiye, might have been 
unable properly to deal with these burning issues. Also, although a 
unity government did not necessarily re fle c t "the w ill of the people",
in lig h t of the close election results, the call for a broad-based
government became yery popular,* so that i f  either Labour or the Likud
On 25.7.84 four prominent w riters, Amos Oz, Chaim Guri, A. B. 
Yeoshua and S. Izhar (Labour supporters a l l )  issued a call for 
national unity. Amos Oz said (1 .8 .84) a fter meeting Prime Minister 
Shamir: " i f  we can ta lk  to the Palestinians, we should be able to 
ta lk  also with the Likud". Former Prime Minister Begin expressed 
strong support for a national coalition. The one leader who came 
out strongly against national unity was former Secretary General 
of the Histadrut Mr. Yitzhak Ben Aaron, s t i l l  quite in fluentia l at 
the time.
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would have appeared responsible for thwarting national unity, they 
could expect electoral punishment.
For the Labour party, a national coalition was attractive because 
i t  was the only way for its  leaders to get back to power. Having become 
used to the trappings of power and influence in the past, and then 
cruelly dispossessed, they were now w illing  to pay the price of 
cooperating with the Likud. Also, the prospect of remaining in 
opposition for a further term would have been detrimental to party 
morale and perhaps to its  future electoral chances as w ell. For Mr. 
Peres, forming a national government was the only way to become Prime 
Minister. Moreover, becoming Prime Minister with the Likud's blessing 
would hopefully remove the inexplicable stigma which made him the 
p o litic ian  Sephardic voters loved to hate. Mr. Peres explained Labour's 
problem (and his) thus: "Since for a time the Labour party had the
image of a party more concerned with its  own good than with that of the 
nation, i t  must not only serve the nation and the state in practice, i t  
also must be seen to be doing so" [Hattis-Rolef, 1985, p. 17]. There is 
no doubt but that the call for a unity government drew much of its  
impetus from ethnic tensions.
As for the Likud, participation in a national unity government was 
an opportunity to demonstrate that i t  had a quality, professional 
m inisterial team, on a par with Labour's veterans. More importantly, 
this way i t  could be part of the damage control team, rather than have 
Labour put to rights what the Likud had destroyed in the 1977-84 
period, when they were alone in power. A national coalition was indeed 
an a lib i for the Likud "being part of the solution a fter being part of 
the problem" [Kirkpatrick Forum, 1987, p. 6] Essentially, the Likud and 
Labour needed each other. "Failing to provide effective economic
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leadership without fu ll cooperation of the powerful Histadrut, the 
Likud actively sought to form a unity government with the Labour 
Alignment, whose representatives ruled the powerful Labour federation. 
On the other hand, the Labour Alignment needed - although perhaps to a 
lesser degree - the cooperation of the Likud in order to legitim ize a 
m ilita ry  withdrawal from Lebanon" [Yanai, 1990, p. 183]
Clearly, then, both Labour and the Likud had a genuine interest in 
forming a national coalition. The question, though, is why did they 
form a nine party government, instead of a straightforward bipartisan 
(Laour-Likud) national executive, which seemingly would have been 
better positioned to tackle the burning issues on the p o litica l agenda.
No few explanations have been given as to why, in the context of a 
national coalition , did the two large parties not free themselves of 
the smaller ones. Labour's Mr. Rabin, for one, said that "the lack of 
trust between the leaders of the two major parties prevented a b i­
partisan government" [interview]. The Likud's Mr. Sharon claimed that 
"due to future uncertainty, each of the large parties wished to 
preserve its  sphere of influence" [interview ]. In fact, before the 
Labour-Likud coalition agreement was fin a lly  signed, each party had 
signed agreements with various small parties in order to try  and block 
the other side's option of establishing a narrow-based government, and 
possibly form its  own co a litio n .* Mindful of the future, each large
There was a clause in the coalition agreement whereby an agreement 
signed by either large party with a smaller party does not bind 
the other, but i t  was largely ignored. The Likud, for instance, 
caused a cris is  even before the NUG was formed by insisting to 
f u l f i l l  commitments made to Shas, a member of its  proto-coalition.
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party fe lt  obligated to bring its  s a te llite  parties into the wide-based 
national coalition.
Paradoxically, even though Labour did not have secondary 
agreements with the religious parties, i t  was as much interested in 
th e ir participation in a national coalition as was the Likud, for only 
in government could Labour develop useful ties  with the religious 
parties, in anticipation of future prospects. After a l l .  Labour would 
most probably need the support of the religious parties i f  i t  is ever 
to reestablish its  own government. Thus, Labour - even more than the 
Likud - was not rea lly  interested in a plain Labour Likud national 
executive, without the religious p a rties .*
All in a l l ,  its  seems that previous commitments and future 
expectations joined to prevent a bipartisan Labour-Likud government. 
S t i l l ,  i t  seems that i f  the party leaders had realized before the 
coalition bargaining process began that a p o litic a l deadlock would 
emerge, the composition of the national coalition might have been 
d iffe re n t.* *  Mr. Sharon, for example, said that he had sensed a 
deadlock was emerging, and "that is why I told Mr. Peres, less than a 
week a fter the elections, that we should f i r s t  have a Labour-Likud 
agreement, and only then deal together with the small parties. Mr.
*  Just before signing the NUG agreement, Mr. Peres offered Mr. Abu- 
Hazeira of Tami (who had already sided with the Likud) to become 
one of Labour's 12-member contingent of ministers. The idea was, 
of course, to have his support i f  and when the national coalition  
would collapse.
* *  Three days a fter the election (26.7.84) Mr. Ya'acobi of the Labour 
Alignment called in an a rtic le  in Haaretz for a Labour-Likud 
national coalition without the ultra-orthodox and the extreme 
le f t -  and right-wing parties.
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Peres, however, started negotiating with the religious parties just as 
soon as our meeting was over. We could have had a smaller and more 
effective government [namely, without minor parties], had he but 
listened to me" [interview].
The importance of accurately assessing the outcome of the 
coalition bargaining process notwithstanding, i t  seems that the 
struggle for the system's pivotal position was a major reason why each 
of the larger parties tried  to make agreements or otherwise cooperate 
with smaller parties. Since no one large party could control the 
pivotal position, a national coalition was formed composed of the two 
large parties and th e ir a llie s . Essentially, i t  was the need to have a 
strong pivotal position that brought about a national coalition, and 
the distrust between the two larger parties could explain why i t  was a 
m ulti- rather than bipartisan government [Galnoor, 1985, pp. 35-45].
Yet another important reason for having a multiparty national 
coalition was the simple fact that the two leading parties were not too 
eager to face each other head-on in a bipartisan government. In such a 
situation they would probably have been required to make clear-cut 
decisions on issues, which they actually wanted to avoid. Ideological 
issues relating to the peace process were a prime example. An unwieldy 
multipartisan government, more than a bipartisan national executive, 
offers the possibility of problem handling - as d is tinct from problem 
solving - and this is probably why i t  was preferable to both Labour and 
the Likud. The wish to escape hard decisions in a "winner-loser" 
context appears to correspond with an attitude of "low risk , low 
expectations".
I t  is worth noting that had the coalition selection process been 
democratized, in that a ll 120 members of parliament could choose a
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governing coalition in a simple yes-or-no voting (yes for parties which 
must be included in the governing coalition, no for parties which must 
be excluded), a bipartisan Labour-Likud coalition would most probably 
have been formed [Brams and Fishburn, 1991, pp. 1-2]. However, 
coalition bargaining and formation is a matter handled by party e lites , 
and they chose to form a multiparty government, for the reasons 
outlined above.
In the event, the coalition agreement formed a 25-member 
government plenum, evenly divided between the Likud and Labour (12 
ministers each) plus one minister for the NRP. Each major bloc was 
completely free to select its  ministers. The Likud allocated ten seats 
to i ts e lf ,  one each to Shas and Morasha, as well as one deputy 
m inister's position to Agudat Israe l, which declined fu ll membership in 
government. Labour appointed nine ministers from its  own ranks, one 
each from Yachad, Ometz and Shinui (shortly afterwards, Yachad formally 
amalgamated with Labour).
In terms of coalition p o litics , by forming a multiparty government 
the major actors "simply" shifted the p o litic a l deadlock from the
leg is la tive  to the executive level, that is , from parliament to
government. This indeed was what the 1984 national unity government was
a ll about.* Of course, such an unwieldy government might turn out to be
more costly than repeat elections. After a l l ,  the inclusion of two
The coalition consisted on 97 members: the Likud contributed 53 
members and Labour only 44. S t i l l ,  the government i ts e lf  was based 
on parity , which meant that i t  was the balance in the legislature, 
not in the executive, that counted. The coalition was actually 
based on the 60:60 parliamentary situation. In a sense, i t  was 
sim ilar to a jury in which the only possible winning coalition  
must include a ll the members.
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opposing p o litic a l blocs composed of 9 parties within a single 
government may bring about years, not months, of ongoing party 
politicking and campaigning. S t i l l ,  being in government - even such a 
government - is safer than any other a lternative , because participants 
are assured of some payoffs without taking risks. This is the essence 
of a "not losing" government.
The Pre-Nuotial Agreement
The interest of both Labour and Likud, or rather of Mr. Peres and Mr. 
Shamir, to share governmental power rather than risk  repeat elections 
when faced with a p o litica l deadlock, constituted a necessary but not a 
suffic ient basis for the formation of a national coalition . There was 
s t i l l  a need to set up a governmental modus ooerandi which would enable 
two opposing parties to become coalition partners. Given the historical 
r iv a lry  between Labour and the Likud, power-sharing could provide only 
a narrow scope of operation in a lim ited number of areas. The attempt 
to find an adequate government formula, in terms of both policy 
guidelines and structure of decision-making, produced a rather unique 
coalition agreement. Essentially, the agreement between Labour and the 
Likud was based on carefully balanced policy positions and on a mutual 
veto structure.
In principle, coalition agreements define ways and means to deal 
with issues on which the coalition partners d if fe r . On the most 
problematic issues, there may be an "agreement to disagree": some may 
be ignored altogether; others may be put on hold, pending the next 
elections or a referendum; yet others may be dealt with by the
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government in a specified and detailed manner - depending on the kind 
of agreement reached by the would-be partners.* Whatever the nature of 
the coalition agreement, i t  must be honoured in good fa ith  for the 
system to work at a l l .  In 1984, there was no honour or good fa ith  
between Labour and the Likud. The task was clear but almost impossible: 
how to force riva ls  to become a llie s . This made the formulation of the 
agreement a work of a r t .* *
The f i r s t  requirement for the formation of a Labour-Likud 
government entailed the formulation of mutually acceptable coalition  
guidelines. Since the two parties were deeply divided on core issues, 
the coalition agreement had clearly to state how these would be 
handled. As to the te rr ito r ia l issue, for instance, i t  was clearly  
specified (clause 14) that there would be no change in sovereignty over 
the occupied te rr ito rie s  during the term of the national coalition, 
unless agreed to by both the Likud and Labour.*** Regarding 
settlements, the agreement detailed (in  clause 15) the precise number 
of settlements to be established in the occupied te rr ito rie s  every
*  In the early 1970's, the NRP and Mr. Dayan were promised by Labour
a referendum on the te r r ito r ia l issue, in order to prevent the 
breakdown of the coalition.
* *  The method by which the coalition agreement had been worked out
was explained to the present w riter in great detail by Labour's 
Mr. Shachal and the Likud's Mr. Nissim, who, together with Mr. 
Peres and Mr. Shamir, negotiated, wrote and signed the document. 
The fu ll text follows in Appendix B.
* * *  This was essentially "a decision not to decide", since i t  was
clear that the ultimate status of the te rr ito rie s  could not be 
changed before new elections.
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year. Electoral reform (clause 1.18) was another issue which could not 
be decided unless agreed upon by the two leading parties .*
In many respects, this was a coalition agreement "a la  carte", 
since each and every a rtic le  was specifica lly  tailoured for the 
circumstances of its  inception. S t i l l ,  despite a ll e fforts  to word i t  
as carefu lly and precisely as is humanly possible, i t  was a problematic 
document, because (in order to make i t  acceptable to both Labour and 
the Likud) certain paragraphs had perforce to include some measure of 
vagueness, so that each party could read them as i t  pleased. Clause 10 
of the agreement, which stated that Israel would call upon Jordan to 
enter peace negotiations, is a case in point. When the call was to be 
made, the Likud intended to include in i t  its  "peace in exchange-of- 
peace" formula, whereas Labour imagined that the statement allowed the 
government to open an immediate dialogue with Jordan, based on its  own 
" te r r ito ry - in-exchange-of-peace" formula.
Acceptable coalition guidelines, important though they are, may or 
may not be acted upon during the life tim e of the government. After a l l ,  
they do not have the same p o litica l clout as specific government 
decisions - which are also problematic in terms of implementation. In 
fina l analysis, the implementation of government policy decisions is in 
the hands of the ministers responsible for th e ir handling. I t  is 
through them that ideology, issues and policy positions can be 
translated into re a lity . In the context of the national coalition.
Since the pivotal religious parties were opposed to any kind of 
electoral reform, i t  was unlikely to take place. S t i l l ,  a face- 
saving formula was put into the agreement, whereby the issue w ill 
be "examined" (the classical "kill-by-committee" method).
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Labour and the Likud, gravely suspicious of each other as they were, 
insisted that th e ir own ministers would be in charge of implementing 
policy on issues regarded to be sensitive - or else, responsibility  
should be s p lit . Thus, for example, both Labour's Defence Minister Mr. 
Rabin and Likud's Housing Minister Mr. Levy were to be d irec tly  
involved in implementing policy on the settlement issue.*
I t  seems, then, that portfo lio  allocation as hammered out in the 
coalition agreement meant more than "merely" dividing payoffs between 
partners. In fac t, i t  also aimed at controlling the implementation of 
government policy in areas of disagreement between Labour and the 
Likud. I f  need be, this mutual control mechanism provided each party 
with p o litic a l tools to block one-sided actions. Put simply, to make 
the guidelines in the coalition agreement credible, both leading 
parties insisted on being equal partners in implementation as w ell.
Acceptable coalition guidelines and mutual supervision of policy 
implementation did not fu lly  satisfy the two partner-opponents. They 
insisted on better safeguards against unilateral moves. As a resu lt, 
the coalition agreement included some p o litic a l innovations which 
essentially created a government structure based on mutual veto 
arrangements. Thus, a ten-member Inner Cabinet (s p lit ,  needless to say, 
5:5 between Labour and the Likud) was established, which provided each
The interparty balance was not maintained in a ll important areas. 
The Likud, which was largely responsible for the economic chaos 
that brought about a national coalition, was oddly given a ll the 
major economic portfolios, because Labour insisted on the Defence 
Ministry. The overall balance was kept, however, not only in 
government portfolios but also with regard to the appointment of 
senior o ff ic ia ls , which again required mutual agreement.
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party with a veto power over government decisions.* Also a Prime
M inisterial Rotation was invented, whereby that most important office
w ill be exchanged in mid-term between the two parties. In essence, the 
coalition agreement attempted to create a government without majority 
ru le , based on complete, total parity: the "perfect" coalition for 
partners who are r iv a ls .* *
The design of new institutions shows that the coalition agreement 
was not written in accordance with the existing rules of the p o litica l 
game; rather, i t  aimed to exchange them for new rules. Formulating the 
coalition agreement was essentially an interparty game played prior to 
the real governmental game. In forging an alliance between two opposing 
parties, i t  was v ita l to foresee the d iff ic u lt ie s  and problems which 
might arise and anticipate them before government was formed. [Laver
and Shepsle, 1990, p. 873].
Unlike most governments, which define th e ir policies and modi 
ooerandi as they go along, in this case policies and structures had to 
be r ig id ly  defined from the outset. There was an absolute need to 
ensure that on those many issues where Labour and the Likud did not see 
eye to eye, neither could act on its  own, without the other's consent. 
The negotiators of the coalition agreement were required therefore to 
deal both with existing problems and problems which might arise in the
*  The term "Cabinet" is reserved in this dissertation for this 
particular organ, whereas "Government" relates to the plenum of 
Ministers.
* *  Once the principle of to tal parity in government was accepted, the 
size of Labour's and Likud's Knesset group became irre levant. In 
Austria's grand coalitions, for example, the proportional rather 
than parity formula was adopted [Dreijmanis, 1982, p. 251].
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future. The ultimate goal was, of course, to secure the s ta b ility  of
the bipolar coalition once i t  was formed.*
The need to anticipate a ll contingencies and the w ill to secure
s ta b ility  produced a coalition agreement which stretched the law to its
lim its , to put i t  m ild ly .** Klaus von Beyme had already noted that in 
Is rae l, "there have been attempts to protect the coalitions through 
amendments to the 'minor constitution'" [von Beyme, 1983, p. 358]. The 
1984 coalition agreement seemed to go a step further. I t  was 
essentially treated by the p o litica l leaders as a 'constitution' in and 
of i ts e lf .  Prime Minister Shamir, for instance, said: "An agreement 
between parties on the establishment of a government of national unity 
cannot be treated as a matter of convenience, lik e  just any other 
contract between po litica l parties. I t  should rather be treated as a 
constitutional cabinet that provides a legal p o litic a l programmatic 
framework for the smooth functioning of the government in both the 
executive and leg is la tive  areas" [Kirkpatrick Forum, p. 153].
The 1984 coalition agreement, the "quasi-constitution", took 39 
days to hammer out, and then a national unity government was formed.*** 
The Labour-Likud negotiations were conducted in an atmosphere of mutual
*  I t  goes without saying that one of the most important measures was 
to safeguard the coalition from too-independent MKs, by imposing 
s tr ic t lim itations on th e ir  freedom of action [Goldberg, 1990, pp. 
197-8]
* *  Thus, the agreement e x p lic itly  put a constraint on the Prime 
M inister's legal right to appoint and dismiss ministers.
* * *  On 13.9.84, the National Unity Government won the investiture vote 
by 89 to 18 with 1 abstention. Prime Minister Peres called i t  "the 
most 'in teresting ' government in Is rae l's  history".
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suspicion, and resembled more than anything else one of those pre­
nuptial agreements which purport to give structure to married l i f e ,  but 
actually deal mainly with the division of communal property when i t 's  
a ll over. Mr. Abba Eban said: "This government, the lik e  of which has 
never happened in any parliamentary democracy, allows each of the two 
major parties to prevent the other from doing what i t  thinks f i t  - each 
of us can thwart the other's major objectives . . .  the NUG is so 
preposterous that i t  might even work" [Hattis-Rolef, 1986, p. 115].
Was There Anv Alternative?
The national coalition based on mutual veto arrangements was the 
outcome of the 60:60 parliamentary impasse that prevailed in the 
aftermath of 1984 elections. Was this po litica l impasse unsurmountable? 
Could Mr. Peres or Mr. Shamir have broken i t ,  had they employed 
differen t bargaining strategies? Could another Labour "formateur" have 
been more successful than Mr. Peres in bringing about a Labour 
government? Could not Mr. Shamir have blocked Mr. Peres's efforts to 
form a government and become the "formateur" himself? And could he not 
then have used the power of office  to form a stable Likud government? 
I t  is impossible to answer these questions with any degree of 
certainty, but i t  is interesting to speculate a l i t t l e .
One strategy that Labour could have been used in its  efforts to 
break out of the impasse was to put public pressure on the religious  
parties. Mr. Peres could have strongly stressed the importance of the
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three seats difference (44 against 41) between Labour and Likud, and 
claim that i t  was against the tenets of democracy to allow any but the 
largest party to form the government. This, of course, was the strategy 
used by Mr. Begin in 1981 when the Likud edged Labour by a single seat 
(48 to 47). I t  seems that such a strategy had l i t t l e  chance, however, 
since i t  would not have changed the position of the religious parties: 
they would never a lly  with Labour against the Likud. Labour's 
negotiator Mr. Shachal maintains that "had we concluded a quick deal 
with Ezer Weizmann of Yachad immediately a fter the elections, and 
promised him a senior government post, we could have gained a strong 
momentum and possibly break the p o litic a l impasse in our favour. 
However, due to intraparty considerations [Mr. Rabin and Mr. Navon were 
promised the Defence and Foreign A ffairs m inistries, respectively], Mr. 
Peres acted too slow and thus fa iled  to break the deadlock" 
[in terv iew ].
Given the 60:60 post election t ie ,  i t  apparently made sense for 
Labour to nominate Mr. Navon, a popular Sephardic leader, as its  Prime 
M inisterial candidate. Such a move may possibly have broken the impasse 
and result in a Labour government, because Shas and Tami - the two 
Sephardic parties in the 60-member Likud bloc - would have been in an 
awkward position, had they opposed the election of Is rae l's  f ir s t  
Sephardic Prime Minister, regardless of his p o litic a l colours.* For 
such a scenario to have unfolded, however, the consent of the party
*  Mr. Navon s t i l l  believes that such a possib ility  existed, although 
Mr. Peres never considered i t  seriously [interview ].
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leader was needed. Mr. Peres could not bring himself to consent to such 
a strategy, since i t  would have cost him the o ffice  of the Prime 
Minister, i f  not his chairmanship of the party. Thus, due to intraparty  
p o litic s . Labour was not given a chance to try  and form its  own 
government.
The Likud could also have employed strategies that might have 
broken the p o litica l impasse. These strategies, likewise, were not 
acceptable to Mr. Shamir, and that was probably why they were never 
pursued. For example, the 60-member Likud's "blocking coalition" was 
apparently strong enough to prevent Mr. Peres, the "formateur", from 
forming a Labour government. The way to do i t  was to take advantage of 
the legal constraint which stipulates that a "formateur" be given up to 
42 days to put together a government and obtain the confidence of 
parliament. Had the Likud tried  to block Mr. Peres for 42 days, i t  
might have gained the p o litica l in it ia t iv e .
In th is event, Mr. Shamir would have become the "formateur" and 
given the opportunity to present a government of his own. Even i f  he 
fa iled , he was s t i l l  the Prime Minister of a caretaker government. Mr. 
Shamir did not want to follow this apparently winning scenario, 
probably because he regarded i t  short-lived and too risky. For the 
Likud, and certainly for Mr. Shamir personally, such a scenario 
involved too many unknown factors at the interparty and intraparty  
levels. A power-sharing arrangement between the Likud and Labour, which 
could be ju s tif ie d  in term of the p o litic a l impasse, seemed a safer 
long-term proposition for Mr. Shamir. He preferred a conservative "low 
risk , low expectations" attitude, and thus contributed to the endurance
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of the p o litic a l stalemate which eventually led to the formation of the 
NUG.*
In conclusion, the formation of the NUG was not necessarily the 
only or even the most desirable p o litica l solution. This "unwanted and 
unloved child" came into being mainly because under the circumstances 
prevailing at the time, i t  seemed the least problematic choice for the 
major actors involved.
There was also the outside chance that the leaders of a third  
party, such as Mr. Weizmann of Yachad or Mr. Burg of the NRP, 
would head a NUG. This, however, was certainly not the fu lfillm en t 
of either Mr. Peres's or Mr. Shamir's dreams.
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Chapter Six
Rotation vs. Status Quo: 
Bipolar Coalition Politics, 1984-86
Bipolar coalition po litics  in 1984-86 evolved in the shadow of the 
expected prime m inisterial rotation. Included the coalition agreement, 
this unique innovation determined that Labour and the Likud would share 
time in the highest executive office in the land. The notion of 
rotation was a quantum leap in Israe li coalition p o litic s . Never before 
had such a remarkable arrangement been part of the deals between 
coalition partners. Explaining the uniqueness of this phenomenon seems 
to be quite germane to the analysis of the NUG's modus ooerandi.
Prime Ministerial Rotation
How Did I t  Come About?
When Labour and the Likud eventually decided to form a national 
coalition, its  basis was to be complete parity. In order to enshrine 
i t ,  they formulated mutually acceptable coalition guidelines, worked 
out a balanced distribution of government portfolios and senior c iv il 
service positions, and created an Inner Cabinet based on mutual veto.
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All these measures contributed to the equality of power-sharing between 
the two p o litica l blocs. However, this was not good enough unless some 
way was found to include the office of the prime minister in these 
parity arrangements. One should bear in mind, in th is context, the 
centra lity  of the position of the prime minister in Is rae l's  po litica l 
system: i t  is fa r more than a mere "primus in ter pares". Therefore, 
both Labour and the Likud insisted that power-sharing should apply here 
too. Since the position i ts e lf  was essentially in d iv is ib le , a time­
sharing arrangement seemed to be the second best [Horowitz, 1990, p. 
227].
The idea of a prime m inisterial rotation was, then, an inevitable 
result of the need to pursue total parity in government between two 
partner-opponents: "The concept of parity in representation is both
reflected and dramatized in the rotation clause of the coalition  
agreement that committed the Likud and the Labor Alignment to 
maintaining the unity government for the entire four-year term of the 
Knesset and to rotating th e ir leaders in the office  of the prime 
minister at midterm" [Yanai, 1990, pp. 183-4]. Even though the idea of 
rotation had started floating around soon a fter the announcement of the 
close election results, i t  took a lo t of bargaining time and e ffo rt for 
both Mr. Peres and Mr. Shamir to accept i t . *
At f i r s t ,  each party leader insisted that he should head the 
national coalition for the entire parliamentary term: Mr. Shamir based 
his claim on his being the outgoing Prime Minister, whereas Mr. Peres
Rotation was seriously discussed only when Mr. Peres was forced to 
ask the President for an extension of his original 21-day mandate 
to form a government.
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was the o ff ic ia l "formateur". Eventually, p o litica l re a lity  prevailed 
over wishful thinking. The fear that repeat elections might then turn 
out to be the only viable p o litica l solution to the deadlock, as well 
as the hypothetical possibility  that a th ird  candidate might emerge - 
convinced both leaders that for th e ir own good, they should agree to 
share the position of the prime minister on a rotational basis. Now
arose the question of the order of rotation: who should head the
national government f i r s t .  Labour's Mr. Peres threatened a total
withdrawal from the negotiations i f  he was not to become prime minister 
f i r s t ,  and the Likud gave in: Mr. Shamir agreed to be second.
Naturally, the Likud demanded that the implementation of rotation w ill 
be legislated, but this never happened, because of the legal 
complications involved.
Essentially, the 1984 rotation agreement stated that the NUG w ill 
serve for 50 months: during the f ir s t  25 months government w ill be 
headed by Labour's Mr. Peres, while the Likud's Mr. Shamir w ill be his 
deputy (until October 1986), and for the next 25 months, Mr. Shamir and
Mr. Peres w ill switch positions (until November 1988). The order of
rotation, and the personal commitment of both party leaders to i t ,  were 
to have a strong impact on interparty and intraparty po litics  in the 
1984-86 period.
The Sequence
The rotation agreement was in effect a p o litica l document, not legally  
binding, the implementation of which was basically dependent on the
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good fa ith  of the parties concerned.* Precisely for th is reason, the 
sequence of rotation was c r it ic a lly  important. The f i r s t  prime minister 
was to assume office at once, while the "heir presumptive" to prime 
ministership had to wait for two years before taking up his position. 
Two years is a long time in p o litics , certainly in a bipolar coalition  
situation. After a l l ,  the rotation agreement could fa i l  to materialize 
for objective or opportunistic reasons, due to interparty as well as 
intraparty considerations; i t  therefore seemed that the uncertainty of 
actual implementation of rotation gave "a clear advantage for the f ir s t  
to take the post: his attaining the o ffice  would not depend on the
government surviving two years, or on the willingness of the other bloc 
to relinquish the office in mid-term" [Horowitz, 1990, p. 227].
Why did the Likud accede to Mr. Peres's demand to become the f ir s t  
prime minister of the 1984 NUG? To begin with. Labour came out of the 
elections as the largest party. More important, the public looked 
forward to a real and urgent change in policies of the outgoing Likud 
government, and i t  was only natural for Labour, rather than the Likud, 
to lead such a change. In the framework of an NUG, Labour would do the 
d irty  job of cleaning the economic mess and getting the Is rae li army 
out of Lebanon - the two most urgent tasks - while the Likud would have 
an a lib i for complying with a change of policy without admitting past 
fa ilu res .
One of Mr. Peres's reasons for insisting on being f i r s t  in the 
sequence of rotation was his burning desire to establish his status as
In this respect, i t  was a to ta lly  d ifferen t situation from the 
legal-constitutional rotation in the top p o litic a l position 
prevailing in the Yugoslav or Swiss systems, for instance.
- 217 -
a national leader. After years of personal abuse, he must have fe lt  
that only the prime ministership of a unity government would gain him 
the legitimacy he so urgently needed. Mr. Shamir too, having just 
succeeded the immensely popular Mr. Begin, had to establish his 
national stature; but unlike Mr. Peres, his need for p o litica l 
legitimacy was not as desperate. Also, there was a difference between 
the personalities of the two leaders. Mr. Peres was not the kind of 
po litic ian  who could wait for years - even for months - to get 
p o litic a l results (or prizes): he wanted them here and now. Mr. Shamir, 
by contrast, although older than Mr. Peres, had the patience to wait 
for things to happen in th e ir own good time.
I t  seems, then, that the image of Labour as the party of change 
and the dynamic personality of Mr. Peres - as opposed to the status q u o  
image of the Likud and Mr. Shamir - contributed to a logical sequence 
of the rotation. In retrospect, this order - Labour f i r s t ,  Likud second 
- "was instrumental in the survival of the government. Uncertainty 
about rotation fa c ilita te d  change under the Labour prime minister 
[Lebanon, economy], and the mutual veto prevented further departure 
from the status q u o  [peace process] under the Likud prime minister. 
Thus, the order of succession provided each prime minister not only 
with his share of o ffice , but also with his share of effective  
p o litica l control" [Horowitz, 1990, p. 232].
Had there been a way to make rotation legally  binding, i t  might 
have made better sense for either leader to be the second prime 
minister, the one who occupies the office when the next elections are 
held. Actually, some party leaders thought that incumbency prior to 
elections was su ffic ien tly  important for either party to gamble on a 
nominal implementation of the rotation agreement. Mr. Nissim, who
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drafted the rotation agreement on the Likud's behalf, said that "I had 
recommended to Mr. Shamir to be the second in the order of rotation 
because p o lit ic a lly  i t  was better for the Likud in the long run" 
[in terview ]. Mr. Peres himself suggested that "p o lit ic a lly  i t  was 
better for Labour to be second in occupying the o ffice  of the prime 
minister, but we could not le t the Likud go on destroying the country, 
so I insisted on becoming f irs t"  [interview ].
True, from a long-term p o litica l perspective. Labour probably took 
some risk by occupying the office of the prime ministers f i r s t ,  because 
i t  was expected in the f i r s t  two years to solve the burning problems 
that were the raison d 'etre of the NUG, and then the Likud would reap 
the results. I t  was obvious that, come election time, the Likud would 
take a ll credit for any achievement. Labour's included, to i ts e l f . *  
Israel Kessar, the Secretary General of the Federation of Labour (the 
Histadrut), publicly expressed his fear that "the righteous suffer and 
the wicked thrive" [Hattis-Rolef, 1985, p. 90].
Summing up the pros and cons of the sequence of rotation, i t  seems 
- especially as rotation was not fixed by law - that i t  made much 
better p o litic a l sense, in the circumstances of 1984, to occupy the 
office of the prime minister f i r s t .  This is what Labour did, and i t  was 
able to use the uncertainty about the implementation of rotation as a 
p o litica l tool to control the modus ooerandi of the 1984-86 NUG.
I t  is not unreasonable to speculate that had Labour led the unity 
government into the 1988 elections, i t  might have gained few more 
parliamentary seats, i f  not emerge d e fin ite ly  victorious.
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The Personal Aspect
The rotation agreement stated that should either Mr. Peres or Mr. 
Shamir be proven unable to perform the duties of the Prime Minister, 
for whatever reasons, th e ir respective parties should replace them - 
with the consent of the other party. Barring that eventuality, however, 
the agreement (Paragraph 1.5, see Appendix B) referred to both Mr. 
Peres and Mr. Shamir bv name - not as the nominees of th e ir respective 
parties.
S tr ic tly  speaking, therefore, had either party replaced its  leader 
in the meanwhile, the agreement would have become null and void. This 
was probably the most exp lic it expression of the mutual personal 
interest that both leaders had in the existence of the national
coalition.
The personal aspect of the rotation was important to both leaders 
mainly in the context of intraparty p o litics , since i t  reduced the 
incentive for internal coups. The leader expected to be most committed
to rotation was of course Mr. Shamir, who had to survive two years as
the Likud's leader before he could become prime minister again. 
Considering past challenges to his leadership, even when he actually 
was prime minister, this was not a simple matter. For Mr. Shamir to 
achieve rotation on a personal basis, he had to make several
concessions to Labour in the division of m inisterial portfolios. 
Specifically , he agreed that Mr. Rabin become a Defence Minister - the
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most important position after the Prime Ministership - for the entire  
duration of the NUG.*
For Mr. Peres, the suggestion that his long-time riva l Mr. Rabin 
would become a Defence Minister for the whole four years seemed rather 
attractive . This way, Mr. Rabin would be unable to engineer Mr. Peres's 
p o litica l demise for having lost for Labour three consecutive general 
elections, both because he would be too busy with defence matters, and 
because the rotation agreement, which in effect w ill name Mr. Rabin 
personalIv as Minister of Defence, w ill also name Mr. Peres personalIv 
as Prime Minister. Mr. Shachal, who drafted the rotation agreement on 
Labour's behalf, said: "The personal aspect of the rotation was also 
intended to protect Peres from a possible revolt by Rabin and his 
people" [interview ]. Of course, i t  was not very lik e ly  that Mr. Peres 
be ousted from party leadership while serving as prime minister, but i t  
is  better to be safe than sorry.
Labour wanted the rotation agreement to be personally attached to 
Mr. Shamir because i t  feared the possib ility  of Mr. Sharon becoming the 
Likud leader, and as such the future prime minister of the NUG.** Mr. 
Rabin claimed that "we wanted to make sure that whatever happens Sharon
*  Had Mr. Shamir agreed to rotation not on a personal basis, the 
Likud would have held the two most senior cabinet posts. Defence 
and Foreign A ffa irs , when Labour occupied the Prime Ministership. 
In the post-rotation period, a ll three posts would have changed
party hands. Mr. Shamir's commitment to rotation perforce cost his 
loyal a lly , Mr. Arens, two years in the Defence Ministry.
* *  Labour found i t  d if f ic u lt  enough to explain why i t  agreed to s it
in the same government with Mr. Sharon in the f i r s t  place, bearing
in mind his dismal record on Lebanon. They found i t  possible,
however, to rationalize i t  away by claiming that according to the 
coalition agreement, each party had an exclusive right to select 
its  own ministers [interviews, Mr. Rabin, Mr. Gur, and others].
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would not be the Likud's leader; that was the real importance of the 
personal aspect of rotation" [interview ]. Such a possib ility  actually 
emerged in June 1986, a few months before rotation was due to take 
place. Mr. Shamir's p o litica l career was in jeopardy because of his 
involvement in the "Shin-Bet a f fa ir " .*  Labour made clear that i t  would 
be w illing  to honour the rotation agreement with any other Likud 
leader, save Mr. Sharon. As i t  happened, Mr. Shamir survived the 
c ris is , not least because he was personally committed to rotation.
Was There a Safe Wav to Avoid Rotation?
Will the rotation agreement be implemented? This was the haunting 
question which dominated the NUG during the entire 1984-86 period. 
Labour's top leaders said publicly, time and again, that the question 
was completely out of place, since they had fu ll intention to proceed 
with rotation as agreed. Mr. Peres himself promised: "We signed an
agreement, and we w ill honour i t  in s p ir it  and in le tte r"  [Israel TV, 
13.2.85]. Mr. Rabin said: "I d e fin ite ly  believe that we shall f u l f i l l  
our undertaking to transfer the premiership to the Likud at the end of 
our two-year term" [Hattis-Rolef, 1985, p. 23]. However, po litic ians ' 
promises count as much in Israel as anywhere else, and the p o litica l 
stakes involved were high enough for the possib ility  of th e ir reneging 
on the agreement not to be dismissed out of hand.
For details see below.
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In 1986, when rotation was due, Labour was indeed faced with an 
acute dilemma about whether or not to renege; the outcome could have 
determined its  future as a governmental party. Mr. Peres has been a 
successful and popular prime minister. At long la s t, he was able to 
v is it  poor Sephardic neigbourhoods and developments towns, the so- 
called "Likud country", without fear of being publicly humiliated. His 
Labour party was well ahead of the Likud in opinion p o lls .*  So why not 
renege on rotation and run for early elections as prime minister? Does 
not Labour deserve an electoral victory, a fter three consecutive 
defeats?** After a l l ,  who knows what w ill happen a fter rotation? One 
scenario was almost certain to unfold - Mr. Peres's popularity would 
decline again, the public's memory being what i t  always is , and then he 
might even be challenged by Mr. Rabin for party leadership. Why not 
seize the opportunity while its  s t i l l  there?
Needless to say, any move to prevent rotation from taking place 
was quite risky. Forcing early elections or trying to form a narrow- 
based Labour government - the two possible moves - might simply fa il  to 
m aterialize. Moreover, even i f  either move was successful. Labour would 
risk voter retribution for breaking a written agreement and for not 
playing a fa ir  game. Mr. Peres might ruin his newly-acquired reputation 
and Labour might be blamed for dismantling the popular NUG. The Labour
*  One "had-elections-taken-place-now" po ll, for example, gave the 
following results for 1986, in terms of parliamentary seats: March 
- Labour 50, Likud 32; July - Labour 51, Likud 32; September - 
Labour 57, Likud 32 (see M a'ariv. 2.11.86).
* *  Euphoric party activ is ts , excited about the prospect of Labour-led 
government, clamoured for avoiding rotation at the April 1986 
party conference.
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party (and more so Mr. Peres personally) has always had problems of 
c re d ib ility  in certain segments of the public, and a renegation on 
rotation might cause an irreparable damage to its  reputation in the 
eyes of the electorate.*
In 1986, several events took place which seemingly provided Labour 
with good opportunities and/or excuses not to implement rotation. In 
March, Herut/Likud held a disgraceful party conference, and television  
showed shameful scenes up to physical clashes between party factions. 
The chaotic conference proved that Mr. Shamir did not enjoy the 
confidence of a majority within his party. As noted above, the rotation  
agreement had named him personally as the "rotatee" (unusual 
circumstances call for unusual words), and now that he seemed to have 
lost the "controlling shares" in the Likud, Labour could use i t  as an 
excuse to declare the agreement null and vo id .** In May-June, Mr. 
Shamir's personal involvement in a major security scandal, the Shin-Bet 
a f fa ir , weakened his p o litica l standing even further, and another good 
opportunity to avoid rotation seemed av a ila b le .***  However, Prime 
Minister Peres was unwilling to take any action.
Several p o litica l commentators suggest that the Likud's intraparty  
p o litic s , and even Mr. Shamir's shaky position in the aftermath of the
*  As an unlikely alternative, there was even a suggestion to hold a 
referendum on whether or not to implement rotation (made by Mr. 
Edri, Labour's parliamentary faction leader, in a TV interview, 
5 .4 .86 ). There has never been a referendum in Is rae l's  history, on 
no question whatever, and there is no legal basis for holding one.
* *  In an interview, Mr. Shachal claimed authorship for th is idea.
* * *  Labour's Mr. Gur insisted that because of the Shin-Bet a f fa ir , Mr. 
Shamir had lost the moral right to become prime minister. He then 
resigned from government prior to rotation in October 1986.
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Shin Bet a f fa ir , were simply not good enough as a pretext to avoid 
rotation. According to this view, only a deeply dividing ideological 
issue, such as a breakthrough in the peace process, could have been 
publicly accepted as a legitimate cause for the collapse of both 
government and ro ta tion .*
Was such an issue ready for decision by October 1986? Labour's Mr. 
Ya'acobi, for one, suggests that "before rotation, the issue of peace, 
based on talks with the Jordanians, was basically ready for a 
government decision. Labour could have avoided rotation and go for
elections. I t  might have lost two seats for dismantling the government, 
but would have gained at least five due to its  position on the peace 
process" [interview ]. Mr. Abu-Hazeira of Tami said: "The peace process 
was the only issue that ju s tifie d  avoiding rotation. I do not know at 
what stage i t  was prior to rotation date. However, I know for sure that 
had i t  been brought up for a decision, Mr. Peres would have gained the 
support of at least 70 members of Knesset, including most of the 
religious parties, and there would be no need for early elections" 
[in terv iew ].
Mr. Rabin, on the other hand, does not believe there was a safe 
way to avoid rotation, even in the pretext of promoting peace: "As for 
the peace process, we could have created a cris is  but then the
Jordanians might have said that there was no agreement or
understanding. Only a spectacular development, a force maieure. could
have ju s tif ie d  avoiding the rotation. In general, i f  Labour would have
Interviews, Messrs. Shchori and Crystal, p o litic a l commentators 
for Haaretz and Hadashot. respectively.
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reneged on rotation, we would have lost trust and c re d ib ility , a 
problem we suffer from anyhow in certain quarters. The party and its  
chairman [Mr. Peres] would have paid a high price for avoiding 
rotation" [interview ]. Mr. Peres, who had the fina l say in this matter, 
agrees for once with Mr. Rabin: "There was no way to avoid rotation, no 
problems in the Likud, not even the peace process. I had to implement 
the rotation agreement" [interview].
Implementation
All uncertainties and speculations notwithstanding, the rotation  
agreement was honoured. On 10.10.1986, Mr. Peres handed President 
Herzog a le tte r  of resignation which read as follows: "As you know, on 
13.9.1984 a coalition agreement was signed between Labour and the Likud 
regarding the establishment of a National Unity Government. The time 
has now come to f u l f i l l  Paragraph 1.5 in the agreement regarding the 
completion of my term as Prime Minister, and th is I now do in 
accordance with this agreement and within the time lim it specified ... I 
estimate that my resignation w ill augment the trust in Israe l's  
democratic regime... which is founded on trust in spoken as well as 
written words. Therefore I am proud of the move I am now making..." 
[Government Press Office]
There is no doubt that Mr. Peres's decision to stand by the 
rotation agreement was motivated by considerations of trustworthiness. 
His p o litica l Achilles heel has always been those repeated allegations 
of non-credib ility , and the last thing he needed was to prove himself 
indeed "indefatigably subversive", to use the oft-repeated phrase
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coined by his party riva l Mr. Rabin. "Peres, aware of the c red ib ility  
problem that hurt his image as Minister of Defense under Mr. Rabin, 
which was strengthened by the le tte r 's  accusation in his memoirs of 
constant subversion on Peres's part, had no alternative but to honour 
the rotation agreement" [Elazar and Sandler, 1990, p. 225]. "Peres did 
not want to have his p o litica l opponents renew the charges against him 
of being unreliable by breaking the rotation agreement which had been 
worked out with the Likud" [Arian, 1988, p. 18].
Ministers who were close to Mr. Peres at the time confirm that 
c re d ib ility  was the major reason for honouring rotation. Mr. Ya'acobi 
suggested that "although i t  made p o litica l sense to avoid rotation, for 
Peres the c red ib ility  problem was the key issue" [interview ]. Mr. 
Shachal, probably the closest to Mr. Peres among Labour's ministers, 
further elaborated: "Peres went along with rotation because of his wife 
and family, who cared for his public image. True, he hoped for
something big to happen before rotation. Since nothing happened, he 
f e lt  he had to le t rotation take place" [interview ]. I t  seems indeed 
that Mr. Peres wanted to rid  himself, once and for a l l ,  of his
notoriety as an unreliable, "yes and no" p o litic ian ; he wanted to build
up the image of "the new Peres".
There were, of course, some hard p o litic a l facts which suggest 
that Mr. Peres had no option but to abide by the rotation agreement. 
"The national unity government implemented the rotation agreement 
primarily because its  f i r s t  two years in office  did not a lte r the
parliamentary conditions that had created i t . . .  In addition to the
personal c re d ib ility  issue that has haunted Peres in the past and made
him sensitive to the possible charge of bad fa ith , he did not have a
viable strategy for an alternative coalition or even a legitim izing
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issue for an early election prior to the rotation date" [Yanai, 1990,
p. 185] In other words, the government formula - and with i t  the
rotation agreement - survived because Labour could not secure the 
support of the religious parties for a narrow-based coalition or for 
early elections.* These parties estimated that they could gain no more 
from a narrow-based coalition than what they have already acquired in 
the NUG. Put simply. Labour could not capture the system's pivotal
position.
The c re d ib ility  question and the attitude of the religious parties 
provide a plausible, but not necessarily a fu ll explanation for the 
implementation of rotation. I t  seems that Mr. Peres took th is step also 
because he expected to be able to bring down the NUG soon afterwards, 
using the peace issue for leverage. This way, he could eat his cake and 
have i t  - deny Mr. Shamir the premiership without losing c re d ib ility . 
Actually, i t  seems that Mr. Peres should have gone along with the
rotation agreement even i f  a reasonable opportunity to fo il i t  had 
presented i ts e lf ,  because no conceivable pretext would have le f t  his 
personal reputation untarnished. Furthermore, Labour's renegation could 
unite the fragmented Likud, alienate the religious parties, as well as 
restore the image of "the old Peres", no matter what the actual reason 
might be.
The alternative strategy, namely to eliminate the p o litic a l 
consequences of rotation soon a fter its  implementation, apparently made
Mr. Peres did try  to court the religious parties. For one thing, 
he supported a b i l l  for s tric te r  enforcement of religious kosher 
laws (June 1985). He also paid a courtesy v is it  to Rabbi Ovadia 
Yossef, the sp iritual leader of Shas, and made several gestures 
intended to display his respect for re lig ion .
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better p o litic a l sense. As i t  turned out, however, th is strategy fa iled  
dismally. What was needed for such a strategy to work, i t  seems in 
retrospect, was possession of both the p o litica l aM  the legal powers 
of prime ministership. But a fte r rotation, of course, Mr. Peres was 
only second-in-command in the NUG, and this turned out to make a ll the 
difference in the world. What Mr. Peres should perhaps have figured out 
in advance, but d idn 't, is that what a prime minister can do without 
too much d iff ic u lty , a deputy prime minister may find to be an 
impossible task.
The Transfer of Power
I t  seems then that as much as Mr. Peres had considered the various 
implications of rotation, he probably did not fu lly  appreciate what i t  
meant for his own po litica l power. Having become so popular a ll of a 
sudden, relegation to the number two position a fter rotation seemed to 
him a mere "legal technicality", with l i t t l e  p o litica l meaning.* This 
became evident in September-October 1986, when Labour and the Likud 
negotiated the transfer of the office of the prime m inister. This 
interparty bargaining was supposed to involve a few necessary 
improvements in the coalition agreement, based on the two years' 
experience of the NUG. In fact, i t  provided Labour with an opportunity 
to extract a certain price for its  readiness to abide by the rotation  
agreement, but Labour fa iled  to take advantage of i t .
*  Mr. B eilin , Mr. Peres's aide, confirms this [in terview ].
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Actually, in these negotiations, Labour fa iled  to achieve any 
substantive change in the rules of the p o litic a l game. Most 
importantly. Labour tried  but could not obtain a "m ini-rotation", i .e .  
get back to the office of the prime minister at the end of the 50
months' term of the NUG - even before the next elections. I t  was agreed
that Mr. Shamir would stay on as prime minister for perhaps more than 
25 months - until the investiture of a new government a fte r the 
elections. Labour wanted to have a say in the preparation of the agenda 
for government meetings, again in vain. Also, the Likud turned down 
Labour's demand to set up an inner economic cabinet, sim ilar to the 
defence and foreign affa irs  cabinet, to be headed by Mr. Peres. 
Moreover, i t  was determined that Mr. Shamir would be able to empower 
ministers to carry out special tasks, possibly circumventing Labour
ministers in charge of the overall domain in which these tasks
regularly f a l l .  All in a l l .  Labour asked for some major changes in the
terms of the coalition agreement, but eventually settled for minor
changes, mostly of a personal nature.*
Mr. Shamir explained the Likud's tough stance in the negotiations:
"The Likud has kept the coalition agreement from A to Z, although i t 's  
well-known that we have had to g r it  our teeth in so doing. And we did 
this in the national in terest. Now i t 's  time for our coalition partner 
to take that same test, and we're watching to see whether they pass i t .  
We w ill not agree to any changes in the rules of the game at th is late
One of the things Mr. Peres wanted was to protect his appointees, 
and even make a few new ones. In th is , he was only partly  
successful; for instance, he could not get for his closest aide, 
Mr. B eilin , an appointment as ambassador to the United States.
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stage" [Jerusalem Post. 3.10.86] The Likud's general attitude  
notwithstanding, i t  s t i l l  seems that since i t  did not want to give 
Labour the slightest pretext for reneging on rotation, the la t te r  could 
have obtained more p o litica l concessions than i t  actually did.
Apparently, Mr. Peres did not strongly insist on introducing 
important changes in government procedures because he thought he could 
s t i l l  play some kind of prime m inisterial role a fte r rotation. Being 
forced to realize that he would now have to play second fidd le  was for 
him a humbling experience. By this default, then. Labour fa iled  to 
protect its  positions in the post-rotation NUG. Mr. Shachal, who 
together with Mr. Peres negotiated the implementation of rotation, 
admitted that "Peres's uderstanding of the legal-constitutional 
significance of the change was found wanting. Rotation represented the 
deterioration of Labour's position in government; we lost dominance and 
even our status of parity" [interview ]. There is no doubt but that from 
rotation in 1986 to the present. Labour has played a secondary role in 
Is rae li p o litics .
To sum up, the prime m inisterial rotation was a watershed event, 
resembling general elections in many respects. However, i t  was not as 
unexpected as Labour's fa ll  from power in 1977, for instance. Rather, 
i t  was scheduled within the ongoing coalition process, yet a c r it ic a l 
event a ll the same. Because of rotation, the 1984 NUG should not rea lly  
be regarded as one grand coalition, but rather as two proto-coalitions. 
Labour's and the Likud's, with a management agreement between them 
[Doron, 1988, p. 89]. The p o litica l nature of this management agreement 
seemed to have a strong impact on the modus ooerandi of the NUG.
Due to the rotation agreement, the value of the NUG to the two 
major actors was not the same; nor was i t  constant over its  expected
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50-months life tim e . For the Likud, which had to wait 25 months for 
rotation and then enjoy the prime ministership for another 25 months, 
the value of the coalition hardly changed during the entire period. For 
Labour, by contrast, having occupied f i r s t  the prime m inister's o ffice , 
the value of the NUG depreciated a fter rotation. This inequality in the 
coalition 's  value between Labour and the Likud was a strong incentive
for the la t te r  to insist on the agreement which stated that the NUG
last for a fu ll parliamentary term, as well as for the former to 
consider ways and means to avoid rotation, or fa ilin g  that, to make
attempts to bring the NUG down afterwards.
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The Days of Shimon Peres
Coming to describe the modus ooerandi of the 1984-1986 NUG under the 
prime ministership of Mr. Peres, we shall examine the way major issues 
on the national agenda were dealt with. All the issues under 
consideration caused conflicts between Labour and the Likud. The level 
of interparty controversy determined that some issues be resolved, 
while others be merely "handled”. After a l l ,  the NUG was a government 
based on parity.
The Non-Polarizing Issues 
Lebanon
The f i r s t  major resolution adopted by the NUG was on the Lebanese War, 
which had begun in June 1982 and was then already going on for more 
than two years; the Israel Defence Force (IDF) was in occupation of a 
large part of Lebanese te rrito ry  south of Beirut, engaged in a war of 
a ttr it io n  with various local forces within this te rr ito ry  and on its  
boundaries. This pressing issue, which provided one of the major 
raisons d 'etre for the existence of a national coalition in the f ir s t  
place, was f in a lly  resolved on January 13th, 1985. The government 
decided on fu ll and complete m ilita ry  withdrawal from Lebanon. Also, in 
order to safeguard towns and villages in the northern parts of Israe l, 
a "security zone" was set up, controlled by the Israeli-backed South 
Lebanese Army (SLA). The credit for putting an end to th is protracted
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conflic t should be given to the p o litica l acumen of Prime Minister 
Peres and the m ilita ry  authority maintained by Defence Minister Rabin. 
These two Labour leaders succeeded where th e ir predecessors, Likud's
Mr. Shamir and Mr. Arens, fa iled .
The decision to disengage from Lebanon was reached in stages, and 
was indicative of the Prime M inister's modus ooerandi in a government 
based on parity . F irs t, Mr. Peres exhausted the diplomatic option 
through attempts to negotiate a reasonable p o litic a l and security 
arrangement with the Syrians and Lebanese [Schiff & Y a 'a ri, 1984] The 
fa ilu re  of this diplomatic in it ia t iv e  served to soften the position of 
those who objected to m ilita ry  withdrawal. Second, Mr. Peres and Mr. 
Rabin sought and received the backing of the "professionals" - the
defence and m ilita ry  establishment. Third, Mr. Peres made sure that a ll 
Labour ministers be united in supporting a withdrawal resolution, 
including former Chief of S taff Mr. Gur, who had certain reservations. 
Fourth, the Labour Prime Minister isolated the Likud party by acquiring 
the support of ministers representing the smaller parties, such as Mr. 
Burg of the NRP, Mr. Peretz of Shas and Mr. Shapira of Morasha.
By now Mr. Peres had already secured a government majority for a 
m ilita ry  withdrawal. However, he looked for some support from within 
the Likud party its e lf  before putting the issue to a formal vote, 
because a head-on Labour-Likud confrontation on such an important 
security matter could adversely affect the p o litic a l legitimacy of the 
formal resolution. Needless to say, acquiring the votes of some Likud
ministers for a decision on a m ilita ry  withdrawal was not an easy task,
bearing in mind that 9 out of the 10 Likud ministers in the NUG were 
members of Mr. Shamir's previous government which proved unable to find 
a way out of this particular maze, while 8 out of the 10 had served in
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Mr. Begin's government that had in itia te d  the war in the f i r s t  place. 
Eventually, as a result of much p o litica l and public pressure, two 
Likud ministers. Vice Premier Mr. Levy (Herut) and Mr. Patt (Liberals), 
joined forces with the majority in a 17 to 8 vote in favour of a 
m ilita ry  withdrawal from Lebanon.
The wide margin of support for Labour's position was rather 
impressive, in that the in bu ilt equilibrium between the two opposing 
blocs in government was thrown completely out of k i l te r .  Mr. Rabin 
noted: "On the question of Lebanon the government was able to take a
decision which diverged from the consensus because there was a crossing 
of lines by several Likud members" [Hattis Rolef, 1985, p. 20]. The 
resolution was regarded as a p o litica l defeat for the Likud, and there 
was even a demand for reconsideration, mainly by Mr. Sharon. However, 
Prime Minister Peres made clear that the resolution stands: "This 
government, like  any government, operates by majority decision; a 
majority decision is binding on a ll members of government; and we w ill 
carry out what's been decided" [Israel TV, 13.2.85]
An important aspect of the Lebanon issue related to the locus of 
decision-making. The issue was decided in the 25-member government 
plenum rather than the 10-member Inner Cabinet (which had not yet been 
activated). The result was that i t  enjoyed a great deal of legitimacy 
and deterred extra-parliamentary ac tiv ity  of the "opposition from 
within" led by Mr. Sharon. In May 1985, upon the completion of the 
m ilita ry  withdrawal. Labour demanded an o ffic ia l investigation into the 
conduct of the entire war. The Likud strongly objected, even threatened 
to dissolve the coalition, and Labour had to back o ff . S t i l l ,  the 
Lebanon issue was for Labour a major p o litic a l victory which 
strengthened the leadership of Prime Minister Peres.
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The Economic Emergency Plan
More than the war in Lebanon, i t  was the national economy, then on the 
verge of total collapse, which provided the real ju s tific a tio n  for the 
formation of a unity government. "The most pressing threat facing the 
Is rae li government in the summer of 1984 was the economic c ris is . With 
a 24.3-percent monthly rate of in fla tion  in August 1984, a gap of $3.8 
b illio n  in the balance of payments in 1982 and almost $4 b illio n  in 
1983, and the 1983 collapse of the bank shares on the stock exchange, 
which endangered the existence of the whole banking system, the Israe li 
economy was facing bankruptcy" [Elazar and Sandler, 1990, p. 226].
The situation was so severe that already in the f i r s t  meeting of 
the NUG, 16.9.84, a special "Economic Committee" of four (Mr. Peres, 
Mr. Shamir, Mr. Moda'i and Mr. Ya'acobi) was set up to deal with the 
economic c ris is . Since one of the major problems was huge public 
spending, the committee was granted special authority to control the 
budgets of the d ifferen t m inistries. Naturally, the various ministries 
resisted such interference; particu larly , attempts to control the huge 
defence budget did not make very much of an impact.* Also, the 
introduction of a few short-term emergency measures was likened by the 
press to the application of bandages where major operation is called 
for; i t  soon became clear that only a comprehensive emergency plan 
might s tab ilize  the national economy.
Finance Minister Mr. Moda'i attacked the defence establishment, 
calling i t  "a state within a state" in a government meeting, 
13.11.84.
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After nine months of preparations, the government approved on June 
30th, 1985, a sweeping economic program. As for the decision-making
mechanism, Mr. Peres adopted very much the same strategy that served 
him so well on the Lebanon issue six months e a rlie r . For an emergency 
plan to have any chance of success, the cooperation of the powerful 
Histadrut was v ita l.  Such cooperation was not readily forthcoming, 
since the plan envisaged both a sharp drop in real income and a sharp 
rise in unemployment. Mr. Peres had to use a ll the power and prestige 
he possessed both as Prime Minister and as the leader of the Labour 
party to obtain the reluctant cooperation of the trade union movement 
[Mr. Kessar, interview]. Mr. Peres "gave just enough ground to the 
Histadrut on technicalities to allow some face saving for Kessar [the 
Histadrut's Secretary-General], but he withstood the pressure" [Lewis, 
1987, p. 591].
Once the cooperation of the trade unions was secured, i t  did not 
take much e ffo rt to get the support of Labour's team in the government, 
including the "social affa irs" ministers, Mr. Navon and Mr. Gur. Mr. 
Rabin, who decided to abstain in the vote on the economic plan, was the 
only odd man out in a united Labour front. He was not happy with the 
cuts proposed in the defence budget, and also used the opportunity to 
distant himself from his party r iv a l, Mr. Peres. The leaders of the 
smaller parties were easily convinced to back the economic plan, so 
that the question was again the attitude of the Likud ministers. Here, 
Mr. Moda'i - the Finance Minister - proved himself an effective a lly . 
Not only was he a co-author of the emergency plan; as a Liberal Party 
leader he actually handled the pressures from the private sector which 
opposed th is massive government intervention in the economy.
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Among the Likud's ministers, Mr. Shamir and Mr. Corfu seemed to 
have learned the lesson from the vote on Lebanon and th is time sided 
with the government majority. The main opposition to the economic plan 
came, however, from the three would-be contenders for the Likud's 
leadership: Mr. Levy, Mr. Arens and Mr. Sharon. Most vocal in his 
opposition was Mr. Levy, whose roots were in the poor Sephardic 
community. He was quite reluctant to impose the further hardships 
involved in the economic plan on the weaker segments of the public. The 
s p lit  within the Likud's ranks was the reason why the government was 
able to adopt yet another major decision with a wide margin of 15 to 7. 
Labour's Prime Minister Mr. Peres could claim for himself two major 
p o litic a l victories within six months.
The Taba Dispute
Six months a fter the introduction of the economic emergency measures - 
which, incidentally, proved highly effective - yet another major issue 
was brought to government decision, the so-called Taba dispute. Taba is 
a small beach area at the Israeli-Egyptian border, near E ila t - a ll of 
i t  250 acres or so - which remained disputed te rr ito ry  following the 
signing of the peace treaty between the two nations in 1979, due to 
imprecise border marking in the early 1900's. From a minor problem i t  
had developed into the major stumbling block on the way of improved 
Israeli-Egyptian relations. Until early 1985, Prime Minister Peres 
referred to the Taba dispute as a minor annoyance, nothing more: "The
Taba issue was not the be-all and end-all of relations between Israel 
and Egypt" [Israel TV, 13.2.85] I t  soon turned out, however, that Egypt 
regarded the Taba dispute as a symbol of " Is raeli intransigence". The
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process of normalization with the only Arab nation to sign a peace 
treaty with Israel came to a screeching h a lt, and the government was 
forced to deal with the issue more seriously.
In May 1985, Labour and the Likud (which held d iffe ren t views on
how to handle this issue, as on everything else) agreed on a procedure 
to formulate government policy: the Inner Cabinet w ill decide between 
"arbitration" and "conciliation". Whereas Labour's position was 
immediately to refer the dispute to an international court for 
arb itra tion , the Likud suggested to exhaust measures of conciliation  
before using the venue of an international jud ic ia l body. For months,
Mr. Peres was unable to bring up the issue for resolution, since he did
not have a majority in the 5:5 Inner Cabinet.
By November 1985, anxious to restore momentum to the relations 
with Egypt, Mr. Peres said: "Mr. Mubarak insists on arb itra tion  and 
that's  i t .  There are two opinions before our cabinet: one opinion is . . .  
le t 's  go to arb itra tion , and this v iew ... takes into account that we 
have a real case here, and that i t  cannot be taken for granted that 
Taba belongs to Egypt. Others insist on conciliation f i r s t  and on 
arb itration  afterwards... there is a disagreement which has yet to be 
resolved either way because of the deadlock in the Inner Cabinet."
Asked i f  he insisted on arbitration even at the cost of dissolution of
the NUG, he replied: "you want me to put the cost before the decision
and I want to do the reverse" [Israel TV, 28.11.85]
In January 1986 Mr. Peres became less circumspect in handling the 
issue, threatening that i f  the Likud would force a 5:5 t ie  in the Inner 
Cabinet, he would raise the issue at the government plenum, where he 
enjoyed a majority, or simply "go to the president" ( i . e . ,  submit his
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resignation).* "Peres adopted a strategy of decision making through 
cris is  management. Understanding that patience alone would not suffice  
to move a compound-structured government with diversified  interests, he 
eventually brought his cabinet to the verge of collapse, thus forcing 
them to swallow b itte r  medicine. He exploited the art of brinkmanship 
in dealing with the Taba issue" [Elazar and Sandler, 1990, p. 224].
This kind of ultimatum was of course in violation of the coalition  
agreement. The Likud was certainly entitled  to hold on to its  position 
in the Inner Cabinet, and Mr. Peres was not supposed to refer the issue 
to the government plenum without its  consent. Yet an ultimatum, i f  
taken seriously, speaks louder than a coalition agreement, and the 
Likud found i ts e lf  between the devil and the deep blue sea - complete 
surrender or no government, no rotation. On January 13, 1986, when Mr. 
Peres agreed to provide the Likud with a face-saving formula, the 
la t te r  accepted his terms on Taba.** Unlike its  conduct on the Lebanon 
and the economy issues, this time the Likud did not s p lit  - i t  
co llective ly  capitulated to Mr. Peres's ultimatum. Rotation, now less 
than a year away, was too important to be risked over the Taba 
issue.***
After only sixteen months in o ffice , Mr. Peres has achieved his 
th ird  major p o litic a l victory in a government based on parity . As for
* The threat was made in Labour's ministers caucus, 8 .1 .86.
* *  Mr. Peres promised the Likud that he would demand that Egypt cease
and desist from supporting te rror, stop a n ti- Is ra e li propaganda 
and accelerate the pace of "normalization".
* * *  Mr. Achimeir, personal aide to Mr. Shamir, admitted as much 
[in terv iew ].
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the issue at hand, Mr. Peres's "arbitration" position proved a loser, 
since the international tribunal ruled against Israel on the Taba 
Dispute. Labour and the Likud blamed each other for the loss. "Labour 
implied that i t  was Likud's insistence on gaining everything that 
resulted in losing everything. Likud accusingly implied that in the 
future a Labour-backed international conference would resu lt, as in the 
international arbitration of Taba, in Israel having to withdraw to the 
pre-1967 borders" [Elazar and Sandler, 1990, p. 237].
The Shin-Bet A ffa ir
The Shin-Bet a ffa ir  amounted to a po litica l cover-up of an incident in 
which members of the Israe li General Security Services (generally known 
as the Shin-Bet) executed two captured Arab te rro ris ts  who had hijacked 
an Israe li bus near Ashqelon in April 1984. Mr. Shamir was then Prime 
Minister of a narrow-based Likud government. Some details had started 
to emerge in public almost immediately, but i t  was not until early 1986 
that public indignation turned into a strong demand for fu ll 
investigation.* The a ffa ir  was highly sensitive because Mr. Shamir 
should have known about i t  a ll along, having been d irec tly  responsible 
for the Shin-Bet, and apparently did. Mr. Peres, when he became Prime 
Minister, might have also been informed about the incident.
The whole a ffa ir  was one more blow to the already tarnished 
prestige of the hitherto near-legendary secret service, which also 
fa iled  to uncover the publicity intentions of the notorious 
Mordechai Vaanunu, who sold to foreign newspapers the purported 
secrets of the Dimona nuclear reactor. Later on, in May 1987, 
Chief Justice Meir Shamgar sharply c ritic ized  the Shin-Bet over 
yet another a ffa ir .
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Investigating any high-level p o litic a l coverup of a security 
"a ffa ir"  is no simple undertaking anywhere, much more so in Israe l. 
S t i l l ,  there were many politic ians - mainly on Labour's side - who 
demanded a jud icia l Commission of Inquiry to conduct an open 
investigation of the a ffa ir , as befits a democratic society. Others, 
mainly on the Likud side, suggested that in the name of national 
security the matter should be investigated by a police team, so as not 
to expose the operational methods of the Shin-Bet. On 25.6.86, 
President Herzog pardoned the Shin-Bet men involved, following a 
recommendation by the Inner Cabinet delivered to him through the 
Minister of Justice. Now there was no c a ll, of course, to investigate 
the incident i ts e lf .  The decision on how to investigate the involvement 
of po litic ians in the apparent cover-up was le f t  to the government, 
namely for those politic ians themselves.
On 13.7.86, the government plenum voted 14 to 11 in favour of 
appointing a special police team to investigate the po litic ians ' 
involvement in the Shin-Bet a f fa ir . The parties which supported the 
resolution were: Likud - 10; Shas - 1; Morasha - 1; the NRP - 1; Ometz 
- 1. Not only was the Likud bloc united this time, i t  also acquired the 
vote of the "neutral" NRP minister and more surprising s t i l l ,  the vote 
of Ometz, a member of Labour's bloc.* For Mr. Shamir, the NUG decision 
was a crucial p o litica l victory: had a jud ic ia l Commission been formed 
to investigate the Shin-Bet a f fa ir , his very p o litica l career might
The Likud simply bought the vote of Ometz's Mr. Hurwitz (for 
deta ils , see below). There was also a problem with Shas's Mr. 
Peretz, who called publicly for a jud ic ia l investigation, and had 
to be reminded to which p o litic a l bloc he belonged.
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have been jeopardized.* With rotation date only few months away, he was 
therefore determined to prevent this eventuality. His party riva ls , Mr. 
Sharon and Mr. Moda'i, backed him a ll the way because they did not want 
Mr. Levy to replace him. Mr. Levy himself, who was eager to get to the 
top position, could not be seen, of course, voting against Mr. Shamir 
in time of trouble.
The vote on the Shin-Bet a ffa ir  was the f i r s t  and only time that 
Prime Minister Peres found himself on the losing side of a major 
government decision.** Actually, Mr. Peres was not rea lly  that eager 
not to lose; at any rate, he did not do everything he could in order to 
win the vote. Had he wanted badly to score a p o litic a l victory on the 
Shin-Bet a f fa ir , he could most probably have achieved i t .  After a l l ,  he 
controlled the government's agenda, and therefore could have delayed a 
decision or avoided one altogether. I t  seems that Mr. Peres did not 
rea lly  want a public judicia l commission because he feared i t  might 
accuse him of negligence in handling the a f fa ir . Moreover, Mr. Peres 
probably wanted Mr. Shamir rather than Mr. Levy to replace him as prime 
minister, come rotation tim e.*** Labour's loss in the vote on the Shin-
*  For Mr. Shamir, the a ffa ir  was "an unfortunate incident". He
accused his rivals  of conducting a p o litic a l vendetta, claiming 
they wanted to do to him what they had done to Mr. Sharon over the 
Lebanon issue. In December 1986, the Attorney General "cleared" 
the p o litica l level of any wrongdoing in this a f fa ir .
* *  Mr. Peres did lose a few minor votes, e.g. a 12:13 vote on a tax
issue (22.9.85). He then accused the Likud of partisan attitude.
* * *  Disqualification from public office  by an o f f ic ia l ,  judicia l
Commission of Inquiry, would certainly have constituted the kind 
of force maieure required to apply the rotation agreement on a 
Likud nominee other than Mr. Shamir. In any event. Labour 
"preferred" Mr. Shamir over Mr. Levy, since the la tte r  was a 
popular Sephardic leader, and thus a tougher competitor.
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Bet a f fa ir  was an indication that the party was in for tough time in 
the NUG, once Mr. Shamir becomes prime minister in October 1986. From 
then on, Labour would have to exploit the mutual veto arrangements in 
the 5:5 Inner Cabinet in order to block the Likud.
The Polarizing Issues
On the p o litic a l solution of the Arab-Israeli conflic t and the 
Palestinian problem, the positions of Labour and the Likud were 
extremely polarized. These matters tended to impair the government 
decision making process and even threatened its  very existence.
The Settlement Issue
As a matter of fact, not a ll the issues relating to the Arab-Israeli 
conflic t involved sharp Labour-Likud controversies within the framework 
of the NUG. The continued establishment of Jewish settlements in Judea 
and Samaria (as the te rr ito rie s  occupied by Israel in the 1967 war are 
o ff ic ia lly  known by decree of the previous Likud government) was quite 
adequately covered by the NUG formula. I t  was one of those potentially  
explosive issues anticipated in the coalition agreement, which 
stipulated that five to six settlements would be established during the 
NUG's f i r s t  year in o ffice , in addition to the continued "development" 
of existing settlements. Also, the NUG was to implement a ll of the 
previous Likud government's last-minute pre-election decisions on new 
settlements. In to ta l, the agreement called for the establishment of 27 
settlements within the NUG's four-year term.
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In re a lity , during Labour's hold of the prime ministership, 1984- 
1986, only three or four new settlements were actually set up. The 
Likud did not raise the roof over th is apparent fa ilu re , and even the 
settlers movement. Gush Emunim, lay low. Labour and the Likud seemed to 
have reached a workable solution: a declarative decision by the NUG to 
carry on with a policy of settlements was enough to satisfy the Likud; 
and Labour, which apparently gave up on a principle, acted effective ly  
to lim it settlement ac tiv ity . "The Likud insisted on the principle of 
continued settlement in the occupied te rr ito r ie s , while Labour sought 
arrangements that would confine its  implementation to a few new
settlements" [Horowitz, 1990, p. 228].
The Peace Process
The modus vivendi between Labour and the Likud with regard to the 
settlement policy could not apply to the peace process and the
te r r ito r ia l issue as a whole. On the final p o litica l resolution of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict and the way to reach i t .  Labour and the Likud 
were diametrically opposed. I t  was clear that the peace process was the 
dark horse among the issues potentia lly capable of blowing up the NUG. 
To avoid such a possib ility , both parties agreed to call for new
elections i f  and when crucial decisions w ill have to be made.
Despite the delicate interparty balance in the NUG, Prime Minister 
Peres was determined to push ahead with the peace process in any way he 
saw f i t .  In February 1985, when the NUG was but a few months old, Mr. 
Peres already acted as i f  he had an open mandate to deal with the peace 
issue, stressing that "the NUG has agreed: (1) to inv ite  [King] Hussein 
to Middle East peace talks; and (2) that the Jordanian Monarch may
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raise whatever issue he wished and the Is rae li side would discuss them 
seriously" [Israel TV, 13.2.85]. What Mr. Peres was trying to do was 
send a clear message to the world, particu larly  to the Arabs, that he 
himself, not the Likud's Foreign A ffairs Minister Shamir, was in charge 
of Is rae l's  diplomatic e ffo rts .
In April 1985, Mr. Peres effective ly  demonstrated his a b ility  as 
Prime Minister to run the diplomatic and p o litic a l show, by forcing the 
NUG to reconsider its  previous, Likud-supported decision not to approve 
a v is it  to Egypt by Labour's Minister without Portfolio Mr. Weizmann.* 
This angered the Likud to such an extent that i t  demanded to bring the 
issue before the 5:5 inner cabinet, which was thus activated for the 
f i r s t  time. This p o litic a l move, which strengthened the Likud's veto 
powers, served as a remainder to Mr. Peres that the NUG was a 
government based on parity , not a Labour government.
In May 1985, when the NUG discussed the release of Arab terroris ts  
in exchange for Is rae li POWs, Mr. Peres again angered the Likud, 
notably Mr. Shamir and Mr. Sharon, by refusing even to consider the 
settlers lobby's request simultaneously to grant pardon to members of 
"the Jewish underground" serving time for acts of te rror against 
Palestinian leaders.** Mr. Peres said that the government would not 
discuss the issue "so that ministers w ill not be judges and judges w ill 
not engage in po litics  and neither w ill replace the President... [The
* In the second vote, the NRP and Ometz changed th e ir positions and 
voted with Mr. Peres. Since Mr. Shamir mainly objected to the 
o ffic ia l nature of Mr. Weizmann's tr ip  to Egypt, the p i l l  was 
sweetened by making i t  a private v is it .
* *  Eventually, Israel released 1,300 terro ris ts  in exchange of 3 POWs 
held by the J ib ril organization.
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authority to grant] pardon is in the hands of the President, with the 
endorsement of the Minister of Ju stice ... and so i t  shall remain" 
[Israel TV, 6 .6 .85 ]. In other words, Mr. Peres accused the Likud of 
disregard for both the supremacy of the law and division of powers 
between the branches of government.
For the Likud, however, the most problematic aspect of the pardon 
issue was neither the legal consideration nor the actual release of the 
prisoners. Rather, i t  feared that Mr. Peres's attitude indicated a 
"soft", generally moderate posture towards the Palestinian issue. The 
Likud suspected that Mr. Peres might want to conduct an independent
policy on this most sensitive issue. Mr. Shamir fe l t  obliged therefore
to c la r ify  his party's position on the Palestinian issue: "The NUG
agreed on the following three points: No negotiations with the PLO, we 
shall not accept any Palestinian state or en tity  in E re tz-Is rae l, 
Israel remains committed to the Camp David Accords" [GPO, interview,
27.6.85].
The Likud's position notwithstanding, Mr. Peres had no intention 
to give up his role as prime mover of Is rae l's  foreign policy, with or 
without the Likud's consent. In October 1985, Mr. Peres vis ited the 
United States and said, both in an address to the United Nations
General Assembly and in a meeting with President Reagan, things that
were unacceptable to the Likud. Mr. Shamir's reaction was rather sharp: 
"This is a c r it ic a l period. The moment Government begins to discuss 
matters relating to the p o litica l solution, to relations between 
ourselves and our neighbors, to the future of E re tz-Is rae l, everything 
becomes sensitive, very intense, and naturally various possib ilities  
are to be expected... including elections. One of the bases of the 
Likud-Labour agreement to establish the NUG was that as regards this
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issue on which we are d iv ided ... relations with the Arab s ta te s ... no 
step is to be undertaken without the agreement of both the Likud and 
Labour. That is the basis. Perhaps i t  binds th e ir [Labour's] hands... 
but a ll of us must abide by the agreement" [Israel TV, 31.10.85].
Prime Minister Peres possessed such a p o litic a l savvy that even a 
t ie  in the Inner Cabinet was not enough to bind his hands. To this end 
he used the parliamentary device of the "Prime M inister's address" to 
ju s tify  his pursuit of peace as he saw f i t .  Specifically , the Knesset's 
perfunctory endorsement of Mr. Peres's address in October 1985, which 
included the controversial phrase "international auspices", was trotted  
out by him as a ll the sanction he required for his foreign policy 
effo rts . I t  was, needless to say, a rather novel defin ition  of 
"parliamentary democracy", a new twist to the principle according to 
which "the assembly i ts e lf  does not decide; i t  only mirrors the 
decisions made by the electorate on the one hand, and by the party (or 
coalition) in power on the other" [Smith, 1972, p. 136].
Naturally, Mr. Shamir was furious, and when asked whether he too 
thought that the Knesset endorsed the idea of an "international forum" 
for talks with Jordan, he responded that i t  was up to the Inner Cabinet 
to decide: "All p o litica l and security matters must be brought before
the Inner Cabinet... otherwise i t  w ill be a serious violation of the 
agreement, and a democratic state is run according to agreements...a 
decision must be made, a vote must be taken, and the vote w ill be the 
deciding factor" [Israel Radio, 11.11.85]. Mr. Peres's attempt to use a 
parliamentary devise to promote government policy, found no grace with 
Labour's Mr. Shlomo H ille l,  the Speaker of the Knesset: "When the
Knesset endorses, or actually takes note of, the Prime Minister's  
address, i t  does not mean that i t  approves of a ll its  deta ils ; while
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debating the various aspects of the speech, many members of the 
coalition [also] c r itic is e  them. But they nevertheless endorse the 
speech as a whole, showing support for the coalition against the 
opposition" [interview ],
Mr. Peres manoeuvered the Likud not only through parliamentary 
tr icks , but on substantive issues as w ell. In fact, the Prime Minister 
conducted many of his p o litica l moves on the peace process in secret 
also because he knew they were unacceptable to the Likud. The Likud 
ministers openly accused Mr. Peres of in itia tin g  diplomatic moves which 
Foreign Minister Shamir was not aware of. Mr. Shamir himself was 
reluctant to admit that he was not consulted by Mr. Peres: "According 
to the agreement, I have to be informed on every p o litic a l move, 
whether open or secret. I receive reports. You needn't think that just 
because I am informed, I also agree with every move" [Israel TV,
31.10.85]. Mr. Shamir insisted on a government decision on how to 
proceed with the peace process: " It  is inconceivable that one person, 
even i f  he is the greatest of geniuses, should determine, decide, and 
implement without consulting with anyone, without some state organ 
deciding on the issue. We demand that a ll p o litica l moves be brought 
before the Inner Cabinet as agreed" [Israel Radio, 11.11.85].
Mr. Peres ignored the Likud's complaints and kept on v is iting  
world capitals and meeting with Arab leaders. He dubbed 1986 "the year 
of negotiations". Following on Mr. Peres's secret v is its , this time to 
Morocco, Likud's Vice Prime Minister Mr. Levy remarked: " I t 's  an ironic 
joke that members of the Inner Cabinet and other ministers have to hear 
via Reuters from Morocco about the Prime M inister's a rr iv a l. I do not 
intend to deny or even to object to the Prime M inister's righ t, 
authority and prerogative to take in the p o litica l arena a number of
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in itia tiv e s  that sometimes are secretive. But here i t  is a matter of an 
open, publicized v is it"  [Israel Radio, 24.7.86]. Foreign Affairs  
Minister Shamir expressed a sim ilar opinion of Mr. Peres's v is its : "The 
fact that he appears alone at meetings of this kind does not exempt him 
from his commitment to the plan which binds the entire government" 
[Israel Radio, 28.7.86].
The Likud was very unhappy with Mr. Peres's questionable 
parliamentary maneouvering as well as with his secret diplomatic moves, 
but i t  was most worried about the contents of the Prime Minister's  
peace policy. The Likud blamed Mr. Peres for putting forward proposals 
which had l i t t l e  in common with the basic guidelines of the NUG. For 
instance, Mr. Peres's proposal to open the negotiations with the Arabs 
and the Palestinians under the auspices of an international conference 
was never approved by government. Mr. Peres even rejected the Likud's 
long-standing "autonomy plan" for the Palestinians, and talked about a 
"unilateral autonomy" as a better way to deal with the issue.* Mr. 
Shamir responded with a strong attack on Mr. Peres, asking the Prime 
Minister (rhetorica lly , though): "Who authorized you to ta lk  in this  
way?" [Herut meeting, 16.12.85]
During his last months in o ffice , Mr. Peres continued with his 
efforts  to keep alive the idea of an international conference, 
promoting i t  in "farewell v is its" to Washington, Cairo and European 
capitals. Due to the Likud's unswerving objections at the time.
A "unilateral autonomy" was a plan calling to le t  the Palestinians 
control th e ir own a ffa irs  in the te rr ito rie s  without a direct 
Is rae li involvement, but with security safeguards.
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however, he has had to wait until 1991 in order to see i t  come to 
fru itio n  - with him on the sidelines.
To sum up, Prime Minister Peres spent a great deal of energy in 
his efforts  to push the peace process forward, but at the end of the 
day he could do very l i t t l e .  The NUG was deadlocked on most issues 
relating to the Middle East co n flic t. The uncertainty about rotation  
was not strong enough, as a p o litic a l lever, to breach th is deadlock. 
The threat not to implement rotation might have played a role in 
sp littin g  the Likud's vote on withdrawal from Lebanon or on the 
economy, or in twisting the Likud's arm on the Taba dispute. Yet i t  
could not overcome the stalemate over the Palestinian, te r r ito r ia l or 
settlements issues.
The Personal Issues
The 1984-86 NUG was repeatedly troubled by clashes between Labour's 
Prime Minister Peres and various Likud ministers, especially Mr. 
Sharon, Mr. Moda'i and Mr. Levy, a ll viewed by Mr. Peres as relating to 
the NUG as i f  i t  was "his" government, not theirs. On two occasions, 
these conflicts developed into major p o litic a l crises which almost 
brought down the NUG.
The Likud's Mr. Sharon, who was instrumental in the formation of 
the national coalition, soon became a major threat to its  very 
existence, continuously challenging the Prime M inister's authority and
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the policy positions of the Labour party.* A particu larly  serious 
cris is  began on 11.11.85, when Mr. Sharon accused Mr. Peres of reaching 
a secret agreement with King Hussein of Jordan concerning an 
international peace conference - far removed from the policy guidelines 
hammered out for the NUG. Mr. Sharon charged that Mr. Peres's policy of 
"appeasement" w ill also jeopardise the peace with Egypt, and that the 
"cynical attitudes" of the Labour party "cost us blood".
Following that incident, Mr. Peres told Mr. Shamir that Mr. 
Sharon's statements sharply violated the principle of collective  
responsibility, and declared his intention to dismiss him from the 
government ( i t  should be recalled that the coalition agreement 
e x p lic itly  denied the Prime Minister his lawful right to dismiss 
ministers representing the other b lo c ).** Mr. Shamir's response was a 
threat to dissolve the NUG: "What is at stake here is the internal 
relationship within the government... we are talking about abiding by 
the coalition agreement" [Israel Radio, 14.11.85]. Mr. Peretz, Shas's 
In terio r Minister, offered his good services as mediator between Mr. 
Sharon and Mr. Peres, and eventually the Prime Minister agreed to 
accept a le t te r  of apology from Mr. Sharon; one cris is  was over.
*  When the NUG was but one month old, Mr. Sharon had already
suggested that Mr. Peres was financially  assisting the Arab sector 
(in  Israel proper), while denying resources from Jewish 
settlements in Judea and Samaria (NUG, 14.10.84). Several months 
la te r  he called both Mr. Peres and Mr. Rabin " lia rs  and 
hypocrites" (meeting with Herut ac tiv is ts , 21 .8.85). Mr. Peres 
immediately consulted with Mr. Shamir, on 23.8.85, and cris is  was 
averted for a while.
* *  Seven Labour ministers demanded in a caucus meeting (12.11.85)
that Mr. Sharon be dismissed - a move which, i t  was believed, 
would lead to early elections.
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The Prime Minister had no choice but to react strongly to Mr. 
Sharon's remarks, not only because of the personal insult involved, but 
also because he had to assert his position as chief spokesman for the 
NUG. By creating this c r is is , Mr. Peres sent a signal to King Hussein 
and others, le ttin g  them know that he rather than the right-wing Mr. 
Sharon controlled government policy. S t i l l ,  Mr. Peres stopped short of 
actually dismissing Mr. Sharon, explaining that "I only warned Mr. 
Sharon and did not f ire  him because we were implementing the emergency 
economic measures" [Haaretz, 3.10.86]. Yet another important reason for 
Mr. Peres not to dismiss Mr. Sharon was his fear of bringing down the 
NUG and probably losing cherished c re d ib ility  in the process, or rather 
proving the lack of i t .
On 7.9.86, yet another Peres-Sharon cris is  erupted when Mr. Sharon 
said that the te rro ris t attack on a synagogue in Istanbul, Turkey, was 
an inevitable outcome of Mr. Peres's misguided foreign policy of 
"begging for peace".* The Prime Minister demanded another le t te r  of 
apology, which was immediately forthcoming ( i t  seems that Mr. Sharon 
was well aware of the Arab saying, "There's no custom duty on words"). 
Mr. Sharon knew well that Mr. Shamir was anxious to assume the prime 
ministership a few weeks hence, which made i t  the wrong time to 
exacerbate relations within the Likud's leadership. A fter a l l ,  many of 
Mr. Sharon's provocative statements were aimed not exclusively towards
Mr. Sharon's apparently suicidal behaviour in the NUG seems to 
have had a logic of its  own. By risking dismissal, he was building 
up a reputation for toughness that somewhat deterred the NUG in 
general, and the Likud's ministers in particu lar, from adopting 
too moderate policy positions. [On "motivated irra tio n a lity "  see 
for instance Tsebelis, 1990, p. 156].
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Mr. Peres and the Labour party; he was also jockeying for position 
within the Likud, and he stood to lose a great deal by sabotaging 
rotation right now.* As i t  was, Mr. Sharon was able to fo r t ify  his 
personal position in the Likud. In February 1990, however, following a 
factional fight with Mr. Shamir, Mr. Sharon decided to resign from the 
government. His resignation accelerated the downfall of the next NUG in 
March 1990, as described in Chapter 8.
In 1986, relationships began to deteriorate between Prime Minister 
Peres and another Likud minister. Finance Minister Moda'i. Indeed, in 
the early days of the NUG, there were good and effective working 
relations between Mr. Peres and Mr. Moda'i, jo in t authors of the 
in i t ia l ly  successful economic recovery programme of July 1985. 
Following the success of the f i r s t ,  stabilisation stage, both Mr. Peres 
and Mr. Moda'i inevitably claimed credit for the programme, which 
inevitably led to p o litica l fr ic tio n  between them. On February 1986, 
when the national economy was supposed to move on to the next stage, 
economic growth, Mr. Peres put forward a number of new proposals 
without consulting f i r s t  his Finance Minister, "who was not relevant 
for this stage".** A furious Mr. Moda'i then le t  i t  be known that he 
was the Minister in charge of the national economy, not a mere clerk at
*  Mr. Sharon said that he personally negotiated the crises with Mr.
Peres, and that was why a compromise was found. I f  i t  was up to
Mr. Shamir, he might have found himself outside the NUG
[in terv iew ].
* *  Mr. Peres in caucus, 5.2.86. To achieve economic growth, Mr. Peres
suggested, for one thing, to allocate "10 percent of the savings -
400 m illion dollars - to investment" [Israel TV, 15.2.86].
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the back and call of the Prime Minister. Now the clash started 
gathering a real momentum.
On 4.4.86, in two d ifferen t newspaper interviews, Mr. Moda'i 
sharply attacked the Labour party and Prime Minister Peres. He charged 
that the Likud accepted the major economic portfolios in the NUG 
because Labour simply did not have any viable plan to deal with the 
alarming state of the national economy. As for Mr. Peres himself, "he 
knows nothing about economics" [Haaretz, 4 .4 .86 ], and "from now until 
rotation he is going to be a roving prime minister" [Hadashot, 4 .4 .86]. 
These insults provided Mr. Peres with a golden opportunity to remove 
Mr. Moda'i from o ffice . On 9.9.86, in a speech at the Labour party 
conference, Mr. Peres made public his intention to dismiss Mr. Moda'i. 
The Likud immediately charged that Mr. Peres has no authority to do so, 
under the coalition agreement - which was true enough, of course.
Mr. Peres responded that " it 's  true, this was the original 
agreement. [But] la te r on, a fter some tr ia ls  and tribu lations, we added 
another clause; a m inister's speaking out against government decisions, 
in vio lation of the coalition agreement, insulting another minister, 
insulting the Prime Minister, w ill lead to the breaking up of the 
government. The Likud has had an opportunity to challenge th is clause, 
[yet] no one challenged i t . . .  and i t  became a part of the agreement. 
The time to challenge this clause was when i t  was made... I f  I do not 
carry on with this [ i . e . ,  dismiss Mr. Moda'i] now, my word becomes 
worthless. The previous incident [Mr. Sharon's c ris is ] was resolved 
because i t  was the f ir s t  one, and there had been no rules beforehand. 
The current cris is  follows a clear precedent" [Israel TV, 9 .4 .86 ].
As a matter of fact, prior to April 1986 there had been scores of 
incidents which could have been interpreted as violations of collective
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responsibility. The encounter between Mr. Peres and Mr. Moda'i 
developed into a cris is  simply because the Prime Minister had wanted i t  
to become one. "This may have been Peres's p o litic a l rationale for 
securing the removal of Likud Finance Minister Mr. Moda'i, thus denying 
continuity to the minister who could claim a measure of the credit for 
economic stabilization" [Elazar and Sandler, 1990, p. 232].
At the beginning of the Moda'i c ris is , Mr. Shamir said: "Labour
broke the agreement. No reason for Mr. Moda'i to resign. The Likud w ill 
not participate in the NUG. Mr. Peres w ill have to go to the President 
and o ffer his resignation" [Israel Radio, 9 .4 .86 ]. A few days la te r , 
however, a compromise was reached whereby Mr. Moda'i, the Finance 
Minister, and Mr. Nissim, the Minister of Justice, changed portfolios. 
Mr. Shamir hastened to explain that "the Likud's duty, out of a sense 
of national responsibility, was to see to i t  that the NUG would 
continue to exist [even i f  i t  meant] to rearrange the government or to 
exchange ministries" [Israel Radio, 14.4.85].
A few months after being "relegated" to the Ministry of Justice, 
Mr. Moda'i had yet another clash with the Prime Minister. On 19.7.86, 
Mr. Moda'i said that he saw no reason to consult Mr. Peres on the 
appointment of a new Attorney General because he did know as much about 
law as on economics. Mr. Moda'i added that Mr. Shamir was going to be a 
better prime minister than Mr. Peres, and he w ill know how to "settle  
the accounts with Labour" [Israel Radio, 20.7.86]. This was the end of 
Mr. Moda'i's membership in the Peres government.* On 21.7.86, Mr.
*  At the time, there was some ta lk  about a possible Labour-Liberal 
alliance in the next Knesset. The Peres-Moda'i conflict 
effective ly  eliminated this eventuality.
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Moda'i volunteered his resignation, much to the r e l ie f  of Mr. Peres and 
more so to Mr. Shamir, who was then anxiously awaiting for rotation to 
take place in October 1986.
Mr. Moda'i was b itte r ly  disappointed with the Likud, which had 
not backed him up in his confrontation with Mr. Peres and allowed him 
to be victimised [interview]. Apparently, when the Likud had to choose 
between Mr. Moda'i and the survival of the NUG, i t  chose to carry on 
with the government formula. Mr. Moda'i, unlike Mr. Sharon, was simply 
not su ffic ien tly  powerful within his party. The Likud would not risk  
the rotation just to save Mr. Moda'i's p o litica l career. As i t  
happened, Mr. Moda'i was back in government a fter rotation, but he has 
never regained the p o litica l status he had had as Finance Minister.
Another Likud minister who has repeatedly crossed swords with 
Prime Minister Peres was Housing Minister Mr. David Levy. Ever mindful 
of his "natural" constituency, lower-class Sephardi groups, Mr. Levy 
constantly challenged the NUG's economic plan, which involved both 
price hikes and a freeze on sa laries .* In April 1985, for example, Mr. 
Levy attacked subsidy cuts which raised prices just before the Passover 
holiday. In the bickering that ensued, Mr. Levy used the by now usual 
threat - breakup of the NUG. Unlike Mr. Moda'i, and more lik e  Mr. 
Sharon, Mr. Levy did have enough clout within his party to make his 
threat look rea l, and Mr. Peres had to back o ff.
Already on 2.10.84, well before the NUG devised its  economic 
emergency plan, Mr. Levy had attacked the government's economic 
policy and resigned from its  negotiating team with the trade 
unions.
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All in a l l ,  the conflicts between the Labour Prime Minister and 
the Likud ministers were about "who runs the NUG". Essentially, Mr. 
Peres was successful in asserting his authority in a ll areas of 
a c tiv ity . However, he could not dismiss such Likud ministers as 
challenged him from fo rt if ie d  positions within th e ir party (Mr. Sharon 
and Mr. Levy), because he did not rea lly  have an option to form a 
Labour government with the small pivotal parties.
Intrapartv Politics
The prime m inisterial rotation agreement provides a useful perspective 
for the analysis of the interaction between intraparty and interparty  
po litics  in both Labour and the Likud, as i t  affected the maintenance 
of the 1984-86 NUG. Essentially, the order of the rotation between 
Labour and the Likud can explain the d iffe ren tia l intensity of 
intraparty p o litic s , while the fact of Mr. Peres and Mr. Shamir being 
personally named in the agreement accounts for the impact of intraparty  
po litics  on the performance of the NUG.
Intraparty po litics  was related to the sequence of the rotation in 
that holding the office of Prime Minister tended to squelch 
factionalism. Thus, in the pre-rotation period (1984-86) the Labour 
party was basically faction-free, whereas the Likud suffered from 
strong factionalism. The 1984-86 NUG seemed rather stable, and 
intraparty po litics  have not seriously affected its  modus ooerandi. 
because both Mr. Peres and Mr. Shamir have had a personal stake in its  
continued existence.
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This is rather striking nevertheless, because Labour at least has 
had good cause to launch an intraparty revolution, in view of the 
shockingly disappointing 1984 election results. The rotation agreement, 
however, made Mr. Peres the f i r s t  Prime Minister of the NUG, and 
furthermore he seemed to be doing rather well in th is job, so that few 
in Labour sought to argue with success. Moreover, the Prime Minister's  
main r iv a l, Mr. Rabin, was busy in the Defence Ministry (as Mr. Peres 
knew in advance he would be), while the threat from the popular but 
ineffectual Mr. Navon was easily neutralized. The result was that in 
the pre-rotation period, 1984-86, the Labour party behaved as a unitary 
actor in the po litics  of the NUG. The record shows that a ll Labour's 
ministers voted in unison on a ll the major issues submitted for 
government resolution.*
Unlike the Labour party, the Likud suffered from intense 
factionalism during the very same period, 1984-86, mainly because both 
Mr. Sharon and Mr. Levy only grudgingly accepted the seniority of the 
party leader, Mr. Shamir.** The two contenders for party leadership 
were particularly  angered by the personal naming of Mr. Shamir in the 
rotation agreement, which practically  secured his position as the 
chairman of the Likud, and neatly ruled out any prospect of intraparty
*  Disciplined voting should be expected of a social-democratic
party, especially as its  ministers met regularly prior to 
government sessions. The one exception was Mr. Rabin's abstention 
on the emergency economic plan, for proposed cuts in the defence 
budget.
* *  As noted e a rlie r, both Mr. Levy and Mr. Sharon had previously
attempted to replace Mr. Shamir, in September 1983 and in April
1984, respectively. Factionalism was also in tensified , needless to 
say, because of the elections defeat which had forced the party to 
share power with Labour.
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revolution against him. Nevertheless, the two challengers resolved to 
coordinate th e ir opposition to the leader, and in Herat's Conference 
in March 1986 they apparently succeeded in pushing Mr. Shamir into a 
minority position in the party he purported to lead.*
I t  was a curious situation, then, with the internal opposition 
having a majority but unable to translate i t  into a real p o litica l 
victory, which certainly wrought havoc within the party - much more so 
because the opposition could not unite behind a single candidate to 
replace Mr. Shamir, even i f  i t  were possible. O ff ic ia lly , then, Mr. 
Shamir remained the party leader, mostly by default. As rotation drew 
nearer, however, i t  did indeed have a moderating influence on this  
in fighting, since the internal opposition could not afford to bear the 
blame for fo ilin g  i t .  Even when Mr. Shamir found himself in serious 
p o litic a l trouble over the Shin-Bet a f fa ir , in June 1986, the 
intraparty opposition never tried  to block his way to the Prime 
M inister's o ffice in October.**
The peace issue seemed to have been the most effective ideological 
weapon in Likud's intraparty p o litics . Mr. Shamir, as party leader, had
* I t  was a stormy conference, marked by name calling and microphone 
grabbing, which nearly came to blows and f in a lly  fa iled  to 
conclude properly.
* *  Mr. Sharon actually supported Mr. Shamir over the Shin-Bet a ffa ir .  
Since he could not replace Mr. Shamir, he had to back him up so 
long as he could not see himself emerge victorious from the 
succession battle  in the Likud. Having already aligned himself 
with Mr. Shamir against a challenge from Mr. Levy in September 
1983, and then come back in April 1984 with a challenge of his own 
(which had fa ile d ), in March 1990, following the collapse of the 
NUG, Mr. Sharon again blocked a coup against Mr. Shamir by Mr. 
Arens and Mr. Levy.
- 260 -
to adhere to the NUG status formula on this subject, and occasionally 
even make a few concessions to Prime Minister Peres. This, of course, 
gave the internal opposition an opportunity to blame Mr. Shamir (as 
well as the Labour party) for being "too soft" on the peace issue, 
a lb e it rather strange for Mr. Sharon and Mr. Levy to accuse Mr. Shamir 
of "softness" on the peace issue: they had supported the Camp David 
Peace Accords in 1979, while Shamir had opposed them.
Due to a ll th is intraparty po liticking, the Likud fa iled  to behave 
as a unitary actor in the pre-rotation NUG. The party was half in and 
half out of government, and its  ministers did not vote in unison on 
major issues. In actuality , government during this period was the 
Labour party and Mr. Shamir's faction in the Likud, while the Sharon- 
Levy alliance was the opposition. However, this situation did not 
matter much as far as the NUG's modus ooerandi was concerned. I t  was 
Mr. Shamir's behaviour, dominated by the tantalising rotation  
agreement, that enabled the 1984-86 NUG successfully to deal with the 
major issues.
Small Parties' Delincuencv
Compared with the stormy confrontations between the Likud and Labour, 
and within the Likud i ts e lf ,  the ac tiv ities  of the small parties in the 
1984-86 NUG can only be regarded as a sideshow. S t i l l ,  several 
incidents involving the minor parties are worth discussing because they 
influenced the modus ooerandi of the NUG as a whole.
When Mr. Hurwitz of Ometz took sides with the Likud bloc on the 
Shin-Bet a ffa ir , i t  was rather surprising. To begin with, Mr. Hurwitz
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had joined government as a member of the Labour bloc, and i t  was 
expected of him not to cross the lines on such an important issue. 
Moreover, Mr. Hurwitz has had a consistent record of supporting public 
investigations of p o litic a l and security a ffa irs .*  What made him change 
his mind and support what amounted to a coverup of the Shin-Bet affa ir?  
At the time, Mr. Hurwitz claimed that he had sided with the Likud 
because he thought the interest of national security was at stake. 
Years la te r , however, i t  was revealed that Mr. Hurwitz support for the 
Likud on the Shin-Bet issue had been bought with a promise to secure 
his p o litica l future - well, perhaps one may call i t  a security 
in terest, a fter a l l . * *
On 28.6.86, Mr. Hurwitz signed a secret agreement with the Likud 
whereby he undertook to support Mr. Shamir on the Shin-Bet issue in 
exchange for two "safe" seats on the Likud's l is t  for the next general 
elections .*** Naturally, the agreement had to be kept secret because 
Mr. Peres was perfectly entitled  to dismiss Mr. Hurwitz, o f f ic ia lly  
s t i l l  a member of Labour's. After a l l ,  i t  is one thing to cross the 
floor on a specific issue, quite another thing to sign a defection 
agreement with the "enemy". To avoid suspicion, Hurwitz has kept
*  Back in the 1960's, he even risked his p o litic a l career by
supporting Mr. Ben-Gurion in the le tte r 's  demand for a public 
investigation of the Lavon a ffa ir .
* *  The "scoop" had been f ir s t  exposed in Hadashot in September 1988.
Subsequently, i t  was confirmed by several Likud leaders
[interview s].
* * *  In Is rae l's  P.R. electoral system, a "safe" seat means a placement
on a party's l is t  of candidates which fa lls  well within that
party's expected gain in the forthcoming elections. Thus, for both 
Labour and the Likud at the time, the f i r s t  30 placements were 
regarded "safe"; lower than that, uncertainty rapidly increased.
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attending Labour caucuses until April-May 1987, at which time he was 
f in a lly  able to explain siding with Likud for ideological reasons, 
relating to the peace issue. Mr. Hurwitz's defection exposed a down- 
and-dirty aspect of Is rae li coalition p o lit ic s .*  I t  also set up a 
precedent, in that never before had a minister defected from one 
p o litic a l bloc to another. In the context of an NUG based on parity  
between two opposing p o litic a l blocs, such a move was particularly  
disturbing. As of June 1986, the formal parity in the NUG did not 
rea lly  ex ist, even though Labour did not know i t .
I f  Labour's proto-coalition suffered from the loss of Ometz, the 
Likud's proto-coalition with the religious parties was basically kept 
in tact. Already in 1984 Mr. Abu-Hazeira of Tami had been promised an 
additional four-year term in parliament for sticking with the Likud 
bloc. The religious Morasha l is t  was allowed to maintain its  cabinet 
position within the Likud bloc despite a s p lit in its  ranks in 1985.**
Also, the Likud leadership prevented an attempt by one of its  junior
ministers, Mr. Katsav, to merge the Labour and Social A ffairs
portfolios in March 1985, because the religious Agudat Israel objected 
to such a move.*** Indeed, due to the tight inter-bloc competitive
*  Mr. Hurwitz says he expected Labour to avoid rotation; th is , in
addition to his general tendency towards the Likud's policy 
positions, made him sign up with the Likud [in terview ]. He did not 
explain, however, why he has kept i t  a secret for a long time.
* *  Morasha had two MK's a fter the elections; one of them s p lit and
le f t  the coalition, the other stayed in the government to set a 
new record: one man, one vote, one portfo lio .
* * *  Agudat Is rae l's  Mr. Porush had only the t i t l e  of Deputy Minister 
for Social A ffa irs , but in fact he had fu ll m inisterial powers. 
His objection to the merger was therefore quite understandable.
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situation, the Likud had to make rather heavy concessions in order to 
keep the religious parties within the fo ld.
In the context of the NUG, not only the Likud but also Labour 
wanted to maintain an ongoing dialogue with the pivotal religious 
parties. This made unacceptable behaviour by the religious parties 
readily forgivable. In December 1985, for instance, an unprecedented 
event occurred when the ultra-orthodox Agudat Is rae l, a coalition  
partner, f ile d  a no-confidence motion because of the establishment of a 
branch of the Mormon Bingham Young University in Jerusalem. Needless to 
say, the Aguda got away with this flagrant vio lation of government 
collective responsibility.
In th e ir bewilderment, both Labour and the Likud considered 
seeking legal advice from the Attorney General on the following absurd 
question: What to do with a coalition partner who f ile s  a motion of no- 
confidence against the government? Only in the context of a bipolar 
national coalition could such a question come up at a l l .  I t  seems that 
Is rae li coalition po litics  can sometimes test credulity to its  lim its , 
and the suspension of d isbelief is a necessary tool of po litica l 
analysis.* F inally , since neither the Likud nor Labour wanted to create 
an unnecessary cris is  with Agudat Is ra e l,* *  lest the delicate balance
*  See Rubinstein, Kirkpatrick Forum, pp. 32-33.
* *  Agudat Israel seems to have calculated its  moves quite w ell. I t
was problematic enough for this anti-Z ion ist party to be a member 
of the coalition (which is the reason why i t  had declined 
membership in the government proper). To be a member of a 
coalition which suffered Mormon missionary ac tiv itie s  (as the 
ultra-orthodox public saw i t )  to go on in Jerusalem, was too much. 
By proposing no-confidence, the Aguda was able strongly to express 
its  objection without suffering any consequences.
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of the NUG be frustrated, the matter was allowed to go by. The motion, 
incidentally, was defeated, and the university was b u ilt .
The Politics of Rotation
The implementation of the prime m inisterial rotation was never taken 
for granted. "Since implementation of the rotation agreement required 
that the coalition government survive for two years, i t  was uncertain 
whether the exchange would actually take place. The exchange was also 
dependent on the good w ill of the f i r s t  to hold the premiership, Peres, 
who had both the incentive and the a b ility  to fo il i t  by refusing to 
relinquish the position to Shamir" [Horowitz, 1990, p. 223]. I t  was 
th is uncertainty of rotation which gave Labour an effective p o litica l 
edge in the struggle to control the NUG's policies. During the 1984-86 
period. Labour played rotation p o litics .
The effectiveness of this rotation po litics  was related to the 
simple fact that Labour had less to fear from the breakdown of the NUG, 
compared to the Likud. I f  government was to collapse. Labour would 
s t i l l  hold the position of prime minister, which means controlling the 
core of p o litic a l power. "Rotation served as a c r it ic a l organizing 
event in the structure and operations of the unity government due to 
the pivotal role of the office of the prime minister in the Israe li 
system of government and in the p o litica l process" [Yanai, 1990, p. 
184].
Aware of its  disadvantageous position, the Likud was hesitant to 
use the mutual veto arrangements of the NUG to block Labour's po litica l 
in it ia t iv e s . Any such attempt was lik e ly  to fo il rotation. In other
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words, each Issue Labour put on the NUG agenda was essentially attached 
to the issue of rotation, and the Likud had simultaneously to relate to 
both the issue at hand and to the issue of rotation. Since the Likud 
could not deal with each issue separately. Labour achieved a dominant 
position in interparty bargaining.* In the 1984-86 period. Labour 
exploited its  bargaining advantage to the h i l t  in order to secure 
p o litica l victories on such major issues as the question of Lebanon, 
the economic emergency plan or the Taba dispute. Also, Labour forced 
the Likud to choose between the p o litica l career of Finance Minister 
Mr. Moda'i and rotation. The Likud chose rotation.
The success of Labour's rotation po litics  was reflected by the 
fact that i t  did have a very strong impact on the behaviour of Likud 
ministers. Mr. Sharon claimed that "the prospect of rotation made i t  
d if f ic u lt  for us to organize effective opposition to Labour's policies" 
[interview ]. Mr. Moda'i asserted that "for two years we could not 
calculate our moves without factoring in our fears that rotation might 
not take place" [interview ]. And Mr. Nissim put i t  quite simply: 
"rotation was hanging over our heads" [interview ]. The Likud leader, 
Mr. Shamir, was naturally most highly sensitive to the issue of 
rotation, and took extra care not to provide Mr. Peres with any excuse 
not to implement i t .  "Shamir, anxious to keep the rotation agreement 
and succeed Peres as prime minister, was therefore obliged to accept 
many of Peres' dictates" [Elazar and Sandler, 1990, p. 225].
*  On the advantages of simultaneous bargaining in a multi-issue 
situation, see for instance D ix it and Nalebuff, 1991, pp. 295-6.
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Mr. Shamir's personal conduct s ign ificantly  contributed to the 
operative capabilities of the NUG. He recognized the rules of the 
"rotation game", and no less important, by his nature he could play 
second fiddle rather w e ll.*  Put together, the objective need to resolve 
the burning issues of a bankrupt economy and a m ilita ry  quagmire, the 
po litics  of rotation played ever so s k il lfu lly  by the dynamic Mr. 
Peres, and the patient equanimity of Mr. Shamir, a ll contributed to the 
"problem-solving" performance of the NUG. Contrary to expectation from 
a government subject to such heavy constraints on its  decision-making 
mechanisms, the 1984-86 NUG functioned rather e ffec tive ly .
Rotation contributed to the effective modus ooerandi of the NUG by 
serving as a tie-breaker in the Labour-Likud stalemate prescribed by 
the coalition agreement. Actually, i t  was rather safe for Prime 
Minister Peres to apply rotation po litics  to non-ideological issues, 
estimating that the Likud would back o ff i f  pushed hard enough. Coming 
to the ideological issues that sharply divided the two parties, 
however, the use of rotation po litics  seemed rather dangerous. On the 
peace issue, for example, Mr. Peres could not push the Likud too hard 
without risking a dissolution of the NUG formula.** Of course, even Mr. 
Shamir himself could not appear too eager to cooperate with Labour,
*  Even Mr. Peres acknowledged: "I don't think Mr. Shamir acts lik e
an alternative Prime Minister" [interview, Yediot Ahronot. 
21.12.84].
* *  Years before, because of disagreements over the peace issue,
Gahal, the Likud's precursor, le f t  the 1967-70 national coalition.
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les t he be accused of abandoning major Likud princip les.* No doubt, 
the lim it was one-sided decisions on the peace issue. Perhaps Mr. Peres 
could s t i l l  have remained Prime Minister even i f  the Likud le f t  the NUG 
because of a bold Labour peace in it ia t iv e , provided the small religious 
parties would support him. This, however, was too much of a risk , which 
he did not dare take. Mr. Peres wanted to play brinkmanship, but not 
fa ll  o ff the brink.**
Apart from the peace issue, rotation p o litic s  was not effective in 
relation to some personal issues. Thus, for example, when Labour put 
the Likud on the horns of a dilemma, forcing i t  to choose between Mr. 
Sharon and rotation, the Likud preferred Mr. Sharon. S im ilarly, the 
Likud won the vote on the Shin-Bet a ffa ir  when Shamir's po litica l 
career was at stake.
I t  appears, then, that rotation po litics  did have its  lim its . I t  
certainly gained for Labour a number of p o litic a l v ictories, but Mr. 
Peres was unable to cross a well-defined lin e , in terms of ideology and 
personalities. Labour's rotation po litics  was also circumscribed by the 
need to play a " fa ir  game" with the Likud, as a coalition partner in a 
government based on parity. The principle involved was expressed by Mr. 
Shamir himself; "During his term as prime minister, the incumbent 
should exercise restra in t. He should refrain  from taking advantage of
*  Mr. Shamir did stand by the Likud's positions, regardless of 
rotation p o litics , in opposing an inquiry into the Lebanon fiasco, 
in opposing Mr. Weizmann's o ffic ia l v is it  to Egypt, and in 
supporting pardon for members of "the Jewish underground".
* *  I f  "brinkmanship is thus the deliberate creation of a recognizable 
risk , a risk that one does not completely control" [Schelling, 
1960, p. 200], rotation po litics  was a controlled risk , not 
brinkmanship.
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his position in order to force on his partners a policy that is 
unacceptable to them" [Kirkpatrick Forum, p. 154]. I f  Labour was to 
appear "unfair" in pushing the Likud too hard, i t  might have destroyed 
the national coalition and suffered losses in terms of p o litica l 
c re d ib ility  - always a problematic issue for Labour. Moreover, such a 
behaviour was bound to incur an electoral cost, especially as the NUG 
formula was becoming rather popular with the general public .*
All in a l l ,  the advantages and lim itations of rotation po litics  
created a mixed pattern of conflict and cooperation between Labour and 
the Likud. Both parties exercised brinkmanship, but very carefully. 
"Almost every major decision by the government was preceded by tense 
p o litic a l maneuvering, sometimes in an atmosphere of cris is . 
Eventually, a ll the crises were resolved, usually to the satisfaction  
of Prime Minister Peres" [Horowitz, 1990, p. 228]. Mr. Shamir 
grudgingly allowed Mr. Peres his victories because of rotation, but 
only so long as they could not be interpreted as "Likud sellouts".
F inally , b itte r ly . Labour implemented rotation simply because 
there was no way out. Hypothetically, having established himself as a 
successful prime minister (through rotation p o lit ic s ), Mr. Peres could 
have used the trump card of early elections. Such a p o litic a l move, 
however, involved a degree of uncontrollable risk . In such elections 
Labour could have been defeated on the ground of lack of c red ib ility
Opinion polls conducted in 1985-6 showed an overwhelming support 
for a NUG over any other kind of government: 59% to 66% of a ll 
respondents in polls conducted in 1985 and 1986 preferred an NUG. 
See for instance Dahaf polls of April 1985, March 1986, September 
1986.
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and fairness for dodging rotation. The other option, a narrow-based 
Labour government without the Likud, was only theoretical, because the 
pivotal religious parties were unwilling to cooperate with Labour 
against the Likud. Under these circumstances, the most Mr. Peres could 
do was to exploit rotation po litics  to its  maximum lim its  until 
rotation day - which was exactly what he did.
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Chapter Seven
Status Quo vs. Early Elections 
Bipolar Coalition Politics, 1986-88
The dynamism characteristic of the 1984-86 period came to an end with 
rotation in October 1986, when Mr. Shamir became Prime M inister, and 
the po litics  of status q u o  became the dominant theme of the NUG. This 
was the outcome of the reduction in the level of cooperation and the 
concomitant increase in the level of competition which now became the 
hallmark of the Likud-Labour bipolar coalition p o litic s . The dominance 
of the po litics  of status q u o  has been closely associated with the 
increasingly important role played by an Inner Cabinet based on mutual 
veto arrangements, where interparty conflictual bargaining was mainly 
conducted.
The Institution of Mutual Veto
The Formation of the Inner Cabinet
One institu tion  which most fa ith fu lly  reflected the basic idea behind 
the formation of the NUG was the Inner Cabinet. This p o litic a l body 
emerged from the need fe lt  by both major parties to secure a complete 
parity , amounting in effect to mutual veto arrangements, at the
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executive leve l. To guarantee a balanced NUG, a unique internal organ 
was set up, whose membership was equally divided between the two 
partner-opponents. Clause 1.14 of the 1984 coalition agreement 
stipulated that "A permanent m inisterial committee, called the Inner 
Cabinet, w ill be established. I t  w ill have 10 members, five  from each 
party".
The creation of a 5:5 internal p o litic a l organ within the 
framework of the NUG suggested a tw o-tier national executive: the 
government plenum and the Inner Cabinet. This apparently complicated 
structure was, however, inevitable: a government plenum consisting of 
25 members, which furthermore could not provide to tal parity between 
the two leading parties, was just too cumbersome. For the possibility  
of mutual veto to exist at a l l ,  a perfectly balanced Labour-Likud 
p o litic a l organ was required. Moreover, the government plenum included 
many small parties, and the two large parties wanted an exclusive club 
of th e ir own. After a l l ,  the NUG was "their" government, not that of 
the minor parties .*
The issue specifically associated with the formation of the Inner 
Cabinet was the development of Jewish settlement in the occupied 
te rr ito r ie s , on which Labour and the Likud were sharply divided. In the 
government plenum, at least 13 out of 25 - the whole Likud bloc plus 
the NRP - were pro-settlement, and 12 members of the Labour bloc, at
I t  is also possible that, given the p roc liv ity  of confidential 
information to leak out to the press from any large-scale 
p o litic a l forum in Israe l, i t  was fe lt  that a ten-member body 
would be more controllable, whereas a 25-member forum would be as 
good as a press conference.
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the most, were anti-settlem ent.* Obviously, the Labour party could i l l  
afford to be in a 12:13 minority position at the government plenum on 
such a major issue. Consequently, i t  suggested the formation of a 
smaller Labour-Likud body based on absolute parity in which the pro­
settlement NRP, which enjoyed a pivotal position in the NUG, was not 
represented.
The formation of a smaller internal organ within the framework of 
the larger NUG could also be ju s tif ie d  in terms of numbers alone. 
Theoretically, at least, a smaller body could improve the decision­
making process by imposing order and efficiency on an unwieldy 
government structure and membership. Moreover, an exclusive Labour- 
Likud internal organ could become the focus of the interparty  
ideological encounters, thus enabling the government plenum to 
concentrate on executive and departmental duties, free of p o litica l 
bickering.
All the above considerations notwithstanding, the Inner Cabinet 
was f ir s t  and foremost a "tool to ensure veto power for each of the two 
main blocs over "core value" decisions" [Elazar and Sandler, 1990, p. 
223]. "Both camps in the 1984 NUG acquired veto power over major policy 
issues through the equally divided 10-member inner cabinet, which could 
be called upon by each of them to make a binding decision" [Yanai, 
1990, p. 183]. In other words, the idea was to ensure that never would 
either large party find its e lf  in a minority position on a major policy 
issue.
One of Labour's group of 12 ministers, Mr. Hurwitz of Ometz, was a 
po litica l "hawk" whose position on this particular issue could not 
be taken for granted, as witnessed by his eventual defection.
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Certainly, the Inner Cabinet could make new decisions, but i t  also 
could as i t  often did - "decide not to decide". Thus, the existence of 
the Inner Cabinet not only tended to prevent the formulation of one­
sided new policies, but also strengthened the p o litic a l status q u o  by 
making i t  rather d if f ic u lt  to bring about changes in existing policies. 
This situation gave the Likud a b u ilt- in  advantage, since i t  was its  
policy that became frozen in this way. In a way, the formation of the 
Inner Cabinet symbolized both the po litics  of mutual veto and the 
po litics  of status q u o . Only when both parties could agree on a new 
policy, or else when one party was s p lit in ternally , could the status 
QUO be change. Put simply, the Inner Cabinet provided the large parties 
with a "safety net" to protect th e ir basic interests.
Actually, in the bargaining which led to the formation of the 1984 
NUG, the Inner Cabinet was f i r s t  conceived of as a committee to 
coordinate coalition a c tiv itie s , rather than an authoritative p o litica l 
body.* I t  was supposed to deal with the interpretation of the coalition  
agreement, determine membership of m inisterial committees, set up 
various government mechanisms and so forth. Later on, i t  was mutually 
agreed that the Inner Cabinet would also deal with a lim ited number of 
sensitive Labour-Likud issues. Only when the coalition agreement was 
f in a lly  signed, however, was i t  realized that the Inner Cabinet was 
granted more p o litica l authority than orig inally  antic ipated.** S t i l l ,
*  Mr. Shachal and Mr. Nissim, interviews
**  By the law of connected vessels, this authority was taken away 
from the government plenum, for which reason some party leaders 
(on both blocs), realizing they were not going to be members of 
the Inner Cabinet, objected to the very idea.
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i t  was not until Labour-Likud relations started to deteriorate, causing 
many issues to be referred to the Inner Cabinet, that its  dominant 
status was fu lly  realised.
For the f i r s t  seven months, the NUG operated without an Inner 
Cabinet, during which time i t  adopted major decisions on the withdrawal 
from Lebanon and on economic policy - important, but non-polarizing 
issues. In April 1985, however, a Labour-Likud clash over a v is it  to 
Egypt of Minister without Portfolio Mr. Ezer Weizmann occasioned the 
f i r s t  meeting of the Inner Cabinet.* The demand came from the Likud, 
which feared that Prime Minister Peres was u n ila te ra lly  trying to 
dominate NUG foreign policy. I t  thus served as a reminder to Mr. Peres 
(who t i l l  then enjoyed a majority in the government plenum and used i t )  
that the NUG was a Labour-Likud coalition, not a Labour government. 
S t i l l ,  the activation of the Inner Cabinet served Mr. Peres's purposes 
in at least one respect: he would now have a tool with which to block 
the Likud's settlement policy. After a l l ,  this was the reason why 
Labour came up with the idea of an Inner Cabinet in the f i r s t  place.
The activation of the inner cabinet was approved in the NUG on 
28.4.85 by an overwhelming majority. Two ministers voted against, 
and two abstained - a ll members of the Labour bloc, none a 
candidate for membership.
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The Composition o f the Inner Cabinet
Intraparty po litics  within the two parties, especially in the Likud, 
dictated to a large extent the very size of the Inner Cabinet. The five  
Likud representatives were: Mr. Shamir - the party leader; Mr. Arens, 
Mr. Levy and Mr. Sharon - the leaders of the three main factions; and 
Mr. Moda'i - the leader of the Libaral wing.* The five  Labour members 
were: Mr. Peres, the party leader; Mr. Rabin, the alternative party 
leader; Mr. Navon, the Sephardic former President; Mr. Ber-Lev, the 
party's Secretary General and a Peres lo ya lis t; and Mr. Weizmann of 
Yachad, who had secured for Labour the leg is la tive  "blocking coalition" 
which paved the way to the NUG.**
The Likud actually suggested a larger Inner Cabinet - 6:6 instead 
of 5:5 - in order to a llev ia te  its  complicated factional situation. The 
sixth member was supposed to be Mr. Nissim, a Liberal factional leader. 
In Labour there were many w illing  candidates for the Inner Cabinet, 
such as Mr. Ya'acobi, Mr. Shachal or Mr. Gur. Mr. Peres, however, was 
not eager to enlarge the Inner Cabinet and insisted on a membership of 
ten at the most.*** I t  is possible that Mr. Peres re a lly  wanted i t  to
* Subsequently, Mr. Nissim replaced the dismissed Mr. Moda'i, who
returned to the NUG after the rotation, but had to wait until the 
resignation of Mr. Arens before he could jo in the Inner Cabinet 
again.
* *  Mr. Weizmann was the only member of a small party allowed to join
the Inner Cabinet. Eventually, he joined the Labour party.
* * *  Following the 1988 elections, as we shall see, the Likud was
strong enough to force a 6:6 Inner Cabinet.
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be a more e ffic ie n t decision-making forum. Besides, he had l i t t l e  
reason to help the Likud solve its  factional problems. I t  was 
suggested, however, that Mr. Peres did not want to add a sixth Labour 
member to the Inner Cabinet and thus build him as a potential national 
leader, who may eventually threaten his top party position.*
I t  is worth noting that i f  o rig ina lly . Labour's group in the Inner 
Cabinet seemed a cut above that of the Likud (in terms of m ilitary  
record, for instance. Labour had two former Chiefs of General S taff, 
Mr. Rabin and Mr. Bar-Lev, and one General, Mr. Weizmann, against the 
Likud's one General, Mr. Sharon). The picture has changed, however, 
with the passage of time. In Labour, while both Mr. Peres and Mr. Rabin 
have kept enjoying a strong po litica l and public standing, the 
p o litica l stature of the remaining three clearly deteriorated. 
Relatively ineffective government performance, coupled with the never- 
ending Peres-Rabin struggle within Labour, tended to suppress the
upward mobility of these leaders. By contrast, in the Likud a ll Inner 
Cabinet members have gained in experience and stature during the
life tim e of the NUG. Not only Mr. Shamir, Mr. Arens, Mr. Sharon and Mr.
Levy of Herut, but also Mr. Moda'i and la te r Mr. Nissim of the Liberal
wing have became well-respected national leaders. Their prominence was 
related to an effective performance in government as a whole, and to a 
re la tive ly  open pattern of leadership mobility in the Likud.
This according to Mr. Ya'acobi, who claims to have been promised 
by Mr. Peres to become Labour's sixth member, and thus is not 
without an axe to grind [interview].
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The Modus Ooerandi o f the Inner Cabinet
The Inner Cabinet has de fin ite ly  become the key p o litic a l institution  
throughout the existence of both Israe l's  NUGs, up until 1990. I t  was 
empowered, according to the coalition agreement, to deliberate and 
decide on the following: (1) issues within the ju risd iction  of the
m inisterial defence committee; (2) foreign policy, defence and 
settlement issues, as incorporated in the Basic Guidelines for the 
government; and (3) any other issue, including those issues stipulated 
by the Basic Guidelines, which the Prime Minister or the Deputy Prime 
Minister wish to raise for deliberation and decision by the Inner 
Cabinet. In other words, no issue was outside the Cabinet's hegemonial 
ju risd iction .
S t i l l ,  i t  was not so much the wide scope of issues, but rather the 
p o litica l status of the decisions adopted by the Inner Cabinet which 
gave this institu tion  its  uniquely powerful standing. F irst and 
foremost. Cabinet decisions were made legally  equivalent to government 
decisions; hence, there was no need for the plenum to approve Cabinet 
decisions - or even be aware of them, since i t  was specifica lly  stated 
that the Cabinet (in the person of either Prime Minister or Deputy 
Prime Minister) may decide not to bring an issue discussed there to the 
knowledge of the plenum. Nor was the Cabinet required to forward to the 
plenum issues on which i t  fa iled  to decide. I f  and when informed, 
government ministers could submit th e ir reservations to the Prime 
Minister; yet no such reservation could delay, much less prevent, the 
implementation of the decision in question. F inally , either the Prime 
Minister or the Deputy Prime Minister could un ila te ra lly  remove an item
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from the agenda o f the government plenum to th a t o f the Inner Cabinet.
The above arrangements make i t  clear that the Inner Cabinet was 
much more than a mere m inisterial committee on security and foreign 
a ffa irs , in that i t  did not have - unlike any ordinary m inisterial
committee - to report to the government plenum. I t  was in effect a
supreme executive organ, with no foundation in Is rae li law .*
The Inner Cabinet was then an authoritative "super government", 
set up through a p o litica l compromise which turned a blind eye to legal 
considerations. Its  decisions were fin a l, and the right to appeal them 
was legally  vague and p o lit ic a lly  hopeless. Because of these legal- 
constitutional problems, there had been, o rig ina lly , a Labour-Likud 
"gentlemen's agreement" not to convene i t  often, or rather to do so 
only i f  i t  was absolutely necessary.** In re a lity , however, the Inner 
Cabinet was very active and was convened rather regularly, having 
proven its e lf  to be the only effective decision-making organ in a
system which saw the relationships between its  major components
deteriorating rather than improving with the passage of time.
I t  is worth noting that the intensive a c tiv itie s  of the Inner 
Cabinet created a problem for the small parties which were not 
represented in i t .  Their exclusion from the Inner Cabinet suggested 
that they were not fu ll partners in the decision-making on central 
issues. To enable the small parties to participate in discussion and
*  On the constitutional problems relating to the Inner Cabinet see,
for instance, Kotler, 1988(A), pp. 38-44.
* *  When the Inner Cabinet was f i r s t  formed. Prime Minister Peres
promised to convene i t  only i f  the NUG's very existence was in
danger.
- 279 -
decision. Labour and the Likud preferred, whenever possible, to refer 
issues for resolution to the government plenum, not to the Inner 
Cabinet, since the broader the deciding body, the greater the public 
legitimacy of the decision. There was however a f l ip  side to this coin: 
much as the religious parties were unhappy with th e ir  exclusion from 
the Inner Cabinet, i t  s t i l l  allowed them to exercise more voting 
freedom in the government plenum. Mr. Burg of the NRP and Mr. Peretz of 
Shas, in particular, would probably have been more cautious and 
consistent in th e ir voting behaviour, had they been members of the 
Inner Cabinet.
Government Collective Resoonsibilitv
In setting up an Inner Cabinet, an hierarchical national executive was 
created in which not a ll ministers were equal: members of the Inner 
Cabinet were "senior" ministers, and the others were "junior" 
ministers. This unprecedented situation, which made most members of the 
government - not by th e ir own w ill - spectators rather than fu ll 
actors, inevitably constituted a problem in the sphere of government 
collective responsibility. This principle means, at least im p lic itly , 
that government members be regarded as "equal" in most respects. When 
not a ll the members are equal, not even in theory, how can they be 
equally responsible for government policy?
Many important decisions were adopted by the Inner Cabinet, many 
of which were never discussed, or even adequately reported to the 
government plenum. As i t  happened, "junior" ministers often heard about 
the deliberations and decisions of the Inner Cabinet from the news-
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media.* The government plenum was regarded by some as more of a rubber 
stamp than a decision-making body. Appeals or reservations to Inner 
Cabinet decisions were dealt with by the Inner Cabinet i ts e lf ,  not the 
government plenum. This was, in fac t, the core of the problem of 
government collective responsibility.
The Pollard a f fa ir * *  in 1987, which involved Israe li espionage 
ac tiv itie s  in the United States, best demonstrated the general attitude  
to m inisterial co llective responsibility in Israel as relating to the 
m ultiple-tiered NUG. The C larification  Committee appointed by the Inner 
Cabinet stated in its  report that responsibility for the a f fa ir  lies  
with the government as a whole. This made l i t t l e  sense. I f  a ll 
ministers were equally responsible, i t  practically  meant that not one 
of them was. Mr. Peres, who was Prime Minister when the spying 
operation had been authorized, indeed thought that no one at the 
p o litica l level should be held responsible: "In England they caught 
four extremely dangerous agents... Maclean, Philby, Fuchs, Burgess... 
who for years sat in the heart of British intelligence. Did anyone ask 
questions about m inisterial responsibility?" [Israel TV, 22.4.87].
The absurdity of the whole situation was best reflected by the way 
the Commission's report was handled. Following its  endorsement by the 
Inner Cabinet, the report was brought to the government plenum on 
27.5.87 for endorsement - without giving "junior" ministers a chance to 
read i t .  In other words, "junior" ministers were asked to assume
* When the Inner Cabinet was set up, Mr. Burg of the NRP asked for 
an observer status, explaining he could not fu lly  rely on 
information leaked from its  closed sessions...
* *  This a ffa ir  w ill be dealt with more extensively below.
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responsibility for an a ffa ir  they knew nothing about. Prime Minister 
Shamir promised them only that they would be allowed to read the report 
after its  endorsement by the government... Mr. Ya'acobi had this 
comment: "I do not run away from my responsibility - apart from the
Pollard case, which the government did not discuss, did not get 
information about; I am against this for moral reasons" [Kirkpatrick 
Forum, p. 97] This was indeed an Orwellian scene, without precedent in 
the history of governments in Is rae l. I t  could only have happened, of 
course, because there was an Inner Cabinet, a "super government" on top 
of a "regular" government.*
Was the Inner Cabinet Reallv Necessary?
Whichever party held the office of the prime minister, i t  v irtu a lly  
controlled government policy. In 1984-86, most issues were resolved to 
the satisfaction of Prime Minister Peres; in 1986-90, Prime Minister 
Shamir dominated the NUG decision-making process. I f  each prime 
minister, in his turn, enjoyed a majority in the government plenum, why 
have an Inner Cabinet? The reason was, of course, that without th is , or 
a sim ilar arrangement, there would not have been an NUG. I t  was the 
mutual veto arrangements within an authoritative Inner Cabinet 
(particu larly  with respect to the number one issue on the po litica l 
agenda, the future of the occupied te rr ito rie s ) which made possible a 
Labour-Likud cooperation in a national coalition.
On many issues, security matters included, the government had 
th ree -tie rs . There was yet another "forum" on top of the Inner 
Cabinet, as related below.
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In almost six year of the existence of national coalitions, Labour 
benefited more than the Likud from the in stitu tio n  of Inner Cabinet. 
Even in 1984-86, when Mr. Peres was Prime M inister, Labour has derived 
some advantages from the operation of the Inner Cabinet, such as
blocking decisions on the establishment of new settlements in the
occupied te rr ito r ie s . From the end of 1986, when Mr. Shamir became 
prime minister, until the downfall of the NUG formula in early 1990, 
the Likud had a b u ilt- in  majority of three to five  votes in the 
government plenum, and Labour certainly needed then the "security net" 
of the Inner Cabinet. In other words. Labour enjoyed a potential veto 
power long a fter i t  had become a minority party in both parliament and 
government.*
I t  was precisely because of Labour's overall weak p o litica l 
standing that the Inner Cabinet began to wield more authority and
power, while the government plenum was relegated to the role of a 
g lo rified  debating society. I t  was Labour's equal status in the Inner
Cabinet ( i .e .  its  veto power) which gave a real meaning to its  
membership in the NUG. The most a veto power could secure for Labour, 
however, was a po litica l status q u o . This was not satisfactory to the 
party which, unlike the Likud, wanted to change the way things were. 
Labour's "solution" was to ignore the Inner Cabinet's mutual veto 
arrangements and pursue its  own policies u n ila te ra lly , mainly on the 
peace issue (th is  was a major reason for the collapse of the NUG 
formula in March 1990).
The 1988 NUG is discussed in detail in the next chapter
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The "Prime Ministers Forum"
The Inner Cabinet, with its  mutual veto arrangements, was a formal 
institu tion  designed to deal with conflictual issues. In order to 
prevent interparty conflicts from tearing the NUG apart, however, there 
was also a need for an informal conflict-reducing in s titu tio n . In 
Is rae l, "kitchen cabinets" have been a long-standing trad ition  observed 
by a ll the coalition governments, and the NUGs were no exception. 
Throughout th e ir existence, a top level informal grouping, which at 
f i r s t  was called "the Prime Ministers forum" and la te r  "the forum of 
four", has operated on more or less regular basis.
Since the NUG was in essence a bipolar Labour-Likud government, i t  
was only natural that the two leaders, Mr. Peres and Mr. Shamir, should 
meet regularly to discuss major issues on the p o litic a l agenda. As of 
September 1984, there was "the informal institu tion  of Friday morning 
meetings between Peres and Shamir to coordinate, and i f  necessary 
bargain over, controversial issues" [Elazar and Sandler, 1990, p. 223]. 
This "institu tion", however, was short-lived. The problem with the 
Peres-Shamir meetings was that the two leaders basically did not trust 
each other and therefore could not, by themselves, create a proper 
mechanism for the management of the NUG. This was why Defence Minister 
Rabin, a former prime minister, joined the two leaders to set up the 
"Prime Ministers Forum".
When relations between Mr. Peres and Mr. Shamir were s t i l l  
agreeable, there was a fa ir  dialogue between Labour and the Likud and 
the NUG functioned properly. However, the deterioration in the Peres- 
Shamir relations sharply reduced the level of the interparty
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bargaining, to the detriment of the NUG as a whole. Already in early 
1986 there were a few Labour-Likud meetings to discuss whether there 
was any common ground between them, apart from the need jo in tly  to deal 
with economic issues at a time of c r is is .*  After rotation in October 
1986, and particularly  as of May 1987, when the Inner Cabinet had 
rejected Mr. Peres's peace plan - the "London Document" - the two party 
leaders were hardly on speaking terms, and the NUG was actually 
functioning as a "split-personality" government. I t  was then that Mr. 
Rabin stepped in; his a b ility  to relate to Mr. Shamir was the adhesive 
force which kept the shaky 1984 NUG formula a live .
With the formation of the 1988 NUG, the Likud's Foreign Affairs  
Minister Mr. Arens (a Shamir a lly ) was "o ffic ia lly "  added to the tr io  
Shamir-Peres-Rabin, in what became known as "the forum of four." There 
were a few attempts to enlarge the membership of the "forum" from four 
to six, by adding the two Deputy Prime Ministers, Mr. Levy of the Likud 
and Mr. Navon of Labour, but they fa iled . A 6-member top caucus 
appeared too large to deal with sensitive issues. Moreover, Mr. Shamir 
had no interest in making his party riva l Mr. Levy a permanent member 
in such a caucus, while Mr. Peres fe l t  no real urge to promote Mr. 
Navon's p o litica l career.**
*  One such meeting took place on 21.2.86 with the participation of
more than 10 government ministers from both sides.
* *  The promise to be made a member of the "forum" caused Mr. Levy,
who favoured a narrow-based Likud government, to support the 
formation of an NUG following the 1988 elections. Also in February 
1990, when Mr. Sharon resigned from the NUG, Mr. Levy was promised 
to become a member of the "forum", in exchange for supporting Mr. 
Shamir in the Likud's intraparty p o litic s . Neither promise was 
fu lf i l le d .
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In terms of modus ooerandi. the "forum" koth resolved interparty  
differences and formulated policies. The "forurm" was thus both a 
p o litic a l and a functional caucus, consisting o f the top o ffic ia ls  of 
the NUG: The Prime Minister, the Defence Minister* the Foreign Affairs  
M inister, and the Finance Minister. Being i  small and intimate 
grouping, where no leaks of secret information were lik e ly , the "forum" 
seemed ideal for "invisible" p o litic s , i e . handling sensitive 
security, diplomatic and p o litic a l issues, lo formal decisions were 
made in this informal caucus, "just some ideas were exchanged" and "a 
few understandings were reached".* Even though the "forum" did not 
formally produce any new p o litic a l decisions, i t  produced policy 
directives on a number of issues where the members shared a common 
in te re s t.**  Needless to say, once an "understanding" was reached in the 
"forum" on a specific issue, its  approval by the Inner Cabinet or the 
government plenum could be taken for granted.
This state of a ffa irs  has added yet another dimension to the 
already acute problem of government collective responsibility. I t  
meant, in e ffec t, that the NUG was a th ree -tie r government: a "forum" 
with four firs t-c lass  ministers, an Inner Cabinet with another eight 
second-class ministers, and a government plenum with additional, th ird - 
class ministers. Now legally , there may arise a situation in which 
several top ministers are authorised by the plenum to deal with a
* Mr. Rabin, interview. A sim ilar view was expressed by Mr. Shamir 
[Israel TV, 31.10.85].
* *  Such mutual understandings occasionally led to fiascoes, as 
witness the Shin-Bet a f fa ir , the Pollard a f fa ir , the arms deal 
with Iran and the transfer of funds to the Contras in Nicaragua.
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lim ited number of issues for a lim ited period of time;* but th is was 
not at a ll the case here. Rather, the "forum" took charge of any issue 
at any time i t  wished to do so. The Pollard a f fa ir , for example, was 
handled almost exclusively by the "forum". Members of the Inner Cabinet 
knew very l i t t l e  about i t ,  and ministers in the government plenum knew 
nothing.** Constitutionally, i t  was an intolerable state of a ffa irs .
For a ll the po litica l and professional experience of Messrs. 
Shamir, Peres, Rabin, and Arens, th e ir performance as a team was far  
from impressive.*** The level of coordination among them was rather 
poor, and the advice they were given on certain issues was bad. The 
four top leaders certainly did a much better job at th e ir own 
individual ministries than in th e ir role as the "apex" of the NUG. The 
deterioration of interparty relations in the NUG could certainly  
provide an "objective" explanation for the weakness of the "forum". 
S t i l l ,  its  very existence, and particularly  the Shamir-Rabin alliance, 
reduced tensions within the NUG, kept the government formula in tact, 
but could not change its  status q u o  p o litics .
*  Specific assignments and lim ited authority were given, for
example, in 1974 to Mrs. Meir and Messrs. Dayan and Eban to
negotiate with Syria about the Golan Heights in 1974.
* *  Mr. Ya'acobi: "On security issues, 1 must admit that even the
Inner Cabinet did not know everything" [interview ].
* * *  There had been effective senior teams (Prime M inister, Defence
Minister and Foreign A ffairs Minister) in the history of Israe l's  
governments: Messrs. Eshkol, Dayan and Eban during the 1967 War; 
Mrs. Meir and Messrs. Dayan and Eban during the 1969 War of 
A ttritio n  and the 1973 War; Messrs. Rabin, Peres and Allon during 
the 1976 Entebbe Operation; and Messrs. Begin, Dayan and Weizmann 
during the 1979 Camp David ta lks. All these seem to have 
functioned better than the "forum" of the NUG. The senior team 
consisting of Messrs. Begin, Sharon and Shamir, however, which ran
the 1982 Lebanon War, was by far the worst.
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The Days of Yitzhak Shamir. 1986-88
In October 1986, Mr. Shimon Peres handed over the Prime Ministership to 
Mr. Yitzhak Shamir, as per the coalition agreement. The NUG now entered 
a completely new phase, in which its  modus ooerandi was greatly 
changed.
The Non-Polarizing Issues
Economic Policy
On the eve of the October 1986 rotation, the Likud rejected Labour's 
suggestion to nominate Mr. Peres as the head of an "economic cabinet", 
signifying increased interparty conflict over economic policy in the 
post-rotation NUG. Labour has had some good reasons to try  and secure a 
stronger influence on economic matters in a government where the Likud 
held the most important economic portfo lios, including that of the 
Finance Minister. Moreover, Labour held the major "spending" portfolios 
- such as Defence, Education and Health - which badly needed the 
support of the Treasury. In addition. Labour fe l t  responsibility to 
certain sectoral economic interests - v illage cooperatives and 
collectives and economic concerns a f f i l ia te d  to the trade union 
movement; most of them were in poor financial shape and could not be 
salvaged without government money, which could not be expected to come 
readily from Likud-controlled m inistries. F ina lly , the July 1985
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emergency economic plan had put the national economy on the road to 
recovery and Labour, having already claimed credit for the great 
achievement, wished to remain involved.
These considerations created some Labour-Likud tensions soon after  
rotation was implemented. When Finance Minister Mr. Nissim prepared the 
f i r s t  budget for Mr. Shamir's government without consulting the trade 
unions, b itte r  interparty accusations were exchanged during the 
marathon government sessions of December 1986 and January 1987. 
Labour's Defence Minister Mr. Rabin, for example, extremely annoyed 
with proposed cuts in the defence budget, said: "Those who got us into 
the Lebanese quagmire and the economic cris is  that faced us when the 
NUG was established, now want to solve the problem by a cut in the
defence budget. Not a chance" FMa'ariv. 18.12.86]. The Likud in turn
reminded Labour how its  disastrous policies led to the 1973 War. Such 
accusations notwithstanding, the matter did not assume cris is  
proportions; Prime Minister Shamir hastened publicly to promise that 
the "unity government is not threatened by the economic plan" [Israel 
TV, 21.12.86].
I t  was Finance Minister Nissim who tried  to diffuse interparty
tensions on economic issues, and he did i t  rather s k il l fu l ly .  Some of
his decisions, regarded by members of his own party as "pro-Labour", 
irked the ire  of some of his colleagues. The end result was that Mr. 
Nissim enjoyed the cooperation of Mr. Peres, and Labour as a whole, in 
the preparation of the budget for 1987/1988, which was readily approved 
by the NUG. Prior to the 1988 elections, Mr. Nissim categorically  
refused to pursue pre-electoral economic policies. So in final 
analysis, contrary to e a rlie r expectations, the economic policy of the 
post-rotation NUG did not serve to polarize Labour-Likud relations.
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The Pollard A ffa ir
In March 1987 a Jewish o ffice r in the U.S. Naval In telligence, Mr. 
Jonathan Pollard, was convicted and severely sentenced a fte r confessing 
to espionage for Israe l. The public exposure of the a f fa ir ,  which 
caused incalculable damage to one of Is rae l's  most valuable assets - 
the special relations with the U.S. - raised in Israel demands for an 
investigation. At f i r s t ,  the government refused to conduct any form of 
inquiry into the matter, but as a result of strong pressures both in 
the U.S. and in Israe l, Prime Minister Shamir reluctantly agreed. The 
investigation, however, was not entrusted with a jud ic ia l Commission of 
Inquiry, as defined by law, but with a "c la rific a tio n  committee" with 
no legal foot to stand on and very lim ited au thority .*
The two-member "c larifica tio n  committee" came to the conclusion 
that the operational level was essentially to blame for any misconduct 
in the Pollard A ffa ir. The four ministers who were involved in the 
a ffa ir  (Messrs. Peres, Rabin, Shamir, and Arens) were cleared of any 
wrongdoing. Immediately upon receiving the committee's report. Prime 
Minister Shamir summoned a special session of the government plenum, on 
27.5.87, to endorse i t .  Even though the report had not been read by 
members of the government, as related above, i t  was confirmed by 14 
votes in favour, 3 against and 4 abstentions. "In the Pollard case... 
both the decision-making and implementation processes were carried out
* The so called Tsur-Rottenstreich Committee included two prominent 
public figures and concluded its  findings in two weeks.
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smoothly, since a ll the major leaders fe l t  themselves threatened" 
[Elazar and Sandler, 1990, p. 231].
Needless to say, the way the whole a f fa ir  was handled was not 
endorsed wholeheartedly by a ll segments of the p o litic a l spectrum. Even 
Knesset members representing the coalition rebelled against their  
leaders and adopted a unique resolution which set up a parliamentary 
committee of investigation, headed by Mr. Abba Eban, to look into the 
p o litic a l handling of the a f fa ir . This committee, at its  own 
in it ia t iv e , investigated various aspects of the issue, and its  probing 
discussions were fu lly  covered by the news media. In its  conclusions, 
the parliamentary committee ascribed heavy responsibility to a ll the 
ministers of the "forum", especially to Mr. Peres who was Prime 
Minister at the time. Mr. Peres tried  to b e lit t le  the results: "The 
honourable committee in not a jud ic ia l commission... I do not expect i t  
to issue a legal conclusion. I t  does not consist of ju r is ts . I t  can 
offer an opinion, as i t  should, regarding policy. I do not think any 
crime was committed here ... this a ffa ir  took place without the approval 
of the p o litica l echelon" [Israel TV, 22.4.87].
I f  Mr. Peres found himself in trouble because of his party 
colleague Mr. Eban, he received some support from Mr. Shamir. The Prime 
Minister declined to accept demands made by some Likud Members of 
Knesset to launch a smear campaign against Mr. Peres using the Pollard 
A ffa ir  for leverage. He seemed to have fe l t  that he was also somewhat 
responsible to what had happened. Besides, Mr. Shamir probably 
remembered Mr. Peres' supportive attitude towards him in the Shin-Bet 
a ffa ir  a year before. I t  seems that on security matters, there was an 
interparty understanding, especially between the top leaders. "No major 
party played the role of determined opposition; rather, both Likud and
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Labour cooperated 1n Investigating these matters in subdued and 
mutually protective ways" [Arian, 1988, p. 19].
The Pollard A ffa ir  was the one major issue in the post-rotation 
period which saw close cooperation between the top leaders of the Likud 
and Labour, at a time when overall interparty relations were 
deteriorating. I t  was a rare example of a nonzero-sum game, or actually 
a cooperative game in an overall zero-sum situation.
The Lavie Project
In the early 1980's, Israe l's  Aviation Industries (lA I) had launched an 
ambitious sc ien tific  and technological program, the centrepiece of 
which was a "state of the art" je t  figh ter. The project involved 
thousands of scientists and engineers, and was supposed to cost 
b illions of dollars. In 1985, Defence Minister Rabin expressed doubts 
as to the technological value of the project, as well as to Israe l's  
a b ility  to carry the financial burden.* Actually, the 1984-86 NUG could 
have put an end to the extravagance, but the then Prime Minister, Mr. 
Peres, was in a bind: more than anyone else, he has been associated 
with the development of Is rae l's  m ilita ry  industries, including lA I; on 
the other hand, he was well aware that the Lavie project has got out of 
hand.
I f  he was unable to make up his mind, the Likud's ministers were 
generally in favour of continuing with this national project (led by
In May 1985 and again in May 1987 Mr. Rabin said that the Lavie 
project was a "land mine" that cost a fortune. He also informed 
his colleagues that the U.S. administration opposed i t .
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ex-Defence Minister Arens, a former professor of avionics). Only in 
spring 1987 did a real opposition to the project begin to emerge. Most 
Likud ministers, mainly for nationalis tic  and prestigious reasons 
(typical of th e ir party's trad ition) supported the continuation of the 
project. On the other hand, most Labour ministers, chiefly for 
pragmatic and financial reasons (typical of th e ir party's trad ition) 
wanted to abandon the project and look for better yet cheaper 
a lternatives.*
Following months of public debate, the government plenum convened 
on 16.8.87 to decide on whether or not to continue with the Lavie 
project. Prime Minister Shamir, who controlled the agenda, resolved - 
after long hours of discussion - not to put the issue to a vote, for 
fearing that his pro Lavie position might be defeated. On 30.8.87, Mr. 
Shamir f in a lly  put the issue to a vote. On the eve of the voting 
session, the positions of the 24 ministers** were evenly divided: 12
ministers, mostly Likud, took a pro-Lavie position, and 12 ministers, 
mostly Labour, were in favour of discontinuation. There were, however, 
few important exceptions in both camps,*** and the issue could not be
* One such alternative was the F-16 je t  fig h te r. However, a majority
in the Inner Cabinet favoured the Lavie, at the time.
* *  The 25th minister,Mr. Rubinstein of Shinui, resigned in May 1987
following the Cabinet's rejection of the "London Document". He
would have probably voted against the continuation of the Lavie
project.
* * *  Since Finance Minister Nissim of the Likud, an Inner Cabinet
member, favoured discontinuation, Mr. Shamir could not bring the
issue for decision in this particular forum.
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perceived as a straightforward Likud-Labour encounter. When Prime 
Minister Shamir called on his ministers to show hands, he fu lly  
expected the result to be a 12:12 t ie .  Much to his surprise, however, 
the fina l outcome was anti-Lavie - 12; pro-Lavie - 11; abstention - 1.
I t  was Mr. Peres who managed to outmaneouvre Mr. Shamir through 
clever manipulations of both government agenda and voting procedures. 
His p o litic a l moves provide a textbook example of heresthetics - the 
art of p o litic a l manipulation.* I t  seems worth while to dwell for a few 
moments on the way Mr. Peres succeeded in defeating an apparently 
winning proposition.
Needless to say, Mr. Shamir decided to bring the issue to a vote 
at a time when he believed his position would certainly prevail. The 
expected 12:12 t ie  would have meant a victory for his pro-Lavie 
position, because the project was already underway, and the actual item 
on the agenda was a proposal to abandon i t ;  its  fa ilu re  to win a 
majority would have meant continuation. Therefore, for Mr. Shamir a 
12:12 t ie  was a rather satisfactory outcome. Not only was i t  good 
enough to win, i t  also did not involve too much arm-twisting and 
imposition of party discip line. The Prime Minister was seemingly 
heading for a comfortable, effortless po litica l victory.
On the other hand, Mr. Peres, who now led the anti-Lavie group, 
realized he was headed for a clear defeat, unless he found a way to 
change at least one minister's vote. To break the expected t ie ,  Mr.
Heresthetics is a term coined by Riker. Essentially, "heresthetic 
is about structuring the world so you can win" [Riker, 1986, p. 
i x ] .
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Peres could try  and change the position of Labour's Health Minister 
Mrs. Arbeli-Almozlino, who took the pro-Lavie side. To do i t  prior to 
the voting session, however, was risky for two reasons. F irs t, Mr. 
Shamir might have decided - as was his prerogative - not to bring the 
issue to a vote he was going to lose. Second, I f  Mr. Peres was to 
impose party discipline on Mrs. Arbeli-Almozlino, Mr. Shamir might have 
done the same to Mr. Peretz, Mr. Hammer and even Mr. Nissim, a ll of 
whom took the anti-Lavie side. Had party discipline been s tr ic tly  
imposed, the inevitable outcome would have been a decision in favour of 
the Lavie proposition.
Mr. Peres concluded, therefore, that i f  nothing could be done 
before the voting session, then something had to be done during the 
session its e lf .  He now had to display the timing of a trapeze a r t is t , 
and this he did. He waited until Mr. Shamir had put the issue on the 
agenda, and was now unable to withdraw i t .  Only then did Mr. Peres make 
his move. He asked for a b rie f recess and le f t  the room with his Labour 
colleagues for a caucus meeting, before Mr. Shamir could stop him or 
appreciate what was happening. In this way, Mr. Peres seized from Mr. 
Shamir the control of the agenda.
In the short but crucial Labour caucus, Mr. Peres applied fu ll 
pressure on Mrs. Arbeli-Almozlino to change her pro-Lavie position. He 
told the Minister that in his view the issue had turned into a pure 
Likud-Labour co n flic t, and i f  she voted with the Likud, she would cause 
Labour a real damage. In other words, the minister was urged to vote 
stra teg ica lly , rather than judge the immediate issue on its  merits, as 
i t  seemed to her. In other words, she was called to ignore short-term 
preferences for the sake of long-term goals.
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Completely taken by surprise, a bewildered Mrs. Arbeli-Almoznino 
could only ask p la in tively  why Mr. Peres had fa iled  to ta lk  to her 
beforehand. She was put in a most embarrassing position, having ea rlie r  
the same day stressed her commitment to the pro-Lavie position in radio 
interviews. For a few minutes the caucus listened to her complaints, 
and then a decision was reached: she would be allowed, as a face-saving 
formula, to abstain. At that moment the Lavie project d ied.* When 
Labour's ministers came back to the meeting room, Mr. Shamir realized  
he was out-foxed. At that particular moment, however, i t  was too late  
for him to do anything about i t .
Mr. Peres was not rea lly  in control of the agenda. However, he
wrestled i t  out of Mr. Shamir's hands at the right moment, forced a 
change of intended voting, and brought about an unexpected victory. The 
timing and the quick execution of this p o litica l maneouvre were the key 
to Mr. Peres's success.**
B r illia n t as this last-minute maneouvre was, however, i t  was the 
united opposition to the Lavie by two key ministers, the Finance 
(Likud) and Defence (Labour) Ministers, which actually decided the
issue. Following the vote, the chief pro-Lavie spokesman. Minister
without Portfolio Arens, decided to resign from the government.
*  Mr. Weizmann remarked during the session that "the burial of the 
Lavie project was preceded by a very expensive state funeral".
* *  The above account of the circumstances surrounding the vote on the 
Lavie project is based on interviews with three key figures: 
Labour's Mrs. Arbeli-Almozlino, the unwilling heroine of the day; 
the Likud's Mr. Nissim, who had planned the voting manipulation 
together with Mr. Peres; and Labour's Minister Mr. Ya'acobi, who 
attended the Labour caucus during the break in the government 
plenum session.
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claiming in a b ility  to share collective responsibility for this 
decision.* The Lavie project was the one major NUG issue over which 
Prime Minister Shamir found himself on the losing side. Secure in the 
knowledge that he was going to win the vote anyway, Mr. Shamir saw no 
need to impose party discipline on Finance Minister Nissim, and this 
was his undoing.
In sum, economic policy, the Pollard a f fa ir  and the Lavie project, 
problematic as they were, did not polarize relations between the Likud 
and Labour within the framework of the post-rotation 1984 NUG. This was 
not the case, however, with the major ideological issues.
The Polarizing Issues
The overall solution to the Middle East problem was the chief cause for 
polarized Likud-Labour relations in the post-rotation 1984 NUG. On two 
important aspects of i t ,  however, the two parties did find an 
acceptable modus ooerandi: Intifada and the Settlement issue.
In tifada: The Palestinian Uprising
Israel was taken by complete surprise when a road accident in the Gaza 
D is tric t, on December 9, 1987, triggered c iv il uprising (subsequently 
known throughout the world in its  Arabic name, In tifa d a l among the
* There was an attempt by Mr. Arens and Mr. Sharon to call for 
another vote on the Lavie, but Mr. Shamir ignored th e ir c a ll.
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population of the occupied te rr ito rie s . When the trouble started, 
Is rae li leaders demonstrated ingenuous wishful thinking in making 
themselves believe that this large-scale uprising is but a sporadic, 
short-lived aberration. Prime Minister Shamir s t i l l  talked about 
"disturbances" [Israel TV, 23.12.87] two weeks a fter they began, while 
the Mayor of Jerusalem Mr. Kollek optim istically observed that the 
"coexistence between Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem is not dead" FMa'ariv. 
9 .2 .88 ]. Defence Minister Rabin, the man d irec tly  in charge, did not 
bother to cut short a tr ip  overseas for another two weeks.
Having returned at las t, Mr. Rabin decided to adopt a "strong 
hand" policy, on which he was supported by the two major parties .* This 
policy included beefing up Israe l's  m ilita ry  presence in the 
te rr ito r ie s , the use of ingenious weaponry to fight street violence, 
arrests and deportations of Intifada leaders, and harsh measures 
against the general Arab population. The "strong hand" policy has 
severely harmed Israe l's  image abroad: the small nation that was David, 
has now become G oliath .** While Is rae l's  reputation was being 
tarnished, these strong measures have not proven successful. I t  was not 
that simple to put an end to a phenomenon that stemmed out of more than 
20 years of frustration and despair among the residents of the occupied 
te rr ito rie s .
*  The main opposition to Mr. Rabin's "strong hand" policy came from
the left-w ing parties. In January 1988 Mr. Daraussa, an Arab 
Labour MK, le f t  the party in protest over of Mr. Rabin's policy.
* *  Several Likud ministers suggested in February 1988 to prevent
foreign press from covering the In tifad a .
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At the end of March 1988, Likud MKs started for the f i r s t  time to
question Mr. Rabin's strategy against the In tifa d a . Specifically , they
claimed that his overall position of te r r i tory-for-peace had been a
major factor in the fa ilu re  to suppress the Palestinian uprising. Mr. 
Rabin, for his part, observed that only progress in the peace process 
could effective ly  put an end to the In tifad a . Naturally, the Likud's 
attacks on Mr. Rabin have increased as the 1988 elections were
approaching. These attacks created tensions between Labour and the 
Likud, the more so because until then Mr. Rabin has been a close a lly  
of Prime Minister Shamir, one of the mainstays of the NUG. Ultimately, 
the two parties unified behind the same m ilita ry  response to the 
In tifad a , mostly because neither could come up with a better answer. 
However, the Intifada as an unexpected p o litic a l development adversely 
effected the decision making process of the NUG, especially as the two 
parties had to ta lly  opposing views on the p o litica l implications of the 
Palestinian uprising.
The Settlement Issue
Prior to rotation, the Labour party had feared that when the Likud 
would assume the top position, i t  would establish, at a minimum, the 
number of settlements provided for by the coalition agreement, and i f  
only p o lit ic a lly  and financia lly  possible - many more. As i t  happened, 
the situation remained very much the same as in the pre-rotation  
period, and settlements in the occupied te rr ito rie s  have not become a 
dividing issue that seriously threatened the unity of the post-rotation  
NUG. Prime Minister Shamir fu lly  supported a pro-settlement policy, but
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he did not want to clash with Labour over th is issue - particu larly  not 
with Defence Minister Rabin.*
As a matter of fact, shortly a fter rotation the settlement issue 
did cause a Likud-Labour controversy. The Likud wanted public funding 
to be channelled to the establishment of more settlements, while Labour 
expected government funds to bail out the kibbutzim, which were in 
financial troubles. Labour's Mr. Peres stressed the economic dimension 
of the issue: "The distinction is not between kibbutzim and
settlements, but between the productive sector and service expenditure" 
[IDF Radio, 8 .2 .87 ]. The leaders of Gush Emunim (the settlement 
movement) suggested in reply that the kibbutzim constituted 
"floundering settlements".** At least in the economic front, the 
kibbutzim won out over the settlements, for they had more public 
support.***
As for the p o litica l dimensions of the issue, the Likud claimed 
that settlements in the occupied te rr ito rie s  contributed to the 
security of Israe l. By contrast. Labour's Defence Minister Rabin said 
that they had no particular security significance [Israel Radio,
24.2.87]. When the Intifada broke out, Mr. Rabin even suggested that 
the settlements in the te rr ito rie s  were "a heavy security l ia b i l i ty " ,  
because they interfered with m ilita ry  operations against the
* As Defence Minister, Mr. Rabin was in charge of the occupied
te rr ito r ie s , and thus had a strong influence over settlement 
policy, the NUG's o ffic ia l policy notwithstanding.
* *  S ettlers ' leader Mrs. Weiss, Ma'ariv. 19.3.87.
* * *  An opinion poll published in Davar (4 .3 .87) indicated that 42% of
the public supported giving unconditional assistance to the 
Kibbutzim.
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Palestinian uprising. The Likud and the fa r right-wing parties held the 
opposite view, namely, that the establishment of more settlements was 
the most effective response to the In tifad a .
The Intifada and the settlements, two separate yet related 
p o litica l issues, created Likud-Labour conflicts and constrained the 
government decision-making process. Their impact, however, was not as 
bad as that of the peace process issue, which has polarized, indeed 
paralyzed, the functioning of the post-rotation NUG.
The Peace Process
I t  was d if f ic u lt  enough to push forward with the peace process in the 
pre-rotation NUG; i t  became impossible to keep i t  moving in the post­
rotation government. As a matter of fact, most Likud Labour clashes 
over the peace process did not even focus around substantive issues; 
they simply could not overcome procedural hurdles, notably the so- 
called "international conference" problem.
Early in February 1987, Labour's Foreign Minister Peres was back 
from Europe and le t  i t  be known that he was going to push forward with 
a plan for an international conference as an opener for Arab-Israeli 
negotiation process.* When the Likud charged that he was not authorised 
to present such a plan without government approval, Mr. Peres reverted 
to his previous pretext, namely, that he had obtained his mandate to do 
so from the Knesset: "In October 1985 the Knesset resolved that direct
In general outline, this had been very sim ilar to the conference 
which eventually took place in Madrid in late  1991.
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negotiations may begin through an international forum. No one can annul 
the Knesset's resolution, whatever his rank. I had shown the text of my 
address to the Prime Minister [Shamir] in advance. The Knesset voted, 
and th is is binding" [Israel Radio, 11.2.87]. A few weeks la te r , back 
from a v is it  to the U.S., Prime Minister Shamir responded: " I t  is the 
cabinet that decides on implementing policy. I f  the Knesset is not 
satisfied with government policy, i t  can express no-confidence in the 
government" [Israel Radio, 25.2.87].
February 1987 saw the NUG tottering on the verge of collapse, even 
though Prime Minister Shamir found i t  d if f ic u lt  to admit i t .  Asked in a 
TV interview about the "feeling that currently two governments are 
acting in Is ra e l. . .  yours and that of Mr. Peres. Who is actually in 
control?" He replied: "That's an erroneous impression; there's only one 
government in Israel" [Israel TV, 24.2.87]. Mr. Shamir was right only 
in a s tr ic t formal sense: Mr. Peres was keeping under his hat a secret 
agreement he had made with King Hussein of Jordan on an international 
conference (the "London Document"). In April-May 1987, however, when 
many of the details of the "London Document" became known, the gale
became a storm and the existence of the NUG as a single collective unit
actually ended. Prime Minister Shamir said that the "idea of a
conference is crazy, suicidal" [Hatzofeh, 10.4.87], and Mr. Sharon
simply suggested that the international conference was "a deception" 
[Israel TV, 30.4.87]. The Likud was rea lly  furious with Mr. Peres, who 
strayed away from government policy and acted independently and 
secretly.
The Labour party blamed the Likud of spreading lie s  in an e ffo rt 
to torpedo the peace conference. "Mr. Shamir and his office engage in 
mudslinging and party politicking but Mr. Peres w ill not be dragged
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into a dispute" rHaaretz. 10.4.87]. Mr. Peres himself, responding to 
accusations of violating the coalition agreement which obliges him to 
cooperate with Mr. Shamir on issues of high policy, said: "There was a 
rotation in position. To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Shamir has no 
authority whatsoever to change the policy we pursued for two years, 
which included striving for direct negotiations via an international 
conference" [Israel TV, 22.4.87].
Essentially, Mr. Peres sought government approval for a tw o-tier 
peace plan: (1) An opening session with the participation of the United 
States, the Soviet Union, Jordan and Israe l; and (2) direct 
negotiations between Jordan and Israe l. He publicly threatened that i f  
the government rejected his plan, he would bring i t  down and seek early 
elections [Israel TV, 22.4.87]. On 13.5.87, Mr. Peres formally put his 
peace plan on the agenda of the Inner Cabinet. I t  was blocked through 
the 5:5 mutual veto arrangement, so that now the plan was o ff ic ia lly  
dead, i f  not buried. For Mr. Peres, the rejection of the "London 
Document" by the NUG was an overwhelming setback; in his view, i t  was a 
breakthrough comparable to the Camp David Accords, a giant step for the 
nation, for his party, and for himself.
P o lit ic a lly , the strategy chosen by Mr. Peres to maneouvre his 
peace proposal through the decision-making mechanism was wrong and 
self-defeating. To begin with, he should have brought Mr. Shamir into 
the picture from the very beginning. This was the only way the "London 
Document" could have taken o ff. A lternatively, prior to putting i t  for 
o ffic ia l resolution, Mr. Peres should have tried  to secure either a 
majority in the NUG for the peace proposal or, fa ilin g  that, a majority 
in the legislature for an early elections proposal. For Mr. Peres, not 
to secure a majority either in government or in parliament meant a
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double loss to the Likud. Having once proven himself a master of 
heresthetics, he now proved himself not to be a grand master.
The May 1987 Inner Cabinet impasse was clearly the end of the NUG 
as a unified national executive, and its  decision-making mechanism 
became paralyzed and stalemated.* Moreover, May 1987 signaled the start 
of an 18 months long election campaign, until November 1988. The 
contest was not between a party in government and a party in 
opposition, but rather between two supposed partners to the same 
coalition. Mr. Peres was both within government and without. Legally, 
he served in government under the "murderer of peace", as Mr. Shamir 
was called then in Labour parlance; p o lit ic a lly , Mr. Peres promoted a 
foreign policy the Prime Minister was dead-set against. This created an 
impossible s ituation .**
In the months following the May 1987 Inner Cabinet deadlock. Prime 
Minister Shamir and Foreign Minister Peres vied with one another for 
control over Israe l's  foreign policy. Mr. Shamir expressed his views 
against any te rr ito r ia l compromise, while Mr. Peres stuck to the 
formula of te r r i tory-for-peace. Mr. Shamir went to Washington and tried  
to explain that real peace could only be achieved through direct 
negotiations with the Arab countries. Mr. Peres travelled around the 
globe promoting the concept of an international conference, which was
* Interparty relations became so bad that occasionally issues such 
as drugs (2 .8 .87), funds for sc ien tific  research (13.9 .87), and 
the lik e , were put on the agenda in order to achieve a minimal 
level of national u n ity ...
* *  Mr. Peres could have resigned from the NUG when his peace plan was 
blocked and fight the Likud from the opposition bench. "Not 
losing" considerations made him stay in, as w ill be explained 
la te r  on.
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not o ff ic ia l government policy. The Prime Minister said angrily; "Had I 
believed then [1984], for a moment, that our partners might consider 
total withdrawal to the pre-June 1967 lines in the context of a peace 
agreement, I would not have entered into a partnership with Labour and 
would have preferred to go to a new election" [K irkpatrick Forum, p. 
150].
In October 1987, Mr. Peres established a precedent by calling upon 
the American Jewish community to intervene in the p o litic a l debate in 
Israel and apply pressure on the government to accept the idea of an 
international conference. This ran against the grain of a tradition  
according to which world Jewry is expected to support the policy of 
Is rae l's  government of the day, and not become involved in party 
p o litic s . Mr. Peres implied that since the well-being of the Jewish 
state is a matter of concern for a ll Jews, the nature of the peace 
process "should be discussed by the entire Jewish world"* [NUG session
1.10.87].
Some real support for Labour's peace proposals came from the peace 
in itia tiv e s  of the U.S. administration in 1988. In fac t, the United 
States government basically supported the formula of t e r r i to ry -fo r- 
peace, which coincided with Labour's ideas. Each time the Americans 
came up with a new in it ia t iv e . Labour was provided with an opportunity 
to attack the Likud's rig id  positions. In March, for instance. Labour
Calls for outside interventions in Is rae l's  domestic po litics  are 
often p o lit ic a lly  costly, because they are interpreted as
unpatriotic. The same reaction Mr. Peres received when, in January
1988, he came up with a suggestion to make the Gaza strip  an
international neutral zone.
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used the peace in it ia t iv e  of Mr. Schultz, the U.S. Secretary of State 
(which was not accepted by the government as a whole), to accuse the 
Likud of increasing the likelihood of a new Arab-Israeli war.* Needless 
to say, in his v is its  to Jerusalem as well as in meetings in 
Washington, Mr. Schultz negotiated separately with Likud and Labour 
leaders about the ways and means of getting Israe lis  and Arabs around 
the same ta b le .. .
The American peace in it ia t iv e  served the Labour party in yet 
another important way. I t  provided its  leaders with a good excuse not 
to leave the NUG even though its  status q u o  policy was to ta lly  
unacceptable to them. Labour could explain that i t  stayed in the NUG in 
order to try  and change its  peace policy with a l i t t l e  b it of help from 
its  Americans friends. The U.S. administration, for its  part, could not 
exert too much pressure on the Israe li government to accept new peace 
in it ia t iv e s , because 1988 was an election year both in Israel and in 
the U.S. Besides, 1988 was the f i r s t  fu ll year of In tifa d a , which 
intensified the r ig id ity  of Prime Minister Shamir's position, under 
strong pressures from Mr. Sharon and the right-wing Techiya party.
Labour's peace policy, the "London Document", which was formally 
dead since May 1987, was fin a lly  buried in August 1988, when King 
Hussein of Jordan acknowledged the PLO's exclusive authority to 
determine the future of the occupied te rr ito r ie s . The Likud used the
The U.S. came up with quite a few ideas to advance the peace 
process. In February 1988 Mr. Murphy, U.S. Assistant Secretary of 
State, toured the Middle East to discuss such concepts as 
"international opening", "interim agreements", "accelerated 
autonomy" and "unilateral autonomy".
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opportunity to suggest that the "London Document" had never been a 
serious peace proposal in the f i r s t  place, while Labour began to think 
that perhaps the Palestinians were the appropriate people to ta lk  with 
about peace.* These developments made the divisions in the NUG even 
more apparent, and the November 1988 elections have become a head-on 
Labour-Likud fight on a single issue: the peace process.**
In conclusion, the national agenda has changed completely with 
rotation. "After the f i r s t  NUG [1984-86] resolved or at least 
stabilized the two major crises in security and economic a ffa irs  that 
had confronted i t  upon taking office two years e a rlie r , the incentives 
for consensus decision making were removed" [Elazar and Sandler, 1990, 
p. 231]. Once the common Labour-Likud agenda was essentially exhausted, 
the long-standing po litica l divisions between these two partner- 
opponents reappeared, to frustrate the government decision making 
process.
One should note that i t  is a rather typical feature of national 
coalitions that th e ir a b ility  to produce new policies is seriously 
impaired once the emergency conditions which brought about the ir
*  The parliamentary opposition followed suit: the Techiya party used 
the opportunity to call for annexation of te rr ito r ie s , whereas the 
left-w ing parties called on the government to recognize the PLO.
* *  In the 1984 NUG, the peace process was basically a media a ffa ir :  a 
lo t of issues were thrown up in the a ir , but no real progress was 
made. Bearing in mind the Israe li configuration of p o litica l 
forces, real progress can come about in two ways only: either the 
Likud might be persuaded to change its  policies (possibly under 
extreme duress), in which case i t  w ill enjoy widespread support 
across the p o litica l spectrum, or Labour w ill have su ffic ien tly  
solid majority to resist strong objections verging on c iv il 
disobedience, i f  not worse, from the Likud and the right wing.
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formation disappear. This phenomenon was witnessed, for example, in the 
1945-66 Austrian grand coalition. Until 1955, the common desire to 
achieve p o litic a l independence and economic reconstruction played an 
important role in securing consensus p o litic s  and a high level of 
interparty cooperation. Once the p o litica l and economic situation in 
Austria was stabilized, however, the OVP-SPO disagreements became more 
salient and frequent. This added yet another constraint to the already 
complex decision-making mechanism, adversely effecting the proper 
functioning of the national coalition [Dreijmanis, 1982, pp. 237-259].
Personal Issues
Generally speaking, the collegial relationship between Likud and Labour 
ministers sharply deteriorated a fter the prime m inisterial rotation in 
October 1986. One major reason was that once the Likud had assumed 
control of the NUG, Labour had nothing to look forward to. When Mr. 
Shamir became Prime Minister, Labour ministers - ch iefly  Mr. Peres - 
came to view the NUG as "his" government, not "th e irs" .* In the post­
rotation period there were probably more fierce clashes between the two 
partner-opponents in government than between the coalition and the 
opposition. The post-rotation government was one in which the Prime 
Minister wished the worst of luck to his Foreign Minister in his
I f  in 1984-6 collective responsibility was a problem of "tuning 
the instruments" in the coalition orchestra, in 1986-88 there were 
two conductors.
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missions abroad, fearing he was conducting a "private" po licy .* Never 
before had the hope that a cabinet minister should fa il  in representing 
the nation abroad been voiced so loudly, even by the parliamentary 
opposition.
The Likud accused Mr. Peres of behaving as i f  he was an 
alternative Prime Minister and blamed him for refusing to play second 
fidd le , as Mr. Shamir did in 1984-86. Such a situation, i t  was argued, 
was bound to create chaos and anarchy. Mr. Peres remained unruffled: 
" it  behooves those who had brought upon us in fla tion  and the Lebanon 
war to be a b it more modest" FMa'ariv. 1 .8 .87]. Likud MKs again and 
again called on Mr. Shamir to dismiss Mr. Peres. Even Labour's Defence 
Minister Rabin, the key figure of the post-rotation NUG, was critic ized  
by the Likud. Interparty relations worsened to such an extent that, in 
March 1988, the Likud parliamentary faction set up a committee to 
examine the possibility of forming a narrow-based Likud government.**
For a ll these Likud-Labour skirmishes, Mr. Shamir was able to 
contain himself: throughout his period as Prime M inister, he never 
dismissed a single Labour minister. He did not want to create crises 
that would possibly cause the downfall of the NUG. Mr. Shamir 
maintained p o litica l control, was content with the status quo, and
*  Haaretz and Jerusalem Post. 6.4.87, quoted senior Labour party 
o ffic ia ls  as saying that there was no reason to go on with the NUG 
after Mr. Shamir had expressed his hope that Mr. Peres would fa il  
in his o ffic ia l v is it  to Spain.
* *  I t  was clear in advance that this move, suggested by Mr. Sharon 
and Mr. Moda'i, both previously dismissed by Mr. Peres, could not 
succeed (the religious parties would not take part in bringing 
down the NUG). But i t  served well the dual purpose of fighting  
Labour and simultaneously embarrassing Prime Minister Shamir.
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could afford to ignore what he viewed as an uncoilegial behaviour by 
Labour's ministers headed by Mr. Peres.*
Intrapartv Politics
Intraparty po litics  have come to play a more prominent role in the 
post-rotation NUG, and had a strong impact on the modus ooerandi of the 
government. Compared with the pre-rotation period, a noticeable change 
was evident in the Likud, where the intensity of factionalism was 
substantially reduced. Mr. Shamir was now Prime Minister and naturally  
enough his intraparty position improved, especially as he was 
constantly attacked by the Labour party. Moreover, he s k il lfu lly  
managed both to fight and s p lit his intraparty opposition.** With the 
final unification of the Likud - the merger of Herut's and the 
Liberal's central committees in August 1988 - Mr. Shamir achieved a 
majority in his party's organs, which fa c ilita te d  intraparty tru ce .***  
The most
* I t  seems that the ir d iffe ren tia l attitudes to verbal abuses by 
ministers from the other party re flec t as well as anything else 
the personality differences between the dynamic, high-strung Mr. 
Peres and the sto lid  Mr. Shamir.
* *  The alliance between Mr. Sharon and Mr. Levy was fra g ile  not only
because both leaders aspired to the top position in the Likud, but
also because Mr. Sharon was apparently more ideologically  
oriented, whereas Mr. Levy seemed more office  oriented. Mr. Shamir 
knew how to use these differences to his advantage.
* * *  Mr. Shamir's faction seemed to have benefited from the merger with
the Liberals, even though in a 3,000 member central committee i t
is impossible accurately to assess the exact strength of each 
faction before i t  comes to an actual vote.
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te llin g  indication of Mr. Shamir strengthened position was the fact
that, unlike in 1984, neither Mr. Levy nor Mr. Sharon challenged him
for the leadership of the Likud prior to the 1988 elections.
I f  factionalism in the Likud, before and a fte r rotation, did not 
seriously impair the smooth functioning of the government, post­
rotation developments in the Labour party contributed much to the 
demise of the NUG as a national executive. Interestingly enough, the 
source of the conflict in the Labour party could be found in the 1984 
rotation agreement, which secured for Mr. Peres only two years as Prime
Minister, while Mr. Rabin was guaranteed a fu ll four year term as
Defence Minister. As explained e a rlie r , th is arrangement seemed useful 
enough for Mr. Peres at the time; but with the implementation of the
rotation agreement in 1986, Mr. Rabin became Labour's most senior
minister, and despite his preoccupation with the In tifa d a , he did find 
time to use this powerful p o litica l position in his ongoing struggle 
with Mr. Peres. Moreover, Mr. Rabin has developed a strong p o litica l 
alliance with Prime Minister Shamir, which further weakened the 
p o litic a l status of Mr. Peres within the framework of the NUG. The 
effect of these developments was that Mr. Peres, previously number one
in both the Labour party and the NUG, found himself in the post­
rotation era as number two to both Mr. Shamir and Mr. Rabin.
These new circumstances were unacceptable to Mr. Peres, who now 
decided to pursue early elections as a means for both destroying the 
NUG formula and undermining Mr. Rabin's position in the Labour party.*
Despite th e ir r iv a lry , Mr. Peres and Mr. Rabin joined to defeat a 
revolt by younger party members in the election of Labour's 
candidate to the Jewish Agency chairmanship (December 1987).
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As intended, this policy created a sharp conflic t with the Likud and 
put Mr. Rabin on the proverbial horns of a dilemma. Thus fa r , Mr. Rabin 
had employed a mixed strategy of competition and cooperation with the 
Likud in the NUG, but now he was forced to decide between party and 
government - to go along with Mr. Peres or be accused of having too 
close relations with the Likud. Since Mr. Rabin assessed that he could 
not defeat Mr. Peres within the Labour party, he had no choice but to 
acquiesce with the strategy of constant fr ic tio n  with the Likud which 
resulted in a paralyzed NUG. The nearer the elections, the more 
intensive became the interparty conflict in itia ted  by Mr. Peres, which 
tended to augment his intraparty status. Three consecutive electoral 
defeats notwithstanding, Mr. Peres managed to lead Labour uncontested 
into the 1988 elections.*
The Small Parties
Intraparty po litics  in the small parties also had an impact on the 
performance of the 1986-88 NUG. Developments within the NRP, for 
instance, affected the relationships between the two leading p o litica l 
blocs in the NUG. Theoretically, such a possib ility  always existed 
since in the 25-member government plenum, the single NRP member was not 
included in the 12:12 Labour-Likud parity arrangements. In the pre­
rotation period the NRP representative, Mr. Burg, showed no
Mr. Rabin did not challenge Mr. Peres also because he was content 
with his cabinet post. He therefore ignored his supporters who 
urged him to try  and assume leadership of the party.
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predilection for either bloc in his voting pattern, so that basic 
parity was not frustrated. But the prime m inisterial rotation happened 
to coincide with an internal power struggle within the NRP, the net 
result of which was that the middle-of-the-road Mr. Burg was replaced 
by the nationalist Mr. Hammer, who mostly voted with the Likud bloc, 
for ideological as well as personal considerations.* In this way, the 
NUG eventually turned out to be more of a Likud government than a 
Likud-Labour national executive.
The withdrawal of the small Shi nui party from the government in 
the post-rotation period also contributed to the deteriorating status 
of the Labour party in the NUG. Shinui was the only le ft-o f-cen tre  
party which joined, a lbeit reluctantly, the Labour party into the NUG 
in 1984. Already at rotation time in October 1986, a factional fight 
within Shinui almost forced the party out of the NUG. When the 
government rejected the "London Document" in May 1987, Shinui quit the 
NUG, leaving Labour in a clear minority position.**
*  Mr. Burg's faction had led the NRP during the decades of "historic 
partnership" with Mapai/Labour. Mr. Hammer headed the younger, 
nationalistic  faction which has always favoured closer relations 
with the Likud. Following this internal s h ift , the NRP was 
regarded by some as the religious equivalent of the Techiya party.
* *  Following its  withdrawal from the NUG, Shinui together with ILP 
and several prominent public figures tried  in vain, in July 1987, 
to form a liberal centre party. Later on i t  joined a left-wing  
bloc with the CRM and Mapam.
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The Politics of Early Elections
In 1986-88, the Likud's adherence to the p o litics  of status q u o  - the 
avoidance of any new decisions - seemed to serve its  current p o litica l 
goals and was compatible with the conservative personality of Mr. 
Shamir, now the Prime Minister. Status q u o  po litics  was also
strengthened by the fact that many existing NUG policies were actually 
Likud policies, having been formulated at the time when the party had 
been solely in government. On the other hand, the Labour party was 
unhappy with the status q u o  and wished to force changes in NUG policy. 
For that purpose. Deputy Prime Minister Peres had to find an
alternative po litica l tool to the po litics  of rotation which served him 
so well in 1984-86. He chose the po litics  of early elections. In
coalition terms, this strategy represented a change of Labour's 1984 
bargaining logic, deriving its  rationale from changes in public opinion 
polls.
Soon a fter rotation in October 1986, Mr. Peres expressed in
several p o litic a l gatherings his view about the urgent need for early 
elections.* The frequency and conviction with which he referred to the 
subject created the impression that he had fu lf i l le d  the rotation 
agreement not least because he believed he could soon be able to force 
early elections, which would hopefully result in a Labour government
* For example, in a meeting of Labour's ministers on 8.2 .87 , and the 
next day in Labour's parliamentary faction.
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headed by himself. The intent to regain for Mr. Peres the position he 
had recently vacated was discussed only in private, however.* Publicly, 
the call for early elections was connected to the peace process.
Labour explained that only an international conference could bring 
King Hussein into the peace process, and that negotiations with Jordan 
were included in the basic guidelines of the 1984 coalition agreement. 
Thus, Labour claimed, i f  the Likud interpreted the coalition agreement 
d iffe re n tly , the best way out of the impasse would be to ask the 
voters' opinion, and the sooner the better. In May 1987, when Mr. Peres 
was about to bring his agreement with King Hussein, the "London 
Document", for government resolution, he was asked what would happen in 
the event of a deadlock in the Inner Cabinet. He replied: "I w ill turn 
to Mr. Shamir and say: 'This government is made up of two parts. I f
they fa il  to agree between them, the fa ir  thing to do is to go to the 
people... I t  is not such a tragedy, to go to e lections '."  [Israel TV,
7 .5 .87 ].
On the eve of the vote in the Inner Cabinet, Mr. Peres said i t  was 
the Likud's "last chance" to accept his peace proposal, but the Likud 
did not seem much impressed by this threat. According to prior 
statements. Labour was supposed to leave the NUG in order to try  and 
bring i t  down from the opposition bench. Several Labour ministers, 
however, argued that i t  was unwise to leave the Likud alone in 
government, free to wreck the country's security and economy. Also, 
they pointed out the danger of allowing the Likud to go to the next
Mr. Shachal, interview.
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elections as the incumbent party. The end result was that Labour 
decided to stay in the NUG, but promised to bring i t  down "in few 
weeks".*
Labour's campaign to bring down the NUG from within had started, 
then, with a whimper, and did not gain much force as i t  went along. Mr. 
Peres was known to have complained that his colleagues were not really  
helping him in this cause, and to some extent he was rig h t. Not a ll 
Labour ministers were for the creation of a "permanent election 
atmosphere".** Besides, a few of them did not approve of some unethical 
moves that were contemplated in order to frustrate the NUG modus 
ooerandi: staying in government while voting no-confidence in i t ;  not 
showing up for government meetings; allying with opposition parties to 
ambush government in itia tiv e s  in parliament; threatening defection from 
the government; and so on .***
Apart from creating chaos within the NUG, the po litics  of early 
elections was based on the assumption that i f  such elections were to 
take place, the end result would be a coalition government headed by 
Labour. In 1987, this assumption seemed valid enough. Mr. Peres's 
popularity, following his successes during his tenure as Prime Minister
*  The decision not to withdraw from the NUG seems to have cost
Labour quite a lo t in terms of c re d ib ility , and clearly  exposed 
its  p o litica l weakness.
* *  In May 1987 Rabbi Meir Kahana of the racist Kach movement was
prohibited from participating in Knesset discussions and votes. 
Since MK Kahana was technically part of the Likud's "blocking 
coalition", this move changed the odds s ligh tly  in favour of early 
elections.
* * *  Such ideas came up in the caucus of Labour's ministers, for
instance, on 28.1.87, 18.5.87, 14.7.87, 2.8.87, and 6.8 .87.
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in 1984-86, was rather high. Also, the Labour bloc had an edge over the 
Likud bloc in most public opinion p o lls .*  During 1988, however, the 
picture has changed to the worse from Labour's viewpoint. The personal 
popularity of Mr. Peres was dropping and, more importantly, the net 
effect of the Palestinian uprising in the te rr ito rie s  was a sh ift to 
the right in public opinion. Indeed, the Intifada turned out to be 
detrimental to Labour electoral prospects. Generally, the public has 
become more hard-lined and anti-Arab and, consequently. Labour started 
lagging in the opinion p o lls .**
I t  seems, then, that Labour's threat of premature elections was 
more real in 1987 than in 1988. However, even in 1987 the po litics  of 
early elections suffered from an acute problem of being perceived by 
the public as dishonest po liticking. Having collected his due from the 
1984 coalition agreement, i t  seemed, Mr. Peres was now doing everything 
within his power to prevent Mr. Shamir from receiving his fa ir  share. 
There was a d istinct possib ility  that a premature election campaign 
would focus not on peace, but rather on emotionally loaded questions of 
public decency.*** Many had suspected that Mr. Peres w ill not abide by
*  A Yediot Ahronot poll taken on July 13-14, 1987, found that party 
for party. Labour led the Likud by a margin of 7 seats in the 
Knesset, while the Labour bloc led the Likud/Religious bloc by 4.
* *  Studies showed that Is rae l's  use of force in the te rr ito rie s  was a 
major explanatory variable in predicting voters' choice. The 
in tifada rea lly  changed voters' p o litic a l opinions: about one- 
fourth said the ir views had become more moderate, while one-third 
said th e ir positions had hardened [Arian & Shamir, 1990, p. 3 ].
* * *  An opinion poll taken in March 1987 found that 46 percent of the 
electorate were w illing  to skip the next elections altogether, 
provided a rotating NUG continued (50 percent objected). Also, had 
Labour brought about early elections, i t  would have lost two seats 
to the Likud [Kirkpatrick Forum, p. 104].
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the rotation agreement; they were proven wrong, but only for a short 
while. His conduct a fte r rotation seemed to vindicate his reputation 
for dishonesty, so that in the las t two years of the NUG's term Mr. 
Peres lost much of the credit he had gained during the f i r s t  two years.
While the loss of prestige was rea l, the prospect of early 
elections proved elusive. Labour fa iled  to gain the religious parties' 
support for early elections.* Furthermore, Mr. Shamir was doing his 
best to protect himself from early elections. "Shamir, not having 
completed his term as prime minister, had no incentive to call for 
early elections, especially when he was lagging in the public opinion 
polls" [Elazar and Sandler, 1990, p. 234]. Thus, Mr. Shamir set out to 
prove to the religious parties that anything Labour could do, he could 
do better. In May 1987, for instance, when the media speculated that 
the ultra-orthodox Shas might support Labour, Mr. Shamir signed an 
agreement with i t :  Shas committed i ts e lf  to block early elections in 
exchange for the Likud's support on religious issues. The right-wing 
Techiya also threatened - in July 1987 and again January 1988 - to 
support early elections i f  the Likud would stray from its  
nationalis tic  policies. "The religious parties and the rightwing 
Techiya exploited the leverage they gained from Labour's election 
proposal by extracting concessions from the Likud in return for 
rejecting the proposal" [Horowitz, 1990, p. 230].
Having fa iled  to gain a majority for early elections, Mr. Peres 
eventually suggested a referendum (which is not provided for by 
any Israe li law or p o litic a l practice, and has never been 
conducted on any issue) on a peace plan concocted out of Labour's 
platform and Secretary Schultz's peace in it ia t iv e  [Labour 
ministers caucus, 24.4.88].
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The Likud's agreements and "understandings" with the small 
parties and with individual MKs, aimed at preventing early elections, 
f in a lly  destroyed the delicate interparty balance in parliament and in 
the NUG. I t  was now that the secret agreement between Mr. Hurwitz of 
Ometz and the Likud (as described in the previous chapter) came to fu ll 
fru itio n . In the government plenum, the Likud could now count on at 
least 14 out of the 25 members (Likud bloc 12, NRP 1, Ometz - 1) for
support on ideological as well as practical issues.* Thus, iron ica lly . 
Labour's po litics  of early elections, which was designed to defeat the 
Likud's po litics  of status q u o ,  in fact strengthened i t .
Labour's po litics  of early elections d irec tly  challenged the 
authority of Prime Minister Shamir, but his reaction was rather mild. 
Having succeeded in preventing premature elections, Mr. Shamir could 
afford to ignore Labour's provocations. During 1988, Mr. Shamir was 
able to push Labour out of the NUG with no much risk , but he chose not 
to do i t ,  for exactly the same reasons of c re d ib ility  and decency which 
were working so badly for Mr. Peres. In order to appear as a national 
leader, abiding by his agreements despite a ll provocations, he 
preferred to head a problematic NUG rather than a narrow-based Likud 
government. Moreover, he may have calculated that an NUG which 
basically pursues a Likud policy would eventually create a right-wing 
atmosphere which may help his party in the next election. All things 
considered, he could afford to and did show magnanimity.
A majority in the coalition government entails a majority in 
parliamentary committees, including the powerful Finance 
Committee.
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In terms of modus ooerandi. the 1986-88 NUG was not a problem­
solving government. Apart from the new decision on the Lavie issue, the 
NUG was mainly a problem-handling government, where issues were at best 
regulated. In fac t, as of May 1987, even regulating issues became 
problematic, due to the worsening Shamir-Peres relations. One important 
outcome of this situation was that the NUG lost some p o litic a l control 
and was unable to impose its  authority on sub-groups such as the Jewish 
settlers in the occupied te r r ito r ie s .*  The re la tive  in a b ility  of the 
1986-88 NUG to regulate conflicts brought about more polarization and 
immobility into the p o litica l system, and status q u o  reigned supreme.** 
"The Is rae li p o litic a l scene a fte r the 1986 rotation was marked by less 
interparty bargaining and more sensitiv ity  to the effects of policy 
decisions on the outcome of the 1988 elections. The time between the 
rotation and the elections became a prolonged p o litic a l waiting period" 
[Horowitz, 1990, p. 230].
All in a l l ,  in 1988 i t  became clear that the Likud's po litics  of 
status QUO prevailed over Labour's po litics  of early elections in two 
significant respects. F irs t, Labour was unable to force premature 
elections and the 1984 NUG lasted for its  fu ll term until 1988. Second, 
Labour's peace policy, which provided the raison d 'e tre  of the early 
elections p o litic s , was defeated in the scheduled elections in 1988.
* *
On problems of ungovernability see, for instance, Horowitz and 
Lissak, 1990, pp. 236-9. These circumstances may partly explain 
why in July 1987 Prime Minister Shamir voted in favour of clemency 
to prisoners of the "Jewish underground" (a group of settlers who 
committed several acts of terrorism against Palestinians and 
planned more), against the position of his own government.
Mr. Shamir's 1986-88 NUG - lik e  his 1983-84 government - did not 
function properly, projected a bad image but was p o lit ic a lly  safe.
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The Parliamentary Opposition
The discussion about the f ir s t  NUG has concentrated until now on the 
relationships amongst the various components and personalities 
composing the parliamentary majority on which th is very wide-based 
government rested. Let us recall now that there were, a fte r a l l ,  
parties represented in the Knesset which had not joined the coalition  
agreement. Inconsequential as i t  may seem, there was a parliamentary 
opposition during that period.
In any parliamentary system, government and opposition appear to 
be at odds. "Government does not need, or want, the opposition's moral 
support. I t  does not need the opposition votes" [King, 1976, p. 18]. 
S t i l l ,  in many systems there is a serious dialogue between government 
and opposition, and on ocassion the opposition is successful in 
delaying or amending government policies. This was not the case with 
the national coalition which dominated the Is rae li parliamentary scene 
and almost to ta lly  restricted the role of the parliamentary opposition. 
There was no surprise factor, not even a theoretical chance to block a 
government in it ia t iv e  in parliament. Actually, the government's 
majority was so large that i t  could not to be endangered even by 
dissenting votes within the coalition parties.
The government controlled over three-fourth of the seats in the 
120-member Knesset, and this was a major factor in determining 
executive-legislative relations. In the words of Mr. Eban, the unity 
government resembles "systems under which the balance between 
responsibility and criticism  - that is to say between government and 
opposition - is disturbed by the almost total absorption of the
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leg is la tive  into the executive" [Hattis-Rolef, 1985, p. 115]. I t  brings 
to mind the way Otto Kirchheimer described the Austrian Red-and-Black 
coalition: "elimination of major p o litica l opposition through
government by party cartel" [Kirchheimer, 1957, p. 136].*
The weakness of the opposition tended to weaken the government 
accountability to parliament and hence to the people, and thus seemed 
to produce apathy on the part of the voters. "The absence of a vibrant 
and formidable opposition in the Knesset bears the potential for 
institu tional imbalance, which may, in the long run, e ither reduce the 
status of the Knesset to that of a rubber stamp or encourage 
extraparliamentary opposition activ ity" [Elazar and Sandler, 1990, p. 
240]. The Knesset as a whole was looked down at to an extent that 
alarmed the Speaker, who warned: "By b e litt lin g  the Knesset we are
performing a disservice to democracy, because the public is slowly
getting accustomed to the idea that one can have a government without 
the Knesset and its  committees" [Hattis-Rolef, 1985, p. 81].
All discussions, amendments and critic ism  were exhausted at the 
executive level, which could not be bothered with leg is la tive  debates. 
"There is an inclination to paralyze the Knesset, or at least reduce 
its  weight," warned the Speaker. "This is due to the fact that the
adoption of any decision by the cabinet and coalition is such a
d if f ic u lt  and cumbersome process that when a decision is f in a lly  agreed
So small the opposition was that i t  could not even gather the 30 
signatures by members required to convene a special parliamentary 
session during a recess. I t  was not surprising, then, that the 
government grudged the opposition even a single parliamentary 
committee chairmanship - not even the State Audit Committee, 
trad itio n a lly  an opposition preserve.
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to, there Is an Inclination, perhaps a subconscious one, to say to the 
Knesset: there are enough madmen around without you interfering" 
Fib id .l In other words, since heated debates had already taken place in 
government i ts e lf ,  there was l i t t l e  incentive to repeat the process in 
parliament. Put simply, the national governments essentially functioned 
as a mini-pariiament, as a "coopposition".
The parity between the two leading partner-opponents accounted for 
the phenomenon of "responsibility avoidance". When i t  is unclear who 
bears responsibility, i t  is not clear who to c r it ic iz e , and how 
actually to oppose. The dualism of government responsibility has 
created problems for the parliamentary opposition. A combination of 
b ila te ra l opposition - common enough in parliamentary systems - and a 
"b ila tera l" government made i t  d if f ic u lt  for the opposition in 
parliament to focus its  critic ism  of the government, which took away 
from its  effectiveness. The inevitable outcome was a decline in the 
status of parliament.
However, i t  was precisely this fact which also lent f le x ib i l i ty  to 
parliament, because there was no reason to enforce s tr ic t party 
discip line. The decline of the parliament was o ffset, to some extent, 
by the performance of some members within the ranks of the coalition. 
" It  is possible that members of parliament from one of the two major 
parties w ill attempt to c r it ic iz e  ministers from the other large party, 
supervise and investigate th e ir a c tiv ity , and promote discussion of 
th e ir policies" [Goldberg, 1990, p. 196] Again, th is is sim ilar to what 
had occurred in Austria's grand coalition, 1945-1966: "Since a ll
government proposals were either compromises between the two parties or 
resulted from logrolling between them... almost none satisfied both 
parties to the same extent. This often led both parliamentary groups to
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c ritic is e  the government's proposal from d ifferen t points of view" 
[Muller, 1990, p. 14].
A c r it ic a l attitude towards the government was occasionally 
displayed by parliamentary committees, mainly the Finance Committee and 
the Public Audit Committee. The highlights of this kind of 
parliamentary a c tiv ity , however, were two investigation committees set 
up to investigate major issues, against the w ill of the government: the 
bank shares manipulation scandal (1985) and the Pollard a f fa ir  (1987). 
When members of parliament investigated these a ffa irs , they pushed 
th e ir party a ffilia tio n s  into the background. In th e ir desire to lay 
the blame at the doorstep of the other party, both Labour and Likud 
members displayed intensive investigative zeal. But then, of course, 
such in itia tiv e s  would have been d if f ic u lt  i f  not impossible to take up 
had there been a narrow-based government.
All the same, the performance of parliament may not have been as 
bad as could be expected in a situation where the opposition was very 
small. One study even disputes "the conventional wisdom that argues 
that the existence of an NUG makes parliamentary decay inescapable" 
[Goldberg, 1990, p. 219]. Be that as i t  may, for healthy executive- 
leg is la tive  relations the National Unity Government "was lik e  a strong 
medicine for a serious illness - i t  is unavoidable but you should stop 
i t  as soon as possible" [Eban, Kirkpatrick Forum, 1987, pp. 11-12].
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Chapter Eight
As Things Change, They Remain The Same; 
The 1988 National Unity Government
The Formation of the 1988 NUG
The 1988 Elections
Given the incessant interparty conflicts within the framework of the 
post-rotation 1984 NUG, the chances for a Labour-Likud cooperation in 
government a fter the 1988 elections looked rather slim. The Likud was 
particu larly  exasperated with Labour for constantly undermining both 
government s ta b ility  and Mr. Shamir's status as Prime Minister. 
Besides, in the election campaign the voters were asked by both parties 
to make a clear choice between the policies of the Likud and Labour on 
the peace and te rr ito r ia l issues; under such circumstances, to propose 
a future national coalition appeared rather inappropriate.
As a matter fac t, during the 1988 election campaign Labour did 
come up with the idea of an NUG (for tactical reasons), but the Likud
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ignored i t . *  The Likud, which was leading in opinion polls, certainly  
did not have any reason to propose an NUG, which would have upset 
right-wing voters and increase the electoral appeal of parties in the 
extreme r ig h t.* *  Also, in the Likud party i ts e lf  Mr. Shamir, aware of 
the objection by Mr. Levy, Mr. Sharon and Mr. Moda'i to an NUG formula, 
preferred not to create unnecessary pre-election tensions.
The elections were held on November 1, 1988 and the results were 
as follows:
Table 8.1 The 1988 Election Results - Likud and Labour blocs
Labour bloc Likud-Reliaious bloc
Labour 39 Likud 40
CRM 5 Shas 6
Rakach 4 Aguda 5
Mapam 3 NRP 5
Shinui 2 Techiya 3
PLP 1 Tzomet 2
ADL 1 Moledet 2
Degel Hatora 2
Total 55 65
* *
In a curious reversal of what had happened in the 1984 campaign, 
Mr. Shamir talked in a nationally televised debate (23.10.88) 
about a broad-based Likud government, not an NUG. Labour's call 
for an NUG was probably the best indication of its  electoral 
weakness which had become noticeable since the beginning of the 
In tifada in December 1987.
Two separate polls published by Ma'ariv and Yediot Ahronot on 
21.10.88 indicated an electoral advantage to the right-of-centre  
parties.
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The most significant outcome of the elections was a strategic 
victory for the Likud bloc over the Labour bloc. The basic 60:60 
p o litic a l t ie  between these two riva l blocs, that had emerged in the 
1984 elections, was now broken: in 1988 the voters gave a clear 65:55 
majority to the right-of-centre bloc. The chief winners of the 1988 
elections were the four religious parties: the three ultra-orthodox
parties - Shas, Agudat Israel and Degel Hatora - and the NRP.* Their 
combined parliamentary representation increased from 13 to 18 seats 
between 1984 and 1988. The ultra-orthodox parties were extremely 
successful, having gained 13 out of the 18 religious seats. Among them, 
Shas has proven to be a strong competitor to the Likud within the 
Sephardic community in development towns and poor neigbourhoods. Shas 
has become the largest party a fter Likud and Labour, and with its  6 
parliamentary seats, i t  occupied the pivotal position in the system.
The Likud i ts e lf  came ahead of Labour - a lbe it by a margin of one 
seat, 40 to 39 - and emerged as the number one party. However, both 
large parties suffered setbacks. The Likud lost votes mainly to the 
small right-wing parties (Techiya, Tzomet and Moledet), which created a 
firs t-tim e  presence of an ultra-right-w ing bloc in parliament. 
Consequently, the Likud party which appeared to have moved towards the 
centre of the party system possessed now a potential to capture its  
pivotal position, which has been weak since Labour's defeat in the 1977 
elections. The Labour party with its  39 seats - its  lowest since the 
f i r s t  ever parliamentary elections in 1949 (save 1977), was relegated
*  On the religious parties in the 1988 elections see Don-Yehiya, 
1989, pp. 11-54; Heilman, 1990, pp.135-151.
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to number two. I t  lost votes to left-w ing parties, mainly the CRM. The 
Likud's edge over Labour in the elections was the product of several 
factors: The In tifad a: King Hussein's public disengagement from the
occupied te rr ito rie s  (and thus from the peace process); Mr. Shamir's 
image as a national leader, as opposed to the "too partisan" Mr. Peres; 
f in a lly , two particularly severe te rro ris t attacks within the last 
couple of weeks prior to the elections strengthened anti-Arab attitudes 
and seemed to have strengthened support for the right-wing. Also,
Labour paid e lectorally due to its  association with the financial mire
of the trade unions' industries.
The loss of seats for both Labour and the Likud was an indication 
that the electorate was disappointed with the indecisiveness of the 
1984-88 NUG. In 1988 a substantial portion of the vote went to extreme 
religious and nationalist parties, seemingly as a reaction to the
renegation on matters of principle associated with a national
co a litio n .*  Iron ica lly , i t  was the success of p o litica l extremism that 
created the need for yet another national coalition.
I t  is worth noting the circu lar nature of these p o litica l 
developments. Compared to the 1984 elections, in 1988 the level of
competitiveness in the party system decreased but the level of
polarization increased. Thus, i f  in 1984 an NUG was inevitable, in 1988 
i t  seemed more as the least of two ev ils . In order to block extreme
The same thing had occurred in Israel in the 1955 elections, when 
the then two large parties in Mr. Sharett's broad-based coalition, 
Mapai and the General Zionists, lost seats to extreme le f t -  and 
right-wing parties. A sim ilar development took place in West 
Germany, where the 1966-69 grand coalition encouraged le f t  and 
right-wing extremism. In the 1969 elections, the neo-Nazi NPD 
nearly gained representation in the Bundestag.
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tendencies and to regulate conflicts which might otherwise tear the 
system apart, the Likud and Labour again joined grudgingly in an NUG, 
which by its  very nature is an indecisive p o litic a l organ. As an aside 
i t  may be pointed out (as a prediction which could be tested in the 
1992 elections, due in June) that th is , in turn, may encourage more 
p o litic a l extremism in the future. The spiral may go on until one large 
party eventually occupies the p o litic a l centre, and the level of 
polarization is reduced.
The p o litic a l extremism which emerged from the 1988 elections was 
worrisome to many. "The Israe li public indicated before the 1988 
elections that they were ready to have one of the parties assume the 
role of forming the coalition. But a fter the very close results were 
announced, polls showed that they again supported the notion of a NUG" 
[Arian, 1988, p. 20]. The support for an NUG was based on fear that a 
narrow-based government could be blackmailed by the small pa rties .* The 
small religious parties, mainly ultra-orthodox, were lik e ly  to demand a 
change in the defin ition of "Who is a Jew?" in the Law of Return - one 
of the most sensitive issues dividing secular and religious Jews in 
Israel and abroad. Sim ilarly, the extreme right-wing parties were 
lik e ly  to demand the annexation of the occupied te rr ito r ie s , i f  not 
transfer of Arabs from them. The extreme left-w ing parties were w illing  
to le t  the Palestinians have an independent state in the te rr ito rie s . 
The formation of a Likud-Labour NUG seemed the only way to restrain  
these extremist, to ta lly  incompatible policies.
On 12.11.88, a huge demonstration in Tel-Aviv demanded that the 
major parties form an NUG. The President of the State also came 
out in favour of an NUG.
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The Coalition Bargaining Process
In many ways the results of the 1988 elections were sim ilar to those of 
1984. However, the minor differences were large enough to change the 
entire structure of the bargaining system. In 1984, Mr. Peres had 
become the "formateur" since the Labour party was the largest group in 
parliament. However, due to the 60:60 Labour-Likud parliamentary t ie ,  
his only re a lis tic  governmental option had been a national coalition  
based on parity , up to the prime m inisterial leve l. In 1988, by 
contrast, Mr. Shamir became the "formateur" not only because the Likud 
party was the largest group in parliament, but also because a majority 
of the members - 65 out of 120 - favoured him as the prime m inisterial 
candidate. As for governmental options, Mr. Shamir had at least two 
re a lis tic  ones: a narrow-based Likud government or a Likud-led national 
coalition.
In the f ir s t  stages of the bargaining process, the Likud 
negotiated with the small religious and nationalist parties in an 
apparent attempt to form a 65-member Likud coalition. These talks had 
an apparent bargaining logic. I f  one p o litica l bloc is stronger than 
the other " i t  may expect a high conflictual payoff and is lik e ly  to 
adopt a conflictual s tra tegy... [Moreover,] i f  the main conflic t in a 
policy dispute corresponds to the le f t-r ig h t ideological cleavage, 
cooperation is less like ly"  [Quirk, 1989, pp. 914-5]. Such a 
conflictual strategy - a Likud government without Labour - was the 
option preferred by leaders such as Mr. Sharon, Mr. Levy and Mr. 
Moda'i. S t i l l  the party leader, Mr. Shamir, did not want to form a
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Likud government. Apparently he himself had good reasons to prefer the 
other feasible coalition option - a Likud-led unity government with the 
Labour party.
One reason for Mr. Shamir's reluctance to lead a narrow-based
Likud government and preference for a national coalition was that he
did not want his prime ministership to be constantly at the mercy of 
sundry extreme r ig h tis t and ultra-orthodox parties. Compared with a 
national coalition, a 65-member Likud coalition - the Likud plus 7 
small parties - appeared to be potentia lly very unstable.* More
importantly, Mr. Shamir's opposition to a narrow-based Likud government 
was based on intraparty considerations. In a Likud government, Mr. 
Shamir's party rivals - Mr. Levy, Mr. Sharon and Mr. Moda'i - were 
bound to get key portfolios, an eventuality not at a ll to his lik ing . 
Forming a national coalition with Labour seemed an effective way to 
prevent i t .  In such a government, key posts w ill have to be allocated 
to Labour leaders, thus reducing the benefits available to Mr. Shamir's 
party r iv a ls .* *  For example, in a national coalition the Defence
portfo lio  would go to Labour's Mr. Rabin, and one of Mr. Shamir's chief 
party riva ls , a potential candidate for party leadership - Mr. Sharon - 
would be blocked.
* This brings to mind a sim ilar situation regarding the Red-and-
Black Austrian coalition: "Divisions within the OVP at times made 
negotiations d i f f ic u l t . . .  In 1959, for instance, the 'reformers' 
led by Klaus, then the OVP leader in Salzburg... wanted an OVP-FPO 
c o a lit io n ... but Chancellor Raab opposed such a coalition , arguing 
that the FPO was not a stable coalition partner" [Dreijamanis, 
1982, p. 249].
* *  Mr. Moda'i and more so Mr. Sharon [interviews] claimed that
intraparty po litics  strongly motivated Mr. Shamir to prefer a 
national coalition to a "partial" one.
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Mr. Shamir's personal reasons for preferring a Likud-led national 
coalition notwithstanding, the strategy designed to achieve i t  was 
complicated and highly risky. I f  Mr. Shamir was to approach the Labour 
party at an early stage of the bargaining process, he might have faced 
at least three major problems. F irs t, strong intraparty opposition from 
those who preferred a narrow-based government: Mr. Shamir would have 
been accused of cooperating with the chief p o litic a l "enemy". Second, 
he might have angered the small parties which constituted the base of 
his hypothetical 65-member winning coalition and push them to a lly  with 
Labour. Third, the Labour party would have probably demanded total 
parity in a national coalition. Given these constraints, Mr. Shamir had 
had to be seen to strive for a narrow-based coalition and only then 
switch to a national one. In other words, Mr. Shamir had f i r s t  to 
consolidate a power-base from which he could o ffer Labour an in ferio r  
position in a national co a litio n .* This was exactly what Mr. Shamir 
did. He was on the verge of announcing a narrow-based Likud government, 
when he suddenly opted for a renewed national c o a litio n .**
Mr. Shamir's efforts  to secure a Likud-dominated wide-based 
coalition almost fa iled  because of the effective bargaining conducted 
by Mr. Peres with the religious parties. At the f i r s t  stages of the 
bargaining process, i t  was widely believed that the religious parties
*  A Likud-led national coalition meant that the Prime Ministership
was essentially a nonnegotiable cabinet post.
* *  The Likud simply ignored written agreements with several small
parties. When Techiya leader Mr. Ne'eman (a world-famous 
physicist) asked Mr. Shamir what to do with the agreement between 
them, whether he should donate i t  to a museum, Mr. Shamir coolly 
replied: "As fa r as I'm concerned, you can do with i t  anything
you'd lik e ."
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negotiated with Labour mainly in order to exact more concessions from 
the Likud. However, Mr. Peres for his part did his utmost to bring 
about a Labour government or, at a minimum, a prime m inisterial 
rotation in a national co a litio n .* To this end, he had to pull at least 
one or even two religious parties to his side. This was not an easy 
task, since the religious parties were basically inclined to support 
the Likud.
Luckily for Mr. Peres, this commitment did not lead to a speedy 
formation of a Likud government, because Mr. Shamir deliberately  
protracted the negotiations in view of the Likud-led national coalition  
which was his ultimate goal. This waiting period angered the religious 
parties, and i t  was this anger that Mr. Peres exploited.
Mr. Peres's bargaining strategy is worth discussing, since i t  
involved some b r ill ia n t  heresthetical moves in the negotiating process. 
More importantly, as w ill be explained below, at one stage Mr. Peres 
managed to change the entire structure of the bargaining system which 
emerged from the 1988 elections. He rather unexpectedly got Labour out 
of its  in fe rio r position and put i t  on an equal footing with the Likud. 
I t  appeared (for a short time) as i f  a national coalition with a prime
Mr. Peres never accepted the 65:55 Likud-Labour power relations, 
claiming that a majority in parliament, including some religious  
parties, was holding views close to those of Labour on the peace 
issue. "They [the religious parties] are not a ll of one hue. The 
Likud is too hasty in annexing them unto its e lf"  [Jerusalem Post. 
2 . 11.88].
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m inisterial rotation would be the final outcome of the bargaining 
process.*
On 28.11.88, the Likud's Mr. Shamir and Mr. Arens met Labour's Mr. 
Peres and Mr. Rabin to o ffer them participation in a non-rotational 
Likud-led NUG. Both Labour leaders accepted the o ffer in principle, but 
said that a final reply would have to wait few days to get the approval 
of th e ir party bureau. On 30.11.88, Labour's bureau was convened to 
decide the matter. Two proposals were put forward for a head-to-head 
vote: (1) Labour should participate in a NUG; (2) Labour should not 
enter a NUG "under the Likud". The carefully worded phrase "under the 
Likud" in proposal (2) meant that only i f  provisions for complete 
parity (including a prime m inisterial rotation) were made. Labour would 
consider the formation of an NUG. Proposal (1) was apparently backed by 
Mr. Peres, Mr. Rabin and most Labour's ministers; proposal (2) was made 
by Mr. Baram, the party's Secretary-General and a member of the party's 
younger generation. By a vote of 61 to 57, Labour's bureau decided 
against an NUG "under the Likud". The unexpected defeat of a proposal 
sponsored by the top leadership was regarded as a p o litica l shock.**
In fact, the Labour bureau decision was the culmination of Mr. 
Peres's bargaining strategy, aimed at opening for Labour the option of 
a rotational government which would enable him to become Prime
*  A coalition bargaining process, stormy as i t  may seem while i t  
goes on, usually lacks elements of real surprise because the basic 
formula of the future government can be predicted with a high 
degree of certainty. Mr. Peres's moves, however, entailed a sudden 
tw ist in the regular course of the bargaining process by opening 
unexpected coalition options.
* *  Jerusalem Post, headline, 1.12.88: "A Shocker from Labour".
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Minister. A necessary condition for such a strategy to take o ff the 
ground was to change the basic 65:55 parliamentary power relations in 
favour of the Likud, to a 60:60 Likud-Labour balance. The potential 
targets to t i l t  the parliamentary balance were the religious parties 
which were leaning towards the Likud. I t  was not a simple undertaking 
to "steal" a religious party from the Likud bloc, but Mr. Peres managed 
to sign a secret agreement with the 5-member Agudat Is rae l, having 
promised them far-reaching financial and religious benefits. The 
signing of such an agreement was a real achievement for Mr. Peres, 
since Labour and Agudat Israel were certainly strange bedfellows.*
Mr. Peres had to keep the Agudat Israel agreement in secret for 
two reasons. F irs t, so as not to a le rt the Likud and push Mr. Shamir to 
form a narrow-based government without delay. Second, to conceal some 
of the harder-to-swallow concessions in the agreement from his own 
party. The agreement certainly constituted a necessary condition - a 
60:60 t ie  - for achieving a Likud-Labour parity in government. However, 
another condition was needed: a decision by Labour's bureau that the 
party would consider participation in government but "not under Likud". 
The problem was that Mr. Peres could not be seen to support such a 
resolution openly. After a l l ,  he had already told the Likud he would 
unconditionally support a national coalition. Also, he would have been 
accused by his party riva l Mr. Rabin of blocking Labour's way into the 
government.
Even during the long years of Labour's dominance, Agudat Israel 
was mostly in opposition. Since 1977 i t  has been a loyal a lly  of 
the Likud.
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Publicly, then, Mr. Peres said nothing about parity ( i .e .  prime 
m inisterial rotation) as an obstacle for a national coalition , and 
actually seconded Mr. Rabin's proposal to jo in  in with no conditions. 
Secretly, however, Mr. Peres tried  to manipulate both the Likud and Mr. 
Rabin, working behind the scenes for the acceptance of a resolution not 
to jo in  a government "under the Likud". I f  Labour's Bureau would have 
approved the Peres-Rabin proposal, i t  would have been impossible for 
Mr. Peres to keep the option of a government based on parity a live . 
Thus, Mr. Peres wanted the Bureau to adopt a resolution which would 
force the Likud to improve its  terms for Labour's participation in a 
national coalition. In other words, having secured his secret agreement 
with Agudat Israe l, Mr. Peres was now working to secure a victory for a 
position he openly opposed.
I t  is d if f ic u lt  to determine the extent to which Mr. Peres was 
actually involved in bringing about the surprising outcome of the vote 
in the party's Bureau, which took place in a secret ba llo t. However, i t  
was unprecedented for a Peres-Rabin sponsored resolution to be defeated 
in any party organ, especially on a major issue. Also, i t  could be 
assumed that those who knew about the secret agreement with Agudat 
Israel - Mr. Peres's close a llie s  - had a clear interest to vote 
against joining a government without conditions. After a l l ,  i f  the 
parliamentary power relations was rea lly  60:60, there was no reason to 
jo in  an NUG without securing parity and rotation. Thus, i t  seems that 
the party's bureau resolution was, to some extent, covertly inspired by 
Mr. Peres and his associates. Both the secret agreement with Agudat 
Israel and the strategic voting in Labour's Bureau made a rotational 
national government a viable coalition option.
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However, Mr. Peres's tactics, b r il l ia n t  as they may seem to the 
Machiavellian s p ir it , were necessarily short-lived. The Likud would not 
have acquiesced with the "defection" of Agudat Is rae l. As the party in 
charge of the caretaker government, the Likud would have probably 
maintained a 60:60 p o litica l stalemate until the religious party 
returned to the fold. Moreover, the Labour party i ts e lf  would have 
rejected many of the concessions included in the agreement with Agudat 
Is rae l. In fact, when some of the details in the agreement - not a ll of 
them - were revealed in meetings of Labour's ministers, Mr. Peres faced 
strong opposition to his moves. Eventually, the e ffo rt to secure a 
government based on prime m inisterial rotation collapsed in face of 
interparty and intraparty d if f ic u lt ie s .*  This collapse notwithstanding, 
the very creation of an option for a rotational NUG, le t  alone keeping 
i t  a live for a while, was an impressive p o litica l achievement.**
Following Labour's fa ilu re  to change the basic inter-bloc power 
relations, the bargaining proceeded towards the eventual formation of a 
non-rotational NUG. The Likud's dominance was symbolized by the fact 
that Mr. Shamir was to hold the prime m inister's o ffice  for the fu ll 
governmental term. Moreover, even though there was an equality in the
*  On 4.12.88 the governing body of Agudat Is rae l, known
(o f f ic ia l ly ! )  as the Council of Sages, decided - following 
meetings with Likud and Labour delegations - to side with the 
Likud. This sounded the death knell for Mr. Peres's hopes for a 
rotational national coalition.
* *  Considering Labour's in ferio r position, the newspapers suggested
that had Mr. Peres succeeded in his moves, he would have deserved 
to be nominated "the Politic ian of the Decade" (see for example 
Hadashot. 2.12.88).
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number of ministers between the Likud and Labour parties, the Likud 
bloc was larger than that of Labour. The government plenum was composed 
of 26 ministers: Likud 11, Labour 11, NRP 2, and Shas 2. Shas and the 
NRP were essentially members of the Likud bloc. The Shinui party which 
had been a member of the Labour bloc in the 1984 NUG did not jo in the 
1988 NUG. The one institu tion  that provided for parity in government 
was a 6:6 Inner Cabinet, based - as in 1984 - on mutual veto 
arrangements.
The 1988 Likud-led NUG was formed on 22.12.88; i t  was the f ir s t  
time in Israe l's  history that the Labour party has agreed to 
participate in a government dominated by another party. Just six years 
e a rlie r , in 1982, the then Prime Minister Mr. Begin had offered a 
sim ilar arrangement which the Labour party rejected fo rth rig h t.*  In 
1988 the p o litica l situation was d iffe ren t. "The 1988-1990 NUG 
witnessed a further deterioration in the position of Labour because i t  
was relegated to a subordinated role to the Likud in the government. On 
the other hand, the Likud's legitimacy was enhanced; i t  was the party 
solely at the helm - with support of Labour" [Arian, 1988:21].
Intraoartv Politics and the Formation of the 1988 NUG
In 1988, more than in 1984, the Likud and Labour each tried  vigorously 
to court the religious parties, and the bargaining process took the hue
* Mr. Begin, personal communication
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of sheer horsetrading. However, the negotiations with the religious 
parties did not aim at achieving a narrow-based government but rather a 
national coalition . Both the Likud and Labour actually used the 
religious parties as a threat v is-a-vis  each other, in jockeying for a 
better position in a would-be national co a litio n .* Mr. Shamir was 
aiming at a Likud-led national coalition, while Mr. Peres was looking 
forward to a government based on parity . They both used the religious 
parties for th e ir  purposes; they both preferred a national coalition  
for reasons of intraparty considerations [Mintz, 1989].
As already noted, Mr. Shamir preferred a national coalition to a 
narrow-based government because, by "sacrificing" a few cabinet seats 
to Labour in a wide-based government, he could possibly strengthen his 
own position in the Likud and reduce the benefits to his riva ls . 
Actually, even when Mr. Shamir found out about the Labour-Agudat Israel 
agreement, a situation which put the option of a Likud-led government 
at risk , he s t i l l  favoured a national coalition, not a narrow-based 
Likud government. For Mr. Shamir not to le t  Messrs. Levy, Sharon and 
Moda'i acquire key government positions was indeed a high p r io rity . Not 
surprisingly, these leaders for th e ir part supported a narrow-based 
Likud government which would strengthen th e ir positions within the 
Likud. To achieve the goal of a Likud-led national coalition , Mr. 
Shamir had to force Labour to jo in  the coalition as a junior partner.
A sim ilar situation developed in Austria in 1962-1963, when both 
the OVP and SPG parties used the threat of a narrow-based 
coalition with the FPO as a bargaining tac tic  in the formation of 
the Black-and-Red grand coalition [Dreijmanis, 1982, pp. 249-50]. 
On the dependence of p o litic a l outcomes on credible threats, see 
for instance Brams and Hessel, 1984.
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This he succeeded in doing by threatening to leave i t  out of government 
altogether by forming a Likud government with the religious parties, 
which would have been a second-best for him, but a disaster for Labour.
As for Labour, Mr. Peres bargained with the religious parties in 
order to achieve a national coalition based on prime m inisterial 
rotation, also for intraparty considerations. Only in such a government 
could Mr. Peres maintain his strong position as party leader. Mr. Peres 
charges that for this very reason, his party riva l Mr. Rabin spoiled 
for Labour the rotation option [interview ]. Allegedly, Mr. Rabin 
preferred a Likud-led NUG, because i f  Mr. Shamir became Prime Minister 
for the entire duration, he and not Mr. Peres would be Labour's senior 
o f f ic ia l ,  which would make him e ffec tive ly , i f  not formally, the party 
leader.* Mr. Peres could, of course, move that Labour not jo in  at a ll a 
Likud-led NUG and serve in a "fighting" opposition to Mr. Shamir. 
However, in opposition Mr. Peres's position would have been weakened 
even further. After a l l ,  i t  is easier to fight intraparty opposition 
from a governmental position than from the opposition bench. So once 
Mr. Peres was faced with the choice between participating as a junior 
partner in a national coalition or remaining in opposition, he opted 
for the lesser of two e v ils .* *
*  Mr. Rabin indeed pulled the rug from underneath Mr. Peres's feet
by publicly declaring during the negotiations that "under the 
circumstances" Labour would not insist on a prime m inisterial 
rotation as a condition to jo in a national coalition.
* *  Besides, Mr. Peres probably assumed that in the governmental
position he sought for himself, as the Finance M inister, he could 
win over the religious parties - a move that fa iled  during the 
coalition bargaining process - because then he w ill have in his 
hands the strings of the national purse.
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Intraparty po litics  in 1988 dictated not only which government 
would be formed, but also membership and portfo lio  allocations. Once
Prime Minister Shamir gave Labour two major posts - Defence to Mr. 
Rabin and Finance to Mr. Peres - he turned to strengthen his faction
within Likud's group of m inisters.* Thus, for example, Mr. Arens, a
Shamir a lly  who was a Minister without Portfolio in the 1984 NUG, 
became Minister for Foreign A ffa irs , not least in order to block an 
intraparty r iv a l, Mr. Levy. Also, Mr. Shamir gave f i r s t  m inisterial
positions to three loyal young politic ians of his fac tio n .** In the 
Labour party, government membership was also determined almost solely 
by intraparty p o litic s . Mr. Peres, whose leadership position was at 
risk , distributed government posts to his loyal supporters and denied 
membership from his r iv a ls . The recalcitrant Mrs. Arbeli-Almuslino, for 
one, was not included in the government.***
I t  seems, then, that intraparty po litics  in both the Likud and 
Labour provides empirical support for a general observation made by 
Luebbert: "In parties in which factional competition is intense, 
government formation provides an often ideal occasion for one faction 
to seek to sabotage another" [Luebert, 1986, p. 52]. Needless to say.
*  Unlike in 1984, in 1988 the Likud-Labour division of portfolios
tended to re fle c t the general preferences of the public: i t
supported the Likud's foreign policy and Labour's economic policy. 
Labour's Mr. Rabin enjoyed c re d ib ility  on security matters, which 
explains his overall popularity.
* *  I t  is interesting to note that despite the fact that the Likud's
grassroot support comes mainly from the Sephardic community, i t  
had no representation among Mr. Shamir's newly promoted leaders.
* * *  Mr. Rabin was able, nevertheless, to block Mr. Peres's attempts to
get rid  of some other members of his faction.
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the formation of the national coalition was not explained to the public 
in precisely these terms. Rather, a wide-based government was ju s tifie d  
by the need to counterbalance national and religious extremism. In 
re a lity , however, ideological moderation was the outcome of the 
coalition bargaining process, not its  driving force.
Mr. Shamir's goal was a Likud-led government; had he been unable 
to achieved i t  in the framework of a national coalition, he would 
probably have formed a narrow-based Likud government, paying a high 
price to the extreme nationalistic  and religious parties .* As for 
Labour, i f  Mr. Peres could have succeeded in forming a narrow-based 
Labour government with both the communists and the religious parties, 
or a rotational NUG through heavy concessions to the religious parties 
- he would have probably done i t ,  justify ing  everything as necessary in 
order to push forward the peace process.** So in 1988, unlike 1984, 
ideology was less of a binding constraint on the coalition bargaining 
and formation process. The factors which counted most was Mr. Shamir's 
motivation for p o litica l dominance and Mr. Peres's motivation for 
p o litic a l survival.
*  This actually happened in 1990, following the collapse of the NUG 
formula, as we shall see further on.
* *  Again, Mr. Peres tried  to do just that in 1990. In 1988 he 
ju s tif ie d  Labour's joining a Likud-led NUG as an unavoidable 
necessity, aimed at "saving" important portfolios from the Likud.
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Unequal Partners
The maintenance of the 1988 Likud-led NUG was problematic from the word 
go, mainly because its  formula was unacceptable to significant factions 
within both the Likud and Labour. In the Likud, the Sharon-Levy-Moda'i 
alliance wished the NUG i l l ,  both because of th e ir opposition to its  
policy package and th e ir desire to topple Mr. Shamir.* In Labour, the 
broad-based government was opposed by Mr. Peres mainly because i t  was 
not a rotating NUG. Actually, the v ia b ility  of the 1988 NUG was heavily 
dependent on cooperation between two rather unlikely partners, Mr. 
Shamir of the Likud and Mr. Rabin of Labour. A Shamir-Rabin dispute was 
therefore more c r itic a l for the maintenance of the government than any 
dispute between Mr. Shamir and Mr. Sharon, or between Mr. Rabin and Mr. 
Peres. In many ways, the 1988 NUG was a Shamir-Rabin government, not a 
Likud-Labour national executive.
The b ila tera l opposition to the NUG used the most explosive issue, 
the pace of the peace process, as its  main p o litic a l weapon. The 
intensity of factional attacks on the government notwithstanding, the 
Shamir-Rabin alliance was strong enough to keep the NUG formula alive  
and even produce an Israe li peace plan in May 1989. However, the 
adoption of the peace plan, which seemingly created a Likud-Labour
In fact, Mr. Levy supported the formation of the NUG believing he 
would jo in the top "forum" and receive more patronage. Soon enough 
he realized how much the promises given him were rea lly  worth.
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Ideological balance within the NUG, caused even more intensified  
factional ac tiv ity  aimed to destabilize the government formula. This 
ac tiv ity  eventually proved successful; within less than a year, in 
March 1990, the NUG collapsed. The way the government coped with the 
strong opposition to the NUG formula, which developed following the May 
1989 peace plan, seems a useful perspective to analyse the modus 
ooerandi of the NUG, which was essentially about factionalism and the 
manipulation of the peace issue.*
Manipulating The Peace Process
Likud-Labour discussions aimed at an acceptable formula on the peace 
issue started soon a fte r the formation of the government. After a few 
months of interparty dialogue, the NUG approved (on 14.5.89) a Shamir- 
Rabin sponsored peace plan based on the notion of holding democratic 
elections in the occupied te r r ito r ie s .* *  I t  was based on the hope that
* Apart from the peace issue, no decisions were made on any major 
issue during the 15 months of the NUG's existence. In government 
sessions ministers mainly listened to reports on plans to absorb 
immigrants, on financial trouble in development towns, on how to 
reduce bureaucracy, on electoral reforms, etc. There were, of 
course, occasional Likud-Labour clashes on social and economic 
issues. However, very few decisions were made on any matter. Due 
to the disagreements on the peace issue, the NUG was v irtu a lly  
paralyzed as a national executive throughout its  existence.
* *  The plan was approved by a wide margin in the NUG. Messrs. Sharon, 
Moda'i, Levy of the Likud and Mr. Shaki of the NRP voted against 
i t ,  claiming i t  was "too moderate". Also Messrs. Weizmann and Edri 
of Labour voted against i t ,  claiming i t  was "too tough". In many 
respects, the NUG plan was sim ilar to Labour's 1988 election 
campaign proposal which was called at the time a "gimmick" by 
Prime Minister Shamir.
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the Palestinians would choose delegates with whom Israel could 
negotiate the future status of these areas. In any immediate sense, 
however, the government in it ia t iv e  was meant to enable a continued 
cooperation between the Likud and Labour in a national coalition, as 
well as to improve Israe l's  image abroad, which has been severely 
damaged since the beginning of the Intifada in December 1987.
The strongest opposition to the NUG peace plan developed within 
the Likud by the "constraints" faction led by three members of the 
Inner Cabinet - Messrs. Sharon, Moda'i and Levy. The faction's ac tiv ity  
and the reaction to i t  by both the Likud and Labour had a strong impact 
on the NUG's modus ooerandi. The faction's open objection to the NUG's 
peace plan was based on its  claim that the plan might lead to the 
establishment of a Palestinian state in the land of Is ra e l.*  
Consequently, the "constrainers" demanded to introduce four amendments 
- which they dubbed "constraints", hence the name of th e ir ad hoc 
alliance - to the original NUG plan: (1) No participation of East
Jerusalem Arabs in the elections; (2) no negotiations as long as 
violence continues, i .e .  before the end of the In tifa d a : (3) no
negotiations with PLO and no Palestinian state in the Land of Israel; 
and (4) the continuation of Jewish settlements in the te rr ito r ie s .
The very formation of the "constraints" faction constituted an 
acute problem for Mr. Shamir. I f  the Likud Prime Minister was to ta lly  
to ignore the demands of the "constraints" faction, he would be faced
The "constraints" faction was furious with a call made by several 
Labourites to open a dialogue with the PLO without the Likud's 
consent. As they put i t .  Labour was but a tenant in the NUG, in no 
position to sell the house (the land of Israe l) without the 
consent of the landlord (the Likud).
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with a mounting opposition within his own party. He was well aware that 
in terms of substance, the "constraints" faction's positions certainly  
reflected the opinions of an overwhelming majority of the Likud 
members. On the other hand, i f  he was to le t  the faction's positions 
become o ffic ia l policy, he would be blamed by Labour for undermining 
the NUG peace plan. Since Mr. Shamir could not wish away the 
"constraints" faction, he was certain to find himself in trouble either 
in the Likud or in the NUG. Put simply, the "constraints" faction 
actually constrained Mr. Shamir to choose between party and government. 
Thus the Likud Prime Minister found himself between the Devil and the 
deep blue sea.
One of the leaders of the "constraints" faction, Mr. Sharon, 
served as the chairman of Likud's Central Committee, the party's 
supreme p o litic a l organ. Therefore i t  was there that the faction 
planned its  showdown with Mr. Shamir. The crucial meeting of the 
Central Committee on July 5 1989 was a turning point in the road of the 
NUG. Also, i t  provides us with a prime example of heresthetics at its  
best.
The main issue at stake was the peace process, although the real 
battle  between the factions revolved around agenda control and voting 
procedures.* Prime Minister Shamir demanded that a single vote of 
endorsement take place on his address, in which he would introduce the
The trad ition  in the Likud has been that the Chairman of the 
Central Committee consult with the Chairman of the Movement (Mr. 
Shamir held the la t te r  position at the time, as he s t i l l  does at 
the time of w riting) when laying out the agenda for the Central 
Committee. Mr. Sharon, however, was not required to defer to him, 
and chose this time to use his prerogative of u n ila te ra lity .
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NUG's peace plan. Mr. Sharon, on the other hand, proposed two separate 
votes: (1) on the Prime M inister's speech; and (2) on the "constraints" 
faction's positions on the peace issue. As a way to  avoid open 
co nflic t, Mr. Shamir suggested a head-to-head vote of his proposal 
against any other proposal, meaning that of the "constraints" faction. 
Mr. Sharon rejected this idea and insisted on two separate votes. The 
procedural fight was not merely a matter of prestige. Rather, i t  
reflected a conflict between Mr. Sharon's strategy o f "increasing 
dimensionality" and Mr. Shamir's strategy of "fixing dimensionality" 
[see Riker, 1986, p. 66]. In other words, the number of dimensions of 
the peace issue introduced through smart p o litica l manoeuvres could 
determine whether i t  would be a winning or a losing proposition within 
the framework of the NUG.
In order to introduce a new dimension to the NUG peace plan and 
prove that in its  original form i t  does not enjoy a m ajority within the 
Likud, Mr. Sharon had to pass a resolution reflecting the positions of 
his faction. By his estimate, in a head-to-head vote between Mr. 
Shamir's policy and the faction 's , the la t te r  would have been defeated 
because many members of the Central Committee, i f  forced to choose 
between th e ir leader and th e ir principles, would probably vote 
strateg ically  (for the leader) rather than sincerely (fo r the 
principles they believe in ) .*  Only two separate votes could have 
relieved the Likud members of this dilemma.
Opinion polls carried out before the meeting among Likud Central 
Committee members (by Ma'ariv and Yediot Ahronot1 indicated that 
Mr. Shamir had the support of at least two-thirds o f the members.
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Mr. Sharon's insistence on two votes instead of one thus 
represented a maneouvre of increasing dimensionality. The obvious fact 
that the two-votes proposal was but a p o litic a l maneouvre did not 
matter much. The members of the Central Committee would certainly have 
voted for the faction's policy, i f  no other issue was involved. After 
a l l ,  i t  did re flec t more fa ith fu lly  the Likud's ideology. "Manipulation 
works even though those who are manipulated know they are being 
manipulated because, once a salient dimension is revealed, its  salience 
exists regardless of one's attitude towards it"  [Riker, 1986, p. 151].
Mr. Shamir protected himself against Mr. Sharon's maneouvres by 
pursuing a strategy of fix ing dimensionality, namely blocking the 
separate votes proposal and insisting on one vote only. The Prime 
Minister was certain of victory in the Central Committee in this case, 
which would enable him to claim that the peace plan enjoys a majority 
both in the NUG and in the Likud. Mr. Sharon could not, of course, le t  
such a thing happen, since i t  would have defeated the very raison 
d'etre  of the "constraints" faction. Attempts to reach a compromise 
between the two sides, even as the Central Committee was already in 
session, fa iled  u tte rly . There was even fear of physical violence 
during the meeting, which disgracefully proved to be the decisive 
factor: the spectacle of a disorderly (and nationally televised liv e )
showdown eventually forced Mr. Shamir to yield to the demands of the 
"constraints" faction. In order to prevent the separate approval of its  
proposals, he agreed to include the four constraints in his own speech. 
I t  was a face-saving formula which fa iled  to disguise complete 
surrender.
And so i t  was that the Prime Minister's speech had been 
scrutinized by leaders of the "constraints" faction before delivery.
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Moreover, Mr. Shamir was made to declare that the principles introduced 
into his speech would bind the representatives of the Likud in both 
government and parliament. For the Prime Minister, th is capitulation  
was a worse outcome than whatever may have happened had he agreed in 
advance to vote separately on his and the faction's proposals, both of 
which would have been approved, in a ll likelihood. In the la t te r  case, 
Mr. Shamir could have told Labour that his proposal represents NUG 
policy, whereas the faction's proposal is only part of the principles 
of the Likud - which, alongside with many other principles, could be 
shelved for the time being. Having included the "constraints" in his 
own speech, however, he dealt a crippling blow to the NUG's original 
peace plan. When at long last the Central Committee meeting was over, 
there was a near-unanimous agreement that the "constraints" faction had 
scored a great p o litic a l victory.
The victory of the strategy of increasing dimensionality over the 
strategy of fix ing dimentionality within the Likud created, as could be 
expected, an NUG c ris is . Even though Prime Minister Shamir insisted 
that his speech did not deviate from NUG policy. Labour leader Mr. 
Peres reacted by saying that "party interests have superseded the 
national need for a peace process. Shamir may agree to Sharon's 
dictates, but the Labour party w ill not" [Israel TV, 6 .7 .89 ]. Labour 
demanded and got another vote in the NUG approving the peace plan 
(23.7 .89), but the plan's p o litica l status and the chances for its  
implementation were severely damaged.
The government cris is  was not only related to the peace plan 
i ts e lf ,  but also to the Shamir-Rabin relations which maintained the NUG 
status QUO thus fa r. When Mr. Shamir made peace within the Likud - 
capitulating to his intraparty opposition - at the expense of the NUG
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peace plan, he lost the confidence of Mr. Rabin, who with him
engineered both the NUG and its  peace plan. This breach of fa ith  marked 
the beginning of the end of the 1988 NUG. I f  until then i t  was a 
Shamir-Rabin operation, now Mr. Peres and Mr. Sharon have seized the
in it ia t iv e . Since both these leaders were dead set against the NUG
formula, for ideological and personal reasons, the s ta b ility  of the 
government, i f  not its  existence, became now very shaky.
In the second half of 1989 the NUG was rapidly deteriorating. Not 
only did the PLO reject the idea of elections in the te rr ito rie s  (which 
made the NUG plan very much irre levant) but also the Intifada  
in tensified, bringing about b itte r  exchanges of accusations between the 
Likud and Labour.* Moreover, two fresh "foreign" peace in itia tiv e s  - 
one by Egypt's President Mubarak (September) and one by U.S. Secretary 
of State Baker (October) - turned up to be destabilizing, as fa r as the 
NUG was concerned. These "ideological interventions" from outside 
appeared to frustrate the already delicate Likud-Labour ideological
balance, since both basically rested on the te r r i tory-for-peace formula 
as well as a meeting in Cairo between Israe lis  and Palestinians - ideas 
to ta lly  unpalatable to the Likud.
In la te  1989 and early 1990 the NUG spoke in three voices on the 
peace issue: Labour supported both the NUG plan and the two "foreign"
in it ia t iv e ; Prime Minister Shamir supported the NUG plan but was 
against the "foreign" in itia tiv e s ; and the "constraints" faction in the
Even aloof politic ians like  Mr. Arens and Mr. Rabin became 
involved in the Likud-Labour mudslinging. When Mr. Arens said that 
Mr. Rabin was not his best choice to deal with the In tifad a , he 
was quickly reminded that because of him, the Is rae li Army was 
stuck in Lebanon for years.
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Likud opposed both the NUG plan and the "foreign" in it ia t iv e s . The 
"foreign" in itia tiv e s , at least that of Mr. Baker, provided Mr. Rabin 
with an opportunity to put Mr. Shamir's real intentions to a tes t, in 
order to see whether or not his position on the peace issue is 
differen t from that of the "constraints" faction. Mr. Rabin expected 
Mr. Shamir to go along with him at least one step further, to an 
unprecedented Israeli-Palestin ian dialogue in Cairo. However, Mr. 
Shamir, suspecting that the PLO was going to be a guiding force in 
Cairo as well as distrusting the Americans' promise to play the role of 
"an honest broker", f la t ly  refused.* Besides, Mr. Shamir's chief desire 
was to keep the peace within the Likud, and making gestures towards
Labour would have served him i l l  in this respect.
In his determination to display a tough attitude v is -a-v is  the 
peace issue, Mr. Shamir dismissed Mr. Weizmann from the NUG on 
31.12.89. Mr. Weizmann was accused of conducting unauthorized meetings 
with PLO. He was alleged to have helped bring about the PLO's qualified  
endorsement of Secretary of State Baker's peace in it ia t iv e . Since 
refusal to have anything to do with the PLO was a central feature of 
the consensus on which the NUG rested, Mr. Shamir showed Labour, by 
dismissing Mr. Weizmann, "who is boss" in government.** This move put
Labour in an awkward position indeed, forcing them to choose between
* As a matter of fact, he la id  out conditions for a Cairo meeting
which the Palestinians rejected at the time, although they did 
accept sim ilar conditions for the subsequent meeting in Madrid.
* *  Apart from revenging the dismissal of Mr. Moda'i in 1986, Mr.
Shamir taught Mr. Weizmann a personal lesson for denying him the 
prime ministership in 1984, when he decided to collaborate with 
the Labour party.
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equally distasteful alternatives: to back Mr. Weizmann meant to put an 
end to the NUG and being portrayed as a pro-PLO party. To abandon Mr. 
Weizmann was to accept a clearly in fe rio r position in NUG. Mr. Peres, 
who wanted to dismantle the NUG formula anyway, suggested that his 
party stand up for Mr. Weizmann. Mr. Rabin, who favoured the 
continuation of the NUG, searched for a compromise solution. Using his 
influence with Mr Shamir, and helped by Mr. Peretz of Shas, Mr. Rabin 
negotiated a way out of the cris is : Mr. Weizmann stayed on as a
minister, but le f t  the Inner Cabinet.
Mr. Shamir seemed satisfied with the conclusion of the c ris is : "I
have punished the man who was responsible for 'PLO chasing'; I conveyed 
a message to the world that we are set against the PLO; and I s t i l l  
succeeded in maintaining the existence of the NUG" [Israel TV, 3 .1 .90 ]. 
He assumed that the Weizmann a ffa ir  would strengthen his leadership 
position in the Likud following months of in fighting , in which the 
"constraints" faction blamed him of "soft" p o litic a l standing and 
opening the door to bring the PLO into the peace process. However, I f  
Mr. Shamir thought that at least he bought some domestic peace, he was 
proven wrong. The "constraints" ministers kept fighting him, because 
the real issue was not policy but the very leadership of the Likud. The 
factional ac tiv ity  intensified in preparation for yet another crucial 
meeting of Likud's Central Committee, scheduled for February 12, 1990.
At that meeting, the basic rules of democratic conduct broke down 
almost completely. Mr. Sharon, the Chairman of the Central Committee, 
again refused to consult Mr. Shamir on the agenda, and insisted again 
on two separate votes. Having learned from past mistakes, Mr. Shamir 
decided to be more re s ilien t this time. At the meeting, Mr. Shamir gave 
his address and asked himself for endorsement. Nobody could te ll
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whether the hands raised in the tumult actually constituted a majority; 
Mr. Shamir announced that he had won a m ajority, declared the meeting 
closed and turned to walk away.* At the same time the chairman, Mr. 
Sharon, grabbed another microphone and asked for the Committee's 
approval of his faction's "constraints". Instead of one or two orderly 
votes, Mr. Shamir and Mr. Sharon were vying with each other over two 
separate microphones, simultaneously asking for a show of hands on two 
differen t sets of resolutions and then each announcing victory. Mr. 
Shamir appears to have emerged the v ictor, i f  for no other reason then
because he had remained the Prime Minister.
In the February 1990 meeting, unlike the one in July 1989, Mr. 
Shamir's strategy of fix ing dimensionality seems to have won over Mr. 
Sharon's strategy of increasing dimensionality. Following the Central 
Committee meeting Mr. Sharon resigned his position in government, 
claiming that he could fight more e ffective ly  for his positions outside 
the NUG.** This development robbed Labour of a sorely needed pretext to
leave the government, since i t  gave a boost to the NUG peace plan which
was the issue at stake.*** However, the Shamir-Rabin alliance was 
crumbling, and i t  was obvious that the government could not survive for 
long. When Mr. Peres approached Mr. Rabin with a plan to form a
*  I t  had been agreed in advance that voting w ill take place only
a fter a debate, to which scores of members from both camps already 
registered.
* *  Another "constraints" minister, Mr. Moda'i, actually le f t  the
Likud to set up a new 5-member parliamentary faction, in order to 
put more pressure on Mr. Shamir.
* * *  Even Mr. Weizmann, the most "dovish" of Labour's ministers, said
that Labour should stay in government now that Mr. Sharon had 
resigned.
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"government of peace" - Labour and the religious parties - the la tte r  
agreed to dismantle a governing formula he had believed in . He was 
w illing  to do i t  not least because he did not feel committed any more 
to Mr. Shamir. I t  was Mr. Rabin's consent to the attempt to form a 
Labour government which brought about the collapse of the NUG in March 
1990.
The downfall of the NUG in 1990 was an indication that the pattern 
of po litics  that fa c ilita te s  conflict regulation fe l l  short of securing 
the degree of ideological and p o litica l consensus required for conflic t 
resolution. "At best such governments could only resolve problems over 
which a broad consensus exists and launch in itia tiv e s  to be completed 
at a stage when the government w ill be more homogeneously structured" 
[Elazar and Sandler, 1990, p. 241].
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The Politics of Narrow-Based Government
Following the 1988 elections and the formation of the Likud-led NUG, 
Labour's leader Mr. Peres soon developed an ambivalent attitude towards 
the government formula, the Likud and Prime Minister Shamir. Apart from 
ideological reasons, Mr. Peres was not ready to put up with his fa ilu re  
to secure an NUG with prime m inisterial rotation in the coalition  
bargaining process. Mr. Shachal, a close associate of Mr. Peres's, 
claimed that "Peres's desire to topple the 1988 NUG existed from day 
one. Without rotation he could not see himself waiting a whole 
parliamentary term without becoming prime minister. This is why he 
planned to destroy the government" [in terv iew ].* This behaviour seems 
to correspond with Piker's idea about p o litic a l manipulation: "The
heresthetician [p o litica l manipulator] thrives when he is losing 
because he is driven, i t  seems, by an intense desire to win" [Riker, 
1986, p. 51]. Even Mr. Peres himself admitted that "there was no point 
to stay long in government without rotation. We made a mistake joining 
the NUG in the f ir s t  place" [interview].
The personal position of Mr. Peres in the non-rotational NUG was 
indeed problematic. Even though he was Deputy Prime Minister and 
Finance Minister, he did not enjoy the same status as Prime Minister 
Shamir or even Defence Minister Rabin. This unacceptable situation Mr.
*  Mr. Edri and Mr. Katz-Oz, ministers loyal to Mr. Peres, expressed 
sim ilar opinions [interviews].
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Peres was determined to change, by trying to form a narrow-based Labour 
government with the support of the pivotal religious parties. To 
achieve this goal, Mr. Peres had two major p o litic a l weapons at his 
disposal. As the leader of the Labour party he could shake the 
foundations of the national coalition by sharpening the already 
existing conflict with the Likud about the peace issue. And as the 
Finance Minister he was in good position to buy out the religious 
parties. Since the views of several religious parties on the peace 
issue were not too distant from Labour's, Mr. Peres's strategy to 
dismantle the NUG and form a Labour/Religious government seemed, at 
least on the face of i t ,  not to ta lly  unrealistic.
There were two ways to try  and form a Labour/Religious coalition: 
through new elections, or through a change of alignment in the existing 
parliamentary situation. Generally speaking, in Israel changing a 
government without new elections is quite leg itim ate .* In this 
particular case, however, the only legitimate way to form a new 
government was through new elections, because the Likud has had the 
foresight to include a clause to this effect in the 1988 NUG 
agreement.** I t  was clearly stated there that i f  the Knesset passed a 
vote of no-confidence in the NUG, no other government would be 
established in its  stead. Rather, within seven days both the Likud and
* In several other countries, on the other hand, a flieaende 
wechsel - a change in the coalition without new elections - is 
p o lit ic a lly  unacceptable, i f  not p lain ly il le g a l. The idea is that 
democratic norms should prevail over parliamentarism. See 
Bogdanor, 1983, p. 275.
* *  See the 1988 coalition agreement. A rtic le  1.22, in appendix C.
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Labour would submit a b il l  for dissolving the Knesset and holding new 
elections within 100 days. Moreover, a change of government without 
asking for the opinions of the voters would certainly detract from the 
p o litica l legitimacy of a would-be Labour/Religious coalition in its  
efforts on the peace issue.
Mr. Peres was not interested in the longer, i f  more legitimate 
route to a Labour/Religious government. He wanted to form i t  already in 
the current Knesset.* He provided several explanations for his choice 
of strategy: F irs t, there was an urgent need to advance the peace
process that could not wait until a fter the long process of new 
elections and new coalition bargaining. Second, several religious 
parties maintained at the time positions sim ilar to Labour's on peace, 
but things could change in the wake of new elections. Third, there was 
no majority in the Knesset for new elections, not least because the 
Likud and Mr. Shamir naturally opposed i t .  And fourth, even i f  i t  was 
necessary to consult the electorate, i t  was better for Labour to enjoy 
incumbency prior to elections. As for the claim that attempts to form a 
narrow-based Labour government in the current Knesset violated the 
coalition agreement, Mr. Peres responded by suggesting that the Likud 
also did not adhere to the agreement - by blocking progress on the 
issue of electoral reforms, for instance.
All these explanations notwithstanding, Mr. Peres had at least two 
important reasons to pursue a policy of narrow-based government rather
The Likud, suspecting Labour of an e ffo rt to form a government in
the current Knesset, tried  to make the 1988 coalition agreement a
state law. But i t  fa iled  to do i t ,  as i t  fa iled  to leg is la te  the
artic les  on rotation in the 1984 coalition agreement.
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than early elections in his attempts to dismantle the NUG. F irs t, 
Labour was well behind the Likud in public opinion p o lls .*  In the 
municipal elections held in February-March 1989, which usually provide 
a good indication of voting patterns for the forthcoming national 
elections. Labour was badly beaten by the Likud.** Second, in the event 
of early elections Mr. Peres was bound to face a strong intraparty  
challenge to his leadership.*** After a l l ,  he led Labour four times 
into defeats in general elections. To become prime minister in the 
current parliamentary term was the safest way for Mr. Peres to secure 
for himself the top spot on Labour's l is t  and lead i t  in general
elections for the f i f th  tim e.****
In his plan to destroy the NUG formula, Mr. Peres was not without 
a llie s  in the Labour party, as well as enemies such as Mr. Rabin, of 
course. In particular, he enjoyed the support of younger party
activ is ts , who saw even a Labour defeat in the next elections as a
blessing in disguise, because i t  would hasten the departure of the
* In July 1989, for example, polls indicated that i f  elections were 
held. Labour's representation would drop from the present 39 seats 
to 25 [Newsweek, 31.7.89].
* *  Indeed, so spectacular was the Likud's success that these
municipal elections were dubbed "the second upheaval" (the " f irs t
upheaval" occurred in 1977, when the Likud upset Labour in
national government). Also, in November 1989 Labour achieved only 
a narrow victory in its  last remaining bastion, the Histadrut.
* * *  Apart from Mr. Rabin, three new contenders for the party
leadership emerged in March 1989: Mr. Shachal, Mr. Ya'acobi and
Mr. Gur.
* * * *  Only Mr. Ben-Gurion has led Mapai/Labour into five general 
elections - a ll of which he won.
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veteran leadership and open new roads for them.* Also the more "dovish" 
party members tended to support him.
Having secured a su ffic ien tly  strong basis at the intraparty  
leve l, Mr. Peres then turned to operate at the interparty leve l. In the 
course of 1989, using his clout as both the leader of the Labour party 
and Finance Minister, he was building a strategic understanding with 
the religious parties. Needless to say, an e ffo rt to s p lit  the 
religious parties from the Likud bloc involved a highly risky p o litica l 
gamble. Granted, several religious parties currently agreed with 
Labour's positions on the peace issue, but did that rea lly  mean that 
they would make Mr. Peres Prime Minister? After a l l ,  for over a decade 
the religious parties supported only Likud leaders as prime m inisterial 
candidates: Mr. Begin in 1977 and 1981, and Mr. Shamir in 1983, 1984
and 1988. Moreover, the a f f in ity  between the Likud and the religious 
parties has related not only to religious issues but also to p o litica l 
issues such as settlements, several security matters and many socio­
economic problems. However, both persistent efforts by Mr. Peres and 
p o litic a l developments within the ultra-orthodox camp appeared to 
undermine the basic formula of 1988 NUG and seemingly made a Labour 
government a not unrealistic option.
One u ltra  orthodox party that has gone through a meaningful 
p o litica l change was Agudat Is rae l. I t  had been basically an opposition 
party until Mr. Begin brought i t  into the Likud government in 1977.
This group seems to have adopted Lenin's slogan, "things have to 
get worse before they can get better". However, one of the ir  
leaders, MK Chaim Ramon, denied [in an interview] that this was 
the group's po litica l thinking.
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Since then i t  was identified with the Likud bloc until its  withdrawal 
from the NUG in November 1989 a fter 11 months of deteriorating  
relations with Prime Minister Shamir. I f  for 40 years Agudat Israel 
regarded Labour as socialist and an ti-re lig ious, in 1989 i t  started to 
relate  more favourably towards Labour, especially as Mr. Peres, the 
Finance Minister, provided i t  with generous financial allocations. 
Because of that. Prime Minister Shamir was forced to make concessions 
to the remaining religious parties, fearing they might change the ir  
tune as w e ll.*  Thus, for example, the Likud "k illed ", in November 1989, 
the proposed Basic Law on Human Rights, which was objectionable to the 
religious parties.
The changing attitude of Agudat Israel severely destabilized the 
government, but i t  was developments within another u ltra  orthodox 
party, Shas, which eventually sealed the fate of the NUG. Headed by the 
nationalist Rabbi Yitzhak Peretz, but guided in effect by an 
extraparliamentary group of rabbis, Shas with its  4 parliamentary seats 
was practically  an integral part of the Likud bloc during the 1984-88 
period.** In the 1988 elections, however, Shas increased its  number of 
parliamentary seats to 6 and became the pivotal party. The moderate Mr. 
Arieh D er'i, who emerged now as Shas's strongman, considered ways and 
means to exploit his party's new position in the system for improved
*  Meanwhile, Mr. Shamir used the unstable situation also to
strengthen his intraparty position: he suggested to his own party 
that the real choice was not between him and the "constraints" 
faction, but between him and a possible Labour government.
* *  In 1984 the Likud risked a major NUG cris is  when i t  backed Shas in
its  clash with the NRP over government patronage.
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benefits, and apparently reached the conclusion that cooperation with 
Labour was his party's best bet. This alliance eventually brought about 
the dissolution of the 1988 Likud-led NUG.
A Labour-Shas cooperation in the framework of a coalition  
government seemed a reasonable enough strategy for both parties. They 
could agree on p o litic a l issues, since Shas, as a Sephardic populistic 
party had no real conflict with Labour's te r r i tory-for-peace formula.* 
As for Labour, since i t  could not attract enough Sephardic votes to get 
back to power, i t  needed to a lly  with a party which could do just th is . 
Shas, a rising new force, seemed the right choice for a partner.** 
Moreover, Shas proved particularly successful in "Likud country" - poor 
neigbourhoods and development towns - which put i t  on co llis ion  course 
with the Likud, much to Labour's delight. Given the tigh t power
relations in the existing Knesset, however, an effective Labour-Shas 
ruling coalition seemed a long-term proposition, perhaps to be 
implemented in the next Knesset. In the current Knesset both parties 
were supposed to cooperate in government on the peace issue as well as 
on Sephardic-Religious issues.
This rationale - to plan a long-term Labour-Shas governing
coalition fo r, say, the decade of the 1990's - did not correspond with
the personal plans of both Mr. Peres of Labour and Mr. Der'i of Shas.
* During a v is it  to Cairo, the Shas "guru" Rabbi Yossef declared
that saving lives is more important than keeping te rr ito r ie s , 
which put him foursquare on Mr. Peres's side.
* *  Many Sephardic voters who had supported Labour until the early
1970's, and then had switched to the Likud in the la te  1970's and 
early 1980's, now fe lt  that both large parties have le t  them down. 
They voted for Shas in 1984 and more so in 1988. Shas got also the 
votes of previous NRP and Tami supporters.
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Both leaders wanted to cooperate in government already in the current 
Knesset. Mr. Peres wished to destroy the NUG and become prime minister 
right away. He certainly did not want to wait until the next elections, 
by which time he may not even head Labour's l is t .  As for Mr. D er'i, a 
candidate for the Finance post in a would-be Labour government, he 
assumed that holding a senior cabinet post for a couple of years would 
enable him substantially to increase Shas's p o litic a l power in advance 
of the next election .*
By the end of 1989, the Peres-Der'i plan to dissolve the NUG was 
basically in place. Even the p o litic a l weapon to be used in bringing 
down Mr. Shamir's government was decided upon: An affirm ative answer to 
Mr. Baker's peace in it ia t iv e . Now, as the would-be coalition partners 
waited for an opportune moment to execute th e ir plan, there was one 
more problem they had to resolve: acquiring the support of Labour's Mr. 
Rabin, a staunch advocate of the NUG formula. Sometime in January 1990, 
Mr. Der'i met with Mr. Rabin, with Mr. Peres blessing, and told him 
that his consent was the last thing needed to bring about a change of 
government which would take Labour to power and Israel to peace talks  
in Cairo. According to Mr. Rabin, "Der'i came to me and said that 
Peres's people claim that you are against Mr. Peres being Prime 
Minister. I said this was not a problem. The important thing was to 
move towards peace" [interview ]. When Mr. Rabin f in a lly  came to believe 
in the fe a s ib ility  of a Labour-Shas "government of peace", the NUG was 
c lin ic a lly  dead.
According to p o litica l commentators, Mr. Der'i expected Shas to 
gain 10 to 12 Knesset seats. [Mr. Shchori and Mr. Crystal, 
interviews]
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Having obtained Mr. Rabin's support for his e ffo rt to set up a 
narrow-based government, Mr. Peres fe l t  confident enough to say: "We 
have today a clear majority in parliament for going ahead with the 
peace process, there is a clear change of heart in the religious 
parties. The moment they [the Likud] say no [to the peace process], 
that w ill be the end of the story [NUG]". The Likud's Deputy Foreign 
Minister Netanyahu responded: "we do not deal with ultimatums, and we 
certainly do not yield to them. I f  Labour wants to bolt the Government, 
they are free to do so. But they w ill be responsible for dealing with 
the consequences" [New York Times. 22.2.90].
In early March 1990, Labour and its  associates, the u ltra  orthodox 
parties, decided to move for a vote of no-confidence in the NUG, 
following which a Labour government was supposed to be formed. The plan 
was as follows: 60 MKs w ill vote against the government (55 Labour
bloc, 5 Agudat Is rae l); the u ltra  orthodox Degel Hatora with its  2 MKs 
would abstain. The government w ill have only 58 votes (47 Likud bloc, 6 
Shas, 5 NRP). The NUG would f a l l ,  and the same parties who voted 
against would form a narrow-based government. Once a Labour government 
was in place, Shas with its  6 MKs would jo in in. This plan was meant to 
save the Shas leadership problems with its  followers, most of whom were 
anti-Labour. The idea was that Shas would not be seen to help setting 
up a Labour government, but merely jo in an already existing Labour 
government.
A plot involving more than half the membership of the Knesset 
could not have remained concealed for any length of time; as i t  was, i t  
became apparent on Monday, 12.3.90, following a meeting of Labour's 
Central Committee. In response, the next day Prime Minister Shamir 
dismissed Mr. Peres from his government - an act which may have brought
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him personal g ra tifica tio n , but was mainly intended to prevent Labour 
ministers from staying on in a caretaker government, should the NUG 
fa ll  in the no-confidence vote scheduled for Thursday 15.3.90.* And 
indeed, a ll Labour ministers then had no choice but to submit the ir  
resignations so as not to be seen abandoning Mr. Peres at th is crucial 
moment. A major po litica l cris is  was afoot, and several politic ians  
attempted to save the NUG formula. However, the Peres-Der'i alliance 
pressed on to topple the NUG as scheduled.
The Knesset debate on the no-confidence vote was as b itte r  as 
could be expected. Mr. Shamir: "Peres never accepted the fact that he 
was not the premier. He treated me as he had treated a ll the other 
premiers he served under, and the record makes that plain . He complains 
of character assassination, but Israe li leaders have already te s tified  
to his character" [Jerusalem Post. 16.5.90] - a clear reference to Mr. 
Rabin's characterization of Mr. Peres as "indefatigably seditious". Mr. 
Peres's response was equally below the belt: "Shamir was poles apart 
from the former Likud premier Begin." The Shamir NUG fe l l  in a vote of 
60 against 55. 115 MKs were present, but the 5 Shas MKs who were absent 
tipped the scale .** Thus came to an end the f i r s t  Is rae li government to
*  By law, a m inister's dismissal or resignation takes effect after
48 hours, so Mr. Shamir had to f ir e  Mr. Peres early enough to make 
sure he was out of the government before i t  fe ll  down. In 
hindsight, i t  was a major miscalculation on Labour's part to le t  
the cat out of the bag more than 48 hours before the scheduled no- 
confidence vote.
* *  E arlier, Mr. Shamir had refused to give the Shas patron Rabbi
Yossef a written commitment on behalf of the Likud to respond 
favourably to the Baker peace in it ia t iv e . The Rabbi then 
instructed Shas's MKs not to show up for the vote, and five  out of 
the six obeyed.
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have lost in a no-confidence vote in parliament. S t i l l ,  for the time 
being Mr. Shamir remained the head of a caretaker government and the 
Labour party was out. Labour's policy of "a narrow-based government" 
apparently won a p o litica l victory, but as we shall see i t  was very 
short-lived.
I t  was symbolic that the collapse of the NUG involved the formal 
dismissal of Mr. Peres from the government. In fac t, Mr. Peres had 
given Mr. Shamir good excuses to dismiss him many times before. 
However, as long as Mr. Shamir believed that the NUG could continue to 
function, he turned a blind eye on Mr. Peres's behaviour and re lied  on 
his close cooperation with Mr. Rabin to keep the government formula 
a live . But when Mr. Rabin joined Mr. Peres in opposition to the 
government, Mr. Shamir realized that the end was at hand. He took a 
p o litica l gamble by dismissing Mr. Peres and sever relations with 
Labour. In final analysis he emerged a winner, for following the 
collapse of the NUG a narrow-based Likud government was formed.
Winning the Battle. Losing the War
The successful 60:55 parliamentary no-confidence vote, on 15.3.90, put 
an end to the NUG: "The operation of parliamentary democracy... implies 
that governments must l ie  down and die when they are beaten in the 
leg is la ture . Typically, such a defeat can be d e fin ite ly  established 
only i f  the government loses a confidence vote" [Laver & Scofield, 
1990, p. 211]. In Israe l, governments are not necessarily buried when 
they die: they become caretaker governments that may come back to l i f e .  
Coalition po litics  revolve sometimes around this kind of l i f e  a fter
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death, and this indeed is what happened to the Shamir government
following the collapse of the national coalition.
Given the coalition c ris is , the President of the State Mr. Herzog 
had to in it ia te  a new agenda which would map ways out of the po litica l 
stalemate. Having consulted with the parties represented in the 
Knesset, as required by law, Mr. Herzog found out that the options of 
new elections or yet another national coalition did not enjoy wide 
support and could not lead to a speedy formation of a stable
government. Thus, the only remaining option was to call on the leader 
of either major parties to serve as a "formateur" for a new government. 
However, the President (as well as anyone else, not least Mr. Peres) 
was surprised to discover that Labour's leader did not enjoy the 
support of a majority of the members of the Knesset.
As expected, Mr. Peres was supported by the 60 members of Knesset 
who voted in favour of bringing down the NUG. But perhaps unexpectedly, 
Mr. Shamir now enjoyed the support of 60 members from the Likud and 
Religious blocs - including the 5 Shas MKs who only a few days ea rlie r
had brought down his coalition by not showing up for the no-confidence
vote.* Given a 60:60 parliamentary balance, who should be called upon 
to form the next government? Never before has an Is rae li President had 
to make a po litica l decision, nor was he supposed to do such a thing. 
The assumption behind the law governing the President's role in 
appointing a "formateur" was that the identity of the candidate would 
emerge in and of its e lf ,  as a result of a clear majority in the Knesset
I t  should be stressed again that Shas, for fear of its  pro-Likud 
voters, could i l l  afford to be seen as doing anything which 
positively prevented Mr. Shamir from heading the government.
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supporting one party leader. This time, however, the appointment of a 
"formateur” meant in fact giving an in it ia l  advantage to either side, 
thus possibly determining a specific resolution to the coalition  
cris is .
On 21.3.1990 President Herzog decided to assign Labour's Mr. Peres 
with the task of forming a new government. He cited three main reasons 
for his decision. F irs t, the Labour party was the largest party in the 
Knesset.* Second, the Labour party succeeded in the no-confidence 
vote.** Third, the President thought that "MK Shimon Peres has the best 
chance of receiving the support of the majority in the Knesset. This is 
of course the main consideration that must guide me and has guided me 
in the past and indeed won the Knesset's approval on each occasion" 
[Herzog, GPO, 21.3.90]. Naturally, the Likud was not very happy with 
the President's decision. However, "there can be no institutional 
method which guarantees that the head of state w ill not have to make a 
decision which is regarded by one of the p o litica l parties as being 
unfair" [Bogdanor, 1983, p. 268].***
*  On the very day of the no-confidence vote, the 5 Liberal MKs
headed by Mr. Moda'i were recognized as a separate parliamentary 
faction, so the Likud was relegated to the number two party with 
35 seats.
* *  Knowingly or otherwise, he thus applied "the principle of gu ilt"
whereby "the party that caused the defeat of government had to 
take responsibility for i t  by being entrusted with the formation 
of the new government" [von Beyme, 1983, p. 357].
* * *  This act by Mr. Herzog, as well as his calls for national
coalitions both in 1984 and 1988, and his other involvements in 
controversial issues (e.g. the p re -tra il pardon given to Shin-Bet 
o ffic ia ls  or the clemency given to the convicts of the Jewish 
underground) a ll indicated that parliamentary democracy in divided 
Israel was facing the phenomenon of "creeping presidential ism".
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The President may have assumed that Mr. Peres has had a good 
chance to form a government, but re a lity  proved him wrong. When Mr. 
Peres o f f ic ia lly  started the bargaining process, he had a leg is la tive  
coalition of 60 MKs - one short of the minimum requirement. However, he 
found i t  near-impossible to get any additional parliamentary support in 
the face of the Likud and its  a llie s . Mr. Peres expected support from 
Shas and Degel Hatora, which parties engineered with him the downfall 
of the NUG, but they did not come through, having been categorically 
instructed by th e ir spiritual leader Rabbi Schach (to whom even Rabbi 
Yossef deferred) not to help in forming a Labour government. This 
"religious veto" forced Mr. Peres to look for parliamentary support by 
renegades from the right-of-centre parties. Here, the "best" potential 
candidates were MKs from the Liberal faction which has just s p lit away 
from the Likud.
In early April i t  seemed as i f  Mr. Peres has managed to put 
together a 61-member winning coalition, when he captured a defector 
from the Liberal faction: MK Avraham S harir.* Having secured a winning 
coalition on paper, Mr. Peres asked the Speaker to convene a Knesset 
session on 11.4.90 in order to present his government and ask for 
approval. Just before the session was due to open, with the coalition  
guidelines on the members' tables and a ll the guests of honour already 
in the gallery, i t  transpired that Mr. Peres did not have a majority to
The strategy of capturing defectors was "justified" by the urgent 
need to form "a government of peace". I t  was supposed to create a 
momentum whereby more parties (such as Shas) would jo in the 
government for fear of being le f t  out. Mr. Sharir, formerly a 
member of the "constraints" faction, was obviously ready to back a 
left-w ing cabinet for hefty o ffice payoffs.
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form a new government after a l l .  Two MKs from Agudat Israel defected 
from the proposed 61-member Labour coalition (following yet another 
rabbi's orders), and did not even show up for the Knesset investiture  
session.*
Finding himself in this awkward position, Mr. Peres asked to delay 
the opening of the Knesset session. The Speaker, Mr. Shilansky of the 
Likud, turned out to be quite accommodating. He could have declared i t  
an investiture session, in which case Mr. Peres would have fa iled  to 
gain the House's confidence and concluded then and there his assignment 
as a "formateur”. However, Mr. Shilansky never called on Mr. Peres to 
present his government, thus granting him a new lease of l i f e  as a 
"formateur". That day Mr. Peres asked the President to extend his 
mandate, hoping that Agudat Israel w ill bring its  two dissident MKs to 
heel, or else replace them. He was given 15 extra days to try  and form 
a government.
Having obtained additional time to form a government, Mr. Peres 
hoped to get somehow support from the Shas or from the breakaway 
Liberals. As much as Shas's Rabbi Yossef wanted to help Mr. Peres, he 
nevertheless fe lt  he had to obey the instructions of Rabbi Schach, as 
well as respect the wishes of pro-Likud Shas voters. As for the 
breakaway Liberals, Mr. Peres thought he might somehow benefit from 
th e ir conflict with the Likud. But the Liberal faction's threat to join  
a Labour government was just a mercenary way to obtain concessions from
Both MKs Verdiger and Mizrachi said they would rather have 
resigned the ir Knesset membership than vote for a Labour 
government [interviews].
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the Likud.* On 25.4.90, when Mr. Moda'i announced that the Liberals 
would stay in the Likud bloc, the last forlorn hope to form a Labour 
government faded away. The next day Mr. Peres informed the President 
that he could not form a government.
On 27.4.90 the Likud's Mr. Shamir called on the President and was 
given a mandate to form a new government. His term as "formateur", long 
as i t  may have been, was not rea lly  eventful - not least because i t  was 
clear that sooner or la te r  a Likud government w ill de fin ite ly  be 
formed. In fact, within two weeks Mr. Shamir already had a 61-member 
winning coalition, but he was in no rush to form a government.** He was 
equivocal in his mind about two possible coalition options: forming a 
narrow-based Likud government or again a Likud-led NUG. In fact Mr. 
Shamir was facing the same dilemma as in the 1988 coalition bargaining 
process. Of course, in 1990 he trusted Labour much less than in 1988, 
but s t i l l  he was not enthusiastic about forming a narrow-based 
government. He abhorred being the captive of religious and right-wing 
extreme parties and head a government in which he, a veteran 
nationalis t, would be regarded a left-w inger. The end result of these 
considerations was that Mr. Shamir decided to delay the fin a l choice of 
government format as much as possible.
*  Mr. Moda'i made a ll the Likud government ministers sign an 
agreement to the effect that he would be granted a top-ranking 
cabinet position and that the whole of his faction would be given 
"safe seats" on the Likud's l is t  of parliamentary candidates for 
the next elections. Hard cash guarantees in case of default were 
also mentioned.
* *  The two defectors, Mr. Mizrachi of Agudat Israel and Mr. Sharir of 
the Liberal faction, were back in the Likud's fold to give Mr. 
Shamir a 61-member majority. They were even joined by a Labour 
defector, Mr. Ephraim Gur, the 62nd member of the coalition .
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Unlike Mr. Shamir, his party riva ls  Mr. Sharon and Mr. Levy were 
keen on a narrow-based government, in which they would get the key 
cabinet positions abandoned by Labour. They put pressure on Mr. Shamir 
to conclude a speedy formation of a government, but he himself was 
s t i l l  w illing  to negotiate with Labour d ifferen t arrangements for a 
possible national coalition. Labour's leaders had good reasons 
seriously to consider a renewed national coalition. For Mr. Peres, the 
main consideration was to avoid or delay his party's relegation to 
opposition status, which for him meant a b itte r  intraparty struggle of 
p o litica l survival. Mr. Rabin simply wanted to be back in government as 
Defence Minister, a position which, he f e l t ,  was simply robbed away 
from him. So both Labour leaders were w illing  to negotiate a national 
coalition, even though i t  was clear enough that i t  would be dominated 
by the Likud party even more strongly than the 1988 NUG.*
During the month of May 1990, Mr. Shamir was s t i l l  not sure
whether or not to pursue a strategy which would bring about an NUG. On
the one hand, he knew what he should expect of Mr. Peres in an NUG; on
the other hand, Mr. Sharon and Mr. Levy would be much more formidable
opponents in a narrow-based government. F inally , despite his 
reluctance, Mr. Shamir formed a narrow-based Likud government in which 
his intraparty riva ls  received top positions. I t  may be said that as 
a matter of fact, Mr. Shamir was not quite free to choose which 
government to form, because Mr. Sharon and Mr. Levy had a veto power on
I t  was obvious, for instance, that the new coalition , whatever its  
hue, would not say "Yes" to the Baker peace plan and would not be 
based on a Likud-Labour parity. To add insult to in jury, Mr. 
Peres, said the newspapers, was to be offered a fa r less 
prestigious portfo lio  - Immigration Absorption.
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the subject. When Mr. Sharon called for a meeting of the Likud's 
Central Committee in early June 1990 to decide the matter, i t  was clear 
that a narrow-based government was soon to become a fac t. On 11.6.90 a 
narrow-based Likud government consisting of 19 ministers was sworn in .*
Looking back at those three months of the p o litic a l c r is is , i t  
seems that in the final analysis, extraparliamentary rabbis rather than 
party po litic ians decided the fate of the governing coalition . To begin 
with. Rabbi Yossef had helped Mr. Peres dismantle Mr. Shamir's national 
coalition by ordering the Shas MKs not to show up for the no-confidence 
vote. Then came Rabbi Schach to restore parity between the two 
p o litic a l blocs by preventing Shas and Degel Hatora from supporting a 
Labour-led government. Finally , the Lubavitzer Rabbi dealt the final 
blow to a possible Labour coalition by instructing his loyal MKs from 
Agudat Israel not to support a left-w ing government. This situation, 
which would have been inconceivable but a decade before, is perhaps the 
best indication for the profound changes that have taken place in the 
composition of the Israe li electorate and in the p o litic a l system as a 
whole.
As the po litica l cris is  progressed, both Labour and the Likud 
became more and more involved in a real-world, down-and-dirty coalition  
politicking . The b itte r  conflict was about capturing the system's weak 
pivotal position, which would enable the winner to form at best an 
unstable government. In the coalition bargaining process marginal
Mr. Levy became Minister of Foreign A ffa irs , while Mr. Sharon was 
given the Ministry of Housing - a prominent position in face of 
the huge incoming waves of immigration, as well as a prime 
position for influence- and benefit-peddling.
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players and defectors called the p o litic a l shots. The) exhibited a high 
degree of mercenary cynicism, a willingness to do anything to acquire 
office payoffs. This period was abuzz with instances of inter-bloc  
defections, intervention of external forces in the coailition process, 
party s p lits , factionalism, p o litica l bribery and much more. The 
public, disgusted with "politics", began to demand chaniges both in the 
extreme P.R. electoral system and in the system of government i t s e l f . *  
However, the public demand for sweeping changes seemed rather hopeless 
because the existing p o litica l structure gives strong power to party 
politic ians who are not lik e ly  to give i t  up easily.
The lesson in coalition terms is that parliamentary forces that 
can agree on defeating the government in a no-confidence vote may not 
be able to agree on a new government to replace i t .  The a b ility  to form 
a government is not quite the same as the a b ility  to engineer a 
successful vote of no-confidence.** Shamir's unity government was 
vulnerable, but not replaceable. Replacing a government must ultim ately  
mean setting up an alternative government that can win the confidence 
of parliament. Obtaining a majority in parliament against a government 
means defeating i t  in a lim ited sense only, until a new government wins 
a vote of confidence.
*  This was, of course, another form of extraparliamentary pressure, 
used most e ffective ly  by a group of decorated veterans who 
launched a hunger strike to demonstrate th e ir  disgust with the 
system. Eventually, as this dissertation was nearing completion, 
the Knesset adopted one of th e ir demands, a lb e it in a diluted  
from: a law for direct elections to the office of prime minister.
* *  I f  a constructive vote of no-confidence was the rule in Israel (as 
i t  is in Germany), the three months coalition c ris is  might never 
have occurred.
- 373 -
Mr. Peres won the small battle but lost the greater war, since 
eventually a narrow-based Likud, rather than Labour government was 
formed. The formation of a Likud government in June 1990 fin a lly  gave 
the majority of the electorate what they had apparently voted for in 
1988: a government under the Likud, based on nationalis tic  and
religious forces, without the participation of Labour. Coalition 
po litics  is c ritic ized  for producing governments that do not re flec t 
"the w ill of the people"; but had Mr. Peres succeeded in forming a 
Labour government, one might have claimed, most reasonably, that i t  
represented a total distortion of the 1988 election results.
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Chapter Nine
Conclusions
In this dissertation, we set out to demonstrate the usefulness of the 
notion of "not losing", using Israe l's  1984 and 1988 national 
coalitions as a case-study. And indeed, i t  seems that this approach can 
explain rather well the secret of the NUGs successful existence for 
almost six years, 1984-1990. "Not losing" considerations dominated the 
interparty bargaining strategies of the various actors during the 
formation phase of both governments, which was why larger-than-minimal 
coalitions came into being in the f ir s t  place. Furthermore, "not 
losing" considerations have had a strong impact on the modus ooerandi 
of both unity governments and thus on th e ir s ta b ility  during the 
following, maintenance phase. F inally , i t  was a deviation from this  
principle which brought down the 1988 NUG.
Minimax ("not losing") coalition strategies were employed by the 
two major parties, Labour and the Likud, as well as by the various 
small parties, in th e ir pursuit to acquire both o ffice  and policy 
payoffs. I t  can and w ill be shown that the more trad itional approaches 
to coalition p o litics , emphasizing "win maximization" as they do, are 
not quite adequate to explain the behaviour of the principal partisan, 
factional and individual actors involved in either the establishment of 
Is rae l's  NUGs or the ir maintenance.
Trad itionally , national unity governments have been given ad hoc 
explanations, mainly in terms of dire national emergency (e.g.
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B rita in 's  government during World War I I ) .  And indeed, this can fu lly  
explain Is rae l's  previous experience with an NUG, in 1967. However, 
while Is rae l's  overall situation was indeed d if f ic u lt  in 1984, this  
does not seem to have been the chief determinant factor of the 1984 
NUG; Israel has managed sim ilar crises in the past without such a 
government.*
Yet another ad hoc explanation which might f i t  the b il l  relates to 
the conservative behavioural pattern of "low risk , low expectations" 
apparent in the leadership style of both Mr. Peres and Mr. Shamir, the 
leaders of the two large parties and therefore the two chief actors in 
the p o litica l system. However, "not losing" considerations w ill be 
shown to have determined to a large extent the moves of nearly a ll
actors, at least some of the time - among them Mr. Rabin, a daring 
general in his time, as well as the charismatic and more famously 
daring Mr. Sharon, on the one hand, and the ever calculating leaders of
the religious parties, on the other hand.
Therefore, we shall endavour to demonstrate that throughout the 
period under consideration, the various moves of the actors involved in 
the Is rae li po litica l system cannot be exclusively explained by the
trad itional "win maximization" approach, without recourse to the 
guiding principle of "not losing".
I t  may even be argued that the present time (early 1992) is no 
less crisis-ridden than mid-1984: enormous immigration absorption 
tasks (incompetently handled), rampant unemployment, serious 
deterioration in U .S .-Israel relations, and relentless te rro ris t  
attacks. Yet there is no NUG at present. In terestingly, however, 
as soon as the f i r s t  shots in the 1992 election campaign were 
fired , the Likud began to ta lk  about a post-election NUG, which 
Labour rejected out of hand. This is where we came in . . .
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C o a litio n  Formation
In analysing the major strategic decisions made during the 1984 
coalition bargaining and formation process (Chapter Five above), i t  
seems that in a ll of them the driving motivation of the actors involved 
was above a ll how not to lose, rather than how to maximize winnings.
At the in it ia l  post-election bargaining stage, both Labour and the 
Likud gave p rio rity  to the creation of "blocking coalitions", ahead of 
trying to form "winning coalitions". Each large party bargained to 
create a leg is la tive  coalition not rea lly  for the purpose of forming 
its  own executive coalition, that is , a government, but essentially in 
order to block the opponent from forming a government. A conservative 
"not losing" approach was also employed at th is stage by the small 
parties, which tended to cooperate with either Labour or the Likud in 
the formation of the leg is la tive  "blocking coalitions" rather than 
keeping th e ir coalition options open as long as possible. Only when 
they fe lt  secure from total loss, did the various parties move on.
Once a p o litic a l stalemate of two 60-member leg is la tive  "blocking 
coalitions" emerged in the 120-member Knesset, Labour and the Likud 
could either "play i t  safe" and share power in government, or take the 
risk involved in repeat elections in the hope of winning a majority 
this time. Their decision, to opt for power-sharing, was a clearly  
risk-averting one in terms of coalition behaviour. I t  simply meant a 
transfer of the "blocking coalitions" from the leg is la tive  level to the 
executive one, in forming a "not losing" government.
Thus, the national coalition formed was a multiparty government, 
not a Labour-Likud two-party national executive. The decision to
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include small s a te llite  parties in the government was aimed at 
minimizing the risk of losing, i f  and when the national coalition would 
dissolve and a minimal coalition would become a viable option.
Even the very coalition agreement defined a government structure 
and modus ooerandi which reflected a "not losing" approach, since i t  
was based on a Labour-Likud parity and mutual veto arrangements which 
aimed mainly at thwarting the p o litic a l opponent, rather than opening 
options to oneself.
The "not losing" behaviour demonstrated at the formation phase 
does not seem rational from the point of view of "win maximization", 
because i t  led to an oversized coalition. However, we should bear in
mind that a "maximizing winning" strategy was highly risky. I t  could
have resulted in a total loss for either side - exclusion from the 
winning coalition either immediately or as a result of repeat 
elections. Therefore, a "not losing" strategy does appear to have had
its  rationale: i t  secured sure i f  small coalition payoffs to the two
large parties as well as most of the small parties.
One of the major reasons why Labour and the Likud displayed a 
common interest in a national coalition related to personal 
considerations by th e ir top leaders, Mr. Peres and Mr. Shamir 
respectively. Rather typ ica lly  for party leaders who tend to perceive 
th e ir personal interests as identical with those of th e ir  parties, the 
two leaders preferred governmental power-sharing to repeat elections, 
because the la tte r  option constituted a personal risk for either of 
them. Repeat elections might have been preceded by a strong intraparty 
challenge to the ir top party positions, not least because they had 
fa iled  to win the previous elections. Compared to this risky option, 
power-sharing seemed a safer and thus preferable choice. This community
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of "not losing" interests was most c learly demonstrated in the prime 
m inisterial rotation agreement which v ir tu a lly  tied the survival of the 
national coalition not only to a Labour-Likud interparty cooperation 
but also to th e ir own po litica l surv iva l.*
Ideological considerations also played a major role in the 
formation of the 1984 unity government. Most significant was the fact 
that the positions of the le ft-o f-cen tre  Labour and the right-of-centre  
Likud on the fundamental issues - peace and te rr ito r ie s  - were 
extremely polarized. This situation created a strong partisan 
motivation to prevent the p o litica l opponent from forming a government 
which might make and implement irreversible ideologically-based 
decisions. Each side was therefore prepared to forego its  own ideology, 
to a certain extent, as long as th is guaranteed that the other side 
would not be able to push through its  policy positions.
Any one of the "win maximization, policy blind" coalition theories 
would have predicted a narrow-based left-w ing or more probably righ t- 
wing coalition, ignoring the fact that pariah parties were represented 
on both extremes of the spectrum. But even a "policy-based, win 
maximization" theory would have been unable to explain why neither 
party attempted during this stage at least to look for chinks in the 
armour of the opponent's blocking coalition, in order to maximize its  
policy payoffs. Needless to say, the coalition which eventually emerged 
has had the gross disadvantage of robbing both major components of
As a matter of fact, Mr. Shamir took great care to make himself 
personally the "beneficiary" of the rotation agreement, ensuring 
in-house peace for the duration. The same applied of course to Mr. 
Peres as w ell, but less forcefu lly because he became the f ir s t  
incumbent.
- 379 -
almost any policy payoff. I t  has had, on the other hand, the advantage
of denying such payoffs to the opponent - and th is , i t  turns out, was
the overwhelming policy-wise consideration.
Turning to the 1988 bargaining and formation process (Chapter 
Eight), i t  seems that again the national coalition was the outcome of 
"not losing" strategies. The Likud's intraparty po litics  was probably 
the key to the formation of the wide-based coalition th is time. Given 
the Likud-Labour parliamentary power relations (65:55), forming a 
national coalition seemed a suboptimal choice for the Likud, because i t  
could have formed a minimal winning coalition and maximize its  office  
and policy payoffs. However, Mr. Shamir was motivated by a desire to
strengthen his own position in the Likud, and the inclusion of Labour
in government seemed an effective way to achieve th is , since i t  was 
bound to reduce coalition payoffs to his intraparty r iv a ls . Thus, the 
national coalition which did not seem a rational choice in interparty  
"win maximization" terms, appears to have had its  logic once Mr. 
Shamir's intraparty "not losing" considerations are taken into account.
As for Labour, i t  decided to jo in the 1988 national coalition for 
both in ter- and intraparty "not losing" considerations. The party as a 
whole made a rational choice by preferring government to opposition, 
and its  move can be explained in terms of both o ffice  and policy 
payoffs: Labour's membership in government meant m inisterial and other 
posts as well as blocking the pursuit of extreme religious and 
nationalist policies. For Labour's leader, Mr. Peres, however, 
coalition participation constituted a certain risk in intraparty 
p o litic s , since in a Likud-Labour government the status of his rival 
Mr. Rabin was bound to be strengthened. S t i l l ,  Mr. Peres agreed to 
bring Labour into the national coalition because he would rather deal
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with a challenge to his leadership position as a government minister 
than as the leader of the opposition.
In general, the formation of wide-based coalitions seems to direct 
our attention to the wider context of coalition bargaining which 
appears to take place simultaneously at the in ter- and intraparty  
levels - two separated but s t i l l  related arenas. Party leaders who face 
d iff ic u lt ie s  in th e ir  own house for having fa iled  to win a clear 
election victory, may try  to jo in a winning coalition in order to find 
there refuge from punishment by intraparty challengers. By the same 
token, party leaders may fear an intraparty challenge even i f  they had 
won the elections, so the same consideration may hold true for them as 
w e ll.
I t  should be emphasized, in this context, that a larger-than- 
minimal coalition holds a real advantage for the beleaguered party 
leader: in a minimal winning coalition, he w ill have to o ffer his party 
riva ls  in fluentia l positions, in which they w ill be able to expand 
th e ir in-party influence s t i l l  further, e ither by allocating jobs and 
funds to supporters, or by appearing as the keepers of the true party 
ideology, or both. A "not losing" approach to this problem is to bring 
in the riva l party and hand over to i t  at least some of these 
positions.
The wider context in which the interparty bargaining and formation 
process is tied to intraparty po litics  actually relates to both the 
pre- and post-election periods. The pre-election period may witness a 
challenge to the party leadership by politic ians who claim that they 
w ill be able to put the party in a more advantageous position for the 
post-election coalition bargaining process. I f  the party is defeated in 
the elections, yet another intraparty challenge is possible, the logic
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of which is to select the "right" leader who would secure for the party 
the best possible coalition option. Naturally, party leaders - even i f
they are the "wrong" choice to lead the party into elections and in the
bargaining process - employ "not losing" tactics to avoid pre- and 
post-election intraparty challenges. I f  they are successful, their  
parties may have to settle  for suboptimal coalition choices [Laver and 
Shepsle, 1990, pp. 504-5].
For instance, prior to the 1984 elections. Labour's Mr. Peres 
seemed to have been aware that he was regarded by many in his party as 
the "wrong" leader; in order to avoid an intraparty challenge, he 
forced early elections. Mr. Navon, who was apparently the "right" party 
leader both in terms of pre- and post-election calculations, was thus 
robbed of the opportunity to contest Mr. Peres within the party. As a 
resu lt. Labour fin a lly  had to settle  for a coalition option which only
a few months ea rlie r i t  had refused even to consider.
While the conclusions so far have focused on the attitudes and 
strategies adopted by the large parties and th e ir leaders, i t  should be
borne in mind that the smaller parties' behaviour can also be explained
by and large in terms of "not losing". They knew in advance, of course, 
that they w ill not be called upon to form a coalition; they also knew 
that they may have a great deal to say about which coalition w ill be
formed; but each one of them knew as well that a coalition may be
formed without i t .
The small parties mainly played the "blocking", not the "pivoting" 
role. In doing that, they joined either of the two large parties, 
perhaps too soon for th e ir own good, for fear that i f  they kept their  
options open for too long they may be le f t  out altogether - especially 
once the two large parties decided to jo in forces. This is a classical
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case of "not losing". For Shas, for instance, the "not losing" attitude  
displayed in 1984 has incurred a price in the long run, when i t  found 
i t  d if f ic u lt  to switch to "win maximization" by steering a middle 
course between the Likud and Labour in 1990.
The case of Yachad's Mr. Weizmann, as well as other small-party 
leaders, brings forth an important point about "not losing" in general: 
while defensive, i t  is by no means a passive strategy. In p o litic s , 
"not losing" has to be played out with as much s k i l l ,  intensity and 
heresthetical a b ility  as "win maximization". Mr. Weizmann, for one, 
having decided, for ideological reasons, not to side with the Likud in 
any case, gave his fu ll support to Labour without any negotiation. He 
may have thought that his pivotal position would lend him automatically 
the payoffs due to an actor who is in position to tip  the balance 
either way. This was a naive approach to "not losing", which eventually 
led to his fading away from the p o litica l scene, alongside with Tami's 
Mr. Abu-Hazeira and Ometz's Mr. Hurwitz, two more pivotal actors in 
1984 who fa iled  to secure the ir respective positions for the long run. 
In short, one may play a "not losing" strategy and lose anyway...
The Maintenance Phase
Needless to say, the tr ia ls  and tribulations of the formation stage are 
by no means over once a government has won the confidence of the 
leg islature. Maintaining the multiparty executive is as delicate a 
balancing act, requiring the same sk ills  and bound by the same 
considerations as forming i t  in the f ir s t  place.
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The formation of the Inner Cabinet and the pattern of portfolio  
allocation were two major features which defined the rules of the "not 
losing" game at the maintenance phase of Is rae l's  National Unity 
Governments. The Inner Cabinet was based on a Labour-Likud parity and 
mutual veto arrangements which represented coalition po litics  of risk  
avoidance and uncertainty reduction. Each of the major parties was 
concerned with securing the a b ility  to thwart the opponent's objectives 
even at the expense of its  own freedom of action. And the allocation of 
government portfolios was balanced in a way that would enable the two 
large parties not to lose to each other by fo ilin g  one-sided actions; 
that is to say, in each major sphere of government a c tiv ity , such as 
settlements, for instance, responsibility was s p lit  between ministries 
held by each bloc. But the most extreme example of the balanced 
distribution of government positions in the 1984 unity government was 
the rotation in the office of the Prime Minister.
The design of a new in stitu tion , the Inner Cabinet, and the unique 
pattern of allocating government portfolios, as defined at the 
coalition formation phase, were supposed to be operative at the 
government maintenance phase. That is to say, the "not losing" approach 
particu larly  underlines that coalition formation is not divorced from 
coalition maintenance. A coalition government is not only a coalition  
but also a government, and a "not losing" actor must know before 
joining the government what precisely is being formed. I f  necessary, he 
w ill insist on changing the rules of the game and/or on designing new 
ones. For example. Labour's insistence on an institu tional change - the 
setting-up of a "no-win, no lose" Inner Cabinet - was aimed at breaking 
the anticipated "winning coalition" of the Likud/Religious bloc in the 
government plenum on the fundamental issue of settlements.
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still, i t  seems that the very transformation from coalition  
formation to maintenance creates a certain change in the atmosphere; 
having secured themselves against total loss, some actors may regard 
themselves safe enough to start mixing th e ir strategies, and elements 
of "win maximization" may become more pronounced. Specifically , in our 
case in point, the "not losing" interparty arrangements on which the 
government was predicated were frustrated by intraparty po litics  
deriving from the factional system described in the Table below:
Table 9.1 The Factional Svstem of the National Coalitions
LABOUR LIKUD
Period Mainstream Opposition Mainstream Opposition
1984-1986 Peres-Rabin None Shamir Sharon-Levy
1986-1988 Rabin Peres Shamir-Arens Sharon-Levy
1988-1990 Rabin Peres Shamir-Arens Sharon-Levy-Moda'i
Factional leaders did bargain to "win" a fte r the "not losing" 
coalition has taken o ffice . For almost six years, however, no leader 
has dared employ a risky "win maximization" strategy that seriously 
threatened the very existence of the basic government formulae.
As related in Chapter Six, in 1984-86 Labour's Prime Minister 
Peres used rotation as a p o litica l weapon to score several partisan 
victories over the Likud. The scope and effectiveness of the po litics  
of rotation was, however, rather lim ited. Mr. Peres did not use i t  to 
"win" fundamental issues, e.g. the peace and te r r ito r ia l issues, since 
such a strategy might have led to the collapse of the government,
- 385 -
especially as the pivotal religious parties refused to side with 
Labour. I f  Mr. Peres was a true "win maximizer", he should have taken a 
decision, sometime in 1986, not to implement rotation but rather to 
compete in new elections - which, based on Labour's high polls ratings, 
could have brought about a "win-maximizing" Labour government. Mr.
Peres did not employ such a strategy because i t  was too risky: a
fa ilu re  meant opposition and an intraparty challenge by Mr. Rabin - a 
total loss. In a nutshell, Mr. Peres used the po litics  of rotation only 
to the extent that he could control the risk and no more.
As for the Likud's Mr. Shamir, despite intraparty opposition from 
Messrs. Levy and Sharon, he voted strateg ically  on several issues, 
allowing Labour to "win", in order "not to lose" rotation. On the peace 
and te rr ito r ia l issues, however, Mr. Shamir did not want to and 
certainly could not vote strateg ically . On these sensitive issues he 
had much more to lose. Had Labour pushed this point to the lim it, 
threatening to bring down the NUG and frustrate rotation, i t  would have 
cost Mr. Shamir the prime ministership, but would also have sent him to 
new elections as a possible winner (not least because Labour would have 
lost a great deal of credit by welching on a written agreement). But
betraying Likud ideology on the te rr ito r ia l issue would have cost Mr.
Shamir the party leadership, and with i t  rotation and everything else.
In 1986-88 (Chapter Seven), a fter rotation. Prime Minister Shamir 
used the po litics  of status q u o  as a "not losing" device to block 
Labour's po litics  of "early elections", which aimed at changing the 
government peace policy, i f  not the government formula i ts e lf .  As of 
early 1988, having the support of the religious parties and a lead in 
the opinion polls, the Likud could rather safely have ejected Labour 
from the government and consequently maximize its  coalition payoffs.
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However, Mr. Shamir declined to dissolve the national coalition because 
for him, status q u o  was a satisfactory "not losing" solution, both in 
government on the peace and te r r ito r ia l issues and - more importantly - 
in the Likud's intraparty p o litic s . A change to a Likud government 
would have meant increased payoffs to Mr. Shamir's intraparty rivals  
and thus reduced payoffs for him.
As for Labour's Mr. Peres, even though he found himself in a
dominated position in the government, he dared not take a risk  in order 
to change the status q u o . In May 1987 he threatened to leave the 
government i f  i t  did not change its  peace policy. The government policy 
did not change, but Mr. Peres nevertheless stayed on. This may have
been embarrassing, but opposition and an intraparty challenge by Mr.
Rabin were rea lly  risky. Losing in government was a loss to the Labour 
party; losing to Mr. Rabin was a loss to Mr. Peres, hence the strategy 
he adopted.
Throughout the life tim e of the 1988 national coalition, as 
explained in Chapter Eight, Prime Minister Shamir has faced a permanent 
dilemma: opt for a united government and a s p lit Likud, or for a united 
Likud and a s p lit government. In his attempts to eat his cake and have 
i t ,  he found a strategic a lly  in Mr. Rabin. They both struggled to 
sustain a "winning coalition" within the government that was under a 
constant threat from Labour's Peres faction and the Likud's Levy,
Sharon and Moda'i ("constraints") faction. F inally , however, Messrs. 
Shamir and Rabin were each forced by th e ir respective intraparty rivals  
to choose between party ("not losing") and government ("win 
maximization"), and they each chose party. Mr. Shamir, because Mr. 
Peres was undermining the government formula anyhow, and Mr. Rabin - 
because he could not contain Mr. Peres. Both Messrs. Shamir and Rabin
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realized that they may lose both in the government and in the party, so 
they chose at least not to lose in the party - even i f  i t  meant risking 
a relegation to opposition. Their choice of party over government was 
thus a conservative "not losing" move, which had to do with po litica l 
survival at the intraparty level, not with "maximizing winnings" at the 
interparty leve l.
Mr. Peres was the one leader who could and did try  to "maximize 
winnings" at the interparty leve l. As i t  happened, his efforts to form 
a narrow-based government succeeded in dismantling the national 
coalition, but fa iled  to form a Labour government. Following the 
fa ilu re  of his risky "win maximization" strategy, Mr. Peres - aware 
that he now faced a serious intraparty risk - changed his strategy back 
to "not losing" and was w illing  to join a renewed national coalition. 
Mr. Shamir was also w illing  to consider such a "not losing" option, but 
intraparty considerations eventually forced him to form a narrow-based 
Likud government. Mr. Peres paid dearly for his unsuccessful venture: 
he lost his cabinet position and eventually the chairmanship the Labour 
party. This was perhaps the best evidence that a "not losing" rather 
than a "maximize winnings" coalition strategy had been the logical 
choice during the life tim e of the national unity governments.
This applies to the small parties as w ell. At the maintenance 
stage, none of the small parties has made a bold move to try  and 
in it ia te  a narrow-based government. They preferred the NUG formula, 
even though i t  could not have been, for them, a "win maximization" 
strategy. In a nutshell, the small parties behaved as factions in the 
large parties rather than as independent actors.
A notable exception was Shas's involvement in the downfall of the 
1988 NUG, and the subsequent attempt by Mr. Peres to form a narrow-
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based government, in which Shas stood to gain a great deal. I t  should 
be borne in mind that this party was completely under the control of an 
extraparliamentary group of rabbis. Its  p o litic a l leadership did seek 
this time to pursue a strategy of "win maximization"; its  spiritual 
leaders, however, were more concerned about the long-term impact on the 
party's grassroot constituents, who were more inclined towards the 
Likud. Whatever payoffs the party might have obtained during the 
remaining two and a half years of the I2th Knesset, i t  could have lost 
more in future elections. In this way, long-term considerations of "not 
losing" prevailed over short-term considerations of "win maximization", 
and Shas made its  astonishing about-face.*
During the formation and maintenance phases of the national 
coalitions, Israe li party leaders ever found themselves involved in a 
balancing act between in ter- and intraparty considerations. This 
dilemma, which is of course quite typical of party po litics  in any 
multiparty parliamentary democracy, is not easy to resolve. What 
appears as an optimal course of action in one game may prove to be a 
suboptimal behaviour in the context of the other game. Usually, leaders 
follow "the dynamics of changing expectations", that is , they "learn" 
in the course of the coalition negotiation and maintenance processes 
about the intentions of in ter- and intraparty riva ls  and adjust their  
strategies accordingly [Kliemt & Schauenberg, 1984, p. 13]. However, i f
The same sort of calculation made Shinui leave the government in 
May 1987, when i t  fe l t  its  position eroded among its  middle-class, 
middle-of-the-road constituents, who tended to d r if t  towards the 
CRM. "Not losing", in this case, forced Shinui to forego 
incumbency payoffs in order to secure future survival.
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no strategy can secure success in both games, party leaders are lik e ly  
to prefer the intraparty game, because i t  is the principal arena in 
which th e ir p o litic a l survival w ill be decided.
In view of th is , the intraparty arena should not be regarded as 
"merely" one of many environmental constraints with which actors who 
form and maintain interparty coalitions have to contend. Intraparty 
po litics  seems to be inherent to the coalition process. Its  importance 
appears to be sim ilar to that of ideology, in determining the 
configurations of actors in the coalition game. Hence our suggestion 
that due to "not losing" considerations, the intraparty arena is a 
major area to be investigated within the analysis of coalition  
p o litic s , and the interparty arena is by no means the only one that 
should be studied in depth. In other words, a proper coalition theory 
should not only ask which parties are involved and what is the numeric 
strength and ideological position of each one of them - but also take a 
good look at th e ir internal composition, as a functional determinant of 
th e ir external behaviour.
Add I i c a b i l i t v
All the above discussion should not be construed as an argument in 
favour of the "not losing" approach as a superior alternative to any 
existing coalition theory. The point is that i t  should be added to, 
rather than to ta lly  replace, the trad itional approaches. In game theory 
terms, i t  may be thought of as a component in a mixed strategy, rather 
than a pure strategy in its e lf .
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The rationale of the "not losing" approach suggests a new 
application to interparty competition in polarized systems. In fac t, i t  
points out a pattern of interparty interaction that is incompatible 
with one of the most famous models of party systems - Sartori's  
"polarized pluralism". Essentially, Sartori argues that a system with a 
high level of fragmentation (five  parties or more) creates "polarized 
pluralism" in that the direction of the interparty competition is 
centrifugal [Sartori, 1976, pp. 342-351]. By contrast, the "not losing" 
approach asserts that precisely because the party system is polarized 
and ideological differences between le f t  and right are wide, off-centre  
parties w ill in it ia te  centripetal moves to capture the centre or forge 
alliances with those already occupying i t .  An off-centre party w ill 
move towards the centre position, even i f  i t  may lose votes to extreme 
parties in its  own "hemisphere", for this is the only way to prevent 
the ideology of the other "hemisphere" from prevailing. This dynamics 
of interparty competition can be called "centripetal pluralism", as 
opposed to "polarized pluralism"; i t  seems to be d irec tly  related to 
the analysis of coalition po litics  in terms of "not losing" strategies.
Centripetal moves by large off-centre parties tend to form 
oversized coalitions which lack ideological cohesion. This phenomenon 
could hardly be explained by the "minimizing" coalition theories - 
certainly not by the policy-blind ones, but not even by the policy- 
based theories which assume a re la tive ly  high degree of ideological 
compactness amongst coalition partners. Indeed, when a larger-than- 
minimal coalition lacking ideological cohesion is formed, i t  implies an 
ideological "freeze" and thus there is a high probability that the 
actors involved were motivated by "not losing" considerations. 
Moreover, precisely because of the lack of ideological compatibility
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these actors w ill be highly concerned with maintaining the s ta b ility  of 
the coalition once i t  was formed. I f  "not losing" considerations 
account for both the formation and s ta b ility  of the coalition , we can 
partly understand why empirical research fa iled  rather surprisingly to 
verify  the theoretical assertion that more compact coalitions are more 
stable [Sanders & Herman, 1977; Schofield, 1987].
Wide-based coalitions tend to be based on "not losing" po litics  
wherever consensus po litics  do not apply. In such coalitions, conflicts  
between partners do take place because the leaders have to take into 
account the attitudes of party members and the wider constituency. Even 
in Europe's consociational democracies, "cartels of e lites" - which are 
largely autonomous in th e ir coalition behaviour and mostly pursue the 
po litics  of accommodation - engage in sporadic conflicts because 
regardless of th e ir "consensual" motive they are rational actors who 
have to consider "not losing" in both the intraparty and electoral 
arenas. In fact, the interaction of the e lites  may be more easily 
approved by the followers i f  i t  stems from "not losing" considerations 
rather than from aloof politicking [Tsebelis, 1990, Ch. 6].
The concept of "not losing" appears to be conducive to the 
emergence of a defensive, status q u o  oriented pattern of coalition  
behaviour. I t  tends to fa c ilita te  the creation of governments 
overburdened with heavy constraints that impair th e ir governing 
capabilities . "Not losing" governments may find themselves incapable 
of resolving conflicts or regulating them - they can only handle them 
[G. Smith, 1986, pp. 216-220]. "Not losing" coalitions create highly 
elaborate rules for the p o litica l game - so elaborate, in fac t, that 
the game its e lf  can hardly be played. In wide-based "not losing" 
governments, where partners are opponents and vice versa, there are
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nearly insurmountable problems of collective responsibility and the 
concomitant avoidance of responsibility.
The circumstances which led to the formation of Is rae l's  1984 and 
1988 national coalitions were rather unique by comparative European 
standards. However, the "not losing" coalition strategy which dominated 
the thinking of Israe li politicians is not uncommon in the party 
po litics  apparent in many parliamentary democracies which have been 
ruled for decades by coalition governments. Professional politic ians  
have a common in ter in avoiding any venture that may risk th e ir careers 
and therefore set a high p rio rity  to bargaining for mutual benefit, 
small though i t  may be, over the escalation of ideological 
controversies and p o litica l confrontations. For them po litics  is "the 
art of the possible" or actually "a survival game". When preference for 
compromise to contest is b u ilt into coalition p o litic s , i t  entails  
prudent conservatism which is incompatible with the high-risk "win 
maximization" assumptions of coalition theory and thus with minimal 
winning coalitions. A defensive risk-averting approach to coalition  
po litics  is much more compatible with oversized coalitions, as the 
Is rae li experience suggests.
The idea of "not losing" seems to offer a good conceptual framework for 
the analysis of the re a litie s  of Israe li national coalition po litics . 
Hopefully, i t  can therefore at least stimulate a re-examination of the 
oft-repeated claim that coalition actors are solely motivated by "win 
maximization" considerations. An expanded set of motivations, which 
would include risk avoidance as well as risk taking, loss minimization 
as well as win maximization, intraparty as well as interparty 
constraints, may have stronger explanatory powers.
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Postscript
In 1917, a year a fter he invented general re la t iv ity , Albert Einstein 
had tried  to apply i t  to the universe. According to general re la t iv ity ,  
matter or energy (which were equivalent) warped space and time lik e  a 
heavy sleeper sagging a mattress. The universe, Einstein realized, was 
the ultimate sagging mattress. He proposed that the weight of the whole 
cosmos could warp space-time around on i t s e l f . . .
But there was a problem with the curved-back universe. Such a 
configuration was unstable, i t  could either f ly  apart or collapse. 
Einstein d idn't know about galaxies. He thought, and was reassured as 
much by the best astronomers of the time, that the universe was a 
static  cloud of stars. To explain why his curved universe didn't 
collapse lik e  a struck tent, therefore, he fudged his equations with a 
term he called the cosmological constant, which produced a long-range 
repulsive force to counteract cosmic gravity. I t  made the equations 
ugly and he never rea lly  liked i t .  That was in 1917, twelve years 
before Hubble showed that the universe was fu ll of galaxies rushing 
away from each other.
When Einstein heard about Hubble's discovery, he discarded the 
cosmological constant, calling i t  the worst blunder of his career. At 
the crucial moment, Einstein had lost fa ith  in the beauty of his own 
beautiful theory. (What he should have suspected, of course, was the 
"evidence" that the universe was s ta tic . His contemporary, the 
inscrutable Eddington, said that no experiment should be believed until 
i t  has been confirmed by theory.) Had he stuck to his guns, Einstein 
would have made one of the greatest predictions in the history of 
science, that the universe is dynamic.
Dennis Overbye, 
Lonelv Hearts of the Cosmos
Which goes to show that Albert Einstein, too, was a "not loser"!
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Appendix A
A Glossary of Parties
Agudat Israel - An ultra-orthodox religious party with a non-Zionist 
ideology. Since 1977 a member of the coalition but without 
assuming fu ll membership in government. See also Poalei Agudat 
Is ra e l.
Achdut Ha'avoda - A left-w ing party a ff ilia te d  with a section of the 
Kibbutzim movement. Was part of Mapam, 1948-54. Joined Mapai in 
the Alignment in 1965. Joined Mapai and Rafi in 1968 to form the 
Israel Labour party.
Alignment - (a) name of an electoral l is t  composed of Mapai and Achdut 
Ha'avoda in 1965; (b) name of an electoral l is t ,  1969-1984,
composed of the Labour party and Mapam.
Arab Democratic List (ADL) - A l is t  of Mr. Abdel Wahab Daraussa, an 
Arab MK who le f t  the Labour party following the In tifa d a .
C ivil Rights Movement (CRM) - A left-w ing party led by Mrs. Shulamit 
Aloni who s p lit from the Labour party. Ran for elections for the 
f i r s t  time in 1973.
Degel Hatora - An u ltra  orthodox l is t  formed in 1988 under the guidance 
of Rabbi Schach.
Democratic Movement for Change (DMC) - A party established in 1977 by 
Mr. Yigael Yadin as a purported alternative to both major parties. 
Collapsed gradually during the term of the 9th Knesset. See also 
Shinui.
Free Centre - A splinter group which le f t  Herut in 1967; a part of the 
Likud between 1973 and 1977, and a component of the DMC in 1977. 
Headed by Mr. Shmuel Tamir.
Gahal - an electoral l is t  between Herut and the Liberal party in the 
1965 and 1969 elections; expanded in 1973 to form the Likud.
General Zionists - A right-of-centre party which favours private 
enterprise. Merged in 1961 with the Progressive party to form the 
Liberal party.
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Hadash - See Rakach.
Herut - A right-wing party founded in 1948 by the Mr. Menachem Begin. 
In 1965, Herut and the Liberal party formed the Gahal l is t ;  since 
1973 the major component of the Likud.
Independent Liberals - The former Progressive party. In 1961 merged 
with the Gerneral Zionists and in 1965 s p lit  again. As of 1984 
part of the Labour bloc.
Israel Communist party (Maki) - until 1967, an orthodox Marxist party; 
since then leaning towards accepted Zionist views. In 1973 was a 
component of Moked; in 1977 was part of Sheli. Since then 
practica lly  nonexistent.
Kach - A movement led by Rabbi Meir Kahane, notorious for its  extremist 
right-wing views.
Labour party - One of Is rae l's  two major p o litica l parties (See Mapai, 
A1ignment).
La'am - An alliance of small factions within the Likud consisting of 
the State L ist, the Independent Centre and the Labour Movement for 
the Land of Israe l. Gradually assimilated within the Likud's major 
components.
Likud - A jo in t l is t  of Herut, the Liberal party, La'am and other 
factions, founded in 1973. The major right-of-centre p o litica l 
bloc.
Mapai - The major component of the Labour movement. In 1968 merged with 
Achdut Ha'avoda and Rafi to form the Labour party.
Mapam - A left-w ing socialist-Z ionist party; was part of the Alignment 
between 1969 and 1984. Left the Alignment for the 1988 elections.
Moledet - A right-wing party established in 1988 by Mr. Rehavam Ze'evi, 
calling for a "voluntary transfer" of Arabs from Israe l.
Morasha - A religious l is t  founded towards the 1984 elections by 
factions from the NRP and Poalei Agudat Is rae l.
National Religious Party (NRP) - A powerful religious party and a 
permanent partner in a ll governments.
Ometz - A 1984 electoral l is t  headed by Mr. Yigal Hurwitz. Was part of 
the Labour bloc and then defected to the Likud.
Poalei Agudat Israel - An ultra-orthodox party with a workers' 
orientation, set up elections lis ts  with Agudat Israel in 1949, 
1955, 1959, 1973 and with Morasha in 1984.
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Progressive List for Peace (PIP) - Established in 1984 as a jo in t Arab- 
-Jewish l is t  supporting the creation of a Palestinian State.
Progressives - See Independent Liberals.
Rafi - A party founded by Mr. David Ben-Gurion when he s p lit  from Mapai 
in 1965. In 1968 most members returned to form the Labour party 
with Mapai and Achdut Ha'avoda. The rest (including Mr. Ben-- 
Gurion) formed the State List.
Rakach - A Communist party that appeals to Arab nationalist sentiments. 
Broke o ff from the Israel Communist Party in 1965. In 1977, joined 
with other splinter groups to form Hadash.
Shas - An ultra-orthodox party which s p lit from Agudat Israel in 1984
in order to appeal to the Sephardic community.
Sheli - A le f t is t  group formed towards the 1981 elections. Then s p lit 
between the CRM and the PLP.
Shinui - A centrist party formed a fter the 1973 War, part of the DMC in 
1977, part of the Labour bloc in 1984.
State List - See Rafi, La'am.
Tami - A party set up in 1981 after its  leader, Mr. Aaron Abu-Hazeira,
s p lit from the NRP. I t  was based on an ethnic appeal to Morrocan
Jews.
Techiya - An extreme right-wing party led by Mr. Yuval Ne'eman; s p lit 
from Herut a fter the signing of the Camp David Accords.
Tzomet - A right-wing party established towards the 1988 elections by 
Mr. Rafael Eitan; s p lit  from Techiya.
Yachad - A l is t  established in 1984 by Mr. Ezer Weizmann, la te r  joined 
Labour.
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Appendix B
The 1984 Coalition Agreement between the Alignment and the Likud
1. The Government
1.1 A National Unity Government (henceforth: the Government) w ill 
be formed, with the participation of the Alignment and the 
Likud factions, and other factions which choose to jo in  the 
coalition in accordance with this agreement.
1.2 The Government w ill be founded on the following principles:
a) Equality between the Alignment and the Likud in the
number of ministries and ministers.
b) The addition of other factions w ill be done in such a 
way that the balance between the two sides w ill be 
maintained. However, the addition of the NRP would not 
be at the expense of either side and would not be 
regarded as a violation of the inter-bloc balance.
c) Should a minister cease to serve as a member of the
government for any reason, his party w ill choose the 
minister who w ill replace him.
1.3 The Government and its  ministers w ill act in accordance with 
the Basic Guidelines attached to this agreement, which are an 
integral part of i t ,  and in accordance with Cabinet 
decisions.
1.4 The Government w ill serve for the entire fu ll term of the
Eleventh Knesset, until November 1988.
1.5 In the f i r s t  25 months the Government w ill be headed by Mr 
Shimon Peres and Mr. Yitzhak Shamir w ill be his Deputy and 
Minister of Foreign A ffa irs , and during the next 25 months 
Mr. Yitzhak Shamir w ill be Prime Minister and Mr. Shimon 
Peres w ill be his Deputy and Minister of Foreign A ffa irs . To 
firm ly base this provision changes w ill be introduced to the 
Basic Law: the Government, to define the status and authority 
of the Deputy Premier.
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1.6 Should Mr. Shimon Peres or Mr. Yitzhak Shamir be unable to 
f u l f i l l  th e ir duties, for whatever reasons, th e ir party would 
provide a replacement with the consultation and consent of 
the other side.
1.7 A rtic le  1.6 notwithstanding, a ll other ministers w ill serve 
in th e ir positions for the entire Government's term of 
office .
1.8 Throughout the entire period of the Government's term of 
o ffice , the Prime Minister w ill not wield his authority
(under Section 21a of the Basic Law: The Government) to
dismiss a minister from his post, except with the consent of 
the Deputy Premier. Such consent w ill not be required,
however, to dismiss a minister who belongs to the faction 
headed by the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister w ill wield 
this authority with regard to a minister belonging to the 
faction of the Deputy Premier, should the la t te r  request i t .
1.9 In order to implement the change of Premiers stipulated in 
A rtic le  1.5, Mr. Peres w ill resign towards the end of the 
f i r s t  25 months of the Government's term of o ffice , and the 
Alignment and the Likud w ill jo in tly  recommend to the
President of the State to nominate Mr. Shamir as the
designate Prime Minister. The new Government w ill be formed 
by the end of the f i r s t  25 months.
1.10 Mr. Shamir agrees to form his government along the principles 
set forth in this agreement.
1.11 This agreement w ill also apply to the government formed be 
Mr. Yitzhak Shamir.
1.12 Twenty five ministers w ill serve in the government, twelve
from either side and one NRP minister.
1.13 The division of m inistries, save the Prime Minister and the 
Deputy Premier and Minister of Foreign A ffa irs w ill be as 
fo l1ows:
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Alignment: The Likud:
1) Ministry of Defence 1) Ministry of Finance
2) Ministry of Education and Culture 2) Ministry of Justice
3) Ministry of Agriculture 3) Min. of Labour & Welfare
4) Ministry of Health 4) Min. of Housing & Constr.
5) Ministry of Immigrants absorption 5) Min. of Industry and Trade
6) Ministry of Police 6) Ministry of Transport
7) Ministry of Communication 7) Ministry of Tourism
8) Min. of Energy and Infrastructure 8) Min. of Science & Develop.
9) Ministry of Economy and Planning 9) To be decided.
The NRP and Shas factions w ill be represented in Government 
by a single minister without portfo lio  each until the Prime 
Minister and his Deputy w ill decide on how to divide the 
Ministries of the In terior and Religious A ffairs among them.
1.14 A permanent m inisterial committee, called the Inner Cabinet, 
w ill be established. I t  w ill have 10 members, five  from each 
side.
1.15 The Inner Cabinet is empowered to deliberate and decide on 
the following issues:
a) Issues within the ju risd iction  of the M inisterial 
Defence Committee under the government operational 
procedures. (The Inner Cabinet w ill also serve as the 
M inisterial Defence Committee.)
b) The policy and defense issues incorporated in the Basic 
Guidelines.
c) Any issue, including those issues stipulated by the 
Basic Guidelines, which the Prime Minister or the Deputy 
Premier seek to bring for deliberation and decision in 
the Inner Cabinet.
1.16 The decisions of the Inner Cabinet w ill have the same force 
as decisions of the M inisterial Defense Committee; but in 
Para. 41c of the government operational procedures, the 
consent of the Deputy Premier w ill also be required, in 
addition to that of the Prime Minister. In Para. 42 of the 
government operational procedures, the Prime Minister w ill be
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entitled  to bring an issue for deliberation by the Inner
Cabinet only with the Deputy Premier's consent. Should
disagreements arise, and the Inner Cabinet does not reach a
decision on a certain issue, the matter w ill not be brought
before the government plenum without the jo in t agreement of 
the Prime Minister and the Deputy Premier. Should an issue be 
brought for deliberation in the government plenum, and the 
Prime Minister or the Deputy Premier determine that i t  should 
be discussed in the Inner Cabinet, the issue w ill be 
discussed in the Inner Cabinet.
1.17 A m inisterial committee for economic a ffa irs  w ill be 
established, to be chaired by the Finance Minister. His 
deputy w ill be an Alignment representative.
1.18 A coalition committee w ill be established to look into 
changing the electoral system and amending electoral laws. 
The committee w ill be chaired by an Alignment representative. 
Changes in the electoral system as well as in the election 
laws w ill not be carried out without the consent of the two 
parties.
1.19 A m inisterial committee w ill be established to determine in 
which ministry to place the Land Authority.
1.20A m inisterial committee w ill be established to look into the 
areas of ac tiv ity  and responsibilities of the Ministry of 
Economy and Planning.
1.21 Decisions by the m inisterial committees stipulated in clauses 
1.19 and 1.20 w ill be regarded as recommendations only.
1.22 A deputy minister from the Likud w ill serve in the Ministry 
of Defence. The defin ition of those c iv ilia n  matters to be 
handled by him w ill be determined by the Minister, a fter  
consultation with him.
1.23 A deputy minister from the Alignment w ill serve in the 
Ministry of Finance. The defin ition of those matters to be 
handled by him w ill be determined by the Minister, after 
consultation with him.
1.24 The Ministry of Police w ill be reestablished.
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1.25 The principle of continuity in government decisions w ill be 
maintained. The opinion of the Attorney General on the matter 
w ill be considered.
2. The Knesset
The Knesset coalition members w ill act in accordance with the
coalition procedures, as follows:
The Coalition Executive
2.1 The Coalition Executive w ill not make a decision on any issue 
brought before the Knesset or one of its  committees, i f  
either of the two factions (Alignment or Likud) objects.
2.2 The Coalition Executive w ill comprise of six members from the 
Likud faction and six members from the Alignment faction, as 
well as one representative from every other faction 
participating in the coalition. In the f i r s t  25 months, the 
Coalition Executive w ill be chaired by a Likud 
representative, and an Alignment representative w ill be his 
deputy. In the ensuing 25 months, an Alignment representative 
w ill serve as chairman, and a Likud representative w ill serve 
as his deputy. The decisions reached at Coalition Executive 
meetings w ill be placed on record. The Coalition Executive 
chairman w ill convey these decisions to the coalition faction 
leaders.
2.3 Motions tb the Agenda and Private Member B ills
a) A member of the coalition who wishes to submit a motion 
to the agenda w ill f i r s t  submit i t  to the Coalition 
Executive chairman. The chairman w ill c la r ify  the 
position of the relevant m inister. I f  neither the
chairman nor the minister objects to the motion, i t  w ill
be submitted to the Knesset Speaker.
b) A member of the coalition who wishes to submit a private
member b i l l ,  w ill f i r s t  submit i t  to the Coalition
Executive for deliberations. The Coalition Executive 
w ill bring the b i l l  to the attention of the relevant 
minister, who w ill state his position within a month. 
Should the minister not state his position within a
month, the b ill  w ill be submitted to the Knesset
- 402 -
Speaker. Should the relevant minister declare his 
opposition to the b i l l ,  he or his representative w ill be 
summoned to a discussion by the Coalition Executive,
which w ill decide on the matter.
c) Members of the coalition factions w ill vote on motions 
to the agenda, whether regular or urgent, and on private  
member b il ls , in accordance with the decision of the 
Coalition Executive, or with the statement of the 
minister replying, should the Coalition Executive not
manage to decide them.
2.4 Amending or Altering a Section of a Law in Committee
a) A member of the coalition who wishes to amend or a lte r  a
section of a b i l l  w ill notify the committee chairman, or 
the coalition coordinator, i f  the committee chairman is 
not a coalition member. The chairman or coordinator must 
delay the vote on the section in question. The 
committee's coalition members w ill meet to decide on the 
proposal after the committee meeting is concluded. I f  
the issue under discussion is a section of particular
importance, the faction of the member proposing to amend
or a lte r the section of the law is entitled  to demand 
that the matter be decided by the Coalition Executive, 
with the participation of the relevant minister.
b) Members of the coalition must vote in favour of b ills
submitted by the Government, and are prohibited from 
abstaining from voting on any of the three readings of 
b ills  submitted to the Knesset by the Government.
c) On issues on which the coalition factions have been 
granted a free vote or the right to abstain, under the 
Transition Law (Amendment) of 1961, the Coalition 
Executive w ill conduct a dialogue concerning the matter 
i f  any one of its  factions so demands.
2.5
a) On the issues enumerated below, action w ill be taken as
follows: (1) A b i l l  for a Basic Law submitted by a 
Knesset member w ill be regarded as a private member 
b i l l .  (2) Basic Law proposed by the Constitution, Law
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and Justice Committee of the Knesset w ill be acted upon 
with the consent of both parties,
b) The right to abstain on issues of conscience or
religious conscience w ill be upheld a fte r c la rifica tio n  
in the Government or the Coalition Executive, except for 
issues concerning the preservation of the religious 
status Q U O .
3. General
3.1 The inclusion of additional factions in the coalition, and/or 
the inclusion of the ir representatives in the Government 
after i t  has been approved by the Knesset, w ill be carried
out jo in tly  and with the consent of the parties to this
agreement.
3.2 The preservation of the status q u o  on religious matters w ill 
be ensured, and the right to submit private b ills  on 
religious matters w ill be upheld. The date for raising these 
b ills , i f  submitted, for debate in the Knesset, and the
manner of voting on them, w ill be determined in consultations 
between the Prime Minister and the Deputy Premier.
3.3 The real level of funding for state and state-religious  
education, schools, infrastructure of higher learning, 
various yeshivas, Torah institutes and educational and 
cultural institutions w ill be maintained, and discrimination 
against any one of the streams of education w ill be 
prevented. I f  a budget cut is made, i t  w ill be proportional.
3.4 A suitable allocation w ill be guaranteed to settlement 
movements and youth movements.
3.5 An agreement between a party to th is agreement and any other 
faction w ill not be binding upon the other party to this  
agreement.
The above agreement was signed on 13.9.1984.
Source: Kotler, 1988(B) pp. 389-394.
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Appendix C
1) The 1988 Coalition Agreement between the Likud and the Alignment
In most respect, the 1988 coalition agreement was a duplication of the
1984 agreement (Appendix B). Following are major artic les  In the 1988
agreement that are significantly d ifferent from the 1984 agreement:
1. A rtic le  1.4: The Government w ill be headed by Mr. Yitzhak Shamir, 
and Mr. Shimon Peres w ill serve as Deputy Premier.
There was no prime ministerial rotation, and a ll Articles  
pertaining to I t  were omitted.
2. A rtic le  1.6: Twenty-six ministers w ill serve In the Government... 
The parity between the Likud and Labour blocs ceased to exist. I f  
In the previous agreement additional parties were Included at the 
expanse of either major party, now they came In outside the major 
parties' quotas.
3. A rtic le  1.8: The Inner Cabinet... w ill have 12 members, six from 
each party.
In the previous agreement, the number was 10.
4. A rtic le  1.20 (on electoral reform. A rtic le  1.17 In the 1984
agreement): the committee w ill look as well Into "changes In the 
governmental system". Also, "should the two parties not reach an
agreement within a year, each party w ill be en titled  to In it ia te
legislation In the Knesset as I t  sees f i t . "
5. A rtic le  1.22: "Should the Knesset pass a vote of no-confidence
against the Government, no other government w ill be established In 
Its  stead. Within seven days of the no-confidence vote, the two 
parties w ill submit a b i l l  for dissolving the Knesset and for 
holding new elections no la te r than 100 days from the day on which 
the b i l l  Is approved by the Knesset. The two parties w ill ensure a 
majority to approve this b i l l . . .  within 30 days of the day In 
which the b il l  Is tabled In the Knesset. They w ill act firm ly to 
base this provision In the appropriate leg is la tion".
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This A rtic le  was needed because th is agreement, unlike the 
previous one, did not determine the duration of the govenment's 
term of o ffice .
2) Members of the National Unity Governments
The 1984-86 NUG (Government No. 22) - 13.9.84 21.10.86
Ministers
Simon Peres (Labour), Prime Minister
Yitzhak Shamir (Likud), Deputy Premier and Minister of Foreign affa irs  
Yitzhak Navon (Labour), Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Education 
and Culture
David Levy (Likud), Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Housing and 
Construction 
Moshe Arens (Likud), Minister without Portfolio  
Yossef Burg (NRP), Minister of Religious A ffairs  
Chaim Bar-Lev (Labour), Minister of Police 
Chaim Corfu (Likud), Minister of Transport 
Mordechi Gur (Labour), Minister of Health 
Yigal Hurwitz (Ometz, Labour bloc). Minister without Portfolio
Moshe Katsav (Likud), Minister of Labour and Social A ffairs
Yitzhak Moda'i (Likud), Minister of Finance 
Aryeh Nechamkin (Labour), Minister of Agriculture 
Moshe Nissim (Likud), Minister of Justice 
Gideon Patt (Likud), Minister of Science and Development 
Yitzhak Peretz (Shas, Likud bloc), Minister of the In terio r  
Yitzhak Rabin (Labour), Minister of Defence 
Amnon Rubinstein (Shinui, Labour bloc). Minister of Communication 
Moshe Shachal (Labour), minister of Energy and Infrastructure  
Yossef Shapira (Morasha, Likud bloc), Minister without Portfolio  
Avraham Sharir (Likud), Minister of Tourism 
Ariel Sharon (Likud), Minister of Industry and Trade
Yaacov Tsur (Labour), Minister of Immigrants Absorption
Ezer Weizmann (Yachad, Labour bloc). Minister without Portfolio  
Gad Ya'acobi (Labour), Minister of Economy and Planning
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Deputy M in isters
Adiel Amorai (Labour), Deputy Minister of Finance 
Shoshana Arbeli-Almozlino (Labour), Deputy Minister of Health 
Avraham Katz Oz (Labour), Deputy Minister of Agriculture 
Ronnie Milo (Likud), Deputy Minister of Foreign A ffa irs  
Menachem Porush (Aguda, Likud bloc). Deputy Minister of Labour and 
Social Affairs
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The 1986-1988 NUG (Government No. 23) - 21.10.86 22.12.88
The membership of this government and its  portfo lio  allocation was 
almost identical to the 22nd government with the following changes:
Yitzhak Shamir (Likud), Prime Minister
Shimon Peres (Labour), Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign 
Affairs
Shoshana Arbeli-Almozlino (Labour), Minister of Health (instead of 
Mordechi Gur who did not join the government until 18.4.88, when 
he became Minister without Portfolio  
Moshe Nissim (Likud), Minister of Finance as of 16.4.86 
Yitzhak Moda'i (Likud), Minister without Portfo lio . From 16.4.86 to 
23.7.86, Minister of Justice. After his resignation, the Justice 
portfo lio  was assigned to Avraham Sharir (Likud)
Moshe Arens (Likud) resigned on 2.9.87 and returned on 18.4.88 as 
Minister without Portfolio  
Yitzhak Peretz (Shas) resigned on 4.1.87 and returned as Minister 
without Portfolio on 25.5.87 
Amnon Rubinstein (Shinui) resigned on 26.5.87 and his portfo lio  was 
assigned to Gad Ya'acobi (Labour)
Yossef Burg (NRP) resigned on 5.10.86 and Zevulun Hammer (NRP) replaced 
him.
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The 1988-90 NUG (Government No. 24) - 22.12.88-15.3.90 
Ministers
Yitzhak Shamir (Likud), Prime Minister and Minister of Labour and 
Social A ffa irs .
Shimon Peres (Labour), Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance 
David Levy (Likud), Vice Premier and Minister of Housing and 
Construction
Yitzhak Navon (Labour), Vice Premier and Minister of Education and 
Culture
Moshe Arens (Likud), Minister of Foreign A ffairs
Chaim Bar-Lev (Labour), Minister of Police
Areih Der'i (Shas, Minister of the In terio r
Rafael Edri (Labour), Minister without Portfolio
Mordechi Gur (Labour), Minister without Portfolio
Zevulun Hammer (NRP), Minister of Religious A ffairs
Avraham Katz Oz (Labour), Minister of Agriculture
Moshe Katsav (Likud), Minister of Transport
Dan Meridor (Likud), Minister of Justice
Ronnie Milo (Likud), Minister of the Environment
Yitzhak Moda'i (Likud), Minister of Economics and Planning
Moshe Nissim (Likud), Minister without Portfolio
Ehud Olmert (Likud), Minister without Portfolio
Gideon Patt (Likud), Minister of Tourism
Yitzhak Peretz (Shas), Minister of Immigrants Absorption
Yitzhak Rabin (Labour), Minister of Defence
Moshe Shachal (Labour), Minister of Health and Infrastructure
Avner Shaki (NRP), Minister without Portfolio
Ariel Sharon (Likud), Minister of Industry and Trade
Yaacov Tsur (Labour), Minister of Health
Ezer Weizmann (Labour), Minister of Science and Technology
Gad Ya'acobi (Labour), Minister of Communication
- 409 -
Deputy M in isters
Yossef Beilin (Labour), Deputy Minister of Finance 
Benjamin Netanyahu (Likud), Deputy Minister of Foreign A ffa irs  
Moshe Zeev Feldman (Agudat Is ra e l), Deputy Minister of Labour and 
Social A ffairs
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Appendix D 
Interviews
The following persons have devoted th e ir time to answer my 
questions regarding events in which they took part, or which they 
observed. T itles  re flec t the position(s) they held during the 1984-1990 
period. The dates relate to the time the interview took place, or the 
communication was w ritten.
Aaron Abu-Hazeira, Tami and Likud, former minister; MK (24.7.91).
Yossef Achimeir, Likud, personal aide to Prime Minister Shamir 1984-92 
(27.3.92).
Nava Arad, Labour, MK (19.1.92).
Shoshana Arbeli-Almozlino, Labour, Minister of Health (25.7.91).
Hanan Azran, p o litica l commentator, Israel TV. (22.2.92).
Gen. Chaim Bar-Lev, Labour, former Chief of S ta ff, IDF; Minister of 
Police (20.11.91).
Uzi Baram, Labour, Secretary General of Labour 1984-89, MK (17.10.91). 
Menachem Begin, Likud, former Prime Minister (personal communication, 
19.8.91).
Dr. Yossef Beilin , Labour, Cabinet Secretary 1984-86; MK 1988
(18.12.91).
Brig. Benjamin Ben Eliezer, Yachad and Labour, MK (8 .1 .9 2 ).
Dr. Ra'anan Cohen, Labour, MK (19.1.92).
Hanan Crystal, p o litica l commentator, Hadashot and Israel Radio and TV
(10.9.91).
Rafael Edri, Labour, Minister without Portfolio (24.7 .91).
Gen. Mordechi Gur, Labour, former Chief of S ta ff, IDF; Minister of 
Health; Minister without Portfolio (13.9.91).
Shlomo H il le l ,  former minister; Speaker of the Knesset 1984-88, MK
(25.7.91).
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Yigal Hurwitz, Minister without Portfolio (23.1 .92).
Moshe Katsav, Likud, Minister of Labour and Social A ffa irs , Minister of 
Transport (18.12.91).
Abraham Katz Oz, Labour, Minister of Agriculture (24.7 .91).
Israel Kessar, Labour, MK, Secretary General of the Histadrut
(16.10.91).
Shalom K ita l, p o litica l commentator, Israel Radio (31 .8 .91).
Michael Kleiner, Likud, MK (10.1.92).
Dan Meridor, Likud, Minister of Justice (16.10.91).
Ronnie Milo, Minister of the Environment (8 .1 .9 2 ).
Eliezer Mizrachi, Agudat Israe l, MK (18.12.91).
Yitzhak Moda'i, Likud, Minister of Finance, Minister of Justice, 
Minister of Economics and Planning (5 .9 .91 ).
Yitzhak Navon, former President; Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of 
Education and Culture (8 .1 .92).
Moshe Nissim, Likud, Minister of Justice, Minister of Finance, Minister 
without portfo lio  (28.8.91).
Ehud Olmert, Minister without Portfolio (8 .1 .9 2 ).
Shimon Peres, Labour, Prime Minister, Vice Premier and Minister of 
Foreign A ffa irs , Minister of Finance (1 .9 .9 1 ).
Gen. Yitzhak Rabin, Labour, former Prime Minister, former Chief of 
S ta ff, IDF; Minister of Defence (2 .8 .9 1 ).
Chaim Ramon, Labour, MK (19.1.92).
Shlomo Raz, p o litica l commentator, Israel Radio (31.8 .91).
Prof. Amnon Rubinstein, Minister of Communications (30 .1 .92).
Moshe Shachal, Labour, Minister of Energy and Infrastructure (22.7.91).
Ilan Shchori, po litica l commentator. Haaretz (27.7 .91).
Gen. Ariel Sharon, Minister of Industry and Trade (23.12.91).
Prof. Shimon Shetrette, Labour, MK (10.1 .92).
Dan Tichon, Likud, MK (10.1.92).
Yaacov Tzur, Labour, Minister of Immigrants Absorption; Minister of 
Health (31.10.91).
Mordechi Virshuvski, CRM, MK (24.7.91).
Gen. Ezer Weizmann, Yachad and Labour, Minister without Portfolio, 
Minister of Science and Development (19.11.91).
Gad Ya'acobi, Labour, Minister of Economy and Planning, Minister of 
Communications (9 .8 .91).
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